Tag Archives: 924(c)

One Lost, One Still in Certiorari Limbo – Update for March 5, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LAST WEEK’S SCORE IS 0-1-1 ON SCOTUS CERTIORARI

Two Supreme Court petitions for certiorari (which is how parties get the Court to take their cases for review) came up last week, leaving our score 0-1-1.

jenga190305The petition in United States v. Rivera–Ruperto, important to people with stacked 924(c) sentences, who were left behind by the First Step Act’s nonretroactivity, asked whether 160 years for a defendant who carried a gun to multiple government-staged drug buys could get 130 years’ worth of stacked 924(c) sentences complied with the 8th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Despite a lot of interest in the criminal justice community that this argument be addressed (and the 1st Circuit’s remarkable en banc opinion asking SCOTUS to take up the issue), the Supremes denied certiorari last week without further comment.

Meanwhile, the government’s request for certiorari in United States v. Wheeler was relisted a second time, and yesterday appeared to be relisted yet again. As noted last week, Wheeler asks whether a prisoner whose 2255 motion challenging a statutory minimum was denied based on current circuit precedent may later seek habeas relief in a 2241 petition (allowed by the 2255(e) “escape clause”) on the ground that the circuit’s interpretation of the statutory minimum has changed. A relist does not mean that cert will be granted, but it increases the odds.

Beneath the surface in Wheeler there is percolating a mootness battle. The 4th Circuit refused to stay its decision in the case, instead issuing the mandate – which is the green light for the district court to apply its holding – nine months ago. Last week, the district court got around to resentencing defendant Gerald Wheeler, and reduced his sentence to time served. Gerry walked out the door a free man, having had whopping eight months cut off his 120-month sentence.

mootness190305In an inversion of what usually goes on at the Supreme Court – a defendant begs to be heard while the Dept. of Justice Solicitor General’s office argues the case is unworthy of review – the government filed a letter with SCOTUS last week arguing that “the grant of habeas relief to shorten [Gerald’s] term of imprisonment means that this case ‘continue[s] to present a live controversy regarding the permissibility of such relief.’”  Gerry’s lawyers, showing their irritation at the government’s conduct in the case, shot back that the Supremes should take a hard pass on this one:

The district court entered its written judgment on March 1, 2019, and Mr. Wheeler has filed a notice of appeal to challenge one aspect of the district court’s resentencing decision. During the course of those appeal proceedings, the government will have the opportunity to ask the en banc Fourth Circuit to reverse the panel decision… Given that the government recently—in the middle of this case—changed a two- decades-old position regarding its interpretation of § 2241, the opportunity for additional percolation in the courts of appeals would be beneficial for this Court’s ultimate review.

Now one might wonder why Gerry, now a free man (to the extent that anyone on supervised release is truly free) would have found anything to appeal in a “time served” sentence. No one involved in the case has Skyped me to explain this, but I suspect his lawyers, whose primary duty to their client was to get him out of prison, filed the notice of appeal in order to be able to do exactly what they have done: to argue that because the case is headed back to the 4th Circuit, the Supreme Court does not need to take it up at this time.

The Supreme Court neither granted nor denied certiorari on the case yesterday, suggesting yet another realist. The Court undoubtedly wanted to digest the dueling letters it received at the end of last week.

lovelawyerB170811My selfish view is that I would like the Supreme Court to settle the issue on the 2255(e) “escape clause,” going with the ten circuits that recognize the legitimate use of a 28 USC 2241 petition in cases like Gerald’s. But Gerald’s lawyers – the Federal Public Defender in the Western District of North Carolina – are doing some first-rate lawyering for their client. As a result, he awoke last Saturday in his own bed for the first time in almost a decade.

That’s what good criminal defense lawyering is all about.

Sentencing Law and Policy, After swift cert denial in Rivera-Ruperto, should I just give up hoping for an improved Eighth Amendment to check extreme non-capital sentences? (Feb. 25)

United States v. Wheeler, Case No. 18-420 (Sup.Ct.) petition for certiorari pending)

– Thomas L. Root

Unintended Consequences – Does First Step Act Open Up 8th Amendment Argument? – Update for February 18, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOES FIRST STEP OPEN WINDOW FOR 8TH AMENDMENT CLAIM ON HARSH GUN SENTENCES?

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman asked this interesting question in a post on his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week.

Prof. Berman noted that First Step Act Sec. 403, “described as a ‘clarification of Section 924(c),’ eliminates the required “stacking” of 25-year mandatory minimums for multiple 924(c) counts at the same time… Sadly, Congress did not make Section 403 of the First Step Act retroactive, and thus defendants previously subject to these extreme stacked sentences will get no direct relief from the new Act.”

Sentencestack170404In 2010, Wendell Rivera–Ruperto was paid by undercover FBI informants to serve as “armed security” at six fake drug deals, and received a 162-year sentence, of which 130 years were for his six stacked 924(c) convictions. In a 1st Circuit decision last year, Wendell was denied rehearing en banc despite one judge’s complaint that courts “have no choice but to approve mandatory ‘forever’ sentences… so long as they can hypothesize a rational reason for the legislature to have thought that the underlying criminal conduct was [so] serious…” The dissenting judge hoped for Supreme Court review.

SCOTUS has incorporated a proportionality analysis into the cruel and unusual punishment analysis required in capital cases. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the defendant asked the Court to extend the reach of that analysis to noncapital cases such as his life sentence for 650 grams of cocaine. Five Justices agreed that Harmelin’s sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, but six Justices agreed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause bore some kind of proportionality analysis. Among those six, three supported a proportionality principle that deferred to legislative judgments, while three others supported a more searching proportionality analysis that would have struck down the mandatory life sentence.

cruel190218This Friday, the Justices will consider whether to review the case. “Notably, and not surprisingly,” Prof. Berman wrote, “the feds now say in opposition to cert that passage of the First Step Act reduces the important of the case: ‘future defendants in petitioner’s position will not be subject to mandatory consecutive sentences of at least 25 years [and the] question presented by his case therefore has diminishing significance’.” But “the fact that the 8th Amendment is supposed to take guidance from an ‘evolving standards of decency’ and be responsive to a ‘national consensus’ against a sentence, I strongly believe the enactment of the First Step Act primarily operates to make Wendell Rivera–Ruperto’s constitutional claim even more substantively potent.”

Justice Kennedy’s retirement last summer creates a window of opportunity for advocates to urge overturning (or cutting back) Harmelin’s 8th Amendment precedent. “Thus,” Berman said, “I am rooting super hard for the Justices to grant cert in Rivera–Ruperto.” Grant of cert in this case, which Berman calls “potentially the biggest non-capital Eighth Amendment case in a generation,” might open other stacking cases to 8th Amendment review.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Doesn’t the FIRST STEP Act add juice to Eighth Amendment challenge to extreme stacked 924(c) sentence in Rivera-Ruperto? (Feb. 10)

Rivera-Ruperto v. United States, Case No. 18-5384 (Supreme Ct.)

– Thomas L. Root

Simms Raises the Ante on 924(c) Crimes of Violence – Update for January 28, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT SIMMS DECISION TEES UP 924(c) DEBATE FOR SUPREME COURT

The vigorous debate since the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Dimaya last year at first seemed to surround whether the residual clause of 18 USC 924(c) – which defines “crime of violence” to include any offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another” – was unconstitutionally vague. That is what the Supreme Court said about the same language in the Armed Career Criminal Act (in Johnson v. United States) and in Dimaya last spring referring to 18 USC 16(b).

violence181008But in the last few months, the argument has morphed into some more basic: when judging whether the offense underlying an 18 USC 924(c) charge is violent, should a court use the categorical approach (which asks whether the offense in its ordinary form is violent, not what the defendant did in the particular case under review)? Or should the court instead look only at how the defendant in the case under review committed the offense?

Three circuits have embraced the conduct-based approach, the 1st in United States v. Douglas, the 2nd in United States v. Barrett, and the 11th in Ovalles v. United States. Three others have backed the categorical approach, the 5th in United States v. Davis, the 10th in United States v. Salas, and the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Eshetu. Two weeks ago, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition to review the 5th Circuit’s Davis decision.

The Circuit split deepened last Thursday with the 4th Circuit’s long-awaited decision in United States v. Simms. In a contentious 100-page decision, the en banc Circuit decided 8-7 that whether an underlying offense supporting a 924(c) conviction is a crime of violence, a trial court must use the categorical approach the Supreme Court adopted and used in Leocal v. Ashcroft. What’s more, using the categorical approach, the 4th said, it is clear that a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery (18 USC 1951) is not a crime of violence.

By extension, this means that in the 4th Circuit, no conspiracy to commit a violent crime is itself a violent crime (although it is in the 2nd Circuit).

violence160110The 4th Circuit focused on the phrase “by its nature” in 924(c)(3)(B), saying that the language directs courts to consider only the basic or inherent features of “an offense that is a felony,” and that the phrase “directs courts to figure out what an offense normally… entails, not what happened to occur on one occasion. Had Congress intended a conduct-specific analysis instead, it presumably would have said so; other statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way… We cannot adopt a reading of 924(c)(3)(B) that renders part of the statute superfluous over one that gives effect to its ‘every clause and word’.”

As important as Simms may be to the 924(c) debate, it is clear that it is not the last word. The Supreme Court is going to resolve the sharp circuit split in Davis as early as June, although it is could well hold off oral argument and a decision to the term beginning in October 2019.

United States v. Simms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2341 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Dimaya Redux at the Supreme Court? – Update for January 7, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI TO 924(C) CASE

After the Supreme Court decision last spring in Sessions v. Dimaya, a lot of people doing time for using a gun during a crime of violence had hoped to attack their 18 USC 924(c) convictions by arguing the underlying crime was not violent.

gunb160201Section 924(c) outlaws using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense or “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in subsection (c)(3)(B) to be a crime in which force is used or threatened against the person or property of another (the “elements clause”) or any a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense,” known as the residual clause.

In Johnson v. United States and, later, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court invalidated similar residual clauses as violating due process because of vagueness.

After Dimaya, the courts of appeal entertained a spate of cases arguing that if 18 USC 16(b) (the residual clause found unconstitutional in Dimaya) was invalid, so was the identically-worded clause in § 924(c)(3)(B). Last September, the 5th Circuit became the first appellate court to decide the matter, holding in United States v. Davis that it would use the same “categorical approach” approved by the Supreme Court in Johnson and Dimaya when applying § 924(c)(3)(B) to the underlying offense. Doing so, the Court said, there was no doubt that 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutional.

A number of other circuits have differed with the 5th since then. Most recently, the 2nd ruled in United States v. Barrett and the 11th held in Ovalles v. United States that § 924(c)(3)(B) survives Johnson and Dimaya. Those circuits agree that, first, 18 USC 924(c) is a criminal offense that requires a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the underlying offense by a jury in the same proceeding. For that reason, the categorical approach – which requires a reviewing court to ‘imagine’ an “idealized ordinary case of the crime” and which would render the 924(c) residual clause unconstitutional – need not be employed. Instead, those circuits used a conduct-based approach, looking at how the defendant actually committed the underlying crime instead of employing some “least violent hypothetical.” See “Circuits Busy Shutting Down 924(C) Dimaya Claims,” Newsletter, Oct. 8, 2018.

scotus161130Naturally, the government prefers the approach favored by every court except the 5th Circuit. Last Friday, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari to challenge the 5th Circuit’s use of the categorical approach in Davis. In that case, the 5th held the defendants’ 924(c) conviction could not stand, because it was based on conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. A conspiracy itself does not use force or threat of force, the Circuit reasoned, so it only could be a crime of violence under 924(c)’s residual clause. Because that clause was identical to the crime of violence residual clause declared unconstitutional in Dimaya, the 5th Circuit held conspiracy to commit a crime of violence could not constitutionally support a 924(c) conviction under the residual clause in that statute, either.

It is possible there will be a decision by June, but it is more likely the case will not be argued until the fall.

United States v. Davis, Case No. 18-431 (certiorari granted Jan. 4, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

You’ve Got Questions, We’ve Got Blank Stares – Update for December 27, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

QUESTIONS ANYONE?

questions181227Yesterday, we presented a précis on the First Step Act. It didn’t help much. We have logged over 600 emails asking questions about the effect of the First Step Act on the sentences of existing inmates, and they continue to pour in.

Did we not make everything pellucidly clear?

Apparently not. Here are the most popular questions and our answers:

•   What sentencing changes are retroactive?

Only people with pre-Fair Sentencing Act crack sentences get retroactive relief. There is no retroactive relief for 18 USC 924(c) stacking, for denial of safety valve, or for 851 sentencing enhancements.

That is not to say that these changes will not come, just like the Fair Sentencing Act – which conservatives would not vote for if it was retroactive – finally became retroactive eight years later. But for now, the people with 924(c) stacked sentences, 851 life and 20-year sentences, and non-safety valve sentences are out of luck.

•   How about the seven days extra good time? Is it retroactive?

Yes.

•   When will I get the seven days extra good time?

This question is on everyone’s lips. The change in federal inmates’ sentence computation will be performed by the Bureau of Prisons’ Designation and Sentence Computation Center in Grand Prairie, Texas. It should not be difficult to do, and it is hardly as though BOP did not know this was coming. However, the BOP is a bureaucracy, and no one in a bureaucracy is going to be daring or self-starting enough to throw the switch just because some blow-dried President in Washington, D.C., makes something binding federal law.

As of last Friday afternoon, DSCC said it was waiting for guidance from the Dept. of Justice. Inasmuch as Monday and Tuesday were federal holidays, we doubt anything was forthcoming on those days. Whether DSCC is even staffed, due to the partial government shutdown, is not clear.

Yet, the BOP faces liability for holding people past their release dates, and as of last Friday, nearly everyone’s release date changed. We talked to DSCC today, and we were told that it still awaits direction from DOJ, and does not expect that for two to three weeks. No one appears to be in a hurry there.

That’s the long answer. The short answer is that we don’t know.

creditsign181227•   How about programs I have already completed? Are credits retroactive?

No, the credits are not. However, a change in 18 USC 3621(h) provides that “beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection, the Bureau of Prisons may begin to expand any evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities that exist at a prison as of such date, and may offer to prisoners who successfully participate in such programs and activities the incentives and rewards described in subchapter D.” We cautiously interpret this to mean that the BOP can start giving credits for programs successfully completed at any time after last Friday. This does not require the BOP to do so, but it is out there.

•   Are all 924(c) offenses ineligible for earned-time credit?

The Act excludes from earned time credits any offense of conviction under “924(c), relating to unlawful possession or use of a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” We read this to exclude all 924(c)s, whether for a crime of violence or for drugs.

•   If you have a 2-level enhancement to your drug conviction for a gun, are you excluded?

No, only a statutory 924(c) conviction excludes you.

miracle181227•   When is First Step effective?

Unless a law says otherwise, it is effective when the president signs it. But do not expect miracles. For the earned time credits, the Attorney General has seven months (until late July 2019) to develop the risk assessment system. The BOP then has 180 days to apply the risk assessment system to everyone and identify the programs that it believes will reduce recidivism (by late January 2020). The BOP then has two years (by January 2022) to fully ramp up the system.

During the initial two years of the program, the First Step Act anticipates, there will be more people wanting programs than there will be program space. The BOP is to put people nearest the end of their sentences in the programs first.

The Elderly Home Detention Program has never had a BOP program statement that implemented it, because it was limited in time and location. The BOP will have to develop procedures to process and judge applications. Nothing prevents someone from applying right away – and we recommend using 34 USC 60541(g)(5)(A) as a guide – but do not expect speedy processing.

Our take about compassionate release, however, is that Congress intends that it be implemented immediately. What is more, the BOP has procedures for dealing with compassionate release applications. While its history of doing so is not especially honorable, there is no need for delay while the BOP spools up a program statement on how to process them.

Nothing else in First Step should require any time for implementation. New or renewed requests for home confinement instead of halfway house, transfers to closer-to-home locations and the extra seven days should be immediate. How quickly the BOP updates sentences to account for the extra seven days is anyone’s guess, but a lot of people with short time will need that done immediately. (See answer above)

•   How do you file for a reduction in a crack sentence because of FSA retroactivity?

You file a motion under 18 USC 3582(c)(2). You should check with the federal public defender in the district in which you were sentenced. Many court ordered the FPD to represent people eligible under 3582(c)(2).

•   Are Guidelines 4B1.1. career offenders excluded from anything under First Step?

No. If you are excluded, it is because of a statute you were convinced of violating.

•   If I was convicted of a crime of violence or a sex offense in my past, does that exclude me from getting earned time credits?

No. Only your current offense will exclude you.

• Who is excluded?

We’ll cover that tomorrow.

now181227•   How soon can people start receiving credits?

Credits could start to accrue as early as the end of July 2019. The Act anticipates that it could take up to two years for the program to completely spool up, and preference will be given to the people who are short time first. This could mean that people with longer dates will not start getting earned time credits right away.

However, there had been discussion that BOP could be expansive in its interpretation of what constituted programs that lessened recidivism, and it could even include UNICOR employment and adult education classes.

•    Did your 21 USC 851 10-year sentence drop to 5 years?

No. Drug sentence enhanced by an 851 notice due to prior drug or state convictions changed, but only natural life (fell to 25 years to life), and 20 years (fell to 15 years to life). Nothing beyond that. And the change is not retroactive.

•   If you are excluded from getting earned time credits, how much halfway house/home confinement will you get?

The Second Chance Act still applies, and theoretically, you are entitled to up to 12 months of halfway house. The BOP has been very stingy with halfway house in the last year and a half, however, and no one knows what the BOP will do.

•   For EOHD, do you serve two-thirds of your sentence or two-thirds of the time between you start and you get good-time release?

If you got 180 months, for example, you serve 120 months. If you get EOHD, you will be on home confinement for 33 months. At 1053 months, you are released on good-time release.

•   If you get 12 months off for RDAP, can you get another 12 months off for earned time credits?

Theoretically, the one does not affect the other. But the BOP has the option to credit you with more halfway house or a shorter sentence, and no one knows how the BOP will decide to apply the earned time credits. No one in Congress discussed this, or, to our knowledge, even thought about it. Some things, like Donald Rumsfeld liked to say, are unknown unknowns.

S.756, First Step Act, passed into law Dec. 21, 2018

– Thomas L. Root

5th Circuit Holds Conspiracy to Rob Not a Violent Crime – Update for November 8, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

924(c) AND HOBBS ACT ROBBERY GETS EVEN MORE CONFUSING

We have reported over the past few weeks that a number of Circuits have held, in the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya, that determining whether the crime underlying an 18 USC 924(c) conviction for using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence had to be conduct-specific or case-specific, as opposed to a hypothetical ordinary-case categorical approach.

Robber160229The 5th Circuit reminded us last week that, curiously enough, it is the outlier. In United States v. Lewis, the Circuit repeated its holding last summer in United States v. Davis that conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery cannot support a conviction for using or carrying a gun under 18 USC 924(c).

How long the 5th Circuit’s position lasts is anyone’s guess. The government filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Davis last month, arguing that the 5th Circuit’s use of the ordinary-case categorical approach in 924(c) cases is at odds with everyone else, and is just plain wrong. Given the stark circuit split and the importance of the issue, we think the government’s chance to win certiorari on the issue is better than even.

United States v. Lewis, Case No. 17-50526 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2018)

United States v. Davis, Supreme Court Case No. 18-431 (petition for certiorari filed Oct. 3, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small

Another Circuit Rejects Categorical Approach to Hobbs Act/924(c) Case – Update for October 24, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small

1ST CIRCUIT HOLD 924(c) IMMUNE TO DIMAYA ATTACK

After Sessions v. Dimaya, a lot of people doing time for using a gun during a crime of violence have hoped to attack their 18 USC 924(c) convictions by arguing the underlying crime was not violent. Two weeks ago, we reported that the 2nd and 11th Circuits had shut down Dimaya attacks on 924(c). Last week, the 1st Circuit joined them.

gunfreezone170330Section 924(c) makes it punishable by a minimum five-year consecutive sentence, to use, carry, or possess a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.” The “residual clause” of 924(c) defines “crime of violence” to mean a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Johnson v. United States and, later, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court invalidated similar residual clauses on vagueness grounds. 

Ishmael Douglas was convicted of a Hobbs Act robbery and a 924(c) count. He argued that under the categorical approach, which looks at the minimum conduct sufficient to violate the statute regardless of what the defendant may actually have done, his robbery could not be considered to be a crime of violence.

The 1st Circuit rejected Ishmael’s argument that 924(c)’s crime of violence definition is void for vagueness. “That is because,” the Circuit said, “the statute reasonably allows for a case-specific approach, considering real-world conduct, rather than a categorical approach, and because Douglas’s conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’.” Agreeing with the 2nd and 11th Circuits, the 1st held that because 924(c) “requires consideration of a contemporaneous offense rather than a prior conviction, this residual clause does not raise either the practical or the Sixth Amendment right-to-trial concerns that led the Supreme Court to adopt the categorical approach in Taylor v. United States [and] Descamps v. United States.”

United States v. Douglas, Case No. 18-1129 (1st Cir. Oct. 12, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small

Another Circuit Sets Impossible Bar for Dimaya 924(c) Claims – Update for October 8, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small

CIRCUITS BUSY SHUTTING DOWN 924(C) DIMAYA CLAIMS

violence160110In the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya, a lot of people doing time for using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence have hoped to attack their 18 USC 924(c) convictions by arguing the underlying crime was not violent. Two courts of appeals – the most recent one last week – are making that pretty hard. A third circuit may be on the way there.

Section 924(c) makes it punishable by a minimum five-year consecutive sentence, to use, carry, or possess a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.” The “residual clause” of 924(c) defines “crime of violence” to mean a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Johnson v. United States and, later, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court invalidated similar residual clauses, because what might or might not constitute a “substantial risk” was so vague that a reasonable person was unable to determine beforehand what the legal effect of conduct would be. For example, while murder certainly carried a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the victim, how about drunk driving (which, if it were the defendant’s fourth or tenth offense – depending on the state – might be a felony)?

Due to Johnson and Dimaya, all manner of offenses that may sound like they’re violent have been held not to be “crimes of violence.”

Irma Ovalles, convicted of being part of a carjacking crew that used baseball bats and assault rifles, filed a 2255 motion challenging her 924(c) conviction on the grounds that carjacking in its ordinarily sense is not a crime of violence. Last week, the 11th Circuit handed down a ruling that all but dooms her effort.

violent170315To determine whether a prior offense is a “crime of violence,” which is what Johnson and Dimaya address, a court is to use a “categorical approach,” which requires a reviewing court not to look at what the defendant actually did to, for example, assault a police officer in, say, Tennessee. Instead, the court is to ‘imagine’ an “idealized ordinary case of the crime,” and figure out whether it could be done without using violent physical force. Sure punching a cop would use violent physical force. But what if the defendant spit on the police officer instead? If Tennessee state law would permit prosecuting such an act, would that – disgusting though it might be – be held not to be “violent physical force?” If so, the predicate crime is not a “crime of violence.”

So assume the defendant were packing a gun hidden in her waistband while assaulting the officer? Or pulled the gun and pistol-whipped him? Would the fact that she reasonably been prosecuted for spitting on him instead mean that the crime was not violent, and thus render the 924(c) residual clause impermissibly vague?

categorical181008The 11th Circuit cleanly cut the “categorical approach” Gordian knot. “On the flip side,” the Court said, “Johnson and Dimaya also make clear… that if 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is instead interpreted to incorporate what we’ll call a conduct-based approach to the crime-of-violence determination, then the provision is not unconstitutionally vague.” Unlike the categorical approach, the conduct-based approach does not focus on legal definitions and “hypothetical ordinary case,” but instead looks at how the defendant actually committed the underlying crime. The 11th held that where the crime of violence being weighed is not a prior offense, but instead a contemporaneous one (and you cannot commit a 924(c) offense without simultaneously committing a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense), then the conduct-based approach had to be used under the rule of “constitutional doubt.” The rule of “constitutional doubt” holds that any reasonable construction available must be used in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. “Accordingly,” the Circuit ruled, “we hold that 924(c)(3)(B) prescribes a conduct-based approach, pursuant to which the crime-of-violence determination should be made by reference to the actual facts and circumstances underlying a defendant’s offense.”

Under the conduct-based approach, Irma is clearly going to be in deep trouble when her case gets back to the district court. As one 11th Circuit judge asked in his concurring opinion, “How did we ever reach the point where this Court, sitting en banc, must debate whether a carjacking in which an assailant struck a 13-year-old girl in the mouth with a baseball bat and a cohort fired an AK-47 at her family is a crime of violence? It’s nuts.”

violence181008

The 4th Circuit just last month heard en banc arguments in United States v. Simms, which may go the same way as Barrett and Ovalles.

Ovalles v. United States, Case No. 17-10172 (11th Cir., Oct. 4, 2018)

United States v. Barrett, Case No. 14-2641 (2nd Cir., Sept. 10, 2018)

United States v. Simms, Case No. 15-4640 (4th Cir., decision pending)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small

Two Circuits Split on Whether Conspiracy to Be Violent Is Itself Violent – Update for September 20, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small

TWO CIRCUITS SPLIT ON HOBBS ACT CONSPIRACY AS VIOLENT CRIME

Two more federal circuits last week joined the chorus of appellate courts holding that a Hobbs Act robbery supports a conviction under 18 USC 924(c) for using a gun during crimes of violence, but they split on whether a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is itself violent.

violence180508The 2nd Circuit continues to hold that the conspiracy to commit a violent crime is also a violent crime. The 5th Circuit, however, ruled that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery can only be violent under the 924(c) residual clause, and it held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague in light of last April’s Supreme Court decision in Sessions v. Dimaya.

The split may set up a Supreme Court decision on conspiracy as a violent crime down the road, but probably not in the 2018-2019 term, which starts in two weeks.

United State v. Barrett, Case No. 14-2641-cr (2nd Cir. Sept. 10, 2018)

United State v. Davis, Case No. 16-10330 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small

What Will A Blended FIRST STEP Bill Contain? – Update for August 15, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small

WHAT WILL BE ADDED TO FIRST STEP IN THE WHITE HOUSE DEAL?

As we have reported, the Trump Administration is brokering a deal to amend the FIRST STEP Act to include some of the sentencing reform provisions of the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act. The compromise, intended to appease SRCA co-sponsors Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois), should clear the way for a Senate vote on FIRST STEP, and passage of some badly needed prison reform.

grassley180604Not everything in SRCA will get dropped into the Senate version of the FIRST STEP Act. Nevertheless, what is proposed is significant to a lot of people.

The SRCA additions to FIRST STEP will probably include:

• Reductions in some drug mandatory minimums, reducing penalty from life to 25 years for a third drug conviction, and from 20 to 15 years for a second drug conviction.

Sentencestack170404•   Ending 18 USC 924(c) “stacking” charges. This provision would prohibit the doubling up of mandatory sentences for carrying a gun during drug or violent crime offenses. The way 924(c) is written now, a defendant who carries a gun while selling pot three days in a row commits three separate 924(c) offenses. The first one carries a consecutive 5 years, and the second and third each carry a consecutive 25 years, meaning the defendant gets 55 years plus the pot sale guidelines. The change in the law makes clear that the increased penalty for a second or third 924(c) offense applies only after conviction for the first one.

• Increase “safety valve” application. This provision would give judges more discretion in giving less than the mandatory minimum for certain low-level crimes, including people with Criminal History II in the safety valve provisions of 18 USC 3553(f).

• Retroactivity for the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act. This provision would make the FSA, which changed sentencing guidelines to treat offenses involving crack and powder cocaine more equally, retroactive to people sentenced before the law went into effect.

"Just the facts, FAMM."
                          “Just the facts, FAMM.”

Last Friday, FAMM released an extended series of fact sheets reviewing which SRCA sentencing provisions are in play. The document, written as a memo to Congress members and staff, is entitled “Fact sheets explaining potential sentencing additions to FIRST STEP Act.” It explains in detail the provisions possibly being added to FIRST STEP, and describes cost savings and justice issues surrounding each.

Also last week, Marc Holden, general counsel to Koch Industries and point man for the Koch initiatives on criminal justice reform, wrote, “By supporting these smart-on-crime, soft-on-taxpayers reforms, President Trump is demonstrating exemplary leadership. If Congress is able to pass the FIRST STEP Act with these sentencing provisions included, it would give the president a lasting, landmark achievement on criminal justice reform that has eluded previous administrations.”

FAMM, Facts sheets explaining potential sentencing additions to FIRST STEP Act (Aug. 10, 2018)

Freedom Partners, President Trump is Leading on Criminal Justice Reform; Senate Should Send Him a Bill (Aug. 9, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small