Tag Archives: habeas corpus

The Short Rocket – Update for January 27, 2023

Leave a comment

rocket190620We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, the short rocket – decisions from around the federal circuits…

SOME CASE SHORTS

Timing is Everything: In 2015, Benny Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a gun in a crime of violence, (an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense). After the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Davis that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was not itself a crime of violence that supported a § 924(c) conviction for using a gun in a crime of violence, Benny filed a 28 U.S.C. §2255 post-conviction motion asking that the § 924(c) be thrown out.

corso170112The government convinced the district court that Benny’s § 924(c) conviction didn’t depend only on the conspiracy, but also on his admissions in open court that established that he had actually attempted to commit the robbery.

‘Gotcha!’ the government cried.

‘Not so fast!’ the 2nd Circuit replied last week. Last summer, the  Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. The Circuit threw out § 924(c) conviction and the mandatory 10-year add-on sentence it represented.

Hall v. United States, Case No 17-1513, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1256 (2d Cir., January 19, 2023)
rocket190620

11th Holds Drug Conspiracy Can’t Lead to Guidelines ‘Career Offender’: Brandon Dupree was convicted of a 21 U.S.C. § 846 drug conspiracy, and was hammered at sentencing as a Guidelines “career offender” (which dramatically increased the advisory sentencing range). An 11th Circuit panel rejected Brandon’s argument that an inchoate offense (that is, a mere plan to commit a crime) does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the Guidelines ‘career offender’ enhancement.

brandon230127Last week, the full Circuit sitting en banc said, ‘Let’s go, Brandon,’ and reversed his ‘career offender’ sentence. The 11th ruled that “application of the enhancement turns on whether the ‘instant offense of conviction’ is ‘a controlled substance offense’ [under USSG] 4B1.1(a)… The plain text of 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Dupree must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement.”

United States v. Dupree, Case No 19-13776, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1183 (11th Cir., January 18, 2023)
rocket190620

Channeling Your Inner Habeas: People are always asking why they can’t point out in their 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motions that their sentences were wrongly calculated, that their lawyers were ineffective imbeciles, that something was very wrong with how they were convicted.

reallawyer170216Mike Escajeda was convicted of selling drugs and carrying a gun. After losing his direct appeal, Mike filed a compassionate release motion, arguing that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” required by an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion were that (1) his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He even admitted in his motion that he had filed for compassionate release because he figured that he could not win relief under § 2255.

Last week, the 5th Circuit ruled that the habeas-channeling rule prevented Mike from raising 2255-type issues in a compassionate release motion. The Circuit said, “Congress provided specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement in federal court… The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying these specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody challenges under [28 USC 2241, 2244, 2254, and 2255], and prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[A] prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence,” the 5th held. “Such arguments can, and hence must, be raised under [the habeas statutes]… Because Escajeda’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).”

United States v. Escajeda, Case No 21-50870, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1041 (5th Cir., January 17, 2023)
rocket190620

DOJ SORNA Rule Blocked: The U.S. District Court for Central District of California last week issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Dept of Justice’s new Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act rule because it violated due process and the 1st Amendment.

injunction230127The rule requires people who had been convicted of a sex crime to register as sex offenders in their state, even if the sex crime convictions have been expunged and the people are not allowed by the state to register. Because plaintiff John Doe could not register, the DOJ’s rule said that he could be prosecuted at any time, and he would have been forced to prove that registration was impossible — “an affirmative defense,” Doe’s lawyer said, “that turns the presumption of innocence on its head.

The court ruled that it was likely an unconstitutional violation of due process to require anyone to affirmatively prove his innocence when he had never been convicted.

Preliminary injunction, ECF 55, Doe v. DOJ, Case No 5:22-cv-855 (CD Cal., Jan 13, 2023)

Reason, A Federal Judge Says the DOJ’s Sex Offender Registration Rules Violate Due Process by Requiring the Impossible (January 19, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Right Claim, Wrong Vehicle? – Update for November 23, 2022

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MAGISTRATE THROWS OUT FCI SHERIDAN LOUSY-CONDITIONS HABEAS PETITIONS

judge160620An Oregon federal magistrate judge last week recommended that some 200 habeas corpus actions alleging insufficient medical care at FCI Sheridan be dismissed.

The magistrate judge ruled that the petitioners have been pursuing the wrong legal strategy. Rather than habeas corpus, the inmates “should have worked to address their concerns through other means.

The Opinion and Order stated that while

the Court is sympathetic to Petitioners’ difficult experiences at Sheridan during the pandemic, the Court cannot conclude that merely alleging that no conditions of confinement could satisfy the Eighth Amendment is sufficient to confer habeas jurisdiction under circumstances such as those present here… Petitioners insist that they are challenging the fact of their confinement, but they do not allege that their convictions or sentences are invalid in the first instance or that they are being held in excess of a lawfully imposed term of imprisonment. Instead, Petitioners allege that the harsh conditions at Sheridan place them at risk of serious harm from COVID-19, allegations premised on the conditions, and not the validity, of their confinement… Indeed, Petitioners’ claims “would not exist but for [the] current conditions” at Sheridan.

The Court ruled that the prisoners’ “argument that habeas jurisdiction exists simply because they allege that nothing short of their release may remedy the unconstitutional conditions at Sheridan thus improperly ‘conflates the nature of relief with the substance of the claim.’

Stirling v. Salazar, Case No. 3:20-cv-00712-SB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206892 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2022)

Oregon Public Broadcasting, Federal judge dismisses claims of mistreatment in Oregon prison as wrong legal strategy (November 17, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

‘You Can’t Just Make Stuff Up,’ Two Courts Tell BOP – Update for November 10, 2022

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TWO EARLY HABEAS DECISIONS ON FSA CREDITS AND DETAINERS ARE POSITIVE

maketherules221110The Federal Bureau of Prisons has been refusing to award earned-time credits (ETCs) for prisoners who complete evidence-based programs to reduce recidivism (EBRRs) where the inmates have detainers, whether for immigration, pending charges or other sentences to be served. Challenges to the practice are in their early stages, but right now decisions on the merits stand at prisoners 2, BOP 0.

Explainer: When another agency or court wants a prisoner – either for service of a sentence, a pending charge, or so it can start deportation proceedings – a “detainer” is filed with the prison authority informing it that the prisoner is to be turned over to the detaining entity when his or her sentence is complete.

The BOP honors detainers, and refuses to place prisoners with detainers in minimum-security camps or send them home to halfway houses or home confinement at the end of their sentences.

When Congress passed the First Step Act, there was an 11th-hour flurry of amendments that severely narrowed the number of prisoners eligible to get credit for completing EBRRs. Prisoners whose crimes included carrying guns, fentanyl, certain leadership roles, sex offenses… by the time Republican fire-breathers like Ted Cruz and Tom Cotton were done, at least 64 different categories of prisoner were excluded from the ETC program, constituting about half of all federal prisoners.

But their programming penuriousness has a flip side: by detailing so many exclusions, Congress strongly implied that the BOP had not been delegated any authority to concoct its own list of additional exclusions.

Notably, the ETC exclusions mention nothing about detainers.  But that hasn’t stopped the BOP from asserting that it has the discretion to declare the inmate ineligible for early release “because the BOP is entitled to interpret the FSA to allow it to deny application of earned ETCs to those federal inmates who have pending criminal charges or a detainer.”

The very early returns are in, and the BOP is losing. In a California district court case, the BOP declared an inmate with low recidivism ineligible to have his earned ETCs applied to his sentence due to two pending Missouri criminal cases. The BOP told the court that the agency has the discretion to declare the inmate ineligible for early release “because the BOP is entitled to interpret [First Step] to allow it to deny application of earned ETCs to those federal inmates who have pending criminal charges or a detainer.”

words221110The magistrate’s recommended decision in Jones v. Engleman rejected the BOP’s position, holding that it is fundamental that a statute’s “words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute. Agencies exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must always give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”

“Here,” the Magistrate Judge ruled, “there are no such interstices, because the relevant portions of the [First Step Act] are not ambiguous or incomplete and Congress’s intent is clearly expressed through mandatory statutory language. The language of the [First Step Act] shows that Congress made a conscious choice to do three things. One, by its use of ‘shall be applied’ and ‘shall transfer”‘language in Section 3632(d)(4)(C), Congress made the application of earned ETCs to effect early release mandatory for prisoners “eligible” under Section 3624(g). Two, by Section 3624(g), Congress spelled out the prerequisites for a prisoner to be ‘eligible,’ which have been described earlier and do not contemplate any additional criteria or precondition to release akin to the Pending Charges Exclusion. Third, by Section 3632(d)(4)(C), Congress explicitly determined which prisoners are “ineligible” to have the [First Step Act]’s ETC and early release provisions applied to them, and none of these expressly delineated categories include prisoners who have pending charges or detainers.”

(After the Jones v. Engleman recommended decision, the BOP decided that inmate Jones didn’t have a detainer after all, so the District Court did not adopt that part of the recommended decision  due to mootness).

myrules221110In a New Jersey case, an inmate with a pending Pennsylvania parole detainer was denied his ETCs because under BOP rules, he was ineligible for halfway house or home confinement due to the detainer. The District Court ruled that the First Step Act’s list of prisoners ineligible for ETCs left no room for the BOP to add other categories. The Court held:

If… the warden determines that Petitioner’s earned TCs should be applied to early supervised release, rather than prerelease custody to a residential reentry center or home confinement, there is no statutory provision or BOP regulation that precludes application of TCs toward early supervised release of prisoners who have state detainers lodged against them. As Petitioner suggested, the provisions regarding detainers in BOP Program Statement 7310.04 apply only to prerelease custody to residential reentry centers and home confinement. As Respondent points out, however, supervised release is different because it does not involve BOP custody…

There is bound to be much more litigation over whether the BOP may deny prisoners with detainers from using ETC credits for shortened sentences. These early decisions suggest that courts will be skeptical of BOP efforts to expand the list of people being denied ETCs.

Jones v. Engleman, Case No 2:22-cv-05292, 2022 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 185635 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 7, 2022)

Jones v. Engleman, Case No. 2:22-cv-05292, 2022 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 185029 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 7, 2022)

Moody v. Gubbiotti, Case No 21-12004, 2022 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 181399 (D.N.J., Oct. 3, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

The Supremes Finally Take The 2255(e) Debate! – Update for May 16, 2022

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LATE-BREAKING NEWS…

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Hendrix by order issued at 9:30 am on Monday, May 16.  

Could the Justices be reading my blog? Doubtful, but the certiorari may be good news for thousands of federal inmates trapped in the 10th and 11th Circuits (depending, of course, on the outcome of this case sometime next year).

SCOTUS MAY FINALLY SETTLE THE 2241 DEBATE
... but a 2255(e) ain't, depending on where you are.
… but a 2255(e) ain’t, depending on where you are.

Let’s say you were standing in front of Sunny’s Cigars with a gun and two prior convictions, one for selling drugs and the other for manslaughter. If the Feds picked you up, you would have been sentenced to a minimum 15 years under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act.

After the U.S. Supreme Court (generally known by the shorthand “SCOTUS“) ruled in Borden v. United States that a crime committed through recklessness was not a “crime of violence” predicate for ACCA, you would want to file with your sentencing court to get the ACCA sentencing enhancement thrown out.

The Borden ruling was not a constitutional ruling, but instead just an interpretation of a statute. That meant that you could not file a second-or-successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, because 28 U.S.C.  § 2244(b) limits successive § 2255s to newly discovered evidence or decisions on constitutionality. However, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) – known as the “saving clause,” lets you file a traditional 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus motion attacking the ACCA sentence where a § 2255 would be inadequate to address the issue.

Or at least it would let you file a § 2241 petition if you’re locked up in, say, Kentucky (in the 6th Circuit). A § 2241 habeas corpus petition is filed in the federal district in which you’re located at the time you file. If you were at FCI Manchester, you’d file in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Go a few miles east of there to do your time in Beckley, West Virginia, for example, and you’d be filing in the Southern District of West Virginia (4th Circuit). Fourth Circuit precedent forecloses you from using a § 2241 petition as a workaround.

gunknot181009Writing in SCOTUSBlog last week, John Elwood noted that Ham v. Breckon, a 4th Circuit decision, and Jones v. Hendrix, an 8th Circuit decision, both asked the same question, and both have been “relisted” by the Supreme Court.

A “relist” is a petition for certiorari that is scheduled to be decided at the Supreme Court’s regular Friday conference, but is “relisted” to be considered further at a subsequent conference. A “relisted” petition is statistically more likely to have review granted by the Court, and that is even more likely where there are two relisted petitions asking the same question.

This is important, because two circuits – the 10th and 11th – don’t permit § 2241 petitions even where the movant is challenging guilt or innocence. A SCOTUS decision on Ham or Jones would not only settle whether a movant could challenge a statutory sentencing enhancement using a § 2241 petition under the “saving clause,” but would address the circuit split between the two outlier circuits (the 10th and 11th) and everyone else on whether guilt and innocence could be challenged as well.

circuitsplit220516Elwood thinks that, while the Court has ducked the issue in the past, it will grant review this time. He wrote, “The government — which generally is a pretty successful respondent as well as a successful petitioner — admits that there is a circuit split on the issue. It would have a hard time saying otherwise, since the government itself petitioned for Supreme Court review on this very issue a couple years back in the much-relisted United States v. Wheeler, before a vehicle problem arose (the prisoner… was released from prison) that apparently persuaded the Supreme Court to deny review in that case.”

Ham v. Breckon, Case No 21-763 (pending certiorari)

Jones v. Hendrix, Case No 21-857 (certiorari granted)

SCOTUSBlog, Challenges to administrative action and retroactive relief for prisoners (May 11, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Home Confinement Removal Without Hearing Challenged – Update for May 11, 2022

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CONNECTICUT SUIT ARGUES HOME CONFINEMENT REVOCATION VIOLATED DUE PROCESS


homeconfinement220511Under the CARES Act, the Federal Bureau of Prisons was authorized to place inmates in extended home confinement as a means of getting medically vulnerable people out of the path of the coronavirus. Under this authority, the BOP has sent about 9,000 inmates to home confinement, where they remain in their residences except for work and a very few tightly-controlled exceptions (weekly groceries, medical appointments, church services and the such).

BOP Director Michael Carvajal has touted the success of the program. He told the Senate Judiciary Committee that only 289 inmates had been returned to prison after being on CARES Act home confinement, and only three of those were returned because of new criminal conduct.

The flip side of that coin is that the BOP sees home confinement as just another prison designation, meaning that the BOP can pull someone at home back to prison for the flimsiest of reasons, or for no reason at all. The government has argued that because inmates have no due process right to placement in any particular prison facility, they have no grounds to challenge a decision to revoke home confinement.

Now, three FCI Danbury inmates have filed a habeas corpus action in U.S. District Court in Connecticut claiming their release to home confinement under the CARES Act was revoked without due process.

“There’s no due process for resolving these cases or real consideration whether the person should be pulled back to prison,” said their attorney Sarah Russell, director of the Legal Clinic at Quinnipiac University School of Law. “There is no opportunity for a hearing or an argument even when children are being impacted.”

On home confinement for over a year, the lead petitioner, Nordia Tompkins, had been able to regain custody of her daughter, enroll in vocational classes and hold down a job. She was sent back to prison after the halfway house supervising her could not reach her by phone because she was in class at an approved time.

The government has argued that because the inmates remained in BOP custody, they had no “protected liberty interest” in remaining on home confinement. Such an interest is necessary in order to trigger a right to procedural due process.

home190109However, the inmates – represented by Yale and Quinnipiac University law school professors – argue that other factors, “such as whether one can form close family and community ties, seek and obtain employment”, are “markers of a liberty interest. It does not matter that someone is serving sentence or is technically in the ‘custody’ of prison authorities. Because Ms. Tompkins has been able to reside with her children and take care of them, attend a community school to further her education, and seek employment, she has a liberty interest in remaining on home confinement under the Due Process Clause [and] was entitled to basic due process protections…”

Danbury News-Times, Danbury prison inmates file lawsuit over home confinement getting revoked (May 5, 2022)

Tompkins v. Pullen, Case No. 3:22cv339 (D.Conn, filed Mar 2, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Procedure Talks, Substance Walks – Update for June 1, 2021

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOES INNOCENCE MATTER? NOT MUCH.

I had a recent email exchange with a guy who, years after his conviction, believes he has the golden bullet to convince his judge that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. When I pointed out he had no procedural route for raising the argument, given that he’s known about the issue for years, he responded that all he has to do is convince the judge of the righteousness of his claim, and the procedure will take care of itself.

innocent210504But procedure never takes care of itself. That is to say, procedure rules over substance. Years ago, Professor Henry J. Friendly complained that habeas corpus procedure had gotten so hidebound that a petitioner’s claim that he or she was actually innocent simply didn’t matter. The title of the law review article said it all: Is Innocence Irrelevant: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments. Even after Friendly’s now-famous 1970 article, the Supreme Court was unable to untether actual innocence from procedure: in Herrera v. Collins, it held that “a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.  In other words, a prisoner who is actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief.  As dissenting Justice Blackmun complained, the only principle this position espouses is “the principle that habeas relief should be denied whenever possible.”

Two cases this week reminded the defendants that the righteousness of their causes paled in significance next to the “angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin” arguments over procedure. In an 11th Circuit case, Sandchase Cody (we’ll call him “Sandy”) initially won his § 2255 motion, having proven to the sentencing court that some of his prior state convictions should not count as Armed Career Criminal Act predicates.

But his victory turned to ashes at resentencing. Initially, Sandy had been sentenced to 294 months for drug distribution and a concurrent 294 months for the ACCA charge. But instead of resentencing on both counts, the judge merely cut his ACCA count to 120 months – the statutory max without the ACCA – keeping the 294 months on the drug count.

angels170726“Unfair!” Sandy cried, apparently laboring under the misappreciation that fairness actually mattered. He appealed, arguing he should have been resentenced on both counts. But because the appeal only challenged the resentencing, not his favorable § 2255 decision, Sandy did not ask for a certificate of appealability (COA). He argued to the 11th Circuit that because he was appealing the new sentence – and not the § 2255 decision vacating the prior sentence – a COA was not necessary.

Background: Under 28 USC § 2253, a prisoner may not appeal a “final order in a proceeding under § 2255” unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, finding that reasonable judges could debate whether the prisoner’s claim has merit. The intent of the COA procedure is to reduce frivolous appeals, just another way that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act has strangled habeas corpus.

Last week, the 11th Circuit dismissed Sandy’s appeal, holding that the COA requirement applies “not only to an appeal from the final order in a proceeding under section 2255 but also to an appeal from an amended criminal judgment, to the extent it raises section 2255 issues.” By contrast, the Circuit said, direct appeal matters that arise after the § 2255 proceeding — for example, an argument that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines at a prisoner’s resentencing — do not require a COA. But Sandy complained in his appeal that § 2255 required he get a complete resentencing, not just a resentencing on one count. That was an argument, the 11th said, over the remedies authorized by § 2255. Thus, it was a § 2255 appeal, and it required a COA.

It seems a trifling point, but procedure prevented his argument from being heard.

In the 6th Circuit, on the other hand, the appeals court ruled that a piece of arcane procedure worked for Edres Montgomery. Edres got resentenced under First Step § 404, the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act. But at resentencing, everyone – including Edres’s lawyer – assumed Edres’s Criminal History range was VI (that’s “6” for the Latin-challenged among us).

But it was only a V (that’s a “5”), Edres discovered afterward, so he appealed. The government argued Edres waived his right to appeal it by not objecting at sentencing. This gave the 6th a chance to expound on waiver, forfeiture, and invited error.

A “defendant can only waive a right that he knows of and actively abandons,” the 6th said. When a claim is waived, it is unappealable. “Forfeiture is at the other end of the spectrum… the passive failure to make a timely assertion of a right.” If a defendant forfeits a claim, “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) allows us to consider such unpreserved arguments for plain error.”

errorA160425In the middle is “invited error”, where the defendant contributes in some way to the district court’s error without intentionally relinquishing his rights. Here, Edres invited the error when his own lawyer agreed Edres’s Criminal History was VI. This left Edres “more responsible for the district court’s error than when he merely forfeits an argument, but he had not made the conscious choice to waive the argument.” Thus the appeals court said, “the consequences fall in between those for forfeiture and waiver… [and while] we do not review invited errors as a matter of course, but we are also not foreclosed from reviewing them; instead, we review for plain error when “the interests of justice demand” it.

The Court said that under a Rule 52 “plain error” analysis, the mistake should be corrected.

United States v. Cody, Case No. 19-11915, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 16019 (11th Cir. May 28, 2021)

United States v. Montgomery, Case No. 20-1201, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 15382 (6th Cir. May 24, 2021)
– Thomas L. Root

That ‘Teague’ Thing? We Were Just Kidding – Update for May 25, 2021

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BAD (BUT UNSURPRISING) NEWS ON RETROACTIVITY

sadprison210525How would you like to be convicted of a federal crime with a long sentence, only to have the Supreme Court hold well after the fact that something about your trial was unconstitutional? How would you like that?

That’s an easy one. You would not like to be convicted.  Period. Whether it was done constitutionally or not. No one wants to be convicted. So that was a stupid question.

But over 50,000 people are convicted of federal crimes every year. And they don’t like it, either. They like it even less if, say, if the government grabbed your cellphone location data without a warrant, or you were convicted by a jury vote of 9-2, or the judge jacked up your statutory minimum because he thought your revolver was really a machine gun.

All of those were deemed to be unconstitutional.  The cellphone location data? Carpenter v. United States, 2018. Less-than-unanimous jury? Ramos v. Louisiana, 2020. A nonjury finding jacking your mandatory minimum? Alleyne v. United States, 2013.

The problem is that if your conviction was final before these decisions established that you were constitutionally wronged, you have no right to ask the court for a do-over. That is not unless the decisions are declared to be retroactive, which means that cases like yours that are already final may reopen the issues on collateral review (habeas corpus).

watershed210525Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Teague v. Lane that decisions holding substantive criminal laws to be unconstitutional (such as the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause in Johnson v. United States) are always retroactive to cases on § 2255 review. However, Teague held, a case in which a criminal procedure was declared unconstitutional (like searches in Carpenter or a less-than-unanimous jury in Ramos) is only retroactive on habeas review only if the new rule was “watershed,” “bedrock” or “essential.”

So what kind of ruling would be “watershed?” Prisoners and defense attorneys have looked for that elusive “watershed” decision for three decades without success. Last week, the Supreme Court heard a case asking whether last year’s Ramos rule on unanimous juries had to be unanimous (a holding which affected Louisiana and Oregon only) was retroactive. The Court ruled 6-3 that Ramos was not a “watershed” rule. More important, the Court gave up pretending that anything could ever be a “watershed” rule.

“This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority. “Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review… And for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collateral review… At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that… no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts… It is time — probably long past time — to make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The watershed exception is moribund.”

squarepeg210525So prisoners, at last, can give up trying to pound round constitutional procedure decisions into Teague’s square holes. The Supreme Court has said what a lot of us suspected ever since Apprendi was declared non-retroactive. Teague’s promise is now and always has been an illusion: there simply are no watershed decisions.

Edwards v. Vannoy, Case No 19-5807, 2021 US LEXIS 2584 (May 17, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Last Week’s § 2255 Gleanings – Update for March 4, 2021

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INMATES GO 2-2 ON § 2255 DECISIONS LAST WEEK

The Courts handed federal inmates two 28 USC § 2255 wins and two losses last week.

habeas191211For the uninitiated, habeas corpus (literally, a Latin imperative phrase to “produce the body”) has been around for about 806 years, give or take, ever since a band of angry noblemen forced King John to sign the Magna Carta (the “Great Charter of Liberties”) as an alternative to having his royal butt kicked.

One liberty the noblemen secured was the right not to be locked up without reason. The Magna Carta empowered courts to issue a writ (order) to a jailer to “produce the body” – that is, come to court with a particular prisoner and show why that prisoner’s detention is legal. Habeas corpus has become known as the “Great Writ,” so ingrained in English common law that our constitution simply assumes the right exists. The constitution only references habeas corpus in the negative, by denying the president the right to suspend the writ except in time of war.

Notwithstanding the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, Congress controls how prisoners may exercise their right to seek the writ in the federal courts by statute. For instance, 28 USC § 2244 regulates the filing of habeas corpus petitions for all claims of illegal detention for reasons other than a defect in the conviction or sentence. Section 2255 of Title 18 permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition where the claim is that the conviction or sentence is contrary to law.

Every federal prisoner has the right to bring one § 2255 motion, subject to rather strict time limits. Bringing a second such petition is possible under very limited circumstances, with permission first being granted by the Court of Appeals.

Now for the week’s news:

violence181008(1) Dearnta Thomas pled guilty to a substantive RICO offense, and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence. The predicate “crime of violence” for the § 924 offense was aiding and abetting the commission of a VICAR offense (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity under 18 USC § 1959), those predicate violent crimes being two Virginia state-law offenses, a conviction for use or display of a firearm in committing a felony and another for “pointing, holding, or brandishing a firearm, air or gas-operated weapon or object similar in appearance.”

After the 2019 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis, Dearnta filed for permission under 28 USC § 2244 to bring a successive § 2255. Last week, the 4th Circuit held that Davis announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and that Dearnta’s argument – that the state convictions were not crimes of violence within the meaning of Davis – stated a plausible claim.

(2) Meanwhile, Travis Harris asked the 5th Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 arguing that after Davis, his conviction for using a destructive device during a crime of violence (18 USC § 844(i)), should be thrown out, because the predicate offense – arson – was no longer a crime of violence.

The 5th agreed, holding – as the 4th Circuit has previously said – that Davis was retroactive and that Travis raised a plausible enough claim to go forward.

lawyerjoke180807(3) Things didn’t go so well for Kevin Kelley in the 1st Circuit. Kev figured he had a “gotcha:” it turned out the Assistant U.S. Attorney who had signed Kevin’s indictment had not paid his bar dues. Because F.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) says that an indictment “must be signed by” a government lawyer, and the AUSA’s law license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues, Kevin argued in his § 2255 motion that the bad signature invalidated the indictment and “robbed the district court of jurisdiction to proceed against him.”

Last week, the 1st Circuit rejected Kev’s technicality. “The Supreme Court, after all, has long viewed a government lawyer’s indictment signing as necessary only as evidence of the authenticity of the document,” the Circuit said, and Rule 7’s “intent is for common sense to prevail over technicalities.” Thus, the Circuit said, “it is unsurprising that many courts refuse to stamp ‘invalid’ an indictment signed by a prosecutor with bar-license problems if other evidence shows that the government was backing the prosecution — with some cases explicitly saying that in such a situation, the complaining party cannot prove prejudice.”

Here, the evidence showed the indictment had been approved by the AUSA’s superior, and that was good enough for common sense to prevail, the Court ruled, especially where Kevin could prove he was not harmed by the suspended AUSA working under a nonpayment suspension.

(4) Finally, Greg Olson got a target letter from the U.S. Attorney, telling him he would be indicted, but offering that he could get a lawyer and work out a preindictment deal. Greg and his lawyer worked out a 30-month plea to tax evasion, but the deal foundered when the government refused to provide any discovery. Greg got indicted, hired a different lawyer, but ended up with a 48-month sentence.

target210305Greg filed a § 2255 motion claiming his pre-indictment lawyer screwed up the plea deal. But last week, a 9th Circuit panel shot him down. Precedent in the circuit holds a defendant has no 6th Amendment right to effective counsel before he is a defendant, meaning that a three-judge panel cannot overrule the prior case. Of course, in such cases, if a three-judge panel thinks the precedent is nonsense, it can refer its case to the court en banc, but here, the Circuit said, “In determining whether this is an appropriate case to do so, we must assess whether Olson might prevail if current circuit precedent were to be overruled… The record does not support Olson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. An en banc ruling would therefore not affect the result.”

In re Thomas, Case No 19-292, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5316 (4th Cir. February 23, 2021)

In re Harris, Case No 19-51045, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5719 (5th Cir. February 25, 2021)

Kelley v. United States, Case No 19-1932, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5646 (1st Cir.  February 25, 2021)

United States v. Olson, Case No 19-16591, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5027 (9th Cir.  February 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Inmate Wins (Sort of) Earned-Time Suit Against BOP – Update for February 26, 2021

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IT LOOKS LIKE A VICTORY, BUT NOT MUCH OF ONE…

slowwalking210226One of the marquee features of the First Step Act is an earned time provision that permits non-excluded federal inmates (and there’s a long list of who’s excluded, from people with gun and violence charges to sex offenders to some kinds of drug dealers) to earn credits that will reduce their sentence lengths or get them more halfway house or home confinement.

The plain terms of First Step said that qualifying programs completed after the Act’s passage would be counted. But ever since First Step passed, the Bureau of Prisons has done its institutional best to slow-walk implementation of the terms.  First, it took nearly every day of the two years it was given by the statute to adopt a recidivism and needs assessment system that would classify inmates according to their risk of recidivism. Then, although the BOP is a system in which virtually no inmate works an 8-hour day, the BOP decided that a day of programming (for purposes of earned-time credits awarded in blocks of 10 or 15 days for every 30 days of programming) should constitute a full eight hours. This meant that an intensive 9- or 10-month drug program that in all devoted 500 hours to the classroom would yield a paltry 62.5 days of programming credit, which would be two 30-day blocks, which would award an inmate 20 to 30 days off a sentence that, on average, would be 10 years long.

jailhouselaw160809The BOP’s latest indignity seems to be an institutional position that none can start earning credit until after January 15, 2022, because the earned-time system is to be phased in over two years, and the two years started January 15, 2020.  Late last summer, an inmate at FCI Fort Dix won a habeas corpus action against the BOP authorizing him to get credit for programs completed since First Step was enacted in 2018. Ever since that decision, Goodman v. Ortiz, was handed down, suing the BOP for earned time credits for completed programs has become a cottage industry at various institutions. In South Dakota (where there isn’t a lot else to do in the winter, even when you aren’t locked down for COVID), there are something like 34 habeas corpus suits pending demanding earned time credit.

The inmate winner in a recent decision from the same judge who wrote Goodman v Ortiz called his victory to my attention last week. It is not quite the triumph one might think it is.

Jeremy Hare filed a habeas action under 28 USC § 2241 against his warden, demanding a shortened sentence or other benefit for having completed programs since the passage of the First Step Act. The government, predictably enough, argued that Jeremy could not get credit for any program completed before January 15, 2020 (although to its credit, the US Attorney was unwilling to adopt the BOP’s position that no credits would be awarded until 2022). But the government did take the untenable position that the First Step Act was not really “enacted” until the BOP said it was, a position the Court dispatched handily:

Enactment means “the action or process of making into law.” ENACTMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  The FSA was enacted on December 21, 2018, and nothing in subchapter D indicates a different effective date for the subchapter… Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(B)(i) unambiguously directs that “[a] prisoner may not earn time credits… for an evidence-based recidivism reduction program that the prisoner successfully completed… prior to” December 21, 2018… There is no ambiguity here. As a result, if Petitioner successfully completed an EBRR [Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction] program or PA [Productive Activity] pursuant to the FSA on or after December 21, 2018, he is entitled to earn Time Credits.

The District Court thus agreed with Jeremy that he was entitled to credit for programs completed after “enactment” of the First Step Act, regardless of how long it may have taken the BOP to actually adopt PATTERN.

humpty210226But that was the high-water mark for Jeremy. The Court ruled that Jeremy could only get credit for programs that addressed needs BOP staff had already identified for him. That could include substance abuse, basic education and whatever else may have been listed in his Program Review by BOP staff. That holding dramatically limited the courses he might otherwise get credit for, because before January 15, 2021, the staff did not routinely make such determinations.

But what really limited the reach of Jeremy’s win was the Court’s conclusion that the BOP calculation that one program day should equal eight full hours of programming was a reasonable one. Jeremy wanted credit for any day on which he might have attended a program, even if that program only lasted an hour. The court found the BOP’s calculation that a “program day” should be 8 hours long was completely reasonable.

The most liberal read of this decision is that inmates might get some credit for programs completed since December 21, 2018, but they will have to jump through plenty of hoops first, and the amount of credit they get may be slight.

Hare v, Ortiz, Case No 20-14093, 2021 US Dist LEXIS 21270 (DNJ Feb 4, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP 4, Inmates 0 in COVID-19 Litigation – Update for June 15, 2020

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE WEEK IN COVID-19 LITIGATION

prisonhealth200313As of last night, June 14th, the number of Federal Bureau of Prisons inmates with COVID-19 had dropped from 2,109 a week ago to 1,341. The number of BOP facilities with COVID-19 on premises rose from 62 to 65, and then fell back to 62 as of last night. Deaths continued to climb, however, from 81 a week ago to 87 last night.

The numbers aren’t bad for the BOP. Inmate sickness has been fluctuating between 1,300 and 2,100 for a few weeks, and the number of prisons affected has leveled. But the BOP’s big advances last week were in the courtroom, not the medical suite.

Besides the 6th Circuit’s stay in FCI Elkton litigation, last Tuesday, Judge Rachel P. Kovner of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied prisoners a preliminary injunction because of inept medical care they claim amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, reasoning that despite deficiencies in MDC Brooklyn’s COVID-19 response, officials likely did not act with “deliberate indifference” to the health threat.

“Petitioners have not shown a clear likelihood that MDC officials have acted with deliberate indifference to substantial risks in responding to COVID-19,” Judge Kovner ruled. “Rather than being indifferent to the virus, MDC officials have recognized COVID-19 as a serious threat and responded aggressively.”

Nevertheless, the court cited significant problems with the BOP’s response to the pandemic. In particular, the judge noted the prison was way too slow responding to sick-calls requests and generally failed to isolate symptomatic inmates. “The MDC appears not to be isolating individuals who report COVID-19 symptoms,” in “tension with the CDC’s guidance” that they should be kept away from other inmates, Judge Kovner wrote. “Under standards of care that both parties have accepted, MDC officials’ apparent failure to fully implement the CDC guidance in these areas constitutes a deficiency in the MDC’s response to COVID-19.”

destroyevidence200615Judge Kovner also held the BOP had destroyed evidence by shredding the paper sick call requests used as the pandemic worsened. She sanctioned the BOP by drawing the inference that “the destroyed records would have contained additional reports of COVID-19 symptoms.” Still, the judge accepted the prison’s claims that it was doing the best it could under the circumstances, ruling that the evidence before the court did not clearly show that the inmates were at risk of serious harm, considering the MDC’s virus response, or that the prison did not care enough to shield them from that risk.

Meanwhile, last Thursday, a Massachusetts district court dealt a blow to the inmate habeas corpus/8th Amendment action against FMC Devens. The court held that the action – while calling itself a habeas corpus petition – was really a suit about prison conditions subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The plaintiffs were given until the end of this week to show compliance with the PLRA, which mandates exhaustion of BOP administrative remedies as a jurisdictional condition. This holding conflicts with the 6th Circuit’s Wilson holding of three days before.

Lose200615The North Carolina habeas corpus case against FCC Butner likewise suffered a setback on Thursday, when the Eastern District of North Carolina federal court denied a preliminary injunction. Like the 6th Circuit in the Elkton case, the district court ruled that while the inmate plaintiffs met the objective prong of the deliberate indifference showing, by showing that COVID-19 “poses significant health risks to both the world and community at large” and that the “disease’s uncontrolled spread within FCC Butner therefore presents a substantial risk of serious or substantial physical injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” they had not shown that the BOP was ignoring the spread of the illness.”

Chunn v. Edge, Case No. 20-cv-1590, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100930 (E.D.N.Y., June 9, 2020)

Grinis v. Spaulding, Case No. 1:20-cv-10738-GAO, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103251 (D.Mass., June 11, 2020)

Hallinan v. Scarantino, Case No. 5:20hc2088, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103409 (E.D.N.C., June 11, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root