Tag Archives: 5th amendment

Continuing Our Santa Gift Review: A Lump of Coal for a Pro Se Defendant – Update for December 28, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘I AIN’T NO SNITCH – I’M JUST AN IDIOT’

Henry Underwood chose to represent himself at trial on a felon in possession of a firearm charge. After all, what do those lawyers know that Hank doesn’t?

snitchin200309Well, for starters, try this one on for size. Hank took the stand to testify in his own defense to the 18 USC § 922(g) felon-in-possession count. He explained to the jury that the gun found under his car seat belonged to someone else, not to him.

OK, so far, so good. But on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the obvious question: if not Hank, exactly to whom did the gun belong? Hank tried to plead the 5th Amendment, saying he did not want to name the owner because he was no “snitch.”

You see, Hank, that dumb lawyer you didn’t want would have told you that by testifying, you were waiving your 5th Amendment rights. But Hank had jettisoned his mouthpiece as unnecessary. For his continued refusal to answer the prosecutor’s question, Hank found himself on the receiving end of a criminal contempt finding. Oh, yeah, and the jury found his testimony not credible and thus voted him guilty of the charged offense.

On appeal, Henry (now represented by counsel, a classic “too little, too late” decision if ever there was one, argued that his pretrial waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary.

lumpofcoal221215Last week, the 7th Circuit gave Henry a lump of coal. The Circuit reviewed the four factors considered in determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary. The first is whether the court had made a formal inquiry into the defendant’s decision to represent himself. Hank argued that the court should have advised him of what his defenses were (and that he’d better be ready to answer questions on cross-examination if he took the stand). The 7th rejected that notion out of hand. The judge is not there to counsel the defendant.

The appellate panel also held that Henry’s “active participation at trial and regular consultation with standby counsel indicate that he knew the choice he was making when he elected to proceed pro se. Reliance on standby counsel reflects an appreciation for the difficulties of self-representation,” the Circuit held.

Besides, the Circuit said, Henry was no virgin. He had two prior felony convictions and one murder acquittal by a jury, “indicat[ing] he possessed knowledge of the complexities of procedure and trial sufficient to make him aware of the task she was undertaking.”

argueidiot180215Finally, the Court said, Hank “chose to proceed pro se after a disagreement with his appointed counsel over his defense and trial strategy. A defendant who waives his right to counsel for strategic reasons, including the decision to proceed without counsel due to differences in opinion regarding defense strategy, tends to do so knowingly… We therefore presume Underwood’s choice in this instance to have been strategic and intentional.”

If Henry thought that he could select which questions he was going to answer when he took the stand, he did not understand the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and thus had no business firing his lawyer.

 United States v. Underwood, Case No 23-1303, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 33404 (7th Cir., Dec 18, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Hold Venue Violation Permits a Retrial – Update for June 16, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOW IT’S TIME FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY…

doublejeopardy230616Tim Smith was a hacker, code cracker, slacker... When he wasn’t hanging out with all the chatroom yakkers, the southern Alabama man liked to fish and dive in the Gulf of Mexico.

Blending his computer savvy with his angler hobby, Tim was able to hack the geographic coordinates of artificial reefs in the Gulf of Mexico from StrikeLines, an Orlando, Florida, company that sold the data to people looking for the best places to fish. Tim – who thought that StrikeLines was morally wrong to capitalize on the work of the people who built the reefs by selling their locations – made the stolen data freely available on the Internet and offered to help StrikeLines patch its website vulnerability in exchange for some data he had been unable to extract from the site about a few great deep locations for catching grouper.

Or so the Northern District of Florida jury found, holding that Tim was guilty of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(iii), for intentionally accessing a computer without authorization; for theft of trade secrets in violation of 18 USC § 1832(a)(1), and for transmitting a threat through interstate commerce with intent to extort a thing of value in violation of 18 USC § 875(d). The judge gave him 18 months.

venue230616But Tim fought back. Before trial, he argued the indictment had to be dismissed for lack of venue, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause (Article III, § 2, clause 3), and the 6th Amendment’s Vicinage Clause. He argued that his trial in the Northern District of Florida was improper because he had accessed StrikeLines’ website from his home in the Southern District of Alabama and the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were located in the Middle District of Florida.

The judge kicked the venue question to the jury, which found that because the effects of Tim’s crime were felt at StrikeLines’ headquarters in the Northern District of Florida, venue was proper. On appeal, the 11th Circuit disagreed, holding that venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper.

But Tim’s victory was short-lived because the Circuit said Tim could be re-prosecuted in the right venue.

Tim took that issue to the Supreme Court, which yesterday agreed in a unanimous opinion that even when a venue issue is decided incorrectly by the jury, that fact does not implicate double jeopardy. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion observed that the usual remedy for error was a new trial rather than complete dismissal of the case. The only exception the court had recognized to that rule, Alito noted, was the violation of the right to a speedy trial, which SCOTUSBlog said the court previously has categorized as “‘generically different,’ presumably because a delayed trial is hardly remedied by one still further delayed.”

Venue in a criminal trial is a procedural issue with a constitutional dimension. The Venue Clause is keyed to the location of the alleged crime, not the district where the accused resides or even the district in which he or she is located at the time of committing the crime. Thus, as the Supreme Court puts it, “the Clause does not allow variation for convenience of the accused.”

The Vicinage Clause guarantees the right to an impartial jury made up of people from the state and district “wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The Vicinage Clause “reinforces” the coverage of the Venue Clause because, in protecting the right to a jury drawn from the place where a crime occurred, it essentially mandates where a trial must be held.

The Supreme Court said a judicial decision on venue is “fundamentally different” from a jury’s general verdict of acquittal. When a jury returns a general verdict of not guilty, its decision cannot be upset by judicial speculation or inquiry into why the jury did what it did. “To conclude otherwise,” the Court said, “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Because a trial court cannot be certain about a jury’s basis for a ‘not guilty’ verdict without improperly delving into the jurors’ deliberations, “the jury holds an unreviewable power to return a verdict of not guilty even for impermissible reasons.”

innocent161024A defendant’s culpability is the touchstone for determining whether retrial is permitted under the 5th Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. When a trial ends with a finding that the defendant’s criminal culpability had not been established, retrial is prohibited. Conversely, “retrial is permissible when a trial terminates on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which the defendant is accused.” For example, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not triggered when a trial ends in juror deadlock, or with a judgment dismissing charges because of a procedural issue like preindictment delay. “In these circumstances,” the Court held, “the termination of proceedings is perfectly consistent with the possibility that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.

The vicinage right is only one aspect of the jury-trial rights protected by the 6th Amendment, the Court said. Retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights. “The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when styled as a ‘judgment of acquittal’ under Rule 29, plainly does not resolve ‘the bottom-line question of ‘criminal culpability’,” the Court said. “In this case, then, the 11th Circuit’s decision that venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper did not adjudicate Smith’s culpability… [and] thus does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

Smith v. United States, Case No. 21-1576, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2546, at *24-25 (June 15, 2023)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Unanimous court holds that the remedy for a venue error is retrial (June 15, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Vitamins Not Healthy For Illinois Man – Update for March 22, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
LISAStatHeader2small

SUPREMES BRING 7TH CIRCUIT INTO LINE WITH EVERYONE ELSE; LEGAL COMMUNITY YAWNS

Earlier this week, the Supreme Court ruled that a man who spent 48 days in jail on charges fabricated by the police could sue under the 4th Amendment for an unreasonable seizure, that being the seven weeks he spent in stir.

Dangerous controlled substance?
       Dangerous controlled substance?

Elijah Manuel was riding in a car pulled over for a turn-signal violation. He complained that the Joliet, Illinois, police beat him and called his racial epithets. The police found a vitamin bottle containing pills (amazing thing, that). When field tested, the pills were found to be negative for illegal drugs, but that didn’t stop the officers from claiming the pills were Ecstasy and arresting Elijah anyway.

The pills tested negative again at the station, but the police report falsely said otherwise. A magistrate found probable cause, and kept Elijah locked up. A short while later, a grand jury – relying on the false police reports and testimony – indicted him.

Eventually, the state crime lab report came back reporting the pills were vitamins. Even then, it took a few weeks for the district attorney to dismiss charges and set Elijah free.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim for malicious prosecution could be brought under the 4th Amendment even after “legal process” – that being the magistrate’s finding of probable cause – issued. The 7th Circuit said it could not be: once legal process issued, such a complaint had to be brought under the 5th Amendment.

false170322In the event readers wonder why we don’t always report on Supreme Court cases like this one, the reason is this: Ten out of 12 federal circuits already held that Elijah’s 4th Amendment claim worked even after legal process issued, and in fact, even after a grand jury indictment, because legal process, like the initial seizure at the time of arrest, is unreasonable if it is based on fabricated evidence. The 8th Circuit had never ruled on the issue, and the 7th Circuit – ruling in Elijah’s case – got it wrong. As far as significance, this case is a yawner.

The decision includes dissents by Alito and Thomas, as well as a number of subsidiary issues orbiting the majority opinion like a legal planetary system. The case only got to where it is today because Elijah waited to the very last minute to file the case, and in fact missed the deadline to sue for false arrest, but not to sue for continued detention. The Justices debate the proper starting point for calculating the statute of limitations, a debate that has a kind of number-of-angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-a-pin quality to it.

At most, Manuel v. Joliet provides a clear basis for an additional constitutional claim – the 4th Amendment – when someone is locked up on bogus charges. It does not, however, really plow much new ground.

Manuel v. Joliet, Case No. 14-9496 (Supreme Court, Mar. 21, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small