Tag Archives: 3B1.2

New Jersey Vacation Goes Awry – Update for March 12, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WE FIND THE GOVERNMENT’S B.S. ‘TROUBLING’

Crystall Robles-Lopez was a homegirl. At 30 years old, she had never traveled from her home in Puerto Rico, never been on an airplane, and instead grew up in poverty. When someone offered her $1,500 to carry a couple of suitcases full of… well, something, Crystall wasn’t sure what… on an airline flight to New Jersey, she felt like she had won the lottery.

Free money and an all-expenses paid trip to sunny Newark, New Jersey. Wowsa!

Sadly, the “something” was about 25 lbs. of powder cocaine. Crystall didn’t make it out of the San Juan airport before being caught.

Crystall’s Presentence Report recommended she receive a 3-level Guidelines (USSG § 3B1.2) mitigating-role reduction. The government argued against it, pointing out that the only crime at issue was Crystall transporting coke, and she couldn’t have a minor role in a one-person crime. Besides, the government said, she was the ‘primary player’ in the conspiracy, she understood the crux of the criminal activity more than any other participant, she hailed Uber rides to take herself to the hotel and then to the airport, and she maneuvered the cocaine to minimize the potential to get caught in a highly policed environment.”

Last week, the 1st Circuit threw out Crystall’s sentence. It criticized the district court for not identifying the “relevant conduct as a whole” to determine Crystall’s role among all of the players. Instead, the Circuit observed, “the district court recognized only the steps Robles herself took to smuggle the two suitcases of cocaine through the airport and onto the plane. By declining to consider any ‘activities… undertaken in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense,’’ the court failed to identify the full universe of relevant participants.”

“Instead,” the 1st said, the district court merely recited “the facts that made Robles guilty of the crimes for which she was charged.” But the purpose of the § 3B1.2 factors “is not to establish guilt; it is to help a court decide whether to apply leniency because a defendant, while guilty, played a substantially subordinate role in the criminal activity.” The district court “incorrectly… placed inappropriate determinative weight on the government’s assertion that her role was indispensable to the success of the criminal endeavor.” But the Guidelines note that “a defendant who… is simply being paid to perform certain tasks should be considered for an adjustment” and caution that “an essential or indispensable role in the criminal activity is not determinative” of eligibility.

The 1st Circuit included a sharp rebuke aimed at the government: “The government makes an unsupportable attempt in its appellate briefing to cast Robles as ‘the star of the show’ and the ‘primary player’ in the conspiracy, making assertions about her role and activities that are patently inconsistent with uncontroverted record evidence… These exaggerations and inconsistencies by the government are troubling.”

United States v. Robles-López, Case No. 23-1587, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 6427 (1st Cir., dated February 4, 2026, but released on March 4, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Voodoo Economics in the Courtroom Takes a Hit – Update for September 25, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DO THE MATH

Christian Delgade-Lopezwas convicted of methamphetamine distribution. At sentencing, he argued for a reduction in his Sentencing Guidelines score for a minor role (USSG § 3B1.2), arguing he was just a simple DJ who was forced by circumstances to deliver meth for $1,000 a trip, and even having to pay his own expenses out of the grand he received.

djmeth200925The district judge didn’t buy it. Based in part on information the judge had gathered on his own about gas prices and mileage, the court did a back-of-the-envelope calculation from the bench, and estimated Chris’s expenses per trip to be $730.00, leaving him with a net profit of $270.00. After learning that Chris made $14.00 an hour at his full-time job, the district court speculated he could have made $224,00 in two days at his regular DJ gig had he not acted as a drug courier. The judge, wondering why anyone would act as a drug courier for what amounted to a lousy $100.00 net gain over honest work, decided Chris’s testimony about being a mere courier simply was not believable. Besides, the court said, Chris refused to cooperate with the government, and thus should not benefit from a minor-role reduction.

Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed Chris’s sentence. The Circuit admitted that a district court’s credibility findings should receive deference, but it ruled that nevertheless, a sentencing finding “must be based on evidence before the court, and thus in the record, and not on speculation or hypothesis.”

idontbelieveyou200925In this case, the district court’s determination was based on pure speculation about the economics of the drug-trafficking scheme, without any evidence with which to evaluate the financial wisdom of Chris’s decision to be a drug courier. “Its impromptu calculations were based on speculation,” the 10th said, “that Jude could work more hours at his existing job, unfounded estimates about the costs involved in each of his trips, and the assumption that he knew of the relative financial benefits of the arrangement prior to accepting.” The court thus erred by relying on its own speculation, the Circuit held, in finding that Chris was not credible.

What’s more, the district court was not entitled to hold that Chris’s lack of cooperation should deny him a minor-role reduction. The Guidelines “include a detailed explanation of what factors a court may and must consider,” the 10th held, “but does not mention cooperation. And although the determination requires a court to look at the totality of the circumstances, logic dictates that a defendant’s cooperation or lack thereof is entirely irrelevant to the factual determination of whether he or she played a minor role in an offense.”

United States v. Delgado-Lopez, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29032 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root