Tag Archives: kansas

Some of It’s Violent, Some of It’s Not – Update for February 5, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MIXED WEEK FOR CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

Defendants arguing that prior state convictions were not crimes of violence enjoyed mixed results last week.

violent160620A 10th Circuit panel ruled in United States v. Bong that robbery under Kansas law can be accomplished with minimal force that falls short of the “violent force” required under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause. What’s more, Kansas aggravated robbery – a robbery committed by someone armed with a dangerous weapon or who inflicts bodily harm during course of a robbery – is not violent, either. Merely being “armed” with a weapon during the course of a robbery, the court said, is not sufficient to render the state offense a “violent crime” for ACCA purposes.

Things did not go so well in the 2nd Circuit. There, the court held in United States v. Thrower that 3rd degree robbery under N.Y. Penal Law 160.05 is a crime of violence for ACCA purposes. The crime requires “forcible stealing,” which is defined as common to every degree of robbery in New York State, requires use or threat of the immediate use of physical force sufficient to prevent or overcome victim resistance. “By its plain language,” the Circuit said, “the New York robbery statute matches the Armed Career Criminal Act.” The holding includes not just 3rd degree robbery, but by necessity all levels of New York robbery.

A 9th Circuit panel, however, held in United States v. Vederoff that 2nd degree assault under Wash. Rev. Code 9A.36.021(1) is overbroad when compared to the generic definition of aggravated assault, because the statute encompasses assault with intent to commit a felony. Because Washington’s 2nd-degree assault statute is indivisible, the panel could not apply the modified categorical approach, and therefore concluded that Washington second-degree assault does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated clause of USSG 4B1.2. For the same reason, the panel held, 2nd-degree murder under Washington Code 9A.32.050 is overbroad because the statute covers felony murder. The panel found the statute indivisible, and therefore concluded 2nd-degree murder is not a “crime of violence” under the enumerated clause of USSG 4B1.2.

The 8th Circuit ruled in Mora-Higuera v, United States that a defendant’s 2255 motion, asserting a due process right to be sentenced without reference to the residual clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) under the mandatory guidelines, was not dictated by Johnson v. United States, because it is “reasonably debatable whether Johnson’s holding regarding the ACCA extends to the former mandatory guidelines.” Thus, the defendant was not able to challenge his mandatory Guidelines career offender sentence on the grounds one of the prior crimes of violence was invalidated by Johnson.

vaguenes160516Finally, the 10th Circuit agreed in United States v. Pullen that “the Supreme Court has never recognized a void for vagueness challenge to the Guidelines and so Johnson neither creates a new rule applicable to the Guidelines nor dictates that any provision of the Guidelines is subject to a void for vagueness challenge.”

United States v. Bong, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2798 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019)

United States v. Thrower, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3145 (2nd Cir. Jan. 31, 2019)

United States v. Vederoff, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3314 (9th Cir., Feb. 1, 2019)

Mora-Higuera v. United States, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3139 (8th Cir. Jan 31, 2019)

United States v. Pullen, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2937 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root