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Court Reminds That Some Supervised Release Provisions Are Constitutional Duds – Update for November 22, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SLEEPERS

A 9th Circuit decision last week reminded me that countless defendants have judgments in their cases that contain some sleeper supervised release terms of dubious constitutionality.

sleeper191122Until Guidelines Amendment 803 in November 2016, standard conditions of supervised release included a requirement that a defendant “support his… dependents and meet other family responsibilities,” that he “work regularly at a lawful occupation,” and that he “notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” Both the 7th and 9th Circuits have struck those standard conditions as being unconstitutionally vague under United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 2015).

Those conditions still purportedly apply to tens of thousands of prisoners when they are released, and can probably be addressed on or near release with a motion under 18 USC § 3583(e).

United States v. Ped, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 34092 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

District Court Cuts Life Sentence for Crack – Update for November 21, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT CUTS LIFE SENTENCE FOR CRACK CCE

It has been a difficult ten months for some people seeking reduced sentences under the Fair Sentencing Act. DOJ says that 1,987 people have gotten sentence cuts, but as I noted last week, the government has dug in its heels on many more movants, arguing in many FSA cases that crack prisoners should be dinged with every gram of drug and Guideline enhancement imagined by the presentence report.

That’s why a recent district court FSA decision from the Northern District of New York to reduce a defendant’s life sentence to time served is so heartening.

life161207In 1997, Tommy Walker was convicted of a continuing criminal enterprise and drug conspiracy, and sentenced to life based on a mandatory minimum sentence imposed because the CCE involved more than 300 times the “5 grams or more” quantity of cocaine base penalized in 21 USC 841(b)(1)(B). However, as the court out it, “if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time, the quantity of cocaine base penalized in 21 USC 841(b)(1)(B) would have been 28 grams or more,” meaning that to get a life sentence, Tommy would have had to be involved with 8.4 kilograms, far more than the 1.5 kg found in the presentence report.

That did not matter, the government said, because the Sentencing Guidelines enhancements that would have been applied under current law if the mandatory minimum life sentence did not apply put Tommy in the 360-life guidelines sentencing range, so the life sentence should stand.

The court rejected the government analysis, noting that one of the enhancements – maintaining a premises for drug distribution – did not exist when Tommy was sentenced, and anyway, the fact about maintaining a premises “was not an element of the charged crimes and did not affect Defendant’s original sentence, and therefore, he would have had little reason to contest it.”

It helped that Tommy had served more than the minimum sentence under his 292-360 month range, was 62 years old, and had “completed his GED, taken extensive educational courses, and excelled at jobs including electrician, law library clerk, and hospital companion, earning strong endorsements from various prison officials. He has also served as a mentor to other prisoners, who have submitted testimonials on his behalf. In short, Defendant has used his time in custody to better himself and help others.”

rehab160812The district court held that in Tommy’s case, “a reduced sentence is consistent with the purposes of the First Step Act and Congress’s intent to remedy the disproportionate impact of the statutory penalties applied to crack cocaine offenses prior to 2010, and to eliminate the disparity between Defendant and those sentenced thereafter.” The district court sentenced him to 340 months, which was time served, a sentence that reflected “the severity of the crimes committed by Defendant, while recognizing his efforts at rehabilitation.”

Don’t underestimate the power of a good disciplinary record and programming.

Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Walker, Case No. 95-CR-101(NDNY, Oct. 25, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes to Hear Another ACCA Case – Update for November 20, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT GRANT CERTIORARI TO ANOTHER ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL CASE

In the last few years, it’s been a great time to be an armed career criminal. Not really (we don’t recommend doing it at any time), but the Armed Career Criminal Act has been the focus of the Court’s attention both directly (Johnson v. United States, Mathis v. United States and Rehaif v. United States) as well as indirectly (United States v. Beckles, Sessions v. Dimaya and United States v. Davis).

Robber160229A quick primer: 18 USC 922(g) provides that certain classes of people – convicted felons, drug abusers, fugitives, illegal aliens – are prohibited from possessing guns and ammo (the actual items, not just the magazine). If you are convicted of a § 922(g) offense, you face a maximum of 10 years in prison. But, if you have three prior convictions for drug felonies, crimes of violence or a combination of the two, you fall under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 USC § 924(e)), and your penalty starts at 15 years and goes all the way to life in prison.

Ever since the 2016 Supreme Court decision in Voisine v. United States, most appellate courts have been holding that a crime committed with a mens rea of recklessness was enough to establish the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Junior Walton discovered 13 bullets in a rooming house that he managed and removed them for safekeeping. He was convicted of possessing ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 USC 922(g)(1) and sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act to 15 years. The application of the ACCA turned on whether one of his past convictions, which could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness, qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s force clause.

The district court said it did not. The 6th Circuit, with several dissenting judges, said it did in an en banc proceeding. Last week, the Supreme Court granted cert to Junior on the question of whether a criminal offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness can qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.

The case, which will be decided by the end of June 2020, could further limit the kinds of prior convictions that will support an ACCA sentence. Just in time, too: last week Attorney General William Barr announced a new DOJ initiative, Project Guardian, intended to “increase scrutiny of people convicted of violent felonies or domestic violence, potentially reducing their access to firearms.”

Walker v United States, Case No. 19-373 (cert. granted Nov. 15)

New York Times, Justice Dept. Unveils Gun Plan, Sidestepping a Preoccupied Washington (Nov. 13)

– Thomas L. Root

Smarter Sentencing Act Back In The Senate Hopper – Update for November 19, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SMARTER SENTENCING ACT RE-INTRODUCED IN SENATE
Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah)
Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah)

The Smarter Sentencing Act, a bill intended to further reduce drug mandatory minimum sentences, was reintroduced in the Senate last week by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) and Mike Lee (R-Utah), both members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. As of the date of this report, we have no bill number to associate with the legislation.

Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois)
Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois)

A lot of what had been contained in prior versions of the SSA, a bill which has been introduced in every Congress since 2013, was included in the First Step Act. What the current version contains is unclear, because the text of the proposed bill has not yet been released. However, Durbin’s office said “the central remaining sentencing reform in the Lee-Durbin legislation would reduce mandatory minimum penalties for certain nonviolent drug offenses.”

In the last iteration of the bill, S.1933 (115th Congress, 2017-18), the bill proposed an expanded “safety valve” under 18 USC § 3553(f) to allow a court to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum for an otherwise eligible drug offender who has three or fewer criminal history points. This change was incorporated into the First Step Act. Also, last year’s SSA reduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses specified in 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B):

•  from 10 years to 5 years for a first-time high-level offense (e.g., one kilogram or more of heroin),

•  from 20 years to 10 years for a high-level offense after one prior felony drug offense,

•  from life to 25 years for a high-level offense after two or more prior felony drug offenses,

•  from 5 years to 2 years for a first-time low-level offense (e.g., 100 to 999 grams of heroin), and

•  from 10 years to 5 years for a low-level offense after one prior felony drug offense.

The First Step Act incorporated the life-to-25 year and the 20-to-15 year reductions, but not the remainders.

Additionally, last year’s SSA made existing mandatory minimums inapplicable to a defendant who functions a courier; and establishes new, shorter mandatory minimum prison terms for a courier.

The current version of the Smarter Sentencing Act “gives federal judges the authority to conduct individualized reviews to determine the appropriate sentences for certain nonviolent drug offenses,” Durbin said in a press release.

BILL-DOA191120Lee said, “The SSA will give judges the flexibility and discretion they need to impose stiff sentences on the most serious drug lords and cartel bosses, while enabling nonviolent offenders to return more quickly to their families and communities.”

The bill is cosponsored by ten Democratic senators, including three presidential contenders, making the likelihood it will pass in the Senate virtually zero.

The Justice Roundtable, Durbin, Lee Reintroduce Smarter Sentencing Act (Nov. 16)

– Thomas L. Root

Unjust Sentence is an “Extraordinary and Compelling” Reason for Sentence Reduction, District Court Says – Update for November 18, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT GRANTS SENTENCE REDUCTION BECAUSE OF “INJUSTICE” OF ORIGINAL SENTENCE

Since the First Step Act passed 11 months ago, a number of observers (me included) have predicted that changes in the 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) sentence reduction procedures that let a defendant petition the district court directly if the Bureau of Prisons failed to do so could be the most consequential provision in the new law.

Sentencestack170404Last week, a district court in Nebraska granted a sentence reduction filed by a defendant whose whopping 895-month sentence for drug trafficking and three stacked 18 USC § 924(c) counts. As you recall,  § 924(c) conviction adds a consecutive sentence of at least five years for using or carrying a gun during a drug or violent crime, increasing to a minimum 25 years for a subsequent offense. Due to poor draftsmanship, the statute has been applied so that if a defendant sold pot while carrying a gun on Monday, did it again on Tuesday and again on Wednesday, and then was caught, he or she would face maybe 41 months or so for the pot sales, but a mandatory additional time of five year, 25 years and 25 years, for a whopping 58 years plus in prison. The First Step Act clarified the statute, so that the 25 year subsequent 924(c) offense had to be committed after conviction for a prior offense.

However, to appease the Sen. Tom Cottons (R-Arkansas) of the world, the First Step change was not retroactive. That left a lot of people stranded with unconscionable sentences. People like Jerry Urkevich.

The government opposed Jerry’s sentence reduction motion, arguing that just because he could not have gotten more than 368 months after First Step passed does not make his sentence reduction motion argument “extraordinary and compelling” (as required by the statute). Furthermore, the government argued, even if the defendant’s sentence were cut, he would still have about half of it to serve, making his motion “premature.”

extraordinary191118The court rejected the government’s arguments, noting that the list of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in Guideline 1B1.13 Note 1 that justify a sentence reduction is not exclusive. Instead, there is a catch-all provision providing that there can be an “extraordinary and compelling reason” other than medical, age or family. That, the judge said, allows a court to consider § 3553(a) factors, as well as criteria in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement.

Although the Sentencing Commission has not amended 1B1.13 since First Step passed, the court said it “infers that the Commission would apply the same criteria, including the catch-all provision… and that this Court may use Application Note 1(D) as a basis for finding extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce a sentence.” Here, the court said, a reduction in sentence was warranted by “the injustice of facing a term of incarceration forty years longer than Congress now deems warranted for the crimes committed.”

The court also rejected the government’s strange and unsupported argument that a sentence reduction cannot be granted unless it results in immediate release. “If this Court reduces the defendant’s sentences on [two 924(c) counts] to 60 months each, consecutive,” the judge wrote, “he will not be eligible for immediate release. His sentence would total 368 months, and he would have served somewhat more than half that sentence. Nonetheless, the Court does not consider the Motion premature. A reduction in the sentence at this juncture will help the defendant and the Bureau of Prisons plan for his ultimate release from custody and may assist him in his pending efforts to seek clemency from the Executive Branch.”

In his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote, “I have made much of a key provision of the First Step Act which now allows federal courts to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. I see this provision as such a big deal because I think, if applied appropriately and robustly, this provision could and should enable many hundreds, and perhaps many thousands, of federal prisoners to have excessive prison sentences reduced.)”

While not precisely a matter of § 3582(c) sentence reduction, the Washington Post reported last week that hundreds of relatives of murder victims, current and former law enforcement officials and former judges have signed letters urging the Trump administration to call off plans to resume federal executions next month.

death170602The letters, signed by current and former officials across the justice system as well as 175 relatives of murder victims, plead with President Trump and Attorney General William P. Barr to stop the executions, which Barr announced last summer that the Trump administration would resume on Dec. 9. The Justice Dept. said five executions were scheduled in the next two months and that more would follow.

Victims’ relatives — the largest single group to sign the letters — denounced the death penalty process as wasteful and something that only extends their grieving. “We want a justice system that holds people who commit violence accountable, reduces crime, provides healing, and is responsive to the needs of survivors,” they write. “On all these measures, the death penalty fails.”

United States v. Urkevich, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197408 (D.Neb. Nov. 14, 2019)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Another District Court finds statutory sentence reform among “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for reducing sentence by 40 years under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Nov. 16)

Washington Post, Hundreds of victims’ relatives, ex-officials ask Trump administration to halt federal executions (Nov. 12)

– Thomas L. Root

Not Quite A Felon Yet… – Update for November 13, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

REHAIF REVERSES UNSENTENCED-FELON-IN-POSSESSION CASE

gunknot181009Chris Davies pled guilty to a pair of Iowa felonies. Before he was sentenced, he was caught with a gun.

Last week, the 8th Circuit relied on Rehaif v. United States to reverse the 18 USC § 922(g) conviction for being a felon in possession of a gun.

Chris had argued that he wasn’t a felon, because he had not been sentenced for the Iowa felonies yet. The Circuit rejected that claim, holding he was convicted when his guilty plea was accepted.

But whether he knew he was a convicted felon was something else. The government argued Chris acknowledged when he pled guilty to the Iowa felonies that he understood that each carried a maximum sentence of up to five years. The government said that proved Chris knew he was in a class of people not allowed to have guns.

idontknow170718The 8th disagreed, holding that while Chris knew he had pled guilty to the Iowa felonies, the facts “do not show that he knew he had been convicted of the Iowa felonies. In other words, the facts indicate he knew the offenses to which he was pleading guilty would ultimately qualify him to be charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, but there is no evidence that he knew when he possessed the firearms… before his sentencing that he had been convicted of those crimes. Indeed, it seems reasonable that someone in Chris’s position, after pleading guilty, might nevertheless think he could possess firearms because he had not yet been sentenced.”

United States v. Davies, 2019 U.S.App.LEXIS 33483 (8th Cir. Nov. 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

DOJ Works to Undermine Fair Sentencing Act in Name of ‘Fairness’ – Update for November 12, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THIS COMES AS NO SURPRISE

strict191112The Department of Justice is interpreting the First Step Act in a way that keeps more inmates serving crack sentences behind bars longer, even as President Trump touts his administration’s role in passage of First Step, the law that made crack-cocaine sentence relief available to pre-Fair Sentencing Act defendants.

The Washington Post report last week confirmed what most people already know (and what Reuters reported several months ago), that DOJ is arguing that a defendant’s sentence length, when resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, should be based on the amount of crack cocaine that his or her Presentence Report found the defendant actually possessed or trafficked, rather than the amount stated in the indictment and which the jury found or the defendant pled. The Post reported that federal prosecutors have made the argument in hundreds of cases.

The distinction is crucial. The amount of crack specified in the indictment must be proven by the government to a jury. The presentence report, on the other hand, is a loosey-goosey collection of the prosecution’s version of the offense and all of the collected but unsubstantiated law enforcement gossip about the defendant that makes him or her look even worse than reality does. The standard of proof is low, the procedures amorphous, and the judge all too willing to not decide evidentiary disputes because they simply do not matter to the court in the sentencing process.

looseygoosey191112As a result, while a defendant may have been found guilty of the offense in the indictment, for instance, distribution of more than 50 grams of crack, the presentence report may cite “reliable sources” who say the defendant possessed maybe a gram a week for two years. The presentence report does some simple addition, and a total of 730 grams results.

The Post said DOJ was even seeking to reincarcerate some people already released under the retroactive FSA. One targeted former inmate was Gregory Allen, who appeared at a White House event in April to celebrate passage of the law. President Trump even called Greg to the microphone.

Before the White House event, prosecutors had lost their bid to keep Allen behind bars. Even as the President asked Greg to speak, the government was appealing its loss. DOJ dropped its appeal about two weeks after Greg’s appearance.

A DOJ spokesman defended the department’s First Step interpretation in an interview with the Post. He said DOJ’s position was justified because prosecutors in years past didn’t need to prove large amounts of drugs to obtain long prison sentences. Under today’s sentencing regime, prosecutors would likely charge the offenders with having larger drug quantities, DOJ hypothesizes. “The government’s position is that the text of the statute requires courts to look at the quantity of crack that was part of the actual crime,” the spokesman argued. “This is a fairness issue.”

Judges have rejected the DOJ interpretation in a majority of cases reviewed by the Post. But at least five federal judges have agreed with the DOJ interpretation, and others have withheld judgment until appeals courts decide the issue.

In the weeks after the bill became law, many AUSAs allowed inmate petitions for early release to go unchallenged. Then, at the direction of the DOJ, prosecutors began to reverse course, court records show. In March, AUSA Jennifer Bockhorst of ND WVa asked federal judges to place a hold on more than two dozen applications for relief, some of which she had not previously opposed. She wrote that she expected to oppose at least some of those applications based on new guidance from the Justice Department.

Some of the people who helped write the legislation also disagree, including Brett Tolman, a former US attorney in Utah. He notes that the First Step text does not explicitly instruct courts to consider the actual amount of crack an offender allegedly had. “This is not a faithful implementation of this part of the First Step Act,” Tolman told the Post. “At some point, they figured out a way to come back and argue that it wouldn’t apply to as many people.”

Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-New York), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, accused DOJ at a congressional hearing last month of “trying to sabotage” the law by interpreting it in this way.

Attorney General Barr has reportedly worried that early releases of inmates under the law will increase crime. Anonymous officials told the Post that Barr is concerned the administration will be blamed if crime increases.

A great example of the kind of blame the AG hoped to duck is illustrated by the person of Rhode Island defendant Joel Francisco, released earlier under First Step this year after 14 years into a life sentence for selling crack. We previously reported he was on the run after being charged with a murder. He has since been arrested, and last week, CNN made his crime a national story.

Also last week, a routine resentencing in Connecticut made national headlines, when Joel Soto’s 17-year sentence was cut to time served, under the lurid headine, “‘Joe Crack’ asks for reduced sentence in drug case.”

“More than 4,700 inmates have been released from prison under the law since its signing late last year,” CNN reported, “and federal officials believe Francisco is the first among them to be accused of murder. While an outlier, his case is raising questions and resurfacing concerns from detractors of the legislation.”

“cotton190502This case is upsetting but it’s not a surprise,” said Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), one of First Step’s biggest critics on Capitol Hill. “Letting violent felons out of prison early as the First Step Act did leads to more crime and more victims.”

Other lawmakers who supported the bill called the incident a tragedy, but hoped that it wouldn’t stand in the way of more progress. “If you’re looking at reforming the criminal justice system you cannot pick an individual criminal act to then raise the question as to whether or not you do reforms to the system,” said Rep. Karen Bass (D-California), a member of the House Judiciary Committee and the chair of the Congressional Black Caucus.

None of this should surprise anyone. Despite the First Step Act rhetoric, The New York Times reported last week that despite bipartisan calls to treat drug addiction as a public health issue rather than as a crime — and despite the legalization of marijuana in more states — arrests for drugs increased again last year. Such arrests have increased 15% since Trump took office.

Washington Post, Crack cocaine quantities at issue as DOJ opposes some early releases under First Step Act (Nov. 7)

ABA Journal, Crack cocaine quantities at issue as DOJ opposes some early releases under First Step Act (Nov. 8)

CNN, He was one of the first prisoners released under Trump’s criminal justice reform law. Now he’s accused of murder (Nov. 9)

Newport News, Virginia, Daily Press, ‘Joe Crack’ asks for reduced sentence in drug case (Nov. 2)

The New York Times, Is the ‘War on Drugs’ Over? Arrest Statistics Say No (Nov. 5)

– Thomas L. Root

Inmate FTCA Medical Complaints Don’t Need Expert Affidavits, Two Circuits Say – Update for November 11, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“THE LAW, IN ITS MAJESTIC EQUALITY…

anatole191111… forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread,” so goes a famous 19th-century quotation. Seldom was that better illustrated than in Federal Tort Claims Act cases brought by prisoners for medical malpractice.

There was a time I thought that complaints about poor health care in the Federal Bureau of Prisons system could be written off to inmate kvetching. After all, inmates do not want to be where they are, and beyond complaining about the alleged lousy criminal justice system that put them where they are, prisoners naturally complain about every aspect of prison – food, correctional officers, recreational opportunities – that they can conjure. But without a doubt, the principal complaint is that the BOP healthcare system is a disaster.

But I have seen too many cases where this is true. In my estimation, the problem is not that the healthcare itself. When the BOP decides that treatment is needed, that treatment is pretty good (chiefly because the specialists brought in are not government doctors, but local practitioners). As I have written about before, the difficulty is in convincing the people who populate the BOP healthcare establishment that care is needed to begin with.

drquack191111Those healthcare people usually conclude, as a first line of defense, that an inmate is malingering. I have worked on cases of a guy with a hump that erupted on his shoulder the size of a grapefruit, who asked about it for months only to have BOP physician assistants tell him (without a biopsy) that it was merely a benign lipoma. When the healthcare people grudgingly consented to have it looked at by an outside surgeon, the inmate quickly began chemotherapy, surgery and radiation – in that order – for the liposarcoma it was. I have worked on cases where inmates went blind because the BOP refused to send him for an outside vision test, which would have showed ocular hypertension, and where an inmate lost a leg to diabetes because healthcare staff argued he was lying about what was diabetic neuropathy.

When a prisoner suffers from poor healthcare, he or she may sue for medical malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act. An FTCA med-mal suit must be brought after making an administrative claim on a prescribed Department of Justice form, and is governed by the substantive malpractice law of the state in which the care was given or withheld.

As every first-year law student learns, in federal civil procedure – at least where the action is in federal court because of a diversity of citizenship of the parties – federal procedural law (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) is followed by the substantive law of the state is followed. While an FTCA action is not a diversity case, courts have ruled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply nonetheless.

And there’s the rub. In an effort to cut down on worthless med-mal claims, most state rules require that when the complaint is filed, it must be accompanied by an affidavit of an expert that the plaintiff’s cause of action has some merit. This requirement means that inmates have to pony up $2,500 to $5,000 right from jump to hire an expert in order to avoid having their FTCA claims dismissed as soon as they are filed.

witness191111That seems fair, right? After all, the requirement applies to all med-mal plaintiffs. The rich and poor alike are required to come up with thousands of dollars in order to even get a foot in the door. Anatole France would be proud – what “majestic equality!”

Last week, two circuits said otherwise. In the 6th Circuit, Dennis Gallivan had surgery while at FCI Elkton. He says the procedure was botched, and left him permanently disabled. Dennis sued under the FTCA.

The district court held that Ohio Civil Rule 10(D)(2) governed. That rule requires a person alleging medical negligence to include a medical professional’s affidavit stating that the claim has merit. Dennis didn’t have such an affidavit (or the spare $2,500-plus needed to get one), so his FTCA suit was thrown out.

Last week, the 6th Circuit reinstated Dennis’ complaint. The Federal Rules do not require such an affidavit, and thus are inconsistent with Ohio’s rule. This inconsistency is important, the Court said, because the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution means that federal rules displace inconsistent state rules, and federal rules govern the FTCA’s application.

Ironically, one of the government’s arguments against Denny’s position was that a 7th Circuit decision, Hahn v. Walsh, had previously held that a state rule requiring an affidavit could coexist with the federal rules that did not require such an affidavit. The 6th rejected that argument, only about 48 hours after a 7th Circuit decision held that Hahn did not apply to the FTCA.

The 7th addressed 735 ILCS § 5/2-622, a state statute that requires the plaintiff in a medical-malpractice suit to file an affidavit stating that “there is a reasonable and meritorious cause” for litigation. . The plaintiff needs a physician’s report to support the affidavit’s assertions. Like the 6th Circuit, the 7th held that because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 did not require such an affidavit, the Illinois statute was inconsistent, and thus did not apply to an FTCA complaint.

accessdenied191111The 7th observed that “a prisoner may have insuperable difficulty obtaining a favorable physician’s report before filing a complaint, so if a complaint not accompanied by an… affidavit is defective, many a prisoner will be unable to litigate a malpractice claim. But if a prisoner or other pro se plaintiff has until the summary judgment stage to comply with the state law, information obtained in discovery may allow a physician to evaluate the medical records and decide whether there is reasonable cause for liability.”

These cases are significant. They do not suggest that a prisoner will not need an expert: every med-mal case sooner or later requires one or more. But it does mean that a prisoner can get to the discovery stage of the proceeding, and have a greater likelihood of getting a tort lawyer to pick up the case and expenses, than he or she did before.

Gallivan v. United States, 2019 U.S.App.LEXIS 33304 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2019
Young v. United States, 2019 U.S.App.LEXIS 32944 (7th Cir. Nov. 4, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Seamy Case, Fascinating Holding – Update for November 6, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CHILD SEX CASE YIELDS FASCINATING CONSPIRACY HOLDING

pornA160829Maurice and Tonya, a couple of mutts in Oklahoma City, forced two 15-year old girls into prostitution for three weeks before law enforcement shut them down. A local businessman named Charles Anthony called the escort service the pair were using to sell the girls’ services, and he lined up a single meeting with the girls (not knowing their ages when he phoned).

When the government freed the girls and arrested Maurice and Tonya, it found records of several customers’ sordid night. Three customers, including Chuck, were indicted along with Maurice and Tonya for conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Chuck was convicted, and sentenced to the statutory mandatory-minimum 10 years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution to the two teen-aged victims in the amount of $327,000 and $308,000.

A normal reaction to this kind of prosecution is that the defendants get whatever is coming to them. Still, that’s a pretty high price for one night, especially where Chuck did not know the girls’ ages when he lined them up.  Last week, the 10th Circuit expressed grave doubts that Chuck’s conduct, however disgusting, made him a co-conspirator in the entire venture.

Chuck’s appeal, strangely enough, focused on restitution. Last week, 10th Circuit agreed that the district court should have separated the harm Chuck’s one-night assignation with the two girls had caused from the broader harm caused by weeks and weeks of sexual slavery by the two who ran the sex trafficking ring. But the more interesting discussion, because it applies generally to criminal conspiracies, was the Court’s discussion of whether Chuck’s single night made him a co-conspirator.

childpros191107Chuck claimed a variance between the indictment, which charged him with conspiring with the two who rang the ring and two other customers to operate a child-prostitution enterprise for three weeks. Chuck argued that the evidence showed that all he did was to hire the girls for one night, and that was a subset of the larger conspiracy.

The 10th Circuit agreed. The evidence, it said, proved that for three weeks Maurice and Tonya conspired to operate a prostitution enterprise, which included two minor females. Maurice and Tonya played interdependent roles to ensure the success of the enterprise: Maurice recruited and controlled the girls, while Tonya advertised the girls’ services and connected them with customers. “The government offered no evidence,” the Circuit said, that Chuck ever joined the broad conspiracy. Instead, it proved only that Chuck and Tonya agreed to arrange a single commercial sex transaction on one night.

“The main deficiency in proof,” the Court said, “concerns the second and third conspiracy elements, i.e., knowledge of the conspiracy’s objective and knowing participation in it. To demonstrate knowing participation, the evidence must show that the defendant shared a common purpose or design with his alleged coconspirators. Though the defendant need not know the existence or identity of all conspirators or the full extent of the conspiracy, he must have a general awareness of both the scope and the objective of the enterprise to be regarded as a coconspirator.”

Here, the 10th said, nothing suggests that Chuck shared his alleged coconspirators’ purpose to operate a child-prostitution enterprise throughout October 2014. From his perspective, Chuck sought to obtain the girls from Tonya to have sex with on a single night. In fact, in its closing argument, the government described the purpose of the agreement from Chuck’s perspective as ‘having sex,’ not as running a prostitution enterprise.”

Plain error - alas, Chuck's was not.
Plain error – alas, Chuck’s was not.

The sad thing is that, had his lawyers properly preserved this issue with a timely objection at trial, Chuck could have won his conspiracy count on appeal, let alone the limited argument he made that restitution liability was not appropriate. But because they did not, Chuck could only raise the matter as plain error, and on plain-error review, he could cite no other cases that had limited restitution to a smaller conspiracy.

Nonetheless, the discussion of variances and conspiracies as subsets of larger conspiracies has great applicability to drug and white-collar conspiracies, and worth the reading.

United States v. Anthony, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32605 (10th Cir. 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Losing Defendant’s Dream-Come-True – Update for November 5, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IT’S CALLED JURY NULLIFICATION

Jury nullification is that doctrine which shall never been spoken of in court. Juries can acquit anyone they want to, even when the evidence is overwhelming. The law, however, prohibits the judge or the lawyers from ever telling the jury of this power.

punchinface180423Last February, Dave Chislton sucker-punched his public defender in an Ohio courtroom after the judge sentenced Dave to 47 years in state prison for assault and arson. The punch, which broke public defender Aaron Brocker’s nose and gave him a concussion, was recorded on a deputy’s bodycam and was witnessed by a courtroom full of lawyers.

The State indicted Dave for felonious assault, but – despite all of the evidence – Dave took it to trial.

Last week, the jury nullified. There is no other description for it. Despite the video and the witnesses, Dave was acquitted. Apparently, the jury just didn’t blame him for the sucker punch.

Dave reportedly applauded the jurors and hooted at his former lawyer as he was led out of the courtroom by deputies.

Cleveland, Ohio, Plain Dealer, Man who sucker-punched attorney in the face during Cleveland court hearing found not guilty, Oct. 25, 2019

– Thomas L. Root