Tag Archives: jury

SCOTUS Goes For Defendant on ACCA Case – Update for June 27, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“SEPARATE OCCASIONS” ACCA FINDING MUST BE BY JURY

In an unusual 6-3 lineup (with a vigorous dissent by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, who is widely assumed to be defendant-friendly), the Supreme Court ruled last week that the 5th and 6th Amendments require that imposing an Armed Career Criminal Act sentence on a convicted felon in possession of a firearm requires a jury, not a judge.

scotus161130The ACCA (18 USC 924(e)) imposes a mandatory 15-year prison term on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun or ammo who has previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. Up to now, judges have made decisions on whether occasions were “separate” by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the Supremes hold that as an element of the offense, whether the felonies occurred on separate occasions, must be found by a jury and that the standard should be “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

circuitsplit220516Up to now, circuits have been split on whether a judge or a jury had to find that the three occasions were different. A Supreme Court opinion two years ago, Wooden v. United States, established standards for deciding when offenses had been committed on “different occasions.” Now, how those standards are to be decided has broken in favor of defendants as well.

A surprising twist in the case was that the government agreed with the defendant that the element should be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt:

Petitioner renews his contention that the 6th Amendment requires a jury to find (or a defendant to admit) that predicate offenses were under the ACCA. In light of this Court’s recent articulation of the standard for determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions in Wooden v United States, the government agrees with that contention. Although the government has opposed previous petitions raising this issue, recent developments make clear that this Court’s intervention is necessary to ensure that the circuits correctly recognize defendants’ constitutional rights in this context. This case presents a suitable vehicle for deciding the issue this Term and thereby providing the timely guidance that the issue requires.

jury151228The decision is yet another chink in the armor of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which permits a judge instead of a jury to find certain facts related to a defendant’s past offenses. That decision is at odds with Apprendi v New Jersey, which held that the elements of any statute that increased the statutory sentencing range had to be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Erlinger majority described Almendarez-Torres as “an outlier” and “at best an exceptional departure” from historic practice. 

Erlinger v. United States, Case No 23-370, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2715 (June 21, 2024)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Bang’ Goes the Jury: Lawyer Ineffective For Not Protesting Judicial Arm-twisting – Update for February 1, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BLOWING UP THE JURY

juryduty180226Simon Brewster was on trial in state court for bank robbery. The jury went out, but reported to the judge a few hours later that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-3 for conviction. The judge gave the jury the Allen charge, known colloquially as the “dynamite charge,” which pressures the jurors to reach a decision by continued deliberation by appealing, essentially, to their desire not to have wasted their and the court’s time.

The jury remained deadlocked, and the judge gave another Allen charge, two additional admonitions that the jurors must continue deliberating, and finally, another long charge that included instructions to keep on deliberating. That lengthy charge emphasized that the jurors had taken an oath to follow the law, which meant they must deliberate more. The judge ended his instructions with the challenge that he had taken his oath seriously and hoped they would do the same.

Shortly thereafter, when told that the one juror who wouldn’t vote to convict was doing crossword puzzles, the judge ordered all the reading materials taken out of the jury room. That tactic turned out to be effective. The jury convicted 20 minutes later.

dynamitejury190201Last week, the 11th Circuit granted Simon’s habeas corpus motion, holding that his lawyer was asleep at the switch for not objecting to the court’s strong-arming the jury. The 11th decided that even if Simon could not prove that judge would have granted a mistrial if he had been asked to do so, Simon was prejudiced. “An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to a defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, nullification, and the like,” the Circuit said. “It does not matter for prejudice purposes whether the judge at a defendant’s trial would have sustained an objection; what counts is whether the judge would have been required to do so under the applicable law and, if so, whether doing so would have resulted in a reasonable probability of a different result.”

Brewster v. Hetzel, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 1931 (11th Cir. Jan. 22)
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– Thomas L. Root