Tag Archives: 18 usc 3582

‘Danger, Danger!’ – Courts Grapple With Prisoners’ ‘Danger to the Community’ on Compassionate release – Update for February 11, 2021

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GUESS THEY MEANT WHAT THEY SAID…

saymean161103Part 1: About 80 days ago, the 6th Circuit ruled in United States v. Jones that because the Sentencing Commission – due to having too few members to even hold a meeting – had not been able to amend compassionate release policy statement § 1B1.13, district judges had no obligation to follow the old version of that Sentencing Guideline.

A little background: At the same time Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it established the Sentencing Commission. Among the Commission’s duties was a directive in 28 USC § 994(t) that it define in detail what constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction (what we commonly call compassionate release).

The Commission’s response was policy statement § 1B1.13, which faithfully adhered to the statute by – among other things – directing that a compassionate release could only be requested by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. After all, that was what 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) said at the time. But in 2018, Congress change the statute in the First Step Act to permit prisoners to bring their own motions for compassionate release if the BOP turned down their request for the agency to do so.. Of course, the BOP turned everyone down: Mother Teresa herself could not have wrangled a compassionate release motion out of the Director.

motherteresa210211Normally, the Sentencing Commission would have amended § 1B1.13 in due course, updating it to reflect that compassionate release motions may be coming from inmates as well as the rare filing by the Director of the BOP. However, the Sentencing Commission was having its own crisis at the time. Three members left the Commission at the end of 2018 when their terms expired, and President Trump had not nominated any replacements. When he finally came up with a few names months later, the Senate never got around to confirming them. As a result, the Commission has lacked a quorum for two years now, and has been able to do absolutely nothing.

Thus, we have a revised compassionate release statute on the books, but an enabling policy statement that is still rooted in the Dark Ages.

That old policy statement set restrictive definitions as to what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a reduction, and said that any reason other than those listed in § 1B1.13 had to be approved by the Director. As well, § 1B1.13 required the judge – among other things – to determine that the prisoner “is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).”

That brings you up to date. Now, for today’s case:

Jones described a three-step process for deciding compassionate release motions: First, a prisoner must show extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. If that showing is made, the movant must then show that the motion is consistent with any applicable policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission. If he or she crosses that hurdle, the prisoner must finally show after considering the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a), the court ought to grant the motion. Jones’s three-step came with one big asterisk: where prisoners were moving for compassionate release on their own – instead of the motion being brought by the BOP Director – the courts should skip Step Two.

Paul Sherwood filed for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), claiming that COVID-19, coupled with his age and medical condition, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. He claimed that the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors also weighed in favor of grant. The government admitted Paul’s medical conditions satisfied the “extraordinary and compelling” threshold, but it argued that his possession of prohibited sex images (read that as “kiddie porn”) meant he “remained a danger to the community, and that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against release.” The district court agreed in a two-line order that Paul “has failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. Not only was he convicted of possession… but he was convicted of transportation as well.”

pornC160829Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed the district court, telling everyone it meant what it said in Jones: § 1B1.13 is to be ignored. “While a brief order may well be sufficient for purposes of denying compassionate release,” the Circuit wrote, “where the order relies exclusively on an impermissible consideration, we must vacate the order and remand the case for further consideration.” The 6th admitted that the district judge could consider whether Paul had a “propensity to be a danger to the community upon release, as well as the nature and circumstances of his offense,” and it even presumed that “the district court’s initial balancing of the § 3553(a) factors during Paul’s sentencing remains an accurate assessment as to whether those factors justify a sentence reduction…”

In other words, the Circuit telegraphed to the district court that it didn’t expect the outcome to be any different after remand, only the process used to get there.

Despite its expectations, “because the district court relied on § 1B1.13(2) as the sole basis for denying Sherwood compassionate release,” the 6th remanded the so that the district court could decide whether the § 3553(a) factors alone weighed in favor of Sherwood’s release, without considering “danger to the community.”

Part 2: In early December, the 4th Circuit ruled in United States v. McCoy that § 1B1.13 should be ignored, and – additionally – that district courts could even consider disproportionately long sentences as reasons for compassionate release.

danger210211Paul Kratsas has spent nearly three decades in prison for a non-violent drug offense committed in Maryland. He moved for a sentence reduction, arguing that he would not get a mandatory life sentence if convicted today, and that his record of achievement in prison showed rehabilitation. The government, predictably enough, argued that there was nothing extraordinary or compelling in Paul’s showing, and anyway, he had not shown he would not be a danger to the community (even after 30 years in prison).

The district court noted that even under current law, Paul would qualify as a career offender, but “with good time credits, he has already served more than the bottom of those guidelines.” District Judge Deborah K. Chasanow obviously concluded that United States v. McCoy meant what it said. She held:

It is time to recognize that both the law and Mr. Kratsas have changed over the last three decades. His youthful refusal to acknowledge his guilt – or to accept punishment – has given way to reflective maturity. His positive attitude while in prison is demonstrated by the myriad courses, programs, and activities he has completed successfully, earning him transfer to a low security facility and the support of his mentor and family. He has demonstrated that he is not likely to be a danger to society due to his insights into his personal responsibility and the release plan he has offered. He is to be commended for his refusal to lose hope.

Paul went home last Friday… for the first time since 1992.

United States v. Sherwood, Case 20-4085, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 2806 (6th Cir., February 2, 2021)

United States v. Kratsas, Case No. DKC 92-208, 2021 U.S. List. LEXIS 13313 (D.Md., January 25, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

6th Circuit FCI Elkton Holding a Mixed Bag – Update for June 11, 2020

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THREE WINS AND A LOSS AT THE 6TH CIRCUIT

winloss200611On the third try, the Federal Bureau of Prisons finally succeeded in getting a higher court to issue a stay in the FCI Elkton (Ohio) habeas corpus/8th Amendment case, stopping for the moment the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s injunction demanding that the BOP identify and either transfer or release medically vulnerable inmates.

On Tuesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the preliminary injunction – which can only issue if a moving party can show irreparable harm and likelihood that it will succeed on the merits of the case – should be set aside. This does not mean that the inmate plaintiffs in the class action cannot win, but I suspect the BOP is betting that time (and attrition of the medically vulnerable inmates, as one after another comes down with COVID-19), will render the whole lawsuit moot before it’s done.

Technically, the lawsuit is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, addressed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The remedy in a habeas action is release of the prisoner or abatement of the unconstitutional condition. Here, the prisoners claimed that the BOP was violating the 8th Amendment, exacting “cruel and unusual punishment” by the Elkton administration’s “deliberate indifference” to a deadly medical condition, COVID-19.

plague200406In a 2-1 decision, the 6th Circuit panel struck down the district court’s order to thin the ranks of the 2,000 inmates at Elkton (located in Lisbon, Ohio, about 65 miles southeast of Cleveland), where more than a quarter have tested positive for the coronavirus and 19 inmates have died. U.S. District Judge James Gwin ruled in April that the administration was not doing enough to protect inmates, and ordered that the BOP transfer or release elderly or medically compromised prisoners.

“Deliberate indifference” has two components, one objective and one subjective. The Circuit ruled that while the plaintiffs had shown that objectively, COVID-19 was a genuine medical danger at the facility, they were unlikely to prove that the steps the BOP had taken as of April 22 — such as screening for symptoms, limiting visitation, increasing cleaning and providing masks — were insufficient to raise the administration’s response above the “deliberate indifference” standard. The majority on the panel agreed that the BOP’s “actions show it has responded reasonably to the risk posed by Covid-19 and that the conditions at Elkton cannot be found to violate the Eighth Amendment.”

Chief Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. dissented, writing that he was “left with the inescapable conclusion that the BOP’s failure to make use of its home confinement authority at Elkton, even as it stared down the escalating spread of the virus and a shortage of testing capacity, constitutes sufficient evidence for the district court to have found that petitioners were likely to succeed on their Eighth Amendment claim.”

habeasB191211Inmate advocates were disappointed with the ruling, but I think there were three wins in the decision for inmates. First, the BOP has argued in this case as well as in other pending cases elsewhere that inmates could not proceed on habeas corpus, but instead had to use a cumbersome procedure that would not have permitted as a remedy the release of inmates. The Court roundly dismissed this argument, holding that the claim being made can proceed on a 28 USC § 2241 habeas corpus petition.

Second, the Court swept aside BOP arguments that the inmates had to “exhaust” administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. This would have required each inmate plaintiff to file administrative remedies to the warden, then the regional BOP office, and final with the BOP in Washington, a cumbersome and largely futile procedure that would have consumed six months before a suit could even be brought.

Finally, the Court held that

“petitioners have provided evidence that they are ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’ The COVID-19 virus creates a substantial risk of serious harm leading to pneumonia, respiratory failure, or death. The BOP acknowledges that ‘[t]he health risks posed by COVID-19 are significant.’ The infection and fatality rates at Elkton have borne out the serious risk of COVID-19, despite the BOP’s efforts. The transmissibility of the COVID-19 virus in conjunction with Elkton’s dormitory-style housing—which places inmates within feet of each other—and the medically-vulnerable subclass’s health risks, presents a substantial risk that petitioners at Elkton will be infected with COVID-19 and have serious health effects as a result, including, and up to, death. Petitioners have put forth sufficient evidence that they are ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm’.”

tryhard200611This is a powerful foil to the government’s oft-repeated claim in opposing compassionate release motions that the BOP is adequately meeting inmate medical needs despite COVID-19, and that there is thus no need to protect vulnerable inmates by compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1). In other words, the 6th said that the BOP was trying, but that it was not succeeding.

That may save the BOP from 8th Amendment claims – at least at the preliminary stage of litigation such as the Elkton case – but it refutes any government claim that no one needs to go home, because the BOP is keeping everyone safe.

Wilson v. Williams, Case No. 20-3447, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18087 (6th Cir. June 9, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Unjust Sentence is an “Extraordinary and Compelling” Reason for Sentence Reduction, District Court Says – Update for November 18, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT GRANTS SENTENCE REDUCTION BECAUSE OF “INJUSTICE” OF ORIGINAL SENTENCE

Since the First Step Act passed 11 months ago, a number of observers (me included) have predicted that changes in the 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) sentence reduction procedures that let a defendant petition the district court directly if the Bureau of Prisons failed to do so could be the most consequential provision in the new law.

Sentencestack170404Last week, a district court in Nebraska granted a sentence reduction filed by a defendant whose whopping 895-month sentence for drug trafficking and three stacked 18 USC § 924(c) counts. As you recall,  § 924(c) conviction adds a consecutive sentence of at least five years for using or carrying a gun during a drug or violent crime, increasing to a minimum 25 years for a subsequent offense. Due to poor draftsmanship, the statute has been applied so that if a defendant sold pot while carrying a gun on Monday, did it again on Tuesday and again on Wednesday, and then was caught, he or she would face maybe 41 months or so for the pot sales, but a mandatory additional time of five year, 25 years and 25 years, for a whopping 58 years plus in prison. The First Step Act clarified the statute, so that the 25 year subsequent 924(c) offense had to be committed after conviction for a prior offense.

However, to appease the Sen. Tom Cottons (R-Arkansas) of the world, the First Step change was not retroactive. That left a lot of people stranded with unconscionable sentences. People like Jerry Urkevich.

The government opposed Jerry’s sentence reduction motion, arguing that just because he could not have gotten more than 368 months after First Step passed does not make his sentence reduction motion argument “extraordinary and compelling” (as required by the statute). Furthermore, the government argued, even if the defendant’s sentence were cut, he would still have about half of it to serve, making his motion “premature.”

extraordinary191118The court rejected the government’s arguments, noting that the list of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in Guideline 1B1.13 Note 1 that justify a sentence reduction is not exclusive. Instead, there is a catch-all provision providing that there can be an “extraordinary and compelling reason” other than medical, age or family. That, the judge said, allows a court to consider § 3553(a) factors, as well as criteria in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement.

Although the Sentencing Commission has not amended 1B1.13 since First Step passed, the court said it “infers that the Commission would apply the same criteria, including the catch-all provision… and that this Court may use Application Note 1(D) as a basis for finding extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce a sentence.” Here, the court said, a reduction in sentence was warranted by “the injustice of facing a term of incarceration forty years longer than Congress now deems warranted for the crimes committed.”

The court also rejected the government’s strange and unsupported argument that a sentence reduction cannot be granted unless it results in immediate release. “If this Court reduces the defendant’s sentences on [two 924(c) counts] to 60 months each, consecutive,” the judge wrote, “he will not be eligible for immediate release. His sentence would total 368 months, and he would have served somewhat more than half that sentence. Nonetheless, the Court does not consider the Motion premature. A reduction in the sentence at this juncture will help the defendant and the Bureau of Prisons plan for his ultimate release from custody and may assist him in his pending efforts to seek clemency from the Executive Branch.”

In his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote, “I have made much of a key provision of the First Step Act which now allows federal courts to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. I see this provision as such a big deal because I think, if applied appropriately and robustly, this provision could and should enable many hundreds, and perhaps many thousands, of federal prisoners to have excessive prison sentences reduced.)”

While not precisely a matter of § 3582(c) sentence reduction, the Washington Post reported last week that hundreds of relatives of murder victims, current and former law enforcement officials and former judges have signed letters urging the Trump administration to call off plans to resume federal executions next month.

death170602The letters, signed by current and former officials across the justice system as well as 175 relatives of murder victims, plead with President Trump and Attorney General William P. Barr to stop the executions, which Barr announced last summer that the Trump administration would resume on Dec. 9. The Justice Dept. said five executions were scheduled in the next two months and that more would follow.

Victims’ relatives — the largest single group to sign the letters — denounced the death penalty process as wasteful and something that only extends their grieving. “We want a justice system that holds people who commit violence accountable, reduces crime, provides healing, and is responsive to the needs of survivors,” they write. “On all these measures, the death penalty fails.”

United States v. Urkevich, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197408 (D.Neb. Nov. 14, 2019)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Another District Court finds statutory sentence reform among “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for reducing sentence by 40 years under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Nov. 16)

Washington Post, Hundreds of victims’ relatives, ex-officials ask Trump administration to halt federal executions (Nov. 12)

– Thomas L. Root

Judge Holds Change in Drug Sentence Minimums “Extraordinary” Grounds for Sentence Reduction – Update for July 10, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

We’re back after a well-deserved week off in Iceland (where the country’s five prisons each house about 30 (not a typo) inmates, who make an average of 28,000 ISK ($290.00) a month.

COURT GRANTS COMPASSIONATE RELEASE BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN DRUG MINIMUMS

A Houston federal district judge two weeks ago re-sentenced Arturo Cantu-Rivera to time served, negating two life sentences in a grant of an 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release motion.

Art was doing time on a drug charged, which had been enhanced by an 851 motion to mandatory life in 1990. The court cited his having completed over 4,000 hours of programming, his tutoring GED classes, his age of 69, and his health, calling all of this an “extraordinary degree of rehabilitation.”

extraordinary190710But as well, the judge noted that the change in the drug mandatory minimums under the First Step Act was part of the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis: “Finally, the Court recognizes as a factor in this combination the fundamental change to sentencing policy carried out in the First Step Act’s elimination of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence solely by reason of a defendant’s prior convictions… The combination of all of these factors establishes the extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying the reduction in sentence in this case.”

Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Canto-Rivera, Case No. H 89-204 (SD Tex, June 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root