Doing The Money Hum at the Supreme Court: Two Restitution Decisions Today – Update for April 19, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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U.S. SUPREME COURT HANDS DOWN TWO CRIMINAL DECISIONS ON RESTITUTION

The Supreme Court handed down two decisions this morning related to restitution. One deals with appealing have to pay it, the other with getting it back. Defendants split the ticket, 1-1.

moneyhum170419In Manrique v. United States, a defendant had an initial restitution judgment entered against him that had no amount specified, the district court holding that restitution was mandatory but deferring determination of the amount until later. Marcelo Manrique filed a notice of appeal from the initial judgment. Months later, the district court entered an amended judgment, ordering the defendant to pay $4,500 restitution to one of the victims. He did not file a second notice of appeal from the amended judgment. When Marcelo nonetheless challenged the restitution amount before the 11th Circuit, the government argued that he had forfeited his right to do so by failing to file a second notice of appeal. The Circuit agreed, holding the defendant could not challenge the restitution amount.

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding a defendant wishing to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that deferred order. If he or she fails to do so and the government objects, the amended restitution order may not be challenged on appeal. The Supremes said 18 USC 3742 (the appeals statute) and Rule 3(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure contemplate a defendant will file a notice of appeal after the district court has decided the issue sought to be appealed. The Court did not decide whether filing the second notice of appeal was jurisdictional, because regardless, it was “at least a mandatory claim-processing rule, which is unalterable if raised properly by the party asserting a violation…” Because the government raised the violation in a timely manner, “the court’s duty to dismiss the appeal was mandatory.”

In Nelson v. Colorado, the plaintiffs had been found guilty of sex offenses against children. Shannon Nelson’s conviction was thrown out on appeal, and at a retrial, she was acquitted. Alonzo Madden was convicted at trial of two counts. One was reversed on appeal, and the second thrown out on habeas corpus. The state refused to retry him.

Meanwhile, both had been forced by the prison system to pay restitution and court fees. Once their convictions were invalidated, they sought to get their money back, but the Colorado Supreme Court said that the state’s Exoneration Act was the only way to get a refund, and that Act required that they prove they were innocent (a much different proposition than being not proven guilty).

money170419Today, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The high court said Colorado cannot retain their money simply because convictions were in place when the funds were taken from them. Once the convictions were erased, the presumption of innocence was restored. Colorado may not presume a person who is adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless remains guilty enough for monetary penalties. The Exoneration Act “creates an unacceptable risk of the erroneous deprivation of defendants’ property.”

Manrique v. United States, Case No. 15–7250 (Supreme Court, April 19, 2017)

Nelson v. Colorado, Case No. 15-1256 (Supreme Court, April 19, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Abandon Hope? Not this Congresswoman… – Update for April 18, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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TILTING AT WINDMILLS

We had an email from an inmate this week asking whether we were aware of a bill pending in Congress that would reduce by the half sentences of nonviolent inmates over 45 years old without any shots.

retread170418The short answer is yes, there is such a bill. The long answer is that this bill – H.R. 64, Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2017 – is the mother of all retreads, having been pending in the last Congress as H.R. 71, Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2015, and the Congress before that (H.R. 62, Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2013), and the Congress before that (H.R. 223, Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act of 2011), and… well, you get the picture.

We can track the pedigree of the Federal Prison Bureau Nonviolent Offender Relief Act all the way back to the 108th Congress (2003-2004), which is when lone wolf Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-Texas) first introduced the measure. She’s been tilting at the same windmill ever since, with her one-sponsor-only bill as certain a fixture in each new Congress as is the State of the Union address.

In 2015, one commentator wrote about Rep. Jackson-Lee’s bill (and others like it) that “these bills have very little likelihood of passage since only one representative, their author, has officially signed on as supporting them. Most of them were also introduced last Congress but were shelved.”

About 10,000 bills get introduced in every 2-year Congress, and only about 3% of them are passed. With the last Congress not able to even bring the Sentence Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 to the floor – after virtually all of its retroactive provisions (that would have helped federal inmates) were gutted – the “nonviolent offender” sentencing bill had no chance of even being taken up by a committee.

Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions
Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions

The new Administration, to put it charitably, is considerably less concerned than were Administrations of the past that federal inmates may be serving unfairly long sentences. Breitbart News, a right-wing website formerly run by Trump confidante Steve Bannon, was beating the drum last Saturday for a close audit of the 1,715 inmates whose sentences were commuted by President Obama. Most of those inmates are not released yet, but that did not deter Brietbart News, which quoted former federal prosecutor Bill Otis as saying, “What Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ Justice Department needs to do now is track the hundreds of fellows who got these pardons and commutations. With overall recidivism rates for drug offenses already being 77%, I think we have a pretty good idea, but the public should get specifics: How many of these guys re-offend; what’s the nature of the new crime; were there related violent crimes in the mix as well; and how many victims (including but not limited to addicts and overdose victims) were there?”

We monitor the bills being introduced in Congress every week. So far, nothing approaching the 2015 SCRA has been introduced.

Just last week, The Hill reported that Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions has directed federal prosecutors to crack down on violent crime. Sessions has tapped Steven Cook, a federal prosecutor and outspoken opponent of criminal justice reform, to lead Sessions’ new Task Force on Crime Reduction and Public Safety.

Alex Whiting, faculty co-director of the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School, was quoted as saying,

Obama moved away from that approach, and I think in the criminal justice world there seemed to be a consensus between the right and left that those policies, those rigid policies of the war on drugs and trying to get the highest sentence all the time, had failed… I don’t know if he is really going to be able to persuade the department to follow his lead on this.

Whiting questions whether Sessions would be able find 94 prosecutors to appoint as U.S. Attorneys who will back his new tough on immigration crime/violent crime approach.

windmill170418With this attitude prevailing in the Justice Department, any surge on sentencing reform (not to mention interest in executive clemency) is extraordinarily unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, a salute to Rep. Jackson-Lee, who makes Don Quixote look like a quitter.

Breitbart News, How Federal Agencies Keep Americans In The Dark About Crime Statistics (Apr. 16, 2017)

The Hill, Sweeping change at DOJ under Sessions (Apr. 16, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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The Price of Magical Thinking – Update for April 17, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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YOU SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE DEAL WHEN IT WAS OFFERED…

magic170417Defendants facing trial often engage in magical thinking about their cases: they believe jurors will find reasonable doubt in the most convoluted explanations, that judges will suppress evidence for the most tenuous of justifications, that they will be bailed out by the admissions of co-defendants who are being rewarded for testifying for the government.

None of this happens often. In fact, it happens so seldom – TV shows notwithstanding – that it’s newsworthy when it arises. With a conviction rate approaching 99%, the government enjoys many hits and very few misses.

But the same kind of magical thinking that convinces problem gamblers that they’re going to beat the odds afflicts defendants. What their lawyers tell them enters their ears but does not reach their brain except through a filter that strips out the cold, hard truth. And later, when the defendants have become inmates, they recall what they want to recall of it.

takedeal170417Take Glen Allen, for example. The lawyer defending him from drug trafficking charges filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search, but told Glen the motion was not likely to succeed, and he should take a plea deal of 91-121 months. Glen refused the deal, and told his lawyer not to negotiate any more deals. He said the proposed sentence “was too much time for me to do according to my involvement.”

Glen figured he knew better than his attorney, so he tried to file his own motion to suppress. When that didn’t work, he asked to hire a new lawyer, which was granted.

When he hired new counsel Clay Janske – whom Glen selected because he “would not be scared” to try the case before a jury – Glen explained to him that he was not interested in a plea deal and told him not even to discuss a new plea offer. Clay litigated the motion to suppress, which was denied. A few days prior to trial, a co-defendant agreed to testify against Glen. The government told Clay that if Glen went to trial, it would seek an enhanced sentence under 21 USC 851 based on Glen’s prior drug felonies. The enhancement would give Glen a mandatory life sentence.

Glen came to his senses, and took the latest plea deal, a mandatory minimum of 10 years. The court figured his guidelines at 121-151 months, and gave him the bottom.

mistake170417Glen filed a petition under 28 USC 2255, claiming his attorney was ineffective in explaining the first plea agreement to him. Gary said Clay told him he would only get “a couple of more years” if he went to trial instead of pleading guilty. Clay said he had told him that, but it was based on inaccurate information Glen gave his lawyer about his criminal history. Glen said that if Clay had properly advised him about the potential of a mandatory life sentence, he would have pleaded guilty before the suppression hearing. Instead, he pleaded guilty right before trial and faced a 10-year mandatory minimum instead of a 5-year one.

What Glen didn’t get – and many defendants don’t get – is that it is not enough just to show a lawyer gave lousy advice about a plea deal. After all, lawyers do that all the time, either because they’re not focused, not very bright, or not working the right information. In order to win a claim of ineffective assistance for bad advice on a plea, a defendant has to be able to show that but for the bum advice, he or she would have probably taken the deal. Last Friday, the 8th Circuit showed just how inflexible a standard that can be.

oops170417The appeals court held Glen had nothing coming, because being ignorant of the risk he might get a life sentence was not all that drove Glen’s decision. True, the Court said, Glen pointed to the fact that once he learned he might get a life sentence, he quickly pleaded guilty. Glen argued that fact showed a “substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood” that he would have accepted the initial plea offer had Clay only advised him he could get life. The Circuit held, however, that it was clear that Glen’s decision “was motivated by his belief that the plea offer was not favorable enough and his hope that he would succeed on the suppression motion.”

guilty170417The district court found that two factors — the decision of Glen’s co-defendant to testify and the possibility of a life sentence — influenced Glen’s decision to plead guilty. In other words, Glen failed to prove that “but for his counsel’s advice, he would have accepted the plea.”

“Under similar circumstances,” the Circuit said, “we concluded a habeas claimant failed to show prejudice in part because he was unwilling to consider pleading guilty, had always expressed a desire to proceed to trial, and none of counsel’s discussions about the possibility of a guilty plea seemed to sway him.” Thus, the Court held, Glen “failed to prove, by a substantial likelihood, that he would have accepted the offer to plead pursuant to the earlier proposed terms.”

Allen v. United States, Case No 15-3607 (8th Cir. 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Rogue Agents, Impaired Judges: A Friday Collection – Update for April 14, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE BEHAVING BADLY

Two reports the past several days caught our attention, and neither speaks well for the federal criminal justice system.

atf170414ATF Agents Running Amok: First, the New York Times reported Wednesday that ATF agents in Bristol, Virginia, set up a secret bank account, which they funded with millions gained in illegally peddling cigarettes. The agents directed their informants to buy untaxed cigarettes, mark them up and sell them for a profit.

The Times said “the operation, not authorized under Justice Department rules, gave agents an off-the-books way to finance undercover investigations and pay informants without the usual cumbersome paperwork and close oversight, according to court records and people close to the operation.”

The account came to light in a civil suit claiming the agents broke federal racketeering law, brought in the Eastern District of North Carolina by a collective of tobacco farmers, who claim they were defrauded of $24 million. Two ATF informants received at least $1 million each from that sum, according to records produced in the suit. Most of the filings in the case are sealed.

The Times reported that “the scheme relied on phony shipments of snack food disguised as tobacco. The agents were experts: Their job was to catch cigarette smugglers, so they knew exactly how it was done.”

Money from the operations was used for a number of activities, including the renting of a $21,000 hotel suite at a NASCAR race, a trip to Las Vegas and a monetary donation to one agent’s daughter’s high school volleyball team.

ATFA170414What is not being said, of course, is that the agents’ misconduct – and the involvement of informants who took off-the-record payments – could have substantial repercussions in any criminal prosecutions where testimony of those agents or CIs played a role. The Department of Justice Inspector General began investigating the allegations after the Times contacted DOJ about the story.

Guardianship Sought for Federal Judge: A federal judge whose bizarre behavior on the bench preceded her mysterious removal from a number of cases was previously ordered to get treatment for alcoholism so severe a colleague believes she cannot take care of herself, according to court records released Thursday.

U.S. District Judge Patricia Minaldi’s alcoholism don’t answer whether it was a factor in the secretive interruptions in her Louisiana courtroom. But the documents show she moved into an assisted living facility specializing in “memory care.”

Minaldi170414In February 2016, during voir dire in a criminal trial, Judge Minaldi failed to determine if jurors were U.S. citizens and delivered no preliminary instructions. After the public defender made a motion for curative measures, the Judge ordered the prosecutor to deliver preliminary instructions to the jury, stopping to complain to the prosecutor, “I have no idea what’s going on here. Get your act together.” After the prosecutor and public defender jointly moved for a mistrial, the chief district judge removed Judge Minaldi from the case and assigned it to Judge Donald Ellsworth Walter, who then declared a mistrial.

The chief judge of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Judge Minaldi to complete at least 90 days of substance abuse treatment, due to the severity of her alcoholism and “legal consequences she had attained.”

Judge Minaldi, 58, has been on medical leave since the end of 2016. Newly released records showing that she is in a long-term care facility are part of a lawsuit filed by Judge Minaldi’s Magistrate Judge, Kathleen Kay. The lawsuit challenges Judge Minaldi’s physical and mental capacity to manage her personal and financial affairs.

That lawsuit was filed under seal, but portions made public report at as of March 2017, Judge Minaldi’s condition was so severe that she was “unable to take care of her daily activities” and “unable to safely take care of her personal needs, financial matters, or her property matters,” the filing says.

Unlike the ATF situation, Judge Minaldi’s condition is medical, not a breach of trust. But like the ATF situation, the effects of recent revelations could reverberate across any number of criminal cases that appeared in front of the Judge over the past several years.

– Thomas L. Root

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Judges’ Decisions are Final… – Update for April 13, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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DON’T LOOK BACK

fasttalk170413Every so often, broadcast stations are required to air an announcement of their contest rules. This is because the FCC believes that listening to an avalanche of mumbo-jumbo delivered by the guy who used to do the Fedex fast-talking commercials makes us more informed listeners.

We were reminded of one of the actually discernable phrases in the contest rules by today’s case: “Judges’ decisions are final.” Finality is a concept that seems hard for people to appreciate, but one which is necessary if the judicial system is every going to work.

fat170413Normally, inmates are on the wrong side of this argument. A prisoner who believes she was wrongly convicted or sentenced wants to keep pleading the case until someone in authority finally agrees with her. There are exceptions to finality – new evidence that could not have been discovered before, a new court decision that meets requirements for being applied retroactively, even a retroactive change in the guidelines. But mostly, “final” means final.

It today’s case, finality actually worked in favor of the defendant. Hakan Yalincak was an NYU student a decade ago when he pled guilty to running a sham hedge fund. Along with a sentence, the court in April 2007 imposed restitution of $4.2 million.

Hakan immediately applied under 18 USC 3664(j)(2) to have money recovered in the fund’s bankruptcy be credited to his restitution. The government paid little attention to the request, noting only that it had no objection to grant of Hakan’s motion. The district court thus approved the request, ultimately applying about $1.55 million collected by the bankruptcy trustee to the amount Hakan was to pay.

bkptcyscam170413What no one appreciated was that the federal bankruptcy system works in a way that would a mere amateur fraudster like Hakan blush. Sure the trustee collected $1.55 million, but by the time all of the bankruptcy vultures – lawyers, trustees, experts – got done picking at it, the victims of the scam got about $300,000. In May 2015, the district court realized that the amount of money actually reaching the victims was about 20% of the credit it had given Hakan, it vacated the 2007 order under F.R.Civ.P. 60(a), which gives a court the power to “correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment.”

Hakan appealed, arguing the 2007 order was final and could not be disturbed.

This week, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hakan. The Court said the issue turned on whether an order modifying restitution was a final, appealable order. If so, the district court could not later revisit it. If not, the order remained open to modification by the district court.

The Circuit decided the 2007 order was final:

When the district court granted Yalincak’s motion for credit, it made a conclusive determination as to Yalincak’s entitlement to credit… The order did not dispose of the issue of restitution entirely, given that the credits were not enough to discharge Yalincak’s restitution obligations in full and thereby end the restitution proceedings. Nonetheless, the district court’s resolution of the § 3664(j)(2) motion was a final decision as to Yalincak’s claim regarding the proper accounting for particular funds. If such a decision were not considered final and appeal had to wait until Yalincak had discharged his restitution obligations entirely, it is unclear as a practical matter whether the district court’s grant of the Sec 3664(j(2) motion could ever be challenged.

over170413Yalincak still owed close to $2 million, according to the district court’s calculations. The Circuit admitted that “the district court’s desire to correct an error largely attributable to the government’s somewhat casual consent is understandable. Nevertheless, considerations of finality dictate that by the time the error was noticed, it was beyond the power of the court to correct.”

United States v. Yalincak, Case No. 11-5446 (2nd Cir., April 10, 2010)

– Thomas L. Root

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Cellphone Voyeurism Worth 25 Years in Prison – Update for April 12, 2017

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A QUESTION OF DEGREE

In the largely seamy world of child porn, much harsher sentences are justifiably reserved for people who produce the images, who procure the kids, or who advertise the stuff for sale. Mandatory minimum sentences for such conduct – listed in 18 USC 2251 – begins at 15 years.

The consumers of the product don’t face a picnic, but sentences under 18 USC 2252 for the people who receive, possess or pass around such images start at a third of the harsher sentences.

Some crimes are pretty hard to demagogue, and production of kiddie porn is one of them. Still, the old maxim that hard cases make bad law remains true.

Much of the rationale for severe sentences for producers arises from justifiable concern over what forcing children to engage in sex acts does to their psyches, how it robs them of the innocence of childhood. One Circuit Court explained that “[t]he crime is the offense against the child – the harm ‘to the physiological, emotional, and mental health’ of the child; the ‘psychological harm; the invasion of the child’s ‘vulnerability’.” 

tom170412Within the production statute’s sweep, however, have come voyeurs, especially with today’s ultra-small wireless cameras. Unlike the producers, voyeurs simply set up their cameras in hope of catching candids of subjects in various states of undress or during intimate moments. While the practice is odious and an invasion of privacy, voyeurism is qualitatively different from other production. Many times the subject – child or not – is not aware of the recording and never comes to find out that the image exists. Whatever intimate sexual conduct that is recorded was volitional: unlike a child forced to act in a porn production, the minor has not done anything he or she didn’t set out to do.

Nevertheless, 18 USC 2251 is unbending, and a voyeur might as well be a producer. That’s what a defendant – we’ll call him Voyeur Vic – found out yesterday from the 10th Circuit.

Vic used hidden cellphones to secretly record his girlfriend’s 11-year old daughter while she showered and used the bathroom, while the girlfriend was at work. Apparently not happy with the quality of the cellphone screen, Vic transferred the video files to his computer and created still images, some of which focused on her girl’s private parts.

Vic never posted the images on the Internet, but rather, kept the still images in his own computer for his personal gratification.

The 11-year old victim was a pretty smart and observant kid, and she saw the cellphones Vic used to record her. She grabbed them, confronted him about what he was doing, and fled on her bicycle to a friend’s house when she feared he would take them from her forcibly. The neighbors called the cops, and that was that.

voyeurism170412Vic was indicted on two counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) & (e). Vic promptly moved to dismiss the indictment. He argued the undisputed evidence showed he “secretly videotape[d] the unaware minor while she performed activities over which he had no control or influence.” He contended his conduct did not satisfy the “uses” element of Sec. 2251(a), which Vic claimed requires “a causal relationship between the defendant and the minor’s sexually explicit conduct.”

Yesterday, the 10th Circuit disagreed. Section (a) of 2251 provides that anyone “who engages, employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to in… any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct… shall be punished…”

The Circuit held that the term ‘uses’ in the statute “reaches a defendant’s active involvement in producing the depiction even if the interpersonal dynamics between the defendant and the depicted minor are unknown.” Such an interpretation, the appeals court said, “gives effect to every word” in the statute, which is a basic tenet of statutory construction. As well, the Court said, “it is consistent with Congress’ intent to provide “a broad ban on the production of child pornography… aimed to prohibit the varied means by which an individual might actively create it.”

The Court said a number of other circuits that have grappled with the issue have agreed that a perpetrator can ‘use’ a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct without the minor’s conscious or active participation.

pornC160829No one contends that such images – especially when edited to focus on a child’s privates – should not be punished. At the same time, applying the same 15-year mandatory minimum sentence to a voyeur who deploys a hidden camera without the subject’s knowledge that would apply to a producer of porn which uses children being coached to engage in illicit conduct for the camera demeans the more serious of the offense.

At the same time, the Circuit’s statutory interpretation is suspect. Far from giving meaning to every word, the appellate court seems to hold that the meaning of “uses” is broad enough to subsume all of the other terms – engages, employs, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces – thus making them surplusage. Interpreting a statute to avoid surplusage is as much a canon of statutory construction as is giving effect to every word.

If “use” means what the 10th says it means, then it includes all conduct that comprises engaging, employing, persuading, inducing, enticing or coercing. It also paints with a very broad brush, punishing conduct that – while reprehensible – does not scar the child the way enticement or coercion does.

Vic got 292 months for his Peeping Tom-ism, a sentence that a director of a porn flick of coerced kids might deserve. Whether locking someone up for a quarter century over voyeurism was the statute’s intent may yet be addressed by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Theis, Case No. 16-3058 (10th Cir., April 11, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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When Lawyers Check In… but Don’t Check Out – Update for April 10, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY WHO YOU CAN’T GET RID OF

Sacred to 6th Amendment law is a defendant’s right to an attorney in criminal prosecutions. In fact, a defendant has a right to an attorney of his or her choice, and within reason, can compel a court to appoint a different lawyer if the accused is unhappy with the one who was first appointed.

roach170310A defendant’s right extends to an appeal and sometimes to post-conviction hearings, rights that have been extended by statute rather than the 6th Amendment. In fact, many inmates who sought 2-level drug sentencing reductions over the past few years found that district courts had issued blanket orders appointing the federal public defender in the district to represent those seeking a sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(2).

Brad Tollefson was one of those prisoners who suddenly found he had appointed legal help. All on his own, Brad had figured he was due for a sentence reduction under Guidelines Amendment 782, and so he filed a motion with his court that he wrote himself, asking for a reduction from 227 to 165 months, arguing that he had really done a great job rehabilitating himself in prison.

But because the district court had issued a blanket order appointing the federal defender to represent everyone seeking a 2-level reduction, Brad had a mouthpiece. His the public defender then filed a motion, too, this one seeking a sentencing cut for Brad down to 183 months.

Brad’s judge was unimpressed with either motion. He thought Brad had already gotten a good enough deal, a prior cut for assisting the government and a downward variance from his Guidelines range. The district court denied both motions, and Brad got nothing.

reallawyer170216Brad filed an appeal, arguing that his 6th Amendment rights were violated, because he didn’t want the public defender’s help. Brad blamed the PD’s conflicting motion for the judge refusing any cut at all. Last week, the 8th Circuit denied his appeal.

Brad argued the district court violated his due process right to be heard because it appointed the federal public defender to represent him. But the Circuit said that to comply with due process, all a district court must do is provide a defendant “adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard.” Because the Supreme Court previously held defendants have no due process right to self representation on direct appeal of their convictions, the 8th said “we find no reason why we should not extend the holding to postconviction sentence reduction proceedings.

Brad complained that his appointed attorney provided ineffective assistance. Because he had no right to counsel during his postconviction sentence reduction proceedings, the Circuit said, Brad “cannot assert a valid claim for ineffective assistance.”

United States v. Tollefson, Case No. 16-1903 (8th Cir., April 6, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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“Standing” Up for the FOIA – Update for April 7, 2017

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YOU’VE GOT TO BE A PLAYER

The Freedom of Information Act is a pretty slick statute. Using FOIA, Joe Average Citizen can obtain all sorts of information from government agencies, quite often including information the government would rather Joe not have.

WHBeer170407Journalists used FOIA to get the FBI file on Dr. Martin Luther King. Hillary’s emails were released because of FOIA requests. The IRS targeting scandal erupted because of an FOIA request. And on a more individualized scale, a casual Freedom of Information Act request we made back in 1994 for an inmate with a life sentence resulted in his release 12 years later.

As an old law partner we once practiced with liked to say, you never know what’s under a rock until you turn it over. Picture the FOIA as the spud bar you use to turn over those rocks.

All is not roses, by any means. First, FOIA applies only to federal agencies, and then only to executive branch agencies. FOI the FBI? Sure thing. CIA? Why not? But you cannot use the FOIA to U.S. Probation Office documents (it’s a judicial branch agency) or to get into the Government Accountability Office files (the GAO is a legislative branch agency).

Redac170407The FOIA has some very restrictive deadlines for agencies to respond, which should ensure that requesters get their documents quickly. Anyone who’s ever filed an FOIA request knows that the agencies honor those deadlines in the breach. And why not? A requester’s only recourse is to sue, after which the agencies will drag their bureaucratic feet even more, and then finally send a few documents and tell the court that they have no idea what the requester’s beef is – he or she got the documents.

And the document response will be incomplete, and documents that are turned over will have words, sentences, paragraphs – sometimes the whole page – blacked out (“redacted” is the term the agencies use) because of one or another exemption from disclosure. That requires more litigation and more piecemeal response. We worked on one plain vanilla FOIA request filed with a U.S. Attorney’s office and the FBI in 2009 that was finally fulfilled after seven years of litigation. Sadly, the Obama Administration – which promised to be the most “transparent” in history – was one of the least compliant with the FOIA.

Still, like the state lotteries tell us, you have to play to win. That’s why we were so bemused by a D.C. Court of Appeals decision this past week in an FOIA action brought by well-known post-conviction lawyer Jeremy Gordon and his non-profit arm, Prisology.

prisology170407Prisology sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons under the FOIA, charging that the BOP violated the statute because it did not publish inmate grievances and its responses, Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit settlement information, and reports on compassionate releases it has recommended to courts. Prisology argued that a section of the FOIA requiring publication of agency final opinions, policy statements not published in the Federal Register, and administrative staff manuals, mandated that the BOP post up the omitted information on the Internet.

But you’ve gotta be a player first, and Prisology overlooked that. It seems the nonprofit never requested bothered to request any information under the FOIA – so it could be turned down – before filing its two-page lawsuit.

Earlier this week, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reminded Prisology that it’s pretty basic first-year law school dogma that anyone bringing a lawsuit has to be able to allege concrete injury. Article III of the Constitution requires a “case or controversy,” and since the dawn of the Republic, that means that the party bringing the suit has to be able to allege it was injured.

player170407The Circuit noted that “Prisology’s complaint contains no allegation of injury, general or otherwise. Even if we inferred an injury to Prisology from the Bureau’s alleged failure to publish its records electronically, this would not differentiate Prisology from the public at large… Prisology made no request of the Bureau of Prisons before bringing suit and therefore received no denial from that agency.”

Prisology argued that its lawsuit “amounted to a request for particular information,” meaning that it has standing. “The argument goes nowhere,” the Circuit replied. “To the extent that a complaint may be seen as a request, it is a request for relief from a court. If the court denies the request, the plaintiff may appeal. But a court’s refusal to grant relief cannot confer Article III standing that otherwise does not exist.”

denied170407We’re rather surprised that the plaintiff made such a rookie mistake. To nonlawyers, “standing” might seem to be a frivolous formality, and the Court acknowledged that, even while expressing its own puzzlement at Prisology’s approach:

The result here may seem overly technical. But Prisology’s predicament is one of its own making. With little effort it may have been able to satisfy the requirements of Article III. The Supreme Court over the years has taken steps to clarify the law of standing. We would not muddy the waters in order to accommodate Prisology’s recalcitrance even if we had the power to do so, which we do not.

Prisology v. Bureau of Prisons, Case No. 15-5003 (April 4, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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The Legend of Petey Candlewood – Update for April 6, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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RIPPING OFF INMATES

[Corrected on January 29, 2019, to cite that about 1,800 inmates annually receive Rule 35(b) reductions, rather than the incorrect “9,500” figure in the original post – sorry for the error]

Anyone reading what we put out often enough might get the sense that we’re no fans of long prison sentences, or – in many cases – of any prison sentences at all. But there are exceptions, and yesterday, we came across one.

snitch161004It’s a fairly well known fact that a substantial minority of federal prisoners trade information for lower sentences. We’re down with that: a defendant’s got to do what a defendant’s got to do. Most people who do this jump aboard the train early, but a few go through sentencing without cooperating, only to regret their decision when they walk through the prison doors. For them, there’s Rule 35(b).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) lets the government file a motion asking that a prisoner’s sentence be cut for post-sentencing cooperation. The Rule 35(b) motion is discretionary on the government’s part, and the sentencing court does not have to grant it. But it works and works well: an average of 1,800 inmates a year received  sentence reductions under Rule 35(b) between 2009 and 2014, with the average prisoner getting a 37% sentence cut.

The biggest hurdle for a prisoner seeking a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction is to have some juicy information to trade. After all, the inmate’s locked up, and there are not a lot of opportunities to come up with the kind of first-hand dirt that case agents and U.S. Attorneys like to feast on. In the last decade, inmate scuttlebutt has invented a way around that: third-party Rule 35(b)s.

winwinwinThe concept is simple: the inmate pays someone to arrange a third party on the street to come up with some good confidential information that helps the Feds bag some bad guys. The people with the information ask the U.S. Attorney to credit their information to the inmate, who gets a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction. A real win-win! A bad guy’s off the street, the informant makes some money, and the inmate gets a sentence cut. What could possibly go wrong?

Lots. The sad fact is that only a very few courts have granted third-party Rule 35(b) motions, and only when stringent standards are applied. Some courts ban third-party Rule 35(b)s altogether, but the trend is to not turn down a chance for the Feds to enforce the law. The courts that approve them generally require that (1) the inmate play some role in instigating, requesting, providing, or directing the assistance; (2) the government would not have received the assistance but for the inmate’s participation; (3) the assistance is rendered for free; and (4) no other circumstances weigh against rewarding the assistance.

Fraud170406In other words, anyone planning on getting a third-party Rule 35(b) would want to be sure that he or she was personally involved in getting the person to step forward, and that the inmate can easily show that the Government wouldn’t have gotten the help without him or her. Most important, the prisoner had better be absolutely sure that the person providing the assistance is not getting paid anything for it.

So who does a third-party Rule 35(b) work for? A wife bailing out her husband, a father bailing out his son, brother helping brother… that kind of thing. It definitely does not work for a stranger being paid by an inmate to snitch on another stranger. One can only imagine the field day a defense lawyer would have with a government witness who had been paid under the table by an inmate to inform on someone else.

EasterBunny170406So a third-party Rule 35(b) cannot happen. But that technicality does not keep inmates from hoping, and where inmates hope, there’s usually someone standing there ready to take their money.

Someone like Alvin Warrick. Or maybe we should call him “Pete Candlewood,” one of the aliases he employed as he ripped off federal inmates and their families. “Pete” and his co-conspirators were indicted in federal court for their third-party Rule 35(b) scheme last fall, and a few weeks ago, they pled guilty. Having enjoyed seven rich years living off money they defrauded from inmates’ families, they now are looking forward to seven lean years (at least).

Relatives of at least 22 inmates paid “Pete” and his sidekicks something like $4.4 million, based on their vague promises to set up third-party Rule 35(b) deals. Through a Beaumont, Texas, company called Private Services, “Pete” and his girlfriend Colitha Bush (who went by “Diane Lane”) told the relatives that they “used a network of informants to make undercover drug deals and to provide information and third party cooperation in other criminal cases under the supervision of prosecutors, federal agents, and the courts.” They said that, “if successful, such deals and information would be credited to the inmate and used to secure their early release through a Rule 35 motion.”

fraud160530Private Services promised families that substantial assistance was being provided to the government on behalf of their inmate loved one. “Pete” even provided fake invoices and phony documents showing that Private Services had inked deals with U.S. Attorneys to provide assistance. In the Factual Proffer “Pete” agreed to in his plea, he admitted that he had “assured and consoled family members of federal inmates that he would work on their case and help to coordinate third party cooperation, but in truth and in fact, and as he well knew, no such work was ever done.”

In its usual celebratory press release, the Acting U.S. Attorney for South Florida fulminated, ““Sentencing reduction fraud schemes that prey on the desperation, vulnerability and trust of federal inmates and their families exploit both the victims and the justice system. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in South Florida and our federal partners across the nation will continue to target such schemes and prosecute the offenders.” While we tend to discount government pontification in criminal cases like the media discount President Trump’s tweets, we’re with him on this one.

Apparently, the FBI is still trying to find additional victims. “If you are a victim, it is critical that you reach out to us,” FBI Special Agent in Charge Perrye K. Turner is quoted as saying in the March 30th USAO press release. “This case highlights that justice is blind and underscores the FBI’s impartiality when investigating cases.”

Unsurprisingly, none of “Pete’s” inmate clients received a shorter prison term during the course of the 7-year scheme. Not a one. But the scam was mightly good to “Pete” and “Diane,” who received regular payments from the inmates’ families, which they spent on luxury cars, vacations and gambling.

scam170406“Pete” and “Diane” – along with Private Services’ treasurer (who had the sense to make a cooperation deal with the government himself rather than through Private Services) – have signed plea deals. And it’s a fair prediction the inmates’ families will never recover a dime.

Miami Herald, Conning the convicts: trio admits to ripping off South Florida inmates (Apr. 3, 2017)

United States v. Warrick, Case No. 1:17-cr-20194 (S.D. Fla.)

– Thomas L. Root

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Live by the Sword, Die by the Sword – Update for April 4, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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SUPREMES SAY COURT CAN CONSIDER MANDATORY GUN SENTENCE WHEN SENTENCING ON UNDERLYING CRIME

Outside of TV cop shows, no one likes drug dealers or violent criminals waving firearms around, which is probably why no crime this side of kiddie porn is easier to demagogue than laws that slam gun-toting criminals.

gun160718Take 18 USC 924(c), which sets penalties for criminals who use, carry or possess a gun “during and in relation to” a crime of violence or drug-trafficking offense. A defendant convicted of a 924(c) offense must get a mandatory sentence of at least 5 years (with increased penalties if the perp “brandished” it or fired it, and whopping increases if, for example, it was fully automatic). What’s even more impressive, the statute raises the mandatory minimum to 25 years for the second offense. Oh yeah, and all 924(c) penalties must be consecutive to any other sentence.

Watch how the math works: On Monday, Bart Badguy robs a convenience store with a .44 Klutzman stuck in his waistband, and makes off with a bag of Doritos. Realizing later that he has nothing to dip it in, he robs another convenience store the next day, the same revolver displayed under his belt, and grabs some French onion dip. The federal sentencing guidelines set him at 63-78 months for the two robberies, and the court sentences Bart at the bottom (understanding what hunger can do to a man).

doritos170404But Paula Prosecutor is a canny lawyer, and she thus had the foresight to get Bart indicted for two 924(c) counts along with the two robberies. The first 924(c) count adds 60 months to the 63 months the district court imposed for the robberies. The second 924(c) count – arising from Bart’s going back for the dip – adds 300 months to the robberies and the first 924(c) conviction. Total sentence: 403 months (35¼ years) for chips and dip.

No one would argue against punishing crimes of violence involving guns more harshly than other offenses. Shooting legend Elmer Keith is credited with observing that one should never bring a knife to a gunfight, and the sentiment – that people carrying guns are likely to use them – undergirds 924(c).

knifegunB170404But the statute is inflexible, and the government has had its fun with it as a result. While Congress probably meant that a second 924(c) conviction – carrying a 25-year mandatory minimum – had to follow a prior 924(c) conviction, prosecutors years ago sold the Supreme Court that the statute did not say there had to be an intervening conviction. In Deal v. United States, a 1994 decision, the Supreme Court held that a drug-addled bank robber who held up six banks in a 3-month period – carrying a gun for all of them – had to get a 105-year sentence.

Yesterday, the government – which had lived by the sword – died by the sword.

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 8th Circuit, holding that a sentencing court may consider the length of a mandatory consecutive sentence when setting the length of an underlying sentence.

In Dean v. United States, the defendant was charged with committing two robberies with a gun. The robberies carried a guidelines sentence of 84 to 105 months. One of the two 924(c) counts carried a mandatory 5 years, and the second carried a mandatory 25 years. Both sentences had to be consecutive to the underlying sentence and each other.

So Levon Dean got to sentencing knowing that he had a minimum 360 months coming. His lawyer argued that it was more than enough, and the judge hardly needed to pile on another 84 months for the underlying offense. While the district court, the judge said he was not allowed to adjust the sentence of the underlying robbery to zero to account for the two consecutive gun sentences. Levon got 400 months.

knifegun170404The 8th Circuit agreed with the government that the underlying offense had to be sentenced as though the 924(c) counts were not there, and then the consecutive sentences had to be stacked on like pancakes. Anything else, the Justice Department argued, would thwart the will of Congress.

How convenient for the government that the will of Congress becomes a crucial consideration in Dean, while it was utterly irrelevant 24 years ago in Deal! Yesterday, however, the Supreme Court found it not so convenient, holding that while adjusting the underlying offense guidelines to zero might negate the will of Congress, that did not matter. The plain text of the statute was clear, and the plain text governs:

The Government speaks of Congress’s intent to prevent district courts from bottoming out sentences for predicate 924(c) offenses whenever they think a mandatory minimum under 924(c) is already punishment enough. But no such intent finds expression in the language of 924(c). That language simply requires any mandatory minimum under 924(c) to be imposed “in addition to” the sentence for the predicate offense, and to run consecutively to that sentence. Nothing in those requirements prevents a sentencing court from considering a mandatory minimum under 924(c) when calculating an appropriate sentence for the predicate offense.

The government argued that Congress’s intent that the underlying offense be sentenced without regard to the 924(c) count could be inferred from the statute’s silence. But in another consecutive-sentencing statute for identity theft, Congress included specific language limiting the district court’s ability to adjust the underlying sentence.

Sentencestack170404The Supremes ruled that because “Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms,” but did not in 924(c), a sentencing court may impose a sentence on the underlying offense of one day, in order to make the overall sentence consistent with what the court considers appropriate under 18 USC 3553 (the sentencing statute). The Court said, “we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”

Dean will go back to court for resentencing, where he will receive 30 years and a day.

Dean v. United States, Case No. 15-9260 (Apr. 3, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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