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4th Holds Defendant Has Right to Know About ACCA Sentence at Guilty Plea – Update for January 21, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT HOLDS LIKELY ACCA SENTENCE MUST BE MENTIONED AT PLEA HEARING

A week ago last Friday, the 4th Circuit ruled that a defendant in a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm case (18 USC § 922(g)(1)) must be told of the risk that he or she will receive a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 USC § 924(e)) at the time the guilty plea is entered.

guilty170417Anyone is entitled to plead guilty, and a lot of people do. In fact, something like 97% of all federal defendants enter guilty pleas. That could be because of the superior law enforcement work done in ensuring that only guilty people ever get indicted. Of course, it could be that the system is rigged so that most of the time, the only rational course for a defendant to pursue is to admit to whatever the government has charged him or her with, in order to save a spouse from indictment, to secure a sentence that offers some chance of release in a reasonable time frame, or just to get out of jail and into a prison setting which is sweeter than county lockup.

Nevertheless, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she gives up a panoply of constitutional rights, such as right to a trial by jury, a right to confront the accusers, the right to present evidence, the right to be found guilty only beyond a reasonable doubt. For that reason, due process and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a guilty plea be entered with the defendant aware of those rights, aware of the contents of any written plea agreement, and aware of the maximum penalty he or she faces.

changeofplea170616Jesmene Lockhart pled guilty without a plea agreement to a single § 922(g)(1) count. During a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing (which is a lengthy formal proceeding at which the defendant changes the “not guilty” plea into a “guilty” plea), the magistrate judge asked the government to “summarize the charge and the penalty.” The government said the “maximum penalty” Jesmene faced was 10 years.

This was technically correct: at that time, everyone was reading the sentencing statute, 18 USC § 924(a)(2), which specified a maximum sentence of 10 years. No one was considering whether Jesmene had prior convictions that might result in his getting a 15-year mandatory minimum ACCA sentence under § 924(e).

But as the parties prepared for sentencing, the presentence report writer uncovered Jesmene’s prior convictions, and noticed the parties that he was eligible for the ACCA 14-year mandatory minimum sentence. Jesmene fought the ACCA designation, arguing that the convictions were too remote (he had been 16 years old), too close in time to one another, and statutorily exempt. Nothing worked.

What Jesmene did not try to do was to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds it was not knowing and voluntary, because has was not told he could get an ACCA sentence. On appeal, even under the tougher “plain error” standard (because his trial court lawyer had not raised the issue), Jesmene claimed his guilty plea was involuntary because he had not been told about the possible ACCA sentence. He contended the benefit he gained from pleading guilty – a reduction from the bottom of his ACCA guideline range of 188 months to 180 months – was “so small as to be virtually non-existent.” Had he known about the risk of an ACCA sentence and how little a plea deal would help him, Jesmene contended, he would have had strong incentive to go to trial to try to avoid the 15-year ACCA sentence altogether.

plea161116In a January 10 en banc opinion, the 4th Circuit held that Jesmene had met the plain error standard: the failure to inform him of the ACCA sentence at the change-of-plea was an error, it was plain, it affected his substantial rights, and “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The Circuit cited national statistics that felon-in-possession defendants only go to trial 3% of the time, but ACCA defendants choose trial 13.5% of the time, and noted that the difference in Jesmene’s guidelines as a non-ACCA defendant and under the ACCA was 125 months. Plus, his very old criminal history (three burglaries within a short time span when he was 16 years old) suggested that Jesmene, being unaware of the ACCA risk, would reasonably have expected to be sentenced at the bottom of his 46-57 month advisory guideline range. By contrast, the only benefit he got from pleading guilty to an ACCA was an 8-month break for acceptance of responsibility.

The 4th said, “the magistrate judge’s failure to inform Lockhart of the correct sentencing range was an obvious and significant mistake. Such an error undermines the very purpose of Rule 11 that a defendant be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him and of the consequences of his guilty plea… As a result of this error,  Lockhart had every reason to think after the plea hearing that he would receive a sentence within the stated statutory range of between zero and 120 months’ imprisonment…”

United States v. Lockhart, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 822 (4th Cir. Jan 10, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP Issues Earned Time Credit Program List – Update for January 20, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP ROLLS OUT FINAL PIECE OF FIRST STEP ACT

teeth200120For those who have been living in a cave for the past 18 months, let’s start with some background. Congress passed the First Step Act in December 2018, the first significant criminal justice legislation in 30 years or so. The public relations centerpiece of the Act was a program to be implemented by the Bureau of Prisons that would assess inmates not just for security risks (something that the BOP has done since the Feds took their first prisoner – the guy who stole General Washington’s wooden teeth – almost two and a half centuries ago), but for the inmate’s risk of recidivism and his or her programming needs that would presumably reduce the chance of reoffending.

The program would then match the inmates with prison programs that would address those needs. Inmates who successfully completed the various programs would be granted “earned-time credits” which could be used for additional halfway house or home confinement. The first 12 months’ worth of credit could even be applied to reduce sentence length by a year.

tortoise190722The Act gave the BOP ample grace period to adopt the assessment tool and implement programming, but time finally ran out yesterday. And just under the wire, last Wednesday the Dept. of Justice announced implementation of the final recidivism and needs assessment program, known by the acronym PATTERN. The final version contains several minor changes from last summer’s draft, alterations made in response to public comments filed last fall. Two days later, the BOP published a list of the programs it currently has or will be adopting, and announced the beginning of earned time credits for federal inmates for completing programing intended to reduce recidivism.

“Beginning today, inmates will have even greater incentive to participate in evidence-based programs that prepare them for productive lives after incarceration,” Attorney General William Barr was quoted as saying in last week’s DOJ press release. “The First Step Act is an important reform to our criminal justice system, and the Department of Justice is committed to implementing the Act fully and fairly.”

The principal change in PATTERN was to add a dynamic measure of an inmate’s “infraction free” period during incarceration, adding a number of prior programs and UNICOR to the programs that benefitted a prisoner’s PATTERN score, and removing metrics for age at first arrest and voluntary surrender from the PATTERN assessment matrix. PATTERN will also no longer look at whether an inmate participated in education or drug treatment programs to measure initial recidivism risk.

Critics had complained that the draft’s focus on an inmate’s prior run-ins with the criminal justice system weighted the system so that minorities generally would be classified as greater recidivism risks than would white inmates.

EBProg200120The list of “evidence based” programs that can qualify an inmate for earned time credits, published last Friday on the BOP site, identified 70 programs, almost all of which will be available at all BOP facilities. The list included some unsurprising ones, such as working at UNICOR, vocational programs, all drug programs, GED and ESL. As well, many new programs, many aimed as cognitive behavior therapy to address everything from food disorders, insomnia, gambling and anger management.

Each program entry in the BOP release lists the program, duration, number of hours’ earned time credit the program earns, locations where the program is offered, and needs the program addresses. For example, one of the 70 programs is called BRAVE (Bureau Rehabilitation and Values Enhancement), a cognitive behavior therapy program for young males on their first offense, will run for six months, 20 hours per week, and earn an inmate completing the program 500 hours of earned time credit. The program, which addresses programs with antisocial peers and cognitions, will be offered at FCI Beckley and Victorville.

The publication contains no explanation of how the BOP intends to convert earned time credit hours into days, which is what First Step contemplated. In the case of a continuing activity like UNICOR, the program list states inmates can earn 500 earned time credit hours, but it does not specify over what period of time or if that 500 hours is just a one-time award.

falsehope170206The First Step Act authorized the BOP to award earned-time credits retroactively to the adoption date of the Act, but the agency has said nothing about doing so. Inmates have had high hopes that such credits would be granted, but long-time observers – including the undersigned – held out little hope that the BOP would take any discretionary step that conferred a benefit on inmates. So far, even a little hope has proven to be too much.

The BOP list of programs is available here.

DOJ, Department of Justice Announces Enhancements to the Risk Assessment System and Updates on First Step Act Implementation (Jan. 15)

BOP, Evidence-based Recidivism Reduction (EBRR) Programs and Productive Activities (PA) (Jan. 17)

– Thomas L. Root

“Friends” are Friends When The Court Says They Are – Update for January 15, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAN I BE YOUR (NEXT) FRIEND?

Prisoner Walter Cardin prepared a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 motion attacking his white-collar fraud conviction, due on June 8th. But two days before the filing, the Bureau of Prisons hauled him from his prison  to the hospital. Lucky for Walt, his sister Natalie had been helping him and had a copy of draft motion.

Nextfriend200115

Natalie filed the motion, signing the draft “Walt Cardin by Natalie Cardin,” and declaring “under penalty of perjury” that she was “attorney in fact, P.P. for Walt Cardin” and that he was incarcerated and “otherwise unavailable to sign this motion and submit it in a timely manner.” On June 8, Walt was released from the hospital and returned to prison.

The district court sat on the motion for a few months, and then invited the government to argue that the motion was improper because of Natalie’s signature. The government obligingly responded, arguing the motion should be dismissed on the ground that Natalie lacked standing to file it as a “next friend” for her brother.

Walt responded by amending the § 2255 motion to add his signature, along with a statement from his case manager that he had been in the hospital at the time the § 2255 motion was filed and a copy of the power of attorney he had given Natalie months earlier, well before the June 8th submission.

A full 21 months after the § 2255 motion was filed, the district court held that Natalie had failed “provide an adequate explanation” as to why Walt himself could not have filed the original § 2255 motion and to show that she was “truly dedicated” to Walt’s best interests when she filed it. The court threw out Walt’s post-conviction motion without considering the § 2255 pleading on its merits at all.

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed. The Circuit observed that the “next friend” doctrine determines when a collateral motion brought by a person who does not have standing to pursue the motion should be deemed brought by a person who does. A “next friend” does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person.

There are two requirements to be a “next friend:” First, the filer must provide an adequate explanation — such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability — why the person he or she is filing for (called the real party in interest) cannot bring the motion himself. Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to file.

The district court rejected Walt’s explanations in his amendment, holding that it was up to Natalie – not Walt – to show that she qualified as a “next friend.” The 6th Circuit said that was wrong: “That the putative next friend bears the burden of proving her status does not mean that the prisoner’s own views, when he can express them, are beside the point. To the contrary, courts routinely consider the prisoner’s statements in determining whether a putative next friend is an actual one.”

delayed200115The district court also thought Walt’s explanation was inadequate because he should have filed the motion earlier in the one-year limitations period for such motions specified in 28 USC § 2255(f)(1). “But that reasoning would shorten from 365 days to 362 the limitations period specified by Congress,” the 6th Circuit said. “The reality is that a great deal of legal work typically gets done in the 72 hours before a filing deadline. The courts should not impose on litigants (much less pro se ones) standards of diligence that nobody meets in practice.”

Practically speaking, the decision – which sent the § 2255 motion back to district court for a ruling on its merits – will have little impact on Walt. He has served his sentence, having been released 11 months ago. And so grind the wheels of justice…

Cardin v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 617 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Correcting Your Sentence After Courts Admit a Mistake Gets Harder – Update for January 14, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH CIRCUIT REFUSES § 2241 MOTION ON CIRCUIT SENTENCING STATUTE REINTERPRETATIONS

habeasB191211Since the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, post-conviction habeas corpus motions brought under 28 USC § 2255 have pretty much been one-to-a-customer. A prisoner is entitled to file a second § 2255 motion only where the Supreme Court had issued a constitutional ruling made retroactive (such as 2015’s Johnson v. United States) or where prisoners discover new compelling evidence that they are actually innocent of the offense of conviction.

But § 2255 has a “savings” clause in subsection (e), that lets a prisoner file a classic habeas corpus action under 28 USC § 2241 if the  § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Supreme Court held in the 1997 Bousley v. United States decision that if there is a change in statutory interpretation (but not a constitutional violation) that makes a prisoner actually innocent of the crime of conviction, the § 2255(e) “savings” clause applies.

magnacarta200116

For those who came in late: Section 2241 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code establishes procedures for petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. It establishes the rules for exercising that ancient (think Magna Carta) right to petition the courts whenever one is being detained (jailed or imprisoned) unconstitutionally or contrary to law. It may be the most valuable right anyone has anywhere (that’s why they call it “the Great Writ“).

But when the writ of habeas corpus is aimed not at the jailer, but instead at the constitutionality of the federal court proceeding that got you to prison in the first place, Congress wrote a separate statute – 28 USC § 2255 – to govern those proceedings. A third section, 28 USC § 2254, addresses procedures for state prisoners who have exhausted their habeas rights in state court, and have to head off to federal court.

manyguns190423Now, back to the live action… Just about every federal prisoner files his or her one-and-only § 2255 motion. You have a year from the time your conviction is final, so it is very much a use-it-or-lose-it proposition. But what if (as often happens) you discover something new that could get you released, but the discovery comes after the year passes? Take our hypothetical defendant, Smith N. Wesson. Unsurprisingly, Smith was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 922(g), despite the fact that he did not know that his prior state conviction was a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor. A felony made him ineligible to possess a gun, a misdemeanor did not. Smith’s lack of knowledge that he was breaking the law made no difference: he would have nonetheless have been guilty. Up until last June, it was not necessary that Smith know he was prohibited from possessing a gun. He only had to know that thing he was carrying was a gun rather than, say, a toaster. And if our man Smith knew anything, he knew guns.

But in June 2019, the Supreme Court threw Smith a bone. It held in Rehaif v. United States that a § 922(g) defendant had to know that he or she was in a class of people prohibited from possessing firearms. After Rehaif, Smith would not be guilty of the crime.

Rehaif was not a decision on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g). Instead, it was just an interpretation of what the statute said. What it had always said, the Supremes said, but none of the courts of appeal had ever under understood that.

gunknot181009But Rehaif put Smith in a quandary: although he was as innocent as a lamb, Smith had already used his § 2255 rights several years before, and he thus could not file a second § 2255 unless he met the narrow criteria. And he definitely did not. But he could file a § 2241 petition, because the § 2255(e) savings clause applies.

Most circuits (not the 10th and 11th) hold that even where a later Supreme Court decision affects only a prisoner’s sentence, not just the prisoner’s conviction, he or she may file a § 2241 petition to get relief. The 4th Circuit has gone further: in the 2018 United States v Wheeler decision, the 4th said that prisoners barred from filing a second § 2255 motion may seek habeas relief under 28 USC § 2241 based on new statutory interpretation decisions from circuit courts of appeal, not just the Supreme Court.

All of which brings us to today’s case. Ramon Hueros got a drug distribution sentence under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A), the mandatory minimum time for which was doubled from 10 to 20 years because he had been previously convicted of two state drug convictions. After a 9th Circuit and 4th Circuit decision held those prior state convictions were not really felonies at all (which meant Ramon should never have gotten a 240-month minimum federal sentence), he filed for relief. He had previously filed and lost a § 2255 motion, so he filed a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus under the “savings” clause.

limitone170912Last week, the 6th Circuit ruled 2-1 that Ramon was not entitled to use the § 2255(e) savings clause (and thus, file a 2241 motion) based on a new court of appeals decision changing statutory interpretation. “Although the 4th Circuit has blessed an identical request [in the 2018 decision, United States v. Wheeler], we must respectfully decline. Among our reasons: Congress allowed prisoners to file a second § 2255 motion only if the Supreme Court adopts a new rule of constitutional law… We would write this limit out of the statute if we held that new rules from the circuit courts (whether of statutory or constitutional law) could render 2255 inadequate or ineffective and trigger the right to a second round of litigation under 2241.”

The Circuit said a § 2255 remedy is not ineffective unless a prisoner identifies a new Supreme Court decision – not just a circuit court decision – reinterpreting a statute. The AEDPA history, as well as the practical effects of holding otherwise – such as gutting the efficacy of the § 2255(f) time requirements – suggest that circuit court statutory rulings should not fall under the § 2255(e) savings clause.

This may finally be the savings clause decision that makes it to the Supreme Court, where the Court will impose national uniformity on use of the clause to bring 2241 challenges where statutes are reinterpreted to make what was once illegal now legal.

Hueso v. Barnhart, 2020 U.S.App. LEXIS 618 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP Slouches Toward First Step Programming – Update for January 13, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

EARNED TIME CREDITS – THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS

devil200113Probably the biggest selling point used by First Step Act supporters when Congress passed the measure in December 2018 was that the bill would deliver evidence-based programming to reduce recidivism. The inmates would be assessed under a new program that accurately gauged their likelihood to be recidivists and their needs that should be met to reduce that likelihood. The inmates would benefit, the public would benefit, the overcrowded and understaffed prisons would benefit, the U.S. Treasury would benefit. Everyone’s a winner!

The programming to reduce recidivism, after more than a year of preparation, is supposed to begin in a week. But the devil’s in the details, and hope for a broad rollout that meets the expectations of First Step backers, let alone those of inmates, is dwindling rapidly.

recividists160314By now, virtually all inmates have undergone an initial assessment under PATTERN, the new risk and needs assessment program developed in response to the First Step Act. According to the Act (a provision now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3621(h)(1)(B)), the Bureau of Prisons is to begin to expand the most effective evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities it currently offers and to add any new evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and productive activities necessary to effectively implement First Step by Jan. 20. Subsection (h)(2)(A) gives the BOP until Jan. 20, 2022, to provide such programming for all inmates. During the “phase in” period, priority placement in the programs is to go to people closest to their release date.

As an incentive for participating in the programs, the First Step Act provides eligible inmates with earned-time credits which can be used toward increasing pre-release custody (halfway house and/or home confinement) or swapping time inside the BOP for more supervised release. A Bloomberg Law article described it last week like this: “Earned time credits… do not reduce a prisoner’s sentence, per se, but rather allow eligible prisoners to serve their sentence outside prison walls.”

winner200113But for a lot of reasons the question of whether the BOP is anywhere close to meeting the First Step Act’s timetable remains open. First, as the BOP admitted two weeks ago, PATTERN has not yet been adopted in its final form. Although the BOP has promised to identify its existing programs that will award inmates earned-time credits, it has not yet done so. What’s more, a surprising large number of federal inmates will not be eligible to receive earned time credits because the BOP has determined they are excluded by one or more of the 65 categories of crime or immigration statute exempted from the program by Congress.

The current limits on time in a halfway house (up to 12 months) and home confinement (the lesser of six months or 10% of the sentence) specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) will not apply to earned time credits. Thus, an inmate can be released to more than a year of halfway house or home confinement after accumulating earned time credits.

Bloomberg Law reported last week that any earned-time credits inmates receive for completing programs prior to the final implementation of the PATTERN tool – whenever that will be – will not be eligible for redemption until the tool is implemented. What’s more, the article reported, “the ability to start earning credits may not actually come for most prisoners until even later than that, depending on how long it takes the BOP to apply PATTERN and create programming and productive activities and assign prisoners to them.”

prisonrace200113PATTERN was the subject of a House Judiciary Committee Oversight hearing last October, where some experts expressed concern about its “racial bias and lack of transparency, fairness, and scientific validity.” The Dept. of Justice has not said how close PATTERN is to being finalized, stating only that it “is currently undergoing fine-tuning.” Indications are that inmates that have been scored so far have been analyzed under a preliminary version of the tool. Last July, DOJ estimates were that the final PATTERN program would be in place by Thanksgiving 2019.

A further impediment to full implementation of earned-time credit program will be the availability of halfway house beds. In most of the country, there is a shortage of available halfway house beds for federal inmates. The Act provides no additional funding or resources for the BOP to increase the loss of halfway house beds, which was at crisis levels several years ago.

“The BOP has a long history of acting in ways that result in lengthier and less productive terms of incarceration despite the obvious will of Congress,” David E. Patton, executive director of the nonprofit Federal Defenders of New York, was quoted as saying by the Washington Post. “For decades the BOP took an unreasonably restrictive view of good time, resulting in thousands of years of additional overall prison time. For decades it refused to exercise the authority given to it by Congress to release incarcerated people who were terminally ill, infirm, or otherwise suffered from extraordinary circumstances… and for decades it has not provided enough vocational, educational, mental health, and substance abuse programming despite abundant need and lengthy waitlists.” Pointing to DOJ data, Patton said wait lists include 25,000 prisoners for prison work assignments, 15,000 for vocational and educational training and 5,000 for drug treatment.

The Washington Post said last week that almost half of BOP prisoners complete no programs, more than half don’t get needed drug treatment, more than 80% haven’t taken technical or vocational courses, and more than 90% have no prison industry employment, according to data.

Help-Wanted180221“The BOP is struggling to fulfill the requirements of the Act as the Bureau is still more than 4,000 positions short,” Shane Fausey, president of the American Federation of Government Employees Council of Prison Locals, told the Post. He complained of “abusive overtime and mandatory double shifts,” adding that requirements of the First Step Act have worsened the crisis.

BOP Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer told the House oversight committee last October that the understaffing was over 3,700 vacancies and said resolving that “is among my highest priorities… but doing so will take time.”

Bloomberg Law, Insight: The First Step Act—Earned Time Credits on the Horizon (Jan. 9)

Washington Post, Federal prison reform has bipartisan support. But it’s moving slowly. (Jan. 9)

– Thomas L. Root

First Birthday for First Step – Update for January 10, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ANNIVERSARY OF FIRST STEP

The first anniversary of the First Step Act, which passed just before Christmas, generated a few observations in the media. USA Today ran an opinion piece that said “the sweeping measure has succeeded over the past year in reducing the number of people serving unjust sentences in our federal prison system. It has been estimated that the measure would impact more than 12,000 cases a year.”

Michael Deegan-McCree, who heads The Bail Project and had worked with #cut50, wrote that the real achievement of First Step was that it led to bipartisanship in an era that lacks it. “From my vantage point, and that of many others who fought for the federal act, the true success of this legislation a year out is the example it has set for bipartisan cooperation in criminal justice reform on the state level — where nearly all incarceration cases begin and the majority remain. The legislation has given Democrats and Republicans political cover and the ability to fight for a system that champions treatment over punishment and rehabilitation over retribution.”

New York University law professor Rachel Barkow, a former member of the United States Sentencing Commission, wrote last week that further reform will require a “president who is committed to making criminal justice reform a top priority and uses the bully pulpit to educate the public about all the reforms that are needed as a matter of both fairness and public safety.”

Even so, she said, much of the problem is currently beyond anyone’s reach. “Right now,” she wrote, “the federal bench is overwhelmingly dominated by people who spent part of their careers defending the government and serving as prosecutors. While that is a commendable career choice and we want some of our judges to have that experience, things go awry when you have a bench that disproportionately has that experience.”

USA Today, A year out, First Step is powerful example for states of bipartisan criminal justice reform (Dec. 31)

Brennen Center, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration (Jan. 3)

– Thomas L. Root

Year-End Judicial Stats from SCOTUS – Update for January 9, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NUMBERS GAME

numbersSupreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts issued his year-end report on the judiciary last week. Besides four pages devoted to Justice Roberts urging judges to promote public confidence in the judiciary, the Report notes that criminal cases rose 6% to 92,678. Appellate cases dropped by 2%, and the number of people on federal supervised release stayed the same, at the amazing level of 113,198.

Supreme Court, 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Dec. 31, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Fifth and 11th Circuits Give and Take on Supervised Release – Update for January 8, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A PAIR OF DECISIONS, GOOD AND BAD, ON SUPERVISED RELEASE

supervisedleash181107Worrying about supervised release may seem a waste of time for inmates more concerned with getting released from federal prison, but virtually everyone with a sentence of less than life will be on federal supervised release sooner or later. A full one-third of those people will have their probation officers seek to revoke their terms (and send them back to prison) before their supervised release term ends.

Supervised release is a term of years, something like parole, imposed after imprisonment. During this period, the released prisoner is subject to a series of conditions – such as holding a job, paying restitution, refraining from new criminal conduct – and reports regularly to a U.S. Probation Officer.

Anthony Foley was on federal supervised release when he was charged with a couple of state drug cases. He neglected to tell his probation officer about them, and – when he was found out – Tony was violated for the failure to report the matter. Tony faced 7-13 months under the supervised release Guidelines. He argued for seven months; the government asked for 13.

The district judge gave him 24 months, saying that Tony’s “criminal history category of five — and his willful failure to notify the probation office within 72 hours of arrest, and I believe, based upon these pending — just pending charges, he’s a continued threat to the community. I believe an upward variance is appropriate.”

Last week, the 5th Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that “a district court errs when it relies on a bare allegation of a new law violation contained in a revocation petition unless the allegation is supported by evidence adduced at the revocation hearing or contains other indicia of reliability, such as the factual underpinnings of the conduct giving rise to the arrest.” Where, as here, “the revocation petition included only bare allegations of new violations of law, and the allegations were not supported by evidence at the revocation hearing and do not have other indicia of reliability,” they were impermissible factors for the district court to consider.”

supervisedrevoked181106Meanwhile, in the 11th Circuit, Jeffrey Hill likewise caught a state drug case while on supervised release. During his revocation proceeding, he filed a motion to suppress evidence he said resulted from an illegal search. The district court ruled that suppression of evidence because of a 4th Amendment violation – the exclusionary rule – does not apply to supervised release revocations.

Last week, the 11th Circuit agreed. Because suppression of evidence imposes “substantial social costs,” including “its toll on ‘the truthfinding process, its incompatibility with the traditionally flexible, administrative procedures of parole revocation, and its frequent necessity for extensive litigation to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded,” the Supreme Court has held the exclusionary rule does not apply in state parole hearings. The Circuit said in light of that, it could see no reason why the exclusionary rule should not apply to supervised release revocation hearings.

United States v. Foley, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 61 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020)

United States v. Hill, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 51 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

How Shall I Release Thee? Let Me Count the Ways – Update for January 7, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE GOLDILOCKS OPTION

All of the New Year’s Eve revelers had not yet left Times Square when the first rumor of the new year landed in my email inbox. An inmate reader wrote: “The Bureau of Prisons is saying that even though the law now says that good time is to be applied based on length of sentence, the ‘rules’ say that they are to evaluate an inmate at the end of the year for good conduct, therefore it can only apply to time served.”

corso170112Not so fast, my friend. As the Old Man of 2019 disappeared through the door – and ‘good riddance!’ many of us thought  – the BOP issued a proposed change to 28 CFR § 523.20 it intends to follow in applying the changes in the good time statute (18 USC § 3624(b)(1)) brought about by the First Step Act. The notice, of course, was published in the Federal Register, where everyone was sure to see it.

Time out for some remedial government class, for those who sat in the back texting their friends. Congress passes bills, which the President signs. Those bills change federal law. Federal law is conveniently restated in the United States Code, which organizes the laws so that they are easy to find.

textinclass200107.jpgLaws quite often sweep broadly and are light on detail. Federal agencies, which are charged by Congress with seeing that the laws are carried out, are entitled to use procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act to adopt rules that give definition to the laws. Imagine Congress passes a law that broadcast licenses should be granted and renewed when the public interest, convenience and necessity requires it. (Actually it did, in § 307 of the Communications Act of 1934.) What the dickens does that mean? Congress delegated authority to the Federal Communications Commission to define what it means by rules adopted pursuant to the APA‘s procedures. Those rules are conveniently set out in the Code of Federal Regulations.

So, contrary to our reader’s perception, the ‘rules’ the BOP seeks to adopt should not contradict 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), but instead provide the detail needed to implement it. Rules are not laws, and – when a statute and a rule are inconsistent – a law always trumps a rule.

classisover200107Enough high school government class for now… In its Dec. 31 Noticethe BOP proposes to calculate an inmate’s “out date” at the time the sentence commences by assuming all good time will be earned (as it has always done). The actual award of the time for each year of sentence will come on the anniversary date of when the sentence started, after the BOP determines, in the words of § 3624(b)(1), that the inmate has shown “exemplary compliance” with BOP rules and policies. Practically speaking, this means the inmate received no disciplinary reports that took away good conduct time as a sanction.

The “exemplary compliance” standard is nothing new. In fact, the only changes in § 3624(b)(1) resulting from the First Step Act are that (1) prisoners earn up to 54 days of good conduct time each year of their sentences, not for each year they are actually in prison. This results in an extra seven days each year; and (2) credit for the last year of a term of imprisonment shall be given on the first day of the last year of the term of imprisonment.

threebears200107In last week’s Notice, the BOP proposed three alternatives for administering good conduct time under the changed law. The first alterative would be, because the changed statute no longer referred to a “portion of a year,” for the BOP to give no credit for the final part of a year an inmate served. The Bureau rejects this as “an erroneous and unfair interpretation” of the new law. In other words, this porridge was too hot.

The second alternative, the Bureau said, would be to interpret the new law to mean inmates get 54 days for the final part of a year, no matter how short. If a sentence were 38 months, for example, an inmate would get 54 days a year for each of the 3 years, and another 54 days for the last two months. The BOP rejected this interpretation as being too fair, because it “would result in some inmates receiving benefits incongruous with those received by others.” This porridge was too cold.

goldilocks200107The third alternative is the BOP’s Goldilocks choice, one the Bureau believes is neither too unfair nor too fair. The BOP proposes that 54 days’ good conduct time vest on each anniversary of the sentence. For the last year, however, the prorated good time would not be awarded until the last day of the sentence, so an inmate could still lose a part year’s good conduct time up to the time he or she walks out the door.

The BOP thinks this porridge is just right. However, the public may file comments agreeing or disagreeing  until March 2.

A couple of interesting factoids appear in the Notice: In the introduction to the rulemaking proposal, the BOP mentioned that the PATTERN risk and needs assessment program has not yet being adopted in final form. As well, the Bureau referred to the glacial pace of recalculating existing inmates’ sentences to add the 7 additional days of good conduct time per year each inmate was awarded by First Step:

Under section 102(b)(2) of the FSA, the recalculation of GCT credit was not effective until the Attorney General completed and released the risk and needs assessment system on July 19, 2019. Although this proposed regulation is not yet in effect, the Bureau re-calculated release dates beginning on July 19, 2019 under the statutory authority of the FSA. Based on these recalculations, 3163 inmates were released from Bureau custody on July 19, 2019; the Bureau is in the process of completing recalculations for the remainder of the inmate population based on the FSA authority, prioritizing recalculations by proximity of projected release date, and releasing inmates as appropriate according to the recalculated GCT release dates.

PB286-200107Of course, many people (your writer included) are at a loss to understand why recalculation of sentences has been such a laborious task. Certainly, even the BOP’s Packard Bell 286s ought to be able to recalculate sentences by running an algorithm that any boot-camp coder should be able to write between video games. But the bureaucracy plods on…

Good Conduct Time Under the First Step Act, 84 Federal Register 72274 (Dec. 31, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

If They’ve Got You, They’ve Got Jurisdiction – Update for January 6, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LIKE AN EARTH GIRL, JURISDICTION IS EASY

earthgirls200106We may as well begin 2020 with a cautionary tale. As I have previously written, arguing that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over a criminal case is a dead-bang loser. Yet, there is a small but persistent cohort of inmates – many of whom inhabit the prison law library – who espouse whack-a-doodle ideas about the law and, for a fee payable in items from the institution commissary – are way too willing to share them with fellow prisoners.

The 2nd Circuit underscored that last week in an opinion that expressed both patience and exasperation with a pro se whack-a-doodle appellate filing by a federal inmate.

First, a word about jurisdiction. Federal courts (except for the Supreme Court) were created by statutes passed by Congress. They are what are known as courts of limited jurisdiction. That is to say that a federal court only has the power to decide an issue that Congress has authorized it to decide. This is what is known as subject-matter jurisdiction. Your neighbor’s kid broke your window with a baseball? Try suing in federal court, and see what happens. Your case will be tossed.

froglevel200106Proceeding hand in hand with subject-matter jurisdiction is personal jurisdiction. A federal court has to have authority over the person of the defendant. If a diminutive elderly woman rams your new Bentley at the Rose Bowl, you cannot return home to Frog Level, North Carolina, and sue her in the Federal District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. There may be subject-matter jurisdiction (diversity of citizenship and sufficient damages to the Bentley, which we won’t get into), but the Little Old Lady from Pasadena has no contacts with the Western District of North Carolina. There’s no personal jurisdiction.

In the federal criminal law sphere, subject-matter jurisdiction – as I have said before – is easy. If the grand jury has indicted you for violating a federal criminal statute, a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction.  But, as defendant Raymond McLaughlin asked the Second Circuit, how about personal jurisdiction?

Ray’s house was in foreclosure. Rather than looking in the mirror to find someone to blame (if you don’t make your house payment, the bank forecloses and takes your house back), Ray decided it was all the state court judge’s fault. He filed documents with the IRS showing he had paid the state court judge $300,000. Of course, he had not. If he had had that kind of money, he would have made his house payments. But Ray claimed he had greased the judge’s palm, intending to get the IRS to go after the judge for failing to report income and thus to make His Honor’s life a living hell.

The scheme fell apart, and Ray was convicted of making a false statement to a government agency in violation of 18 USC § 1001.

sovereigncitizen161125Before his conviction, Ray filed a truckload of pro se motions arguing, among other things, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Ray had bought into the “sovereign citizen” movement, which in essence believes the federal government is illegitimate and therefore that its laws are not binding. As Ray’s District Court judge observed, the “sovereign citizens” seek to “clog the wheels of justice” by raising frivolous arguments that the courts and the Constitution lack authority.

“Sovereign citizens” can, however, make a claim that hardly anyone else can. Their claims have a perfect record in federal court: none has ever won.

Neither did Ray. The 2nd Circuit explained that whenever a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal offenses charged, it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants charged in the indictment and present before the court to answer those charges. A federal district has subject-matter jurisdiction over any indictment charging that a federal law has been broken. Therefore, it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, no matter whether he or she walks in voluntarily or is dragged in by federal agents.

As the Circuit put it, a defendant need not “actually participate in the proceedings in order for the court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”

juris170501It is pretty simple, the 2nd said. The indictment charged Ray, and Ray was present before the district court. “Accordingly, the District Court had personal jurisdiction over McLaughlin and the judgment is valid.”

Note: personal jurisdiction should not be confused with venue. The Sixth Amendment gives a defendant “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” In other words, Ray could not have been put on trial in the District of Hawaii – no matter how much nicer the weather – for a crime that allegedly occurred in Connecticut. But “venue” is a topic for another day.

United States v. McLaughlin, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 38626 (2nd Cir. Dec. 30, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root