Tag Archives: 3553(a)

Mountains of Evidence Trumps Molehills Every Time – Update for January 18, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MORE IS BETTER

By now, everyone knows that for a federal prisoner to win a sentence reduction motion under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – known to all by the misleading but convenient shorthand “compassionate release” – he or she must show that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for the motion (a list of what situations fit this bill may be found in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s new § 1B1.13(b)) and that grant of the requested reduction is consistent – whatever that means – with the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a). Such factors include the history of the offense and the offender, the need for just punishment, protection of the public, deterrence, and other considerations.

founderingship240118Unsurprisingly, most federal prisoners seeking compassionate release focus on the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” standard, because it’s easier to quantify, and people generally like to focus more on the bad things currently happening to them than bad things they might have done in the past. Yet as many compassionate release motions founder on the shoals of § 3553(a) as ever die on the “extraordinary and compelling” hill.

While you sit back to drink in the beautiful symmetry of the prior paragraph’s mixed metaphor, consider the strange position that  “post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts” occupy in the compassionate release firmament. Post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may not be the sole extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, but they may be one of several. At the same time, post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts are relevant to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors: good behavior and completion of in-prison programming suggest that the prisoner will not pose a danger to the public and perhaps has already been justly punished so as to correct his or her errant ways.

So what kind of consideration must a district court give evidence of good conduct and programming? The 4th Circuit ruled almost five years ago in United States v. Martin that “where a movant presents substantial evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, a district court must provide a more robust and detailed explanation in ruling on a motion for compassionate release.” Last week, the appellate court reminded everyone that for the Martin rule to apply, a movant should remember that more is better.

violent160620Historically, Angel Centeno-Morales had been anything but an angel. Before his current felon-in-possession conviction, he had been convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, battery, and several gun and drug offenses. In his current case, he sold meth and threatened people with his gun to discourage cooperation with law enforcement.

While he was locked up, Angel’s wife died of COVID, leaving their young son without a caregiver. He filed for compassionate release, arguing that the death of the primary caregiver for the minor child was an extraordinary and compelling reason for a compassionate release grant.

The district court agreed but denied the compassionate release motion nonetheless based on the § 3553(a) factors. The judge cited that Angel had distributed a lot of meth while on probation, used guns for intimidation and coercion, and had gotten two disciplinary infractions in his six years in prison. The district court held that Angel’s continued incarceration was “necessary to reflect the seriousness of his offenses, protect the public from further crimes, provide for just punishment, promote respect for the law, and provide deterrence.”

angels240118On appeal, Angel complained that the district court violated Martin by not providing enough detail supporting its denial, but the 4th Circuit disagreed. The Martin defendant presented “a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never evaluated,” the Circuit said. “What’s more, the movant in Martin was incarcerated for nearly two decades, became a respected tutor for other inmates, and exhibited such exemplary behavior that correctional staff moved her into a low-security facility.” But district courts must only “set forth enough to satisfy our court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis” for its decision. “The district court does not owe every movant for compassionate release a ‘robust and detailed’ explanation on every argument about post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts,” the 4th said.

Angel presented no “mountain” of mitigating evidence that he had become an angel. “He completed just a few vocational courses and received two disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. Importantly, he remains classified as a ‘medium’ security inmate. This is not the kind of exceptional post-sentencing evidence for which Martin would require a ‘robust and detailed’ explanation,” the Circuit held.

United States v. Centeno-Morales, Case No. 22-6607, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 310 (4th Cir. January 5, 2024)

United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Whose Motion Did You Just Deny, Judge? – Update for December 15, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

I NEVER SAID THAT

Neversaidthat231215Ever feel like the court was reading something other than your motion when it denied you relief?

Robin Sims filed for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that COVID had wrecked his health and the Federal Bureau of Prisons was not giving him adequate care. The government agreed that at least one of Robin’s chronic medical conditions was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a compassionate release, but it opposed Robin’s motion because the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors failed to support letting Robin out at this time.

The district court, however, released an opinion smacking of alternate reality. It first held that Robin’s argument for release “due to the increased risk of contracting COVID and changes in the law arguments [did] not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction.” The court also noted the government’s opposition claim that there were no extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting compassionate release. Finally, the district court concluded, the § 3553(a) factors weighed against grant. The court denied the compassionate release on those bases.

twooutofthree231214Last week the 9th Circuit reversed the district court denial, holding that “the government and the district court misread Sims’s pro se motion.”

The district court and government were unforgivably sloppy. First, the government summarized Robin’s argument as being that “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist because the coronavirus (COVID-19) places him at risk if he remains in the custody of BOP.”

Robin never said that. Rather, he argued that he was experiencing ongoing medical complications because of the COVID he had had. He challenged the adequacy of the BOP medical care. Robin relied on these reasons, in addition to intervening changes in the law, to show extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a reduced sentence.

The 9th also ruled that the district court’s order misstated the government’s position by mistakenly saying that the government opposed Robin’s motion because he had failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons.  The government had said just the opposite.

mistake170417Doesn’t matter, the government told the 9th Circuit. The district court errors were harmless, the government contended, because the judge had also found that the § 3553(a) factors disfavored Robin’s motion. The Circuit disagreed. “[M]otions for compassionate release require an individualized inquiry,” the Circuit held, and “here, we see no indication that the district court considered Sims’s argument that his health and medical care needs were ‘extraordinary and compelling,’ or that it reviewed the medical records [he] submitted in support of his motion.

The case now goes back to the district court to consider the 18 USC § 3553 factors in light of the extraordinary and compelling reasons Robin had shown.

United States v. Sims, Case No 22-3430, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 32310 (8th Cir., December 7, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

EQUAL Act Jumps Low Hurdle, High Hurdle is Next – Update for September 30, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOUSE PASSES EQUAL ACT

crackpowder160606Over 25 years ago, the United States Sentencing Commission – never a hotbed of progressive thought – concluded that the draconian drug policy of considering every gram of crack cocaine to be the equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine was irrational and resulted in disproportionately severe crack sentences being imposed mostly on black defendants.

But just as sex sells in the marketing ethos, outrageous punishment sells in the political world. At least until a few years ago, no member of Congress ever lost an election because he or she was too tough on crime.

Fourteen years ago, Presidential candidate Barack Obama decried the crack-to-powder disparity, and in April 2009, his Dept of Justice lobbied for the elimination of the 100:1 ratio. The House passed a 1:1 bill that year, but by the time the Senate took it up the following summer, 1:1 had become 18:1 in order to satisfy certain troglodytes in that chamber, chief among them the unlamented former senator Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III of Alabama.

Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III
Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III

The resulting Fair Sentencing Act mandated a new 18:1 crack/powder quantity disparity ratio, but without retroactivity, so that accidents of time hammered a defendant who was sentenced in July 2010, for example, with a 100:1 sentence, while one whose lawyer managed to delay sentencing until the dog days of August benefitted from a much shorter mandatory minimum. Under this formula, people caught with 28 grams of crack receive the same sentence as someone caught with 500 grams of powder cocaine, despite the American Medical Association’s findings that there is no chemical difference between the two substances.

The Fair Sentencing Act became retroactive to all defendants with crack mandatory minimums (but see United States v. Terry) by the passage of the First Step Act in December 2018.

Fast forward to last week. The EQUAL Act, pending in both houses of Congress, proposes the elimination of any disparity between crack and powder cocaine. But Sen Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) a conservative lawmaker from the heart of the corn belt but a champion of criminal justice reform, said candidly that he didn’t think he could find enough Republican votes to come up with the 60 needed to pass the EQUAL Act in the Senate.

This past Tuesday, the House decided to give Grassley the chance to try anyway, passing the EQUAL Act (H.R. 1693) by a lopsided vote of 361-66. (Grassley may have a point. All 66 nay votes in the House were from GOP lawmakers).

Surprisingly (at least to me), Representative Louie Gohmert (R-Texas), a former judge who has said some people – not without some justification, I might add – think he is the “dumbest guy in Congress,” was a sponsor of the EQUAL Act. The Congressman said the measure was “a great start toward getting the right thing done. He said during floor debate that as a judge, “Something I thought Texas did right was [to] have an up-to-12 months substance abuse felony punishment facility. Some thought it was strange that a strong conservative like myself used that as much as I did. But I saw this is so addictive, it needs a length of time to help people to change their lives for such a time that they’ve got a better chance of making it out, understanding just how addictive those substances are.”

In the Senate, at least 10 Republicans would have to join with all Democrats to advance it in the evenly divided chamber. A Senate version of the EQUAL Act, S.79, was introduced by Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) and currently has five cosponsors, including three Republicans: Sen. Rob Portman (Ohio), Rand Paul (Kentucky), and Thom Tillis (NC). It remains before the Committee on the Judiciary.

The House version of the EQUAL Act that just passed provides that in the case of a defendant already serving a sentence based in any part on cocaine base may return to court to receive a sentence reduction, in a procedure that appears to be similar to the Section 404 procedure for Fair Sentencing Act retroactive resentencings, but with one interesting twist: Section 404 proceedings do not require the district judge to consider whether a sentence reduction is consistent with the sentencing factors in 18 USC § 3553(a). The EQUAL Act procedure permits imposition of a sentence reduction only “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) of title 18, United States Code.”

Is this a good thing? Probably anything that adds structure (however slight) to the process is beneficial. Without any standard, nothing prevents a district judge from making arbitrary decisions. Even with a § 3553(a) requirement, a Sentencing Commission study of the compassionate release process has found that a defendant’s likelihood of success ranged from about 70% in Oregon to a lousy 1.5% (Western District of North Carolina).

crack-coke200804Anything that can avoid swapping one disparity for another is probably a good thing.

So what would be the practical effect of such a change? When the Fair Sentencing Act passed, the U.S. Sentencing Commission responded by reducing sentencing ranges across the board for crack offenses, so that a five-year mandatory sentence for a defendant without a prior criminal history possessing 28 grams of crack equaled what the Guidelines said his sentence should be. If the ratio falls to 1:1, and if the Sentencing Commission makes the same adjustments, a hypothetical defendant with no prior record (and no sentencing enhancements) would see the following sentencing range adjustments:

chart210624

Of course, as they say in the commercials, “actual results may vary.” But if the courts are mandated to consider § 3553(a) first, maybe they will vary less.

But first, the EQUAL Act has to pass the Senate…

– Thomas L. Root

‘What Might Have Been’ Part of § 3553(a) Analysis, 9th Circuit Says – Update for September 28, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A HOLDING OF CONSEQUENCE

A 9th Circuit decision handed down last Thursday appears arcane, but it is very consequential for current and future compassionate release and retroactive Guidelines reductions that will certainly be adopted in the future.

A decade ago, Jose Lizarraras-Chacon was convicted of heroin distribution. He entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement for 210 months. After the First Step Act passed, he filed for the 2014 Guidelines Amendment 782 two-level reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2). Jose pointed out to the court that after First Step, his prior state drug conviction the government had used to enhance his sentence with a 21 USC § 851 notice no longer counted as a felony drug case.

criminalrecord2100928A § 3582(c)(2) motion requires a court to first consider whether a defendant’s sentencing range has gone down because of a retroactive Guidelines change. If it has, the court has to consider whether to reduce the sentence in light of the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Jose argued that the court should consider that fact he could no longer get enhanced under 21 USC § 851 if he were sentenced after First Step. The district court refused, saying it was not allowed to consider subsequent changes in the law when reaching a § 3582(c)(2) decision.

The 9th Circuit reversed, holding that a court’s discretionary decision under the § 3553(a) factors at step two of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry “exceeds the limited scope of a resentencing adjustment applicable to step one.” While at step one, a district court may substitute only the new Guidelines amendments for the guideline provisions applied when the defendant was sentenced, “at step two, there are no similar limitations on what a district court may consider.”

“An underlying principle in federal judicial tradition is that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime,” the Circuit held. “In seeking to ensure that the punishment fit the offender, the Supreme Court has explained that judges should use the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics… It follows that in a § 3553(a) factor analysis, a district court must similarly use the fullest information possible concerning subsequent developments in the law, such as changes in sentencing guidelines, legislative changes to a mandatory minimum, and changes to a triggering predicate offense to ensure the punishment will fit the crime and critically, to ensure that the sentence imposed is also sufficient, but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment; to afford adequate deterrence; and to protect the public.”

The Court’s analysis should apply equally to § 3553(a) factors being considered for compassionate releases. The decision means that when arguing whether a sentence is “just punishment” or provides deterrence, the fact that the sentence originally opposed would be unlawful if handed down today should have a major impact on a district court’s reasoning.

United States v. Lizarraras-Chacon, Case No. 20-30001, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 28823 (9th Cir., September 23, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root