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Sentencing Commission’s Sounds of Silence on Retroactivity – Update for August 9, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION PUTS BRAKES ON RETROACTIVITY

deafeningslience240809In the annals of retroactive U.S. Sentencing Commission guidelines, never has such an ambitious retroactivity agenda yieldzed such… silence.

The USSC is the federal agency responsible for promulgating guidelines for federal judges in imposing criminal sentences. Its proposed amendments to those Guidelines — made in the spring of every year — become part of the Guidelines on November 1 unless Congress steps in to veto some or all of the changes.

A Guidelines change that would reduce a sentencing range does not apply to the sentence of a prisoner who has already been sentenced unless the Commission proposes a change in USSG § 1B1.10, the Guideline governing retroactivity.

Retroactivity doesn’t happen often. In 36 years and over 825 amendments, the USSC has made an amendment retroactive 21 times (under 3% of the time).

retro240506This year, the Commission proposed to make four Guideline changes, in areas of acquitted conduct, gun enhancements, Guidelines calculation where a defendant is convicted of an 18 USC § 922(g) felon-in-possession count, a 21 USC § 841 drug trafficking count , and a separate 18 USC § 924(c) gun conviction; and a change in the drug Guidelines to tie mandatory and high base offense levels to statutory maximum sentences instead of more complex factors that inflate sentencing ranges.

The Commission solicited public comment on the proposed retroactivity and the staff prepared retroactivity impact reports that, among other matters, estimated how many prisoners would be eligible for reduced sentences if retroactivity on each proposal was adopted.

However, at yesterday’s meeting, the Commission tersely declined to vote on the measure. After about 10 minutes of discussion on Commission priorities for the coming year, US District Court Judge Carlton Reeves (SD-MS), chairman of the Commission called for a motion to adopt the retroactivity proposal. His call was met with a deafening silence.

Chairman Reeves was not surprised, the decision to defer retroactivity apparently having been scripted beforehand. He said:

The matter fails for a lack of a motion.

The public tuned in today to hear not only about the commission’s final priorities but also our decision about retroactivity. Our final priorities made clear that we are listening closely to the public’s recommendations about how to do our work. Many have called for the Commission to identify clear principles that will guide its approach to retroactivity. After deep deliberation, we have decided to heed those calls. For that reason, we will not be voting on retroactivity today. Nevertheless, I want to thank all of those who submitted comments and testimony regarding retroactivity for these amendments. Please know that your input has been heard and will continue to be heard as the Commission moves forward.

So what happened?

The best speculation is that the Commission is responding to criticism heaped on it for adopting amended Guideline 1B1.13(b)(6), which permits judges to grant compassionate release where a prisoner’s sentence could not be imposed today because of changes in the law that occurred after the sentence was imposed. Subsection (b)(6) contains a lot of caveats: the prisoner must have served 10 years, the change must have created a substantial disparity between the prisoner’s sentence and current sentences for the same offense, and the inmate’s prison record had better be clean as a whistle.

Nevertheless, after the Commission adopted the amended 1B1.13 containing the new subsection (b)(6), Sen John Kennedy (R-LA), a member of the Judiciary Committee, introduced the Consensus in Sentencing Act (S.4135) to require the Commission to achieve “bipartisan agreement to make major policy changes.” The bill would amend 28 USC § 994(a) to require that amendments to the Guidelines receive five votes from the Commission’s seven voting members.

At the time, Kennedy whined that “[t]he Sentencing Commission for decades strove to achieve bipartisan agreement when adopting amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. In recent years, the Commission has lost its way and begun forcing through amendments on party-line votes.”

The Commission has seven voting members. No more than four members can belong to the same political party.

Sens Ted Cruz (R-TX), John Cornyn (R-TX), Tom Cotton (R-AR) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) cosponsored S.4135, which is stalled in the Judiciary Committee and has no chance of passage before the 118th Congress expires at the end of the year.

Nevertheless, in June, retired US District Judge John Gleeson, a member of the Commission, met with Kennedy, after which Kennedy said that “Gleeson acknowledged the concerns raised about the Commission’s recent practices and confirmed that the Commission will return to making changes on a bipartisan basis.”
“I look forward to seeing the fruits of this commitment.”

I suspect he just did.

can230407The Commission did not reject retroactivity on the amendments, but its intention to adopt guiding principles for retroactivity pretty much ensures that any decision on making the acquitted conduct and other amendments retroactive has been kicked down the road for a year or better.

Sentencing Commission Public Hearing (Video) (August 8, 2024)

Sentencing Commission, Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle (August 8, 2024)

S.4135, Consensus in Sentencing Act

Sen John Kennedy, Kennedy introduces bill to restore bipartisan decision-making at Sentencing Commission (April 7, 2024)

Sen John Kennedy, Kennedy confirms that Sentencing Commission will return to bipartisan agreement for changes to Sentencing Guidelines (June 3, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Announces Slate of Fall Amendments – Update for April 22, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION TAKES A WHACK AT ACQUITTED CONDUCT

The US Sentencing Commission last week adopted a slate of proposed amendments to the Guidelines, finally addressing the acquitted conduct issue that has bedeviled the Commission and Supreme Court for the past two years.

can230407SCOTUS sidestepped the question last year, sitting on 13 certiorari petitions raising the question of whether sentencing for acquitted conduct – that is, conduct for which a defendant has been found not guilty by a jury – is constitutional. At the prodding of the Dept of Justice – which told the Supremes that they should let the Sentencing Commission handle it only to then tell the Sentencing Commission it lacked the power to do so – SCOTUS finally denied the cert petitions last July, with several justices saying they would wait for the Sentencing Commission to address the issue.

The acquitted conduct Guidelines amendment will redefine “relevant conduct” under USSG § 1B1.3 to exclude conduct for which a defendant was acquitted in federal court. Because judges must rely on “relevant conduct” to set the Guidelines sentencing range, the change is significant.

For example, if a defendant is convicted of distributing cocaine but acquitted of selling heroin, the amount of heroin that the government said he had sold currently be factored into his Guidelines range as long as the judge found it more likely than not that he had actually sold it. The proposed amendment would prohibit counting the heroin regardless of whether the judge thought the defendant had done it or not.

“Not guilty means not guilty,” Sentencing Commission Chairman Judge Carlton W. Reeves, who sits on the Southern District of Mississippi bench, said. “By enshrining this basic fact within the federal sentencing guidelines, the Commission is taking an important step to protect the credibility of our courts and criminal justice system.”

reeves230706Commissioners were divided on whether to consider enforcing the acquitted conduct sentencing amendment retroactively. A majority voted to have the USSC staff prepare a retroactivity impact analysis, which is the initial step toward making an amendment retroactive.

Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said in a press release, applauded the Commission’s vote, noting that it came after he and Sen Charles Grassley (R-IA) introduced the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023. The legislation would have prohibited judges from using conduct acquitted by a jury. The measure has not gained consideration the full Senate.

The Commission is allowed to grant retroactivity – which lets people already sentenced according to Guidelines that are now being amended go back to court to secure the benefit of the amendment in the form of a reduced sentence – on new defendant-friendly amendments. Ratroactivity on last fall’s criminal history amendments was vigorously opposed by some commissioners and the DOJ, which has an ex officio representative on the Commission. This time around, the Commission is considering whether to make multiple defendant-friendly changes retroactive:

• the acquitted conduct amendment;

• a change to juvenile sentences that eliminates adding 2 points for prior juvenile incarcerations of more than 60 days;

• a change to §2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) to provide that the 4-level enhancement gun serial number obliteration applies only if the serial number has been modified such the original number is “is rendered illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye;” and

• a change to Commentary in §2K2.4 to permit grouping of 922(g) gun count with drug trafficking count where the defendant has a separate 18 USC 924(c) conviction based on drug trafficking.

During the retroactivity vote, Commissioner Claire Murray – a former Trump administration DOJ official – made the obvious point that judges may also still rely on acquitted conduct at sentencing when considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, which courts must consider at sentencing, regardless of the Guidelines advisory sentencing range.

The bad news in the amendments was pretty much expected. For economic crimes, the recommended sentence under the guidelines increases dramatically as the amount of loss resulting from the offense increases.

shakeitoff240423As it is now written, the loss is defined in the Guidelines commentary as the higher of actual loss or intended loss. If you try to steal the Hope Diamond from the Smithsonian (value $250 million) but only get a rhinestone imitation (value $250) because the real one had been rented out to Taylor Swift for the weekend, the Smithsonian’s actual loss would be just a few bucks, but the intended loss would be a quarter billion.

In 2022, the 3rd Circuit held in United States v. Banks that the Commentary expanded the definition of loss beyond the ordinary meaning of “actual loss,” and thus, “intended loss” could not be used to set a defendant’s Guidelines. The new loss amendment moves the commentary section into the actual guideline, making sure that intended loss is included in setting the Guideline sentencing range and allowing the use of gain from the offense as a substitute for loss.

Whether the changes will become retroactive depends in part on USSC data on how many prisoners would be eligible for a reduction. If the number is too high, the Commission becomes concerned that the courts will be overwhelmed with reduction motions.

Finally, unhappy that the Commission last year adopted a new compassionate release guideline and made the criminal history guidelines retroactive on a 4-3 vote, Sen John Kennedy (R-LA) last week introduced the Consensus in Sentencing Act to require that changes to the Guidelines get at least five votes out of the seven Commissioners.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said it “cannot be pure coincidence” that Kennedy introduced the bill the day before last week’s USSC meeting. The bill stands little chance of passing before Congress expires at the end of the year.

Reuters, US panel prohibits judges from sentencing for ‘acquitted conduct’ (April 17, 2024)

Law360, Sentencing Commission Limits Acquitted Conduct Sentencing (April 17, 2024) 

Press release, Durbin Applauds Sentencing Commission’s Unanimous Vote To Prohibit Acquitted Conduct From Being Used In Sentencing Guidelines (April 18, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Senator Kennedy introduces “Consensus in Sentencing Act” to increase USSC votes needed for guideline amendments (April 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

“Their Verdict Didn’t Matter”: Taming the ‘Acquitted Conduct’ Sentencing Monster – Update for March 8, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT ISSUE ARRIVES WITH A LOT OF BAGGAGE

The U.S. Sentencing Commission completed two days of hearings yesterday on what, if anything, it should do to rein in “acquitted conduct” sentencing, the Guidelines- and Supreme Court-sanctioned practice of relying on evidence that a defendant committed a crime even if a jury had found him or her not guilty of that offense.

acquitted240308Jessie Ailsworth knows what that feels like. During this week’s hearings, he told the Commission he felt relieved when he heard the jury return 28 “not guilty” verdicts in his 1996 trial for crack cocaine distribution. But Jessie said “fairness went out the window” when he got hammered with 30 years for the seven counts on which he was found guilty.

The judge based Jessie’s sentence on all of the counts in the indictment, including the 28 acquitted counts.

“I was very angry for a long time,” Jessie told the Commission. “I felt like the system failed me. I really believe that the jury did their best. They took their time, wrote notes, asked questions, and reached their verdicts. But, when I was sentenced, the court sent me to prison based on the jury’s acquittals. I felt like the system didn’t just fail me, it also failed my jury. We all knew what the jury was trying to do, and when I was sentenced, I wondered why we had even spent all those days with the jury, if at the end of it all, their verdict didn’t matter.”

Jessie was one of 15 witnesses testifying over the two days. Others included judges, probation officers and advocates. Judge Deborah Cook of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between “the important distinction in the proof necessary for convicting versus sentencing… That is, so long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory maximum set by the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge [a] defendant’s right to jury by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct, when sentencing within that statutory range.”

Proof140424Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog yesterday, explained how the question is stickier than either Jessie or Judge Cook might think. Prof Berman wrote that “rights directed at a balanced and thorough process — in other words, rights that support accuracy concerns or that tend to put the prosecution and defense on a more even playing field — do apply at sentencing. Rights that offer the defendant special protections — such as those that automatically resolve errors in the defendant’s favor or primarily protect the defendant’s autonomy — do not apply at sentencing. Framed only a bit differently, one might see concerns for sentencing “accuracy” to be a kind of Crime Control concern, and one that would counsel against preventing judicial consideration of acquitted conduct. But the jury trial right is fundamental to our nation’s vision of Due Process and our commitment to “defendant special protections,” and that’s surely why many are troubled by any judicial sentencing process that functionally disregards a jury’s decision to acquit on certain charges.”

Prof Berman suggests (without endorsing this outcome) that if factual accuracy is paramount at sentencing, the judge will consider acquitted conduct in all its glory. This, of course, is a slippery slope. How about evidence that the judge suppressed and the jury thus never heard? How about proffers (attorneys telling the judge what their witnesses would have said if allowed to testify)?

If due process (protecting a defendant’s rights) is the correct model, then a jury’s acquittal on any particular count is ‘game, set, match’ for sentencing. This is at the expense of accuracy and the core legal principle, first enunciated by Marcus Tullius Cicero two millennia ago, to “let the punishment fit the crime.”

The “due process” model, too, is a slippery slope. After all, “acquitted conduct” sentencing is only a concern in the 2-3% of federal prosecutions that actually go to trial. We’re talking about elephants when the issue should be all animals that are not elephants. For the overwhelming 97% of cases in which the defendant pleads guilty, the Guidelines permit sentencing on “related conduct.” Related conduct can be found by the court only by a fairly squishy “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and the government may meet that standard with hearsay evidence and fuzzy math from witnesses the defendant has no right to confront. In drug and fraud prosecutions especially, where the amount of drugs or amount of loss drives the Guidelines sentencing range, a “due process” model should demand that standards for determining facts at sentencing provide the same “reasonable doubt” and 6th Amendment right of confrontation that a defendant enjoys during the conviction phase.

Prof Berman observed that as he watched the Commission’s hearing “explore[] many of the devilish details, it was clear how acquitted conduct’s intricacies may largely explain why past Commissions have avoided these issues as a policy matter and why the US Supreme Court avoided these issues as a constitutional matter since its 1997 Watts decision.”

can230407Speaking at a symposium at Ohio State last Monday, Judge Carlton Reeves, chairman of the Sentencing Commission, said that the Commission took up acquitted conduct “out of deference to the Supreme Court” after it denied certiorari in McClinton v. United States and said, “Well maybe the Sentencing Commission ought to look at it.”

Earlier, in a Sentencing Commission news release, Judge Reeves said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the commission listens. From continuing the use of acquitted conduct to restricting (or even eliminating) its use in sentencing, all options are on the table.

Sentencing Commission, Public Hearing on Acquitted Conduct (March 6-7)

Sentencing Policy and the Law, USSC hearings on acquitted conduct: the devilish details amid a fundamental criminal process debate (March 6)

Kansas Reflector, Kansas man says prison sentence based on acquitted conduct was ‘ultimate betrayal’ (March 6)

– Thomas L. Root

Feb 1’s Here… Let the Prisoners Go! – Update for February 1, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RUMOR CONTROL 101: WHAT HAPPENS ON FEBRUARY 1? (HINT: NOTHING)

nothinghere190906My inbox has been flooded in the last few weeks with people wondering what all will happen today, Thursday, February 1st. One said changes in the gun laws will go into effect. Another heard that the meth laws will change. Another explained that all criminal history points from prior state convictions will be dropped from Guidelines criminal history. A fourth heard that acquitted conduct will be banned for sentencing purposes.

Yesterday, a prisoner complained that people were saying that effective today, FSA credits could be used by everyone, not just low- and minimum- recidivism level inmates. At least this last guy recognized that the rumor was bullshit on stilts, and responded with appropriate disgust.

The plain and sad fact is that NONE OF THESE RUMORS IS TRUE. NONE. ZERO. NADA. ZIP.

Congress is not changing the federal firearms statutes this year. With methamphetamine and fentanyl flowing across the border being a hot campaign issue, no one’s changing those laws, either. Congress can’t even approve a federal budget or aid to Ukraine and Israel, or a plan to stop the border crisis. Passing legislation that benefits a portion of the 160,000 federal prisoners is not on anyone’s radar.

True, the Sentencing Commission is considering what – if anything – to do with acquitted conduct, but any change in the Guidelines is not likely to be retroactive and is 10 months away at least. And the Supremes may cause real upheaval in the federal gun laws when Rahimi is decided in the next five months.

But nothing will happen today.

timereductionfairy231003

However, tomorrow… On February 2, the Time Reduction Fairy will emerge from her den. If she sees her shadow, we’re in for another year of no criminal justice reform. The smart money, unfortunately, is that February 2 is going to be sunny.

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Proposes Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Change – Update for December 18, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MOVING RIGHT ALONG…

USSC170511Last Thursday the U.S. Sentencing Commission acted with uncharacteristic alacrity, adopting proposed amendments for the 2024 amendment cycle about a month earlier than has been typical over the past 30 years.

The Commission proposes seven changes in Guideline policy in a 755-page release, the most anticipated of which is the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing.

The Commission proposes adopting one of three acquitted conduct options:

Option 1 would amend § 1B1.3, the “relevant conduct” Guideline, to provide that acquitted conduct is not relevant conduct for determining the guideline range. It would define “acquitted conduct” as conduct constituting an element of a charge of which the defendant has been acquitted by the court, except for conduct establishing the instant offense that was “found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Option 2 would amend the § 1B1.3 Commentary to provide that a downward departure may be warranted if the use of acquitted conduct has a “disproportionate impact” on the guideline range.

Option 3 would amend USSG § 6A1.3 (which addresses the standard of proof required to resolve Guidelines disputes) to provide that while a “preponderance of the evidence” standard generally is sufficient, acquitted conduct should not be considered unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence.

acquitted230106The Supreme Court last June denied 13 petitions for writ of certiorari related to use of acquitted conduct in sentencing. Four Justices felt the Commission should first address the issue. US District Judge Carlton W. Reeves, chairman of the USSC, said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the Commission listens… [A]ll options are on the table.”

The USSC proposal also addresses counting juvenile convictions for criminal history. The Commission proposed changes that would limit the impact of those convictions on criminal history scoring and expand consideration of a defendant’s youth at sentencing.

One piece of bad news is the Commission’s proposal to undo the effects of the 2019 Supreme Court Kisor v. Willkie decision. A year ago, the 3rd Circuit relied on Kisor in United States v. Banks to hold that the loss enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) includes only what was actually lost. The Circuit reasoned that the word “intended” appears only in the 2B1.1 commentary and not in the Guideline itself, and thus “the loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word ‘loss’ to include both intended loss and actual loss.”

Sentencing for “intended loss” is the fraud equivalent of “ghost dope“:  Often, “intended loss” is what the government says it is, and that figure shoots the Guidelines sentencing range to the moon.

Banks sparked a debate on how much deference to give the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines. The 3rd said the USSC lacked authority to use its commentary – which is not subject to Congressional approval before adoption – to expand the meaning of “loss” to include what was intended but did not happen.

loss210312The USSC now intends to short-circuit the Kisor v. Willkie debate (and to kneecap the Banks decision) by moving “intended loss” from the commentary into the text of 2B1.1. Because that amendment will be subject to a possible (but improbable) veto by Congress veto, the Kisor v. Willkie problem with 2B1.1 will melt as fast as snowflakes on a hot stove.

The USSC drew its proposed amendment from policy priorities adopted last August. Not making the final cut were policy priorities on career offender (and not for the first time) and methamphetamine.

The proposed amendments will be open for public comment period until February 22, 2024. A public hearing will occur after that. Final proposed amendments will be sent to Congress by May 1 to become effective next November 1, 2024.

USSC, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (December 14, 2023)

USSC, US Sentencing Commission seeks comment on proposals addressing the impact of acquitted conduct, youthful convictions, and other issues (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Public Hearing (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Federal Register Notice of Final 2023-2024 Priorities (August 24, 2023)

United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022)

Bloomberg Law, Wall Street Fraudsters Rush to Cut Prison Terms With New Ruling (November 1, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Acquitted Conduct Rides Again on Capitol Hill – Update for November 7, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOUSE COMMITTEE SENDS ACQUITTED CONDUCT BILL TO FULL HOUSE

The House of Representative Committee on the Judiciary last Wednesday unanimously approved the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023 (H.R. 5430). Spearheaded by Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN), the bipartisan measure was approved 23-0.

acquitted230106

In September, Cohen introduced the bipartisan measure with Rep Kelly Armstrong (R-ND), with Sens Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) introducing a companion bill, S.2788, in the Senate. This legislation would end the practice of judges increasing sentences based on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted. It will now advance to the full House of Representatives for a floor vote. The Senate has yet to act on the measure.

During markup of the bill, Cohen said, “Just about every Supreme Court Justice who’s been around lately – John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and Antonin Scalia… Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Clarence Thomas, going down to Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh have all said this needs to be changed. So with that I would ask that we… arrive at justice. People should be convicted of proven crimes and sentenced for those crimes.”

The Sentencing Commission considered prohibited acquitted conduct from being used in sentencing last winter but decided the issue needed more review. On June 30, the Supreme Court denied review on 13 different cases raising the issue.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week that “this notable vote committee certainly does not ensure Congress will get this bill to the desk of the President, but it should serve as a strong message to the U.S. Sentencing Commission that it should have bipartisan support for any acquitted conduct reforms it might be considering during its current amendment cycle.”

H.R. 5430, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023

S. 2788, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023

Sentencing Law and Policy, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act receives unanimous bipartisan support in US House Judiciary Committee (November 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission To Take Measure of BOP – Update for August 29, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“HOW ARE WE DOING? PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING SURVEY…

It’s unlikely that the Federal Bureau of Prisons will be asking prisoners that question anytime soon. But someone might.

howwedoing230829At last week’s meeting, the U.S. Sentencing Commission said that in the coming year, it plans to assess how effective the BOP is in meeting the purposes of sentencing listed in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2). Those purposes include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and adequate deterrence, to protect the public and to effectively provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other treatment.

The Commission also plans to continue review of how the guidelines treat acquitted conduct for sentencing purposes. The Supreme Court recently denied review in a baker’s-dozen cases asking it to declare the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing to be unconstitutional. Three Justices cited the ongoing USSC study of the issue as a reason to hold off.

Other Commission priorities in the coming year include studying the career offender guidelines, methamphetamine offenses, sentencing differences for cases disposed of through trial versus plea, and sentences involving youthful individuals.

badfood230829Speaking of prisoner satisfaction, inmates should not expect any help if they are unhappy with the chow. Two weeks ago, the 10th Circuit ruled that an inmate claim that the BOP was tampering with the food it served him – in violation of the 8th Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment – presented a new application of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The Circuit said that the existence of alternative remedies (the BOP’s administrative remedy route, no doubt) made a Bivens claim unavailable to the prisoner under last year’s Supreme Court decision in Egbert v. Boule.

Egbert drove a metaphorical legal stake into Bivens‘ heart, as the 10th’s decision in the prisoner food case makes clear. It’s easy enough to cluck one’s tongue over Prisoner Adams’ tainted food claim (like any prison food is edible), but a lot of serious Bivens claims died on Egbert’s hill.

US Sentencing Commission, Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle (August 24, 2023)

Adams v. Martinez, Case No 22-1425, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21369 (10th Cir, August 16, 2023)

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971)

Egbert v Boule, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022)

– Thomas L. Root

What’s Old Is New – Update for July 11, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS DENIAL OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING REVIEW MAKES LITTLE SENSE

As everyone knows, on June 30 the Supreme Court finally denied review to a thundering herd of petitions (13 in all) raising the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing. And in so doing, the Court suggests that it’s way behind the times.

acquitted230106Acquitted conduct sentencing is the practice of using a charge of which a defendant was acquitted by a jury to enhance a sentence. The lead petitioner, Dayonta McClinton, was convicted of robbing pharmacies but acquitted of killing one of his fellow robbers in an argument over sharing proceeds. Nevertheless, the judge more than tripled his sentence from a range of 57-71 months to a sentence of 228 months because the murder was “related conduct,” despite the fact a jury said the petitioner was not guilty of killing his co-conspirator.

A careful reading of the statements issued by some Justice on the denial adds equivocation to five months of evasion.

When the Supreme Court denied review, Justice Sotomayor dissented and several other Justices issued statements. Last week, in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote at length about the denial of review. “It is quite obvious that objections to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing raise constitutional issues,” he said. The certiorari petition filed by Dayonta McClinton makes this clear in its Question Presented: “Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit a federal court from basing a criminal defendant’s sentence on conduct for which a jury has acquitted the defendant…’ These rights are, as the Court put it in Apprendi, “constitutional protections of surpassing importance” because they define restraints on state powers and processes to impose criminal punishments.”

The statements of Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett suggested these Justices voted against granting certiorari because the Sentencing Commission was considering new guidelines for acquitted-conduct sentencing. Justice Kavanaugh wrote that it is “appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination before the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.” But as Berman observes, Kavanaugh

does not explain why it is ‘appropriate’ to leave unresolved a constitutional issue while a federal agency might address a policy issue… The Justices’ statements referencing the USSC do not account in any way for how any ‘Sentencing Commission determination’ would have any impact on the Court’s consideration of ‘constitutional protections of surpassing importance.’

Policy is policy, but constitutionality is fundamental. As Berman notes, whether acquitted conduct sentencing is constitutional has nothing to do with whether the USSC thinks that it makes policy sense to permit acquitted conduct sentencing. Obviously, the USSC once thought so (given that USSG § 1B1.3 relevant conduct sentencing has been a fixture of federal sentencing since 1988). As Berman put it, “How the USSC (or Congress) might choose to regulate sentencing law and process would not and could not resolve the array of constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court was asked to consider in McClinton. Indeed, the USSC and Congress cannot even know the full reach and limits of their powers to set forth rules concerning acquitted-conduct sentencing with constitutional matters unresolved.”

Besides, the USSC and Congress can only speak to acquitted conduct sentencing at federal sentencing, even though over 90% of sentences are handed down by state courts.

wrong160620Berman cites another problem with the Supreme Court’s punt on acquitted conduct sentencing. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent says that “the Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the Sentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted conduct sentencing in the coming year.” The Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett statement says, “The Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue.”

Neither is correct.

Berman suspects that Sotomayor’s dissent and Kavanaugh’s statement were written months ago, before the Sentencing Commission – which proposed an acquitted conduct sentencing amendment in January – withdrew its acquitted conduct sentencing proposal for further study on April 5th. What’s more, when the Commission released its proposed 2024 amendment cycle priorities last month, acquitted conduct sentencing was conspicuously absent.

“It no longer seems to be accurate to state that the Commission ‘has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year’” or that it is currently considering the issue, Berman wrote last week.

The Supremes seem to expect the USSC to assume the burden. The USSC, which is ill-equipped to do so, expects SCOTUS to do its job. Expect nothing from either body on acquitted conduct sentencing: you won’t be disappointed.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: constitutional concerns with acquitted conduct that only SCOTUS can address (July 4, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: did the Justices write cert denial statements in the acquitted conduct cases months ago? (July 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Piddles and Twiddles on Acquitted Conduct – Update for July 5, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS KICKS ACQUITTED CONDUCT CAN DOWN THE ROAD

It seems appropriate during this Independence Day holiday to recall the musical 1776, especially where the character John Adams complained that the Continental Congress “piddled” and “twiddled” without ever solving anything.

piddle230705The delegates gathered in “foul, fetid, fuming, foggy, filthy Philadelphia” had nothing on the Supreme Court of the United States. After relisting, tabling, untabling and relisting (again and again) over five months, the Court last Friday finally denied review to the 13 pending petitions for certiorari raising the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing.

Led by McClinton v. United States, the cases challenged the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing, loosely defined as giving defendants “additional prison time for crimes that juries found they didn’t commit.”

In late January, the Dept. of Justice got the Supreme Court to place a hold on McClinton, promising SCOTUS that the Guidelines amendments proposed by the Sentencing Commission would fix the acquitted conduct sentencing problem. Then, DOJ showed up at the Sentencing Commission to tell it that it lacked the power to make the acquitted conduct sentencing change. When the Commission rolled out the amendments in April, it deferred action on acquitted conduct sentencing until next year.

The Supreme Court then again took up McClinton but continued to relist the petition from week to week. Relisting the petition rather than granting or denying it suggested that several Justices strongly supported granting certiorari and were trying to swing the minimum four votes needed to qualify the issue for full review.

Relisting cannot last forever. At last week’s “cleanup” conference, held at the end of every term, SCOTUS denied review to McClinton and its related petitions for certiorari. denied190109Uncharacteristically for such matters, the McClinton certiorari denial generated opinions from no fewer than five Justices. Justice Sotomayor warned that “the Court’s denial of certiorari today should not be misinterpreted. The Sentencing Commission… has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year. If the Commission does not act expeditiously or chooses not to act, however, this Court may need to take up the constitutional issues presented.”

Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett, echoed Sotomayor: “The use of acquitted conduct to alter a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range raises important questions. But the Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue. It is appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination before the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.”

Justice Alito noted that he concurred with the denial of certiorari, but staked out his position in a 6-page opinion: “[B]ecause my colleagues have laid out some of the arguments in favor of one side, I thought it appropriate to outline some of the countervailing arguments.”

can230407Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman – who filed an amicus brief supporting McClinton – wrote in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog that “I am disappointed, but not all that surprised, that the Justices keep being content to kick this ugly-but-challenging acquitted-conduct can down the road.”

McClinton v. United States, Case No 21-1557, 2023 US LEXIS 2796 (June 30, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In final order list of Term, Supreme Court grants cert on big new Second Amendment case and denies/punts cert on acquitted conduct cases (June 30, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Acquitted Conduct Coming Around Again at Supreme Court – Update for May 30, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IS 13 A LUCKY NUMBER FOR ACQUITTED CONDUCT?

lucky13-230530For the past five months, we’ve been watching McClinton v. United States, a petition in front of the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of acquitted-conduct sentencing.

You’d think that fact that a jury has acquitted a defendant of criminal conduct should prevent a court from taking that conduct into account at sentencing, but since United States v. Watts in 1997, as long as a defendant is convicted of any criminal offense, punishment for that offense can be enhanced to account for conduct for which a jury found the defendant not guilty.

Some state courts have held acquitted conduct sentencing to be unconstitutional, and some former Supreme Court Justices – Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg – and current Justice Clarence Thomas have condemned the practice.

McClinton and four similar petitions were relisted once in January. “Relisting” means the justices considered the petitions at a weekly conference and then deferred a decision on whether to grant review (certiorari) to the next conference. A “relist” suggests that one or several Justices support granting the petitions.

duplicity2305309In late January, the Dept of Justice got the Supreme Court to place a hold on McClinton and four other petitions by essentially assuring SCOTUS that proposed Guidelines amendments rolled out by the Sentencing Commission on January 12th – which included a proposal to ban acquitted conduct sentencing – were going to fix the problem. DOJ told the Supreme Court that “[t]his Court’s intervention” was not “necessary to address” the widespread problem of acquitted-conduct sentencing because “the Sentencing Commission could promulgate guidelines to preclude such reliance.”

You may recall that after selling the Supreme Court on tabling the acquitted conduct petitions, DOJ filed an unctuous set of comments with the Sentencing Commission a few weeks later arguing the USSC lacked authority to place restrictions on acquitted-conduct sentencing because 18 USC § 3661 bars restricting judges as to the information about the background and conduct of defendants that they can consider.

(As an aside, I note that McClinton’s counsel promptly informed the Supreme Court about DOJ’s gamesmanship in trying to torpedo McClinton because the Sentencing Commission would fix the problem at the same time it was whining to USSC that the agency lacked the legal right to do so).

The Sentencing Commission decided on April 5 not to act on acquitted conduct this year, although it said it would try to take the issue up next year. Now, maybe because of DOJ’s duplicity, the Supreme Court relisted those original five cases for a second time, to be discussed at last Thursday’s conference. And now, the five pending petitions have been joined by an additional eight cases raising the same or similar issues.

As John Elwood put it in SCOTUSBlog last week, “We’ll find out soon how lucky these 13 petitions are.” ‘Soon’ could be this morning at 9:30 am Eastern, when the results of last week’s conference are announced.

McClinton v. United States, Case No. 21-1557 (petition for certiorari pending)

SCOTUSBlog, Acquitted-conduct sentencing returns (May 24, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Catching up, yet again, with a big bunch of relisted acquitted conduct petitions pending before SCOTUS (May 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root