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Lousy Lawyering and Other Stories – Update for April 27, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“DID I SAY FIVE YEARS? I MEANT FIVE DECADES…”

Four decisions of note last week:

stupidlawyr191202Oops, My Bad: Dave Mayhew was charged with white-collar fraud. The government offered him a plea deal that promised a maximum sentence of five years.

“C’mon, man,” his lawyer said. “That’s no deal. If we go to trial, five years is the worst we can do.” Dave, who paid big bucks for this professional advice, followed his attorney’s guidance and went to trial.

You can guess what happened. Dave lost, and he was sentenced to 27 years.

After appeals were over, Dave filed a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective for giving him such bad advice. The district court denied the petition, pointing out that Dave was told at his re-arraignment that he could get up to 55 years on all of the charges and the court – no one else – would decide the sentence. So Dave knew what he was getting into, the judge claimed, and that cured any prejudice he would have suffered from his lawyer’s idiocy.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed. The re-arraignment came only after Dave had rejected the plea deal. The Circuit admitted that in the usual lousy-advice-on-sentence-exposure case, the law is clear that if the defendant pleads guilty after a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing, the court’s warning that only it would determine the sentence and that the maximum the defendant faces, “taken together, may well have been enough to cure… counsel’s misadvice. But there is a fundamental problem,” the 4th held, “with applying that principle here, and it has to do with timing: The court’s admonitions in this case came only after Dave already had rejected the government’s plea offer, and there is no indication — in the record or from the government on appeal — that the offer remained open at that point.”

Bait and Switch: Rebecca Stampe made a deal on her drug case, agreeing to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea locking her sentence at 168 months. An 11(c)(1)(C) plea sets a particular sentence or sentence range, with the court’s role limited to honoring the sentence deal or rejecting the guilty plea.

Deal170216Becky’s deal came with a government promise that if she testified against her co-defendant, she might get a substantial-cooperation sentence reduction under USSG § 5K1.1. But after she made the plea deal, the government dismissed the case against her co-defendant because of some unspecified misconduct by the informant (which presumedly made the informant’s testimony worthless).

Becky demanded information about the misconduct under Brady v Maryland, arguing that it was material to her guilt as well. She also moved to withdraw from her plea agreement (but not her guilty plea), figuring she’d do better with an open plea that let the court sentence her than she would with a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea.

Last week, the 6th Circuit shot her down. The Circuit ruled that the evidence could not possibly be material to Becky’s defense, because she had already pled guilty, so there was no defense left to make. As for the plea agreement, the Circuit said, “While we do not doubt that Stampe sincerely believed that she might avoid some prison time because of her putative cooperation in her co-defendant’s case, the plea agreement contemplated but did not require that possibility. So contrary to her assertion on appeal, it was not the ‘principal purpose’ of the agreement. The main purpose was the exchange of her plea for the government dropping the other charge against her and agreeing to a 168-month sentence.”

mathisEnd Run: John Ham filed a 28 USC § 2241 habeas petition claiming that Mathis v United States – a Supreme court decision that dictated how a sentencing court should apply the “categorical approach” in deciding whether a prior crime was a “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act – required that he be resentenced to a lot less time.

John figured that the 4th Circuit’s United States v. Wheeler decision authorized the district court to address his § 2241 petition on the merits. The district court disagreed, and Jim appealed.

Wheeler adopted a four-part test for using § 2241 petitions to attack a defective sentence where a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.” One of those tests is that a petitioner must show a retroactive change in substantive law that happened after the direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.

John claimed that Mathis satisfies that requirement, changing “well-settled substantive law” about how a sentencing court should apply the categorical approach. Last week, the 4th Circuit disagreed.

“Mathis itself made clear that it was not changing, but rather clarifying, the law,” the 4th held. “The categorical approach has always required a look at the elements of an offense, not the facts underlying it… Indeed, Mathis merely repeated the ‘simple point’ that served as ‘a mantra’ in its ACCA decisions: ‘a sentencing judge may look only to the elements of the offense, not to the facts of the defendant’s conduct’.”

abandoned210427jpgSee You Around, Chump: Finally, in the 8th Circuit, Charles Ahumada filed a § 2255 motion arguing his attorney abandoned him by failing to file a petition for rehearing on his direct appeal. Not so, the Circuit said. In order to make a 6th Amendment ineffective assistance, a defendant first has to have a constitutional right to counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel on a discretionary appeal, and a petition for rehearing is exactly that.

Chuck admitted as much, but argued that the Circuit’s Criminal Justice Act plan requiring counsel to file non-frivolous appeals gave him a due process right to effective counsel. “Even assuming there was a breach of the statute, the CJA,” the 8th said, “it does not give rise to a claim for ineffective representation of counsel.”

United States v. Mayhew, Case No 19-6560, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11248 (4th Cir., April 19, 2021)

United States v. Stampe, Case No 19-6293, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11459 (6th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ham v. Breckon, Case No 20-6972, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11493 (4th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ahumada v. United States, Case No 19-3632, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11861 (8th Cir., April 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Last Week’s § 2255 Gleanings – Update for March 4, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INMATES GO 2-2 ON § 2255 DECISIONS LAST WEEK

The Courts handed federal inmates two 28 USC § 2255 wins and two losses last week.

habeas191211For the uninitiated, habeas corpus (literally, a Latin imperative phrase to “produce the body”) has been around for about 806 years, give or take, ever since a band of angry noblemen forced King John to sign the Magna Carta (the “Great Charter of Liberties”) as an alternative to having his royal butt kicked.

One liberty the noblemen secured was the right not to be locked up without reason. The Magna Carta empowered courts to issue a writ (order) to a jailer to “produce the body” – that is, come to court with a particular prisoner and show why that prisoner’s detention is legal. Habeas corpus has become known as the “Great Writ,” so ingrained in English common law that our constitution simply assumes the right exists. The constitution only references habeas corpus in the negative, by denying the president the right to suspend the writ except in time of war.

Notwithstanding the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, Congress controls how prisoners may exercise their right to seek the writ in the federal courts by statute. For instance, 28 USC § 2244 regulates the filing of habeas corpus petitions for all claims of illegal detention for reasons other than a defect in the conviction or sentence. Section 2255 of Title 18 permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition where the claim is that the conviction or sentence is contrary to law.

Every federal prisoner has the right to bring one § 2255 motion, subject to rather strict time limits. Bringing a second such petition is possible under very limited circumstances, with permission first being granted by the Court of Appeals.

Now for the week’s news:

violence181008(1) Dearnta Thomas pled guilty to a substantive RICO offense, and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence. The predicate “crime of violence” for the § 924 offense was aiding and abetting the commission of a VICAR offense (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity under 18 USC § 1959), those predicate violent crimes being two Virginia state-law offenses, a conviction for use or display of a firearm in committing a felony and another for “pointing, holding, or brandishing a firearm, air or gas-operated weapon or object similar in appearance.”

After the 2019 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis, Dearnta filed for permission under 28 USC § 2244 to bring a successive § 2255. Last week, the 4th Circuit held that Davis announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and that Dearnta’s argument – that the state convictions were not crimes of violence within the meaning of Davis – stated a plausible claim.

(2) Meanwhile, Travis Harris asked the 5th Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 arguing that after Davis, his conviction for using a destructive device during a crime of violence (18 USC § 844(i)), should be thrown out, because the predicate offense – arson – was no longer a crime of violence.

The 5th agreed, holding – as the 4th Circuit has previously said – that Davis was retroactive and that Travis raised a plausible enough claim to go forward.

lawyerjoke180807(3) Things didn’t go so well for Kevin Kelley in the 1st Circuit. Kev figured he had a “gotcha:” it turned out the Assistant U.S. Attorney who had signed Kevin’s indictment had not paid his bar dues. Because F.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) says that an indictment “must be signed by” a government lawyer, and the AUSA’s law license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues, Kevin argued in his § 2255 motion that the bad signature invalidated the indictment and “robbed the district court of jurisdiction to proceed against him.”

Last week, the 1st Circuit rejected Kev’s technicality. “The Supreme Court, after all, has long viewed a government lawyer’s indictment signing as necessary only as evidence of the authenticity of the document,” the Circuit said, and Rule 7’s “intent is for common sense to prevail over technicalities.” Thus, the Circuit said, “it is unsurprising that many courts refuse to stamp ‘invalid’ an indictment signed by a prosecutor with bar-license problems if other evidence shows that the government was backing the prosecution — with some cases explicitly saying that in such a situation, the complaining party cannot prove prejudice.”

Here, the evidence showed the indictment had been approved by the AUSA’s superior, and that was good enough for common sense to prevail, the Court ruled, especially where Kevin could prove he was not harmed by the suspended AUSA working under a nonpayment suspension.

(4) Finally, Greg Olson got a target letter from the U.S. Attorney, telling him he would be indicted, but offering that he could get a lawyer and work out a preindictment deal. Greg and his lawyer worked out a 30-month plea to tax evasion, but the deal foundered when the government refused to provide any discovery. Greg got indicted, hired a different lawyer, but ended up with a 48-month sentence.

target210305Greg filed a § 2255 motion claiming his pre-indictment lawyer screwed up the plea deal. But last week, a 9th Circuit panel shot him down. Precedent in the circuit holds a defendant has no 6th Amendment right to effective counsel before he is a defendant, meaning that a three-judge panel cannot overrule the prior case. Of course, in such cases, if a three-judge panel thinks the precedent is nonsense, it can refer its case to the court en banc, but here, the Circuit said, “In determining whether this is an appropriate case to do so, we must assess whether Olson might prevail if current circuit precedent were to be overruled… The record does not support Olson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. An en banc ruling would therefore not affect the result.”

In re Thomas, Case No 19-292, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5316 (4th Cir. February 23, 2021)

In re Harris, Case No 19-51045, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5719 (5th Cir. February 25, 2021)

Kelley v. United States, Case No 19-1932, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5646 (1st Cir.  February 25, 2021)

United States v. Olson, Case No 19-16591, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5027 (9th Cir.  February 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

A Day to Beat Up Lawyers – Update for February 23, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LAWYERS BEHAVING BADLY

Today, we feature a pair of cases in which lawyers are the stars, and not in a good way:

banana210223I Feel Conflicted: When Eric Scurry arrived for day 1 of his drug trial, his lawyer – Chris Davis – was missing. It seemed Chris had a hearing in another courtroom, and that one was more important to him than Eric’s was. This is not a development calculated to give a client a warm, fuzzy feeling about his attorney, the notion that his or her freedom was playing second banana to a client who had paid more for the lawyer’s services.

But not to fear, Eric! Chris’s wife, Mary, was also a lawyer, and Chris – who cared about Eric’s case very much – dispatched her to cover the trial. No matter (as it turned out later) that Mary had not read the file and knew nothing about Eric’s case. She was a warm body with a law degree, just what a guy facing decades in prison needed.

Had Mary read the file, she would have been aware that Eric and his co-defendants previously had attacked the wiretap that led to their arrest for a technical deficiency, albeit a glaring one. The district court denied their motion to suppress the evidence, but the issue their joint motion raised was a substantial one.

Everyone on the defense side of the table knew that… except for Mary. She convinced Eric to take a plea deal for a minimum 10 years, reserving only the right to appeal one inconsequential pretrial holding. The co-defendants also pled, but their attorneys reserved the right to appeal the wiretap suppression.

jailfree140410That turned out to be a good deal for Eric’s co-defendants. They appealed and won. The Court of Appeals held the government’s wiretap application to be deficient, and all of the evidence against them was suppressed. The co-defendants walked free. But Eric did not, because his plea deal did not reserve the right to raise that issue.

Eric seemed to recognize that Mary had screwed up, because on appeal, he had the Davises thrown off his case. He told the court he planned to accuse them later of incompetence. That made sense. But what happened next did not.

Inexplicably, when Eric filed a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 seeking to set aside his guilty plea, Mary offered to represent him on the motion, and he agreed. She then amended the § 2255 motion, claiming Eric had been coerced into pleading guilty by the evidence that had later been thrown out in his co-defendants’ cases, thus giving him the same level of professional representation on his § 2255 that she had given him at trial: lousy.

The problem was simple: to set aside his guilty plea and plea deal, Eric was required to show not just that his perception of the admissibility of the evidence was wrong, but that his lawyer had given him incompetent representation. Which of course Mary had. But because Mary failed to argue her own incompetence during the § 2255, the court denied Eric relief.

conflict200318Last week, the D.C. Circuit threw Mary (and, for good measure, Chris) off the case again. The problem is, the Circuit said, “as long as counsel’s advice to take the plea rather than gamble on an evidentiary suppression issue was “reasonably competent,” the plea is “not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession.” That being the case, Eric could not win his § 2255 unless he showed Mary has given him incompetent advice. And that, as I noted, meant Mary would have to argue that she was incompetent.

The Circuit ruled that “by affirmatively intervening in Scurry’s collateral proceedings despite the conflict and not pressing the ineffective assistance claim, Davis seemingly made a choice advancing her own interest at the expense of her client’s.”

Eric will get another shot at relief, this time – we trust – with a competent lawyer.

usmale210223I’m A U.S. Male: Elvis warned that you shouldn’t “tamper with the property of the U.S. Mail (or maybe ‘male’)”. Last week, Sixth Circuit said you can’t use the U.S. mail to tamper with statutory deadlines, either.

Blake Cretacci hired a lawyer to file a 42 USC § 1983 action for damages against some local jail guards who allegedly used excessive force against him and . Blake hired a local lawyer by the unlikely name of Andy Justice, who prepared the complaint. Andy planned to file the federal court complaint electronically, as attorney members of the bar of the court are allowed to do. But on the night before the statute of limitations expired on Blake’s claim, Andy discovered that Coffee County, Tennessee, where the conduct occurred, was not in the Middle District of Tennessee, where Andy was admitted, but instead in the Eastern District of Tennessee, where Andy was not admitted.

The next day, Andy tried to get admitted to the Eastern District so he could electronically file the complaint, but that could not be accomplished in only a day. Andy drove to a federal courthouse in Winchester, Tennessee, to try to file the complaint in person, but there was no staffed clerk’s office there. By then, Andy could not get to the Chattanooga federal courthouse in time, but he had an idea.

The “prison mailbox rule,” enshrined in Houston v. Lack, holds that if an inmate files a document with a federal court by mailing it from the prison, the filing is deemed to be delivered to the courthouse the moment the inmate turns it over to a prison official. Andy, being a bright lawyer, knew this, so he ran the complaint over to Blake at the jail.

Andy told Blake that he should deliver it to a correctional officer immediately, explaining that because he was an inmate, he could take advantage of the prison mailbox rule. Blake did so.

dogmail210223Last week, the 6th Circuit threw out Blake’s complaint as untimely. The Circuit ruled that “the prison mailbox rule was created to prevent pro se prisoners from being penalized by any delays in filing caused by the prison mail system. But if a prisoner does not need to use the prison mail system, and instead relies on counsel to file a pleading on his or her behalf, the prison is no longer responsible for any delays and the rationale of the prison mailbox rule does not apply… Accordingly, we hold that, in the context of the filing of civil complaints, the prison mailbox rule applies only to prisoners who are not represented by counsel and are proceeding pro se.”

Nice try, Andy, but you can’t use the U.S. mail to tamper with court deadlines. Elvis could have told you that.

United States v. Scurry, Case No 18-3067, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 4785 (D.C. Cir.  Feb 19, 2021)

Cretacci v. Call, Case No 20-5669, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 4493 (6th Cir. Feb 17, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Resentencing Good Fortune Can’t Be Bootstrapped Into a New 2255 – Update for February 8, 2021

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GOING BACK TO THE WELL

nogoingback210208Any federal prisoner who has filed a post-conviction habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 knows that the § 2255 remedy – a powerful way to get as conviction overturned or sentence vacated – is pretty much a one-and-done thing: you can’t file a second § 2255 without permission from a court of appeals (pursuant to 28 USC § 2244). Getting that permission is a pretty tall order, requiring that you show there’s a new Supreme Court decision that the Court has decided should be applied retroactively to cases already decided, or you have some newly-discovered evidence that is so boffo that the jury would have acquitted you and the judge himself would have driven you home.

Charlie Armstrong thought he had found a work-around that would let him file a second § 2255 without having to jump through the § 2244 hoop. After being convicted and imprisoned on a marijuana charge, Charlie found himself to be the beneficiary of the Sentencing Commission’s 2014 reduction of drug-crime scoring for Guidelines sentence. The change was essentially an across-the-board reduction of two levels, and people already sentenced were allowed to apply two their sentencing judges for discretionary resentencing applying the 2-level reduction under the procedure laid out in 18 USC § 3582(c)(2).

After his conviction but before the 2014 Guidelines reduction, Charlie filed a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. While the § 2255 motion was pending, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782, and after Charlie applied to his sentencing court, his judge cut his sentence by 25%.

mulligan190430Some time later, the district court got around to denying Charlie’s § 2255 motion (which, alas, is the fate of most such motions). Charlie promptly filed a second § 2255, challenging his newly-reduced sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of his attorney. Charlie explained that he didn’t need § 2244 permission to file the new motion, because his 2-level reduction was a new, intervening judgment giving him the right to challenge the new sentence with a § 2255, essentially giving him a § 2255 mulligan.

The district court disagreed, and dismissed the new § 2255 petition as a second or successive motion.

The 2010 Supreme Court Magwood v. Patterson decision held that if “there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two [§ 2255] petitions, an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive.” With this opinion in hand, Charlie appealed the district court’s denial, arguing his 2-level reduction was the exactly the kind of new judgment Magwood had in mind.

doover210208Last week, the 11th Circuit turned him down. The Circuit said that in Magwood, the sentencing court “conducted a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating evidence afresh,” the 11th said, giving the sentencing judge a chance to commit new errors or to repeat the same errors as in the original sentence. But a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding.” Instead, it simply “provides for the ‘modification of a term of imprisonment’ by giving courts the power to ‘reduce’ an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission.”

Armstrong v. United States, Case No 18-13041, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 3265 (11th Cir., February 5, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

For The Want of a Nail… – Update for December 15, 2020

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COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AIN’T JUST ANOTHER 2255

career160509Stephen Fine pled guilty in 2014 to a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy (21 USC § 846) and money laundering (18 USC § 1956). At sentencing, the district court found Steve was a Guidelines career offender (USSG § 4B1.1) based on two prior state drug convictions.

As regular readers know, being christened a “career offender” exposes a defendant to dramatically higher Guidelines sentencing ranges.

After conviction, Steve attacked his conviction in a 28 USC § 2255 habeas corpus action, alleging his lawyer had been ineffective. The motion failed. Then in July 2019, Steve filed an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) sentence reduction motion, asking the court for what is generally known as “compassionate release.”

kleenix201215A momentary frolic into grammar and language: The statute calls the action of a court modifying a sentence in response to a proper motion under § 3582(c) as a “sentence reduction.” Originally, the § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion could only be brought on a prisoner’s behalf by the Bureau of Prisons, something that happened seldom enough to make a Blue Moon seem commonplace by comparison. Nevertheless, the BOP started referring to the motion it alone was authorized to bring as “compassionate release,” and the term – like a brandnomer – stuck. Think “tissue” (sentence reduction) versus “Kleenex” (compassionate release).

A § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release motion must show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. Steve’s extraordinary and compelling reasons were (1) his “post-sentencing rehabilitation” and (2) that he was actually innocent of his sentence, because court decisions since his sentencing had held that the state convictions his judge relied on in declaring him a career offender should not have been counted in that calculus.

His district court turned down the compassionate release motion. Last week, the 8th Circuit agreed.

rehabilitation201215Citing Guideline § 1B1.13 (which, by the way, the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th have held does not apply to an inmate-filed compassionate release motion), the 8th Circuit held that rehabilitation alone was not a proper basis for a sentence reduction motion. As for Steve’s claim that he was not properly a career offender – his other extraordinary and compelling reason – the Court noted that his “challenge to the career offender determination was still a challenge to his sentence. A federal inmate generally must challenge a sentence through a § 2255 motion, and a post-judgment motion that fits the description of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence should be treated as a § 2255 motion… Even an intervening change in the law does not take a motion outside the realm of § 2255 when it seeks to set aside a sentence… The district court was therefore correct that his challenge to the career offender determination and resulting sentence was an unauthorized successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence.”

In a compassionate release motion, a defendant who has established an extraordinary and compelling reason must also show that grant of the motion would be reasonably consistent with the sentencing factors set out in 18 USC § 3553(a). That was where Steve’s sentence argument would have fit. Had he suggested that a sentence reduction would have been consistent with § 3553(a) factors, because the correct punishment – and thus, the punishment society suggests would be adequate but not too great – was really a lot less than what he got.

nail201215Of course, Steve still would have lost, because he was missing an “extraordinary and compelling reason.” Without one of those, none of the rest of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) matters at all. For the want of a nail…

United States v. Fine, Case No 19-3485, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 38786 (8th Cir Dec 11, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

11th Circuit Says ‘Answer All the Questions, Judge’ – Update for November 17, 2020

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11TH CIRCUIT SENDS § 2255 MOTION BACK TO DISTRICT COURT FOR CLISBY ERROR

clisby201117A Clisby is not – to the best of my knowledge (and I try to keep up with this sort of thing because my three grandkids expect nothing less) – the hottest new toy this Christmas season. Instead, Clisby is an 11th Circuit decision that requires a federal district court “to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus… regardless whether habeas relief is granted or denied.” The holding applies to § 2254 and § 2255 motions alike.

Cliff Senter filed a § 2255 motion claiming that his Armed Career Criminal Act conviction could not stand after Johnson v. United States was decided, because one of the priors it relied on was an attempted Alabama robbery, and – because no such crime was on the books in Alabama when he was convicted of it – it had no elements, and thus could not be matched with the elements test of 18 USC § 924e.

It was a pretty solid argument, but the district court misinterpreted it to be a collateral attack on the attempted robbery conviction. While a post-conviction movant can argue that a state prior conviction doesn’t meet the ACCA test, he or she cannot argue that the state conviction is invalid and should be thrown out. That question needed to be resolved by the state courts that imposed the conviction to begin with. The district court thought that Cliff was attacking the validity of the Alabama attempted robbery conviction, and held Cliff couldn’t do that in a § 2255 motion.

Of course he could not, but sometimes an argument does double duty, and when that happens, the court has to apply it to the issue properly before it, even if it could apply equally to an issue that – if raised – would not properly be before it. Last week, the 11th Circuit reversed the dismissal of Cliff’s § 2255 motion, holding that

“when a habeas petitioner… presents a claim in clear and simple language such that the district court may not misunderstand it,” a district court must address and resolve the claim. In this case, Senter clearly raised the claim that his ‘attempted robbery cannot qualify as a violent felony under either the force clause or as an enumerated offense because it is a non-existent offense and therefore does not have any elements and by misconstruing it as a collateral attack on his state conviction, the district court failed to resolve his actual claim and violated Clisby.”

paperwork201117To be sure, a district judge may grow weary of deciding an especially prolix § 2255 motion – with issue after issue, and each issue having multiple sub-issues which themselves have multiple sub-parts – but that’s what comes with the cool robe and lifetime sinecure. 

This decision remind us that Clisby will cause a case to be sent back until the district court finishes all of the paperwork.

Senter v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 35704 (11th Cir. November 13, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

“If At First You Don’t Succeed…” Doesn’t Work in Habeas Corpus – Update for October 28, 2020

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WHEN TOO MUCH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH

oneshot201029You pretty much only get one shot trying to convince your judge you were wrongly convicted in a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 (except for a few circumstances not relevant here). But how about the “saving clause” in § 2255(e) which lets an inmate use another route to file habeas corpus when a § 2255 petition “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention?”

Roberto Beras, convicted of using his check cashing/money transfer business to launder millions in drug proceeds, figured § 2255(e) meant he could file a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus if the § 2255 no longer worked (because it had already been filed and denied in the 2nd Circuit, and two requests to file successive § 2255s denied as well).

Roberto figured the Supreme Court’s 2008 Cuellar v. United States decision was his ticket home. So even while his § 2255 motion was pending in New York, Roberto was filing § 2241 habeas corpus motions wherever he happened to be. In two petitions filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, he claimed he was innocent under the Cuellar statutory interpretation decision, but the Northern District court disagreed, finding Roberto would have been found guilty even under Cuellar. When Roberto was transferred to a facility in the Western District of Louisiana, he filed the same claim again.

Last week, the 5th Circuit threw out Roberto’s latest § 2241 petition as an “abuse of the writ.”

The § 2255(e) “saving clause” permits an inmate to file a 28 USC § 2241 petition based on new interpretations of federal statutes – like Cuellar – when the claim was previously “foreclosed by circuit law at the time when it should have been raised” and when the “retroactively applicable decision establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.” But, the Circuit said, that wasn’t the issue here. Instead, Roberto’s § 2241 should be dismissed as “an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.”

2255(e)filings201029“Abuse of the writ” is a common-law based “body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions.” Under 28 USC § 2244(a), the Circuit held, it can dismiss a successive habeas application as an “abuse of the writ” where the movant raises a claim in a subsequent petition that either was raised or could have been raised in an earlier petition.

The 5th said Roberto “has filed claims in at least four circuits and for nearly twenty years. To allow him to repeat the same claim – heard and denied by another circuit – would be to condone forum-shopping… Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system.”

Beras v. Johnson, Case No. 18-30684, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33058 (5th Cir Oct 20, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

1st Circuit Gives Pre-Booker Career Offenders Some Relief– Update for October 5, 2020

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NO DEFENDANT LEFT BEHIND

vagueness160110The 2015 Supreme Court decision Johnson v. United States was a landmark, holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson’s reasoning led to Sessions v. Dimaya (extending Johnson to the criminal code’s general definition of “crime of violence” at 18 USC § 16(b)) and 2019’s United States v. Davis holding extending Johnson to 18 USC § 924(c), the “use or carry a firearm” statute.

But thousands of inmates who were held to be Guidelines “career offenders” because of prior crimes of violence got no relief. A Guidelines “career offender” is very different from an ACCA armed career criminal. A Guidelines career offender is someone with two prior crimes of violence or serious drug convictions (federal or state). If a defendant qualifies as a Guidelines career offender, he or she will be deemed to have the highest possible criminal history score and a Guidelines offense level that ensures a whopping sentencing range.

After Johnson, a number of Guidelines career offenders, whose status had been fixed by including some dubious prior convictions as “violent,” sought the same kind of relief that Johnson afforded armed career criminals. But in 2017 the Supremes said that Johnson did not apply to the Guidelines. Beckles v. United States held that the Guidelines were not subject to the same kind of “vagueness” challenge that worked in Johnson, because the Guidelines did not “fix the permissible range of sentences, but merely guided the exercise of discretion in choosing a sentence within the statutory range.”

This may have been so for people sentenced under the advisory Guidelines. However, back before the 2005 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, those “advisory” Guidelines were mandatory. They did not guide a judge’s discretion. Instead, the law required a judge to sentence within the applicable Guidelines sentencing range except in very narrow circumstances, and then only if the sentencing court jumped through the many hoops the Guidelines erected.

Robber160229So, how about guys like Tony Shea, who was sentenced after a bank robbery spree as a career offender back in 1998? Tony’s prior crimes of violence were pretty shaky bases for a career offender enhancement (not that Tony didn’t have plenty of problems for his string of armed robberies, but that’s another story). Tony was looking at minimum 430 months under normal Guidelines, nothing to sneeze at, but with the career offender label, Tony’s minimum sentence shot that up to 567 months (that’s 47-plus years, or 330 dog years).

Tony filed a § 2255 motion arguing that because his Guidelines career offender sentence was mandatory, not “advisory,” the Johnson holding should apply to wipe out his career offender status.

Last Monday, the 1st Circuit agreed. The appeals court noted that while Beckles was right that advisory Guidelines guide a judge’s discretion rather than “fix the permissible range of sentences,” the pre-Booker Guidelines did much more than this. The Circuit said “when the pre-Booker Guidelines ‘bound the judge to impose a sentence within’ a prescribed range, as they ordinarily did, they necessarily “fixed the permissible range of sentences” she could impose.”

Judicial despotism... probably not a good thing.
         Judicial despotism… probably not a good thing.

“It’s easy,” the 1st said “to see why vague laws that fix sentences… violate the Due Process Clause. The… rule applied in Booker serves two main functions. First, fair notice: requiring the indictment to allege ‘every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted… enables the defendant to determine the species of offence with which he is charged in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly…” Second, “the rule also guards against the threat of ‘judicial despotism’ that could arise from ‘arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions,’ by requiring the jury to find each fact the law makes essential to his punishment.”

Only the 11th Circuit has explicitly held that Beckles does not apply to mandatory Guidelines career offender enhancements. The 5th, 8th and 10th Circuits are on the fence. This 1st Circuit decision is the first to emphatically apply Johnson to give relief to people like Tony, who is already well into his third decade of imprisonment.

Shea v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 30776 (1st Cir., September 28, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Sobering § 2255 Lessons – Update for September 10, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A COUPLE OF CAUTIONARY 2255 DECISIONS

A pair of Circuit decisions on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions last week did not deliver a lot of hope to petitioners.

bribeB160627In one 6th Circuit decision, former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora got a number of bribery-related convictions vacated because of the intervening 2016 Supreme Court decision in McDonnell v. United States. The decision is instructive for public officials and employees caught up in so-called pay-to-play cases, where they are accused of trading official favors for profit. But the cautionary note for the rest of § 2255 movants relates to cumulative error.

Jimmy, like many § 2255 movants, argued that even if no single error he cited justified reversal, the cumulative effect of the many errors he cited was to violate his due process rights. “Cumulative error” is a favorite catch-all issue, added to the end of a § 2255 motion to give it sufficient heft.

Thehe cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of errors that are in and of themselves insufficient to require a reversal can nevertheless yield a denial of a defendant’s 5th Amendment right to a fair trial, and thus – by the sheer weight of the pile of mistakes, require a mistrial.

As a circuit court of appeals observed in a case almost 30 years ago, “the possibility of cumulative error is often acknowledged but practically never found persuasive.” The doctrine justifies reversal only in the unusual case in which synergistic or repetitive error violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.

The 6th Circuit poured additional cold water on the doctrine last week. The Circuit doubts that “cumulative error” has any place in a § 2255 motion: “We note, however, that we are uncertain whether this theory of prejudice is available to § 2255 petitioners… And we are especially uncertain that it is available where one of two claimed errors is an evidentiary error… But we leave these questions for the district court to consider on remand after it assesses the harmlessness of the instructional error independent of any cumulative effect.”

shootemup161122Meanwhile, in the 5th Circuit, Lauro Valdez used a convenient handgun to shoot a man Lauro said was trying to break in. His self-defense claim might have worked, except that after Lauro shot him once, he walked over to the prostrate victim and pumped more three rounds into him.

An old lawyer I knew used to say, “Two bullets or two bodies, and you’ve got a problem.” That was Lauro’s predicament. He could explain the one shot at an intruder. The other three a minute later – not so easy.

Lauro was charged with being a felon-in-possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g). His lawyer told him that he faced a 24-36 month Guidelines range if he were convicted. That was wrong, because USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1) has a cross-reference for murder – which clearly applied here – that would raise Lauro’s Guidelines to at least 324 months. That meant Lauro would undoubtedly get 10 years, the maximum sentence for felons-in-possession allowed by statute.

Being advised wrongly by his lawyer, Lauro figured he would use the “justification” defense at trial, arguing he had just grabbed a gun to protect himself from an imminent threat. This might have worked for him, too, except that on the eve of trial, he learned that his wife would testify the gun had been on Lauro’s nightstand a week before the shooting, way too long ago to let him argue a sudden need to possess a gun against an imminent threat.

Lauro decided to plead guilty. At the change-of-plea hearing, the judge explained that § 922(g) carried a 120-month statutory maximum, and that regardless of what his lawyer might have said about a possible sentence, “it’s not a guarantee and it’s not binding on this Court.”

Lauro, of course, agreed. Defendants in those hearings usually are able to process nothing the judge says, and Lauro was no exception.

At sentencing, the judge gave Lauro the full 10 years, using the Guidelines cross reference for murder. Lauro later claimed in his § 2255 motion that his lawyer had predicted only 36 months, and had said nothing about a murder cross-reference to the Guidelines.if he had known about the Guidelines’ murder cross-reference, Lauro wrote in his motion, he would not have waived his right to a jury trial. His lawyer admitted in an affidavit that he had completely missed the murder cross-reference when he advised Lauro.

lawyer15170317The issue when a defendant alleges his counsel’s errors led him to take a plea rather than go to trial is not whether the defendant could have won the trial, but instead only whether a rational defendant would have chosen to go to trial. Here, the 5th Circuit held Lauro’s lawyer’s performance was not deficient, because both he and the court told Juan about the 10-year statutory maximum. The Circuit so much as said that a competent lawyer can’t figure out the Guidelines, so misadvising his or her client was not deficient representation.

What’s more, the 5th said, Lauro suffered no prejudice, because it was clear that “rather than risking conviction by the jury (with no sentencing benefits whatsoever), Lauro hoped to parlay a late guilty plea into a credit for acceptance of responsibility and additional benefit from cooperating or rendering substantial assistance. In other words, knowing that wifey was going to blow up his defense, the Circuit said, Lauro did what any rational defendant would do.

One judge dissented, as he should have, from this terrible decision. Any rational defendant – being told that if he pled, he would get 120 months and if he went to trial, he would get 120 months – would take his chances with a jury.

Dimora v. United States, Case No. 18-4260, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 27675 (6th Cir Aug 31, 2020)

United States v. Valdez, Case No. 18-40495, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 27909 (5th Cir. Sep 1, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Lord, Save Us From Parents… – Update for June 30, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FATHER KNOWS BEST

Seldom is a defendant is such a mess that the advice of his family or friends cannot make things worse. That’s what happened to David Day.

David faced a messy white-collar case, one that could easily yield a Guidelines sentence of more than 90 months. His public defengoodlawyer160314der was top-drawer (as full-time public defenders usually are): she could assess a loser of a case, and she did, negotiating a government offer for a 51-month sentence.

But parents always want the best for their kids. Although David was in his mid-30s, his Dad figured prominently in planning his defense. And Dad, who had seen all of the relevant TV shows,  figured a court-appointed lawyer couldn’t possibly be any good. He convinced David to reject the offer, and then to dump his PD in favor of hiring two lawyers Dad knew, both whom could smell a fee and thus told David he could easily beat the case.

Things went downhill fast.

After the new lawyers collected their fee, paid over several months (by Dad), they entered their appearance in the case. The government generously re-offered the 51 month deal, but the new lawyers – without ever opening the case files, which they had not yet bothered to pick up from the public defender – told David to reject 51 months and go to trial.

toast200630A few weeks later, the new lawyers finally picked up the files and read the discovery. For the first time, they could see that David was toast. They convinced him to plead, but by then there was no deal. He entered an open plea, which is a plea to the whole indictment without any deal whatsoever. When all the dust settled, David got 92 months.

David filed a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion, arguing the hired lawyers were incompetent for telling him to reject the plea offer without having first read the file. That seems like a pretty basic blunder. But David’s trial judge didn’t think so. She denied the § 2255 motion without a hearing, holding that even if the lawyer had done that, David could not show he was prejudiced by their mistake, because the government’s offered plea agreement would not have bound the court to a particular sentence, so there was no guarantee the judge would have sentenced David to 51 months.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed. The proper inquiry, the Circuit said, is not whether the sentencing court is bound by a plea agreement, but whether it is reasonably probable that the court would have accepted its terms and that the resulting sentence would have been less than the one that was actually imposed.

The 7th complained that the “judge’s prejudice analysis also overlooks the practical realities of plea negotiations. Few court observers would contend that the government’s views as reflected in its plea stipulations and Guidelines recommendations have no influence on a judge’s real-world sentencing decisions… Judges usually follow the nonbinding recommendation in Rule 11 type B agreements in part because they know that not accepting prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations will hamper plea negotiations in future cases. Why would prosecutors offer nonbinding plea agreements — and defendants accept them—if they count for nothing in the sentencing decision?

dumblawyer180108The government weirdly warned the Circuit that ruling in David’s favor would produce “absurd results” by encouraging defendants to engage incompetent attorneys. Of course they would: it makes perfect sense to hire a dummy and get slammed with a lot of time, so that you can roll the dice on your less-than-10% chance that you can win your § 2255 a few years down the road.

Ask David. He’s already served all but 12 months of his 92-month sentence. No doubt he’s happier to have his rights vindicated after he’s done the time he would not have had if he had stuck with his public defender.

The Court, with regal understatement, wrote the government argument “strikes us as an entirely unrealistic concern.”

Day v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19640 (7th Cir. June 24, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root