What’s in a Name? – Update for February 24, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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A SHAKESPEARE FESTIVAL

Bruce Swisshelm signed a plea agreement to resolve his bank fraud indictment. It included the fairly Government promise not to argue for a sentence above the top of the Guideline range, and the defendant would not argue for a sentence below the bottom.

rose170224Bruce’s sentencing range was 57-71 months, but his attorney vigorously argued for a downward variance and bombarded the court with letters from the community attesting to the fact that Bruce was a great guy. The Government objected to her tactics, arguing that defense counsel’s arguments and the letters violated the plea agreement. Bruce’s lawyer disagreed, saying the agreement only prohibited her from arguing for a downward departure, and all she was asking for was a variance.

Variance, departure? A difference, is it not? Bruce’s attorney was undoubtedly emulating Renaissance lawyer Juliet, who once argued, “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose, By any other name would smell as sweet.” And there is little doubt the judge found her arguments as sweet as a rose: despite the 57-71 month Guidelines range and the terms of the plea agreement, the court sentenced Bruce to 12 months and a day.

The Government appealed, arguing in essence, “Lord, what fools these mortals be” if they think they did not breach the plea agreement. Earlier this week, the 8th Circuit agreed.

Defense counsel just wanted the court to picture her client in the best possible light.
          Defense counsel just wanted the court to picture her client in the best possible light.

The Court of Appeals admitted that there are a lot of case out there holding  what’s to be done when the Government breaches a plea agreement, but that it had never decided the appropriate remedy when the defendant violates the deal. The Court said, “We do not now decide the proper remedy for any future defendant’s breach of a plea agreement, but in the particular circumstances of this case we decline to treat Swisshelm’s breach of the plea agreement differently from a breach by the government.”

A governmental breach of a plea deal always carries with it constitutional due process concerns. Those concerns are not present in where the breaching party is the defendant, but “principles of contract interpretation” nevertheless causes the Court to hold Bruce “accountable to the terms of the plea agreement. The parties agreed that they would not request a sentence outside the Guidelines range, and the government agreed not to pursue the several additional charges and Guidelines enhancements it could have lodged against Swisshelm in return for his guilty plea… Swisshelm thus received the benefit of the plea agreement—the government’s forbearance from seeking an above-Guidelines sentence—but deprived the government of its corresponding bargained-for benefit—Swisshelm’s forbearance from seeking a below-Guidelines sentence. “

Defense attorneys know that some clients just can't be prettied up at sentencing, no matter how hard one tries...
     Defense attorneys know that some clients just can’t be prettied up at sentencing, no matter how hard one tries…

The Court ordered resentencing in front of a different judge, which is precisely the remedy Bruce would have gotten if the Government had breached. Bruce – who had to think he had a real soft-touch sitting on the bench – complained that a different judge was hardly necessary and that his breach had been harmless. Doing the math, the 8th figured that a decrease in sentence from 57 months to 12 months was quote material. It said the different judge “may in the exercise of discretion consider the letters submitted on Swisshelm’s behalf for the purpose of determining a sentence within the Guidelines range, but not for the purpose of considering a downward departure or variance from the Guidelines range.”

The Court noted that appointment of a new judge in cases like this is standard, and was “in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge; the fault here rests on the defendant, not on the sentencing judge.”

Bruce can’t be thinking that “All’s well that ends well.” He’s already served his 12-month sentence, and was just released last month. He’s now looking to going back for another 45 months, at least.

United States v. Swisshelm, Case No. 16-1416 (8th Circuit, February 22, 2017)

 – Thomas L. Root

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Sentencing Commission Issues Comprehensive Drug Recidivism Study – Update for February 23, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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BUT I REPEAT MYSELF…

A 149-page report issued Tuesday by the U.S. Sentencing Commission offers a fascinating, data-filled glimpse into recidivism by federal drug offenders.

shawshank161117First, our criticism: the data are drawn from 10,000+ federal drug offenders who were either released or placed on probation during 2005. While a study on recidivism necessarily has to watch a cohort of people over a period of years, a lot has happened since 2005 that may change the accuracy of some of the findings.

For example, the study showed that among the 2005 releasees, methamphetamine offenses constituted just under 17% of all offenses. By 2015, about 31% of all drug offenders were methheads. The other concern is that all of the releasees would have been sentenced before United States v. Booker, and thus had mandatory Guidelines sentences. That leaves unanswered the question whether non-mandatory Guidelines sentences have a different influence on drug offender recidivism than did the old regime of mandatory Guidelines sentences.

offenderages170223But our concerns do not materially lessen the benefit that the Report’s wealth of data confers on the sentencing debate. The overall finding is sobering: over an 8-year period, one half of the 2005 group of federal drug trafficking were rearrested for a new crime or a violation of supervised release conditions.

Some other findings:

• Crack cocaine offenders had the highest rate (61%) of recidivism of any drug type, while powder cocaine offenders had the lowest rate (44%);

• The median time from release to the first recidivism event was 25 months;

• Nearly one-fourth (24%) of recidivist drug trafficking offenders had assault as their most serious new charge, followed by drug trafficking and public order offenses at about 15% apiece;

offenderages170223• A drug trafficking offender’s criminal history was closely associated with the likelihood of recidivism, from a recidivism rate of 35% for offenders with no prior criminal history, to 77% for offenders in the highest criminal history. Interestingly, the Guidelines “career offenders” – whom policy dictates are supposed to represent the hardest-core offenders – had a recidivism rate of 63%, lower than three of the six other criminal history ranges;

• A federal drug trafficking offender’s age at time of release was closely associated with likelihood of recidivism. Drug trafficking offenders released prior to age 21 had the highest recidivism rate at 65%, while drug trafficking offenders over 60 years old at the time of release apparently retired, with a recidivism rate of only 16.5%;

• There is little apparent association between the length of imprisonment and recidivism for drug trafficking offenders overall, a finding that supports other studies suggesting that no prison sentence over 5 years has any greater deterrent effect than a 5-year term. However, once criminal history is accounted for, length of imprisonment is associated with lower rates of recidivism (probably because of the older age of the prisoner when released).

• Federal drug trafficking offenders had a substantially lower recidivism rate compared to state drug offenders released around the same time. Over 76% of state drug offenders released from prison were rearrested within five years, compared to 42% of federal drug trafficking offenders released over the same five-year period.

The Report includes chapters breaking down the numbers according to the types of drugs in the offenders’ cases.

rearrestbysent170223There’s plenty of data in the Report for everyone. While only being released two days as of this writing, the Report is already being used by one inmate going back for resentencing and another 60+-year old offender on supervised release who wants the court to end his supervision early.

United States Sentencing Commission, Recidivism Among Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders (February 21, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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No Beckles Today, But Supremes Issue Interesting COA Opinion – Update for February 22, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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BECKLES V. UNITED STATES NOT DECIDED YET, BUT SUPREME COURT SPANKS 5TH CIRCUIT IN “BLACKS ARE VIOLENT” CASE

The Supreme Court issued three opinions this morning, one of which was criminal. A decision in Beckles v. United States was not handed down, but given that the three decisions decided today were argued in October, November and early December, we anticipate that Beckles could pop at any time.

scotus161130The interesting case handed down is Buck v. Davis, a Texas death penalty case in which the defense attorney amazingly enough introduced expert testimony that his client was more likely to be violent because he is black. After Buck lost his habeas corpus in state court, and was denied habeas in federal district court and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.

What may be of general interest to federal petitioners is the Supreme Court’s spanking of the 5th Circuit for that court’s stingy denial of Buck’s certificate of appealability. The Supreme Court complained that the Circuit “exceeded the limited scope of the COA analysis. The COA statute sets forth a two-step process: an initial determination whether a claim is reasonably debatable, and, if so, an appeal in the normal course. 28 U. S. C. § 2253. At the first stage, the only question is whether the applicant has shown that ‘jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or… could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.”

Here, the Supreme Court said, the 5th Circuit “phrased its determination in proper terms. But it reached its conclusion only after essentially deciding the case on the merits, repeatedly faulting Buck for having failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. The question for the Court of Appeals was not whether Buck had shown that his case is extraordinary; it was whether jurists of reason could debate that issue.”

The 5th Circuit is hardly alone in this approach. We think mostly of the 4th Circuit, which has COA petitioners file an “informal brief,” which suggests that the COA is being granted or denied based on an analysis of the entire case rather than the rather low bar of “appealability.”

Branding your own client with a racist stereotype?  Bad lawyering...
           Branding your own client with a racist stereotype? Bad lawyering…

The Supreme Court held that Buck’s lawyer was ineffective and Buck was prejudiced thereby. It sent the case back for resentencing.

The Supreme Court has not yet announced the next date for issuance of opinions, but it generally gives not much more than week’s notice. The argument dates of the three announced today suggests that Beckles is on track for a March issuance.

Buck v. Davis, Case No. 15–8049 (Supreme Court, February 22, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Right to Effective Counsel Only Comes with Indictment – Update for February 16, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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TIMING IS EVERYTHING

Every inmate knows the truth behind the Southern Gothic pop song “The Night The Lights Went Out in Georgia“, at least in the lyric “don’t trust your soul to no backwoods southern lawyer…”

reallawyer170216The 6th Amendment guarantees an attorney to every person charged with a felony. The Supreme Court has interpreted the right to guarantee not just some guy or gal stuffed into a suit and carrying a briefcase. Instead, the right is to an effective lawyer.

Claims in post-conviction filings that a lawyer was ineffective – and that the defendant’s constitutional rights were therefore violated – are as plentiful as wildflowers in June. And more often than you might think, the complaints are justified.

We’re not going to plumb the depths of lawyer foolishness today. Instead, we’re looking at a Tennessee case where the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were denied not because of what the lawyer did or didn’t do, but rather when he did or didn’t do it.

John Turner was arrested by a joint federal-state task force after robbing four Memphis-area businesses at gunpoint. The State of Tennessee charged him, and John hired attorney Mark McDaniel.

Deal170216During the summer of 2008, while state charges were being litigated, state district attorney told McDaniel that the United States Attorney’s Office planned to get an indictment against John under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which criminalizes interference with commerce by threats or violence, and for using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for each of the four robberies. On the federal firearms charges alone John faced a mandatory minimum of 82 years. The Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the matter told McDaniel he would offer John a 15-year sentence if John would accept the offer before the federal indictment was returned.

McDaniel says he relayed the federal plea deal to John, who refused to take it. He said John told him that 15 years was too much time for what he did. For his part John says McDaniel did not present the offer to him properly. John fired McDaniel and hired a new attorney, just as a new AUSA took over John’s case. The best deal the new AUSA offered was 25 years, which John accepted.

In 2012, John filed a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that McDaniel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiations on the federal charges. The district court denied the motion without reaching the factual question of whether McDaniel was ineffective. Instead, the district court decided that John did not have a 6th Amendment right to counsel on the federal charges before the indictment issued.

rights170216Earlier this week, the 6th Circuit very reluctantly agreed. The Court noted that its own precedent held that until formal federal charges were filed, no 6th Amendment right to effective counsel attached. The Court found the prior holding flawed, and noted that a number of other circuits had held to the contrary.

The Circuit said

In adversarial plea negotiations like Turner’s, a defendant’s right to trial and to contest the sentence are often at stake. It makes plea negotiations a “critical stage” of the criminal process. Whether they occur before or after the filing of formal charges, it is undisputed that the plea negotiation process is adversarial by nature and the average defendant is ill equipped to navigate the process on his own. The current bright-line rule does not allow for the realities of present-day criminal prosecutions and their heavy reliance on plea bargaining. Defendants face an increasing number of federal-state prosecutions that blur the lines of demarcation on exactly when charges are filed for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Defendants also must navigate the complex web of federal sentencing guidelines, computations that confound even those who work with them often.

In short, there is no logic to a “bright-line” rule that charges have to be filed before a 6th Amendment right attaches. However, the Court admitted, 6th Circuit precedent in United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000) required that the Court rule that John’s claim – event if correct – did not rise to a 6th Amendment violation.

The Court suggests that this issue may be ripe for Supreme Court review. For what it’s worth, we think the Court could have overruled the Moody precedent because of intervening Supreme Court decisions in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper.

Turner v. United States, Case No. 15-6060 (February 15, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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The Final Word on Obama Clemency – Update for February 15, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL REVEALS ARBITRARY WORLD OF OBAMA COMMUTATIONS

nothing170215You can pay your money and take your chance. From one angle, former President Barack Obama was the most merciful president in U.S. history, granting commutations to over 1,700 federal prisoners. From another, Obama squandered chances to make needed, permanent chances in the federal criminal justice system, choosing instead to sprinkle exhibitions of mercy one a few lucky inmates, done in such a way as to burnish Obama’s image rather than provide any responsible leadership.

Chief among our complaints was that even if you’re a clemency cheerleader, you have to be profoundly disappointed that Obama accomplished so little, and so much less than he and his minions confidently predicted in 2014. Former Attorney General and Obama buddy Eric Holder once speculated that the final number of clemency grants could reach 10,000 — one of every 19 federal prisoners.

It wasn’t for lack of raw material. Obama received more petitions for clemency than any recent president. And maybe that was the problem. In a recent interview, former White House Counsel Neil Eggleston revealed that Obama himself may have been the bottleneck:

I would give him memos on the cases, and he would spend a long time on each one. For a significant number, he was fine with my recommendation. For others, he would say: “Why are you recommending this person to me? Look at his conduct in prison, look at his prior convictions. I’m uncomfortable that this guy is going to take advantage of a second chance.”

Or the alternative: There were times when the deputy attorney general may have recommended in favor of a commutation, and I recommended against it, and [Obama] would call me in and ask: “Why don’t you agree with this one?” Or he’d say: “Look there’s this prior conviction, I’m troubled by it, can you get me more information?”

He was really into the details. There were two parts to the way he thought. The first was he just thought a lot of these sentences from the 90’s and 2000’s were excessive. But he also felt very strongly about the idea of rehabilitation and second chances. It wasn’t enough that the person had just gotten too lengthy a sentence. He also wanted make sure these were people who would benefit from a second chance. So if someone didn’t do any programming, got into fights, had a lot of infractions, etc., I think the president was concerned they would be unlikely to do anything but go back to their life of crime when they got out.

He felt strongly that this was a gift, and the gift had to be earned.

delegate170215Obama’s hagiographers will undoubtedly hail his obsession with the details of each of the 1,700+ commutations as evidence of the depth of commitment the President had to the commutation program, the extent of his compassion, the whatever. The plain fact is that America’s chief executive showed an unnatural preoccupation with the minutiae of commutation, hand-picking the winners and losers when his time should have been spent on larger matters. The boss should set out some broad principles – like the White House did with the Clemency Project – and then simply delegated authority to trusted staffers to carry it out.

For that matter, Eggleston’s offhand comment that Obama “felt strongly that this was a gift, and the gift had to be earned” reveals much. Holder told the American Bar Association in 2014 that the clemency initiative was intended to “correct the disparities” that were orphaned when the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was passed without a retroactivity provision. But Eggleston’s statement suggests that the President saw it as more Messianic, that he was empowered to magically change lives, and that he would bestow the gifts only on those he deemed worthy. Deciding who was worthy and who was not thus because as arbitrary as most other acts of God.

Eggleston seems defensive to claims of arbitrariness:

I think the thing the outside commentators didn’t really understand was that I had more information about these people than others did, including, frankly, their lawyers. I had records of how they performed in prison, and information about their prior crimes. And when people say there was arbitrariness it’s because they didn’t know factors that I knew.

All 1,700 went through me and the small group of lawyers underneath me. And ultimately I didn’t want people in jail thinking to themselves, ‘How can this be?’”

That, of course, is exactly what the folks in prison – including people with horrific drug sentences and excellent institutional records – are wondering. We had one unsuccessful inmate write to us that his disciplinary record was spotless, while another inmate there received work that Obama had commuted his sentence while siting in the Special Housing Unit because of a serious rules infraction.
The inmate who wrote to us asked “how is that right?” The answer, of course, came from a former Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, who famously said, “Life is unfair.”

clemencyjack161229The inmate’s mistake, of course, was in thinking that the clemency program was ever about justice and fairness for them. It wasn’t. It was about Obama and his legacy.

In that, the clemency program was quite successful.

While anecdotes do not statistics make, we cannot help but note that one of the carefully vetted commutations – Robert Martinez-Gil, whose life sentence was commuted because Obama found he had “turned [his] life around” – just got arrested in San Antonio with a kilo of cocaine powder. He was free for about 18 months. At minimum, this does not speak well for the superiority of Obama’s analytical prowess. 

The Marshall Report, The Man Who Ran Obama’s Clemency Machine (Feb. 14, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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A Snitch in Time… – Update for February 14, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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NO HONOR AMONG THIEVES… OR COOPERATORS

snitch161004One of the enduring myths about prisoners is how universally despised snitches are. The lowest of the low, people with no sense of loyalty, yada yada.

Horse puckey. Informants are everywhere in the system. In 2015, one out of eight federal defendants was rewarded for ratting out other defendants with a sentence reduction. Another 1.5% received a sentence reduction after the fact for cooperation after being locked up.

As one inmate (who was informed on, but had no information himself that the government wanted to swap for): “Man, you do what you gotta do.”

The number of defendants getting sentence reduction motions doesn’t reflect how many try to swap what they know for a lower sentence without success. Some solicit the government without success. Others provide information but get nothing. The problem is that the government’s offer is simple and rather one-sided: tell us everything you know, and we’ll then decide whether we feel like rewarding you with a motion to reduce sentence.

The structure of the cooperation motion provides an inmate with a powerful incentive. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the government (and only the government) may file a motion to reduce a defendant’s sentence for cooperation. If the motion is made – under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 – the sentencing judge may depart downward from the Guidelines sentencing range, regardless of any mandatory minimum sentences required by statute. If the inmate waits until after sentencing to cooperate, the government (and only the government) may file a motion under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to resentence the inmate to a reduced term, again without regard to what statutes say the minimum must be.

dubois170214Obviously, if the defendant faces a staggering mandatory minimum because of drug quantity or packing a gun or any of dozens of other statutory provisions, the only way to wrestle the sentence into the range of sanity is to sing like a canary, and then to depend on the kindness of a particular stranger who happens to be the Assistant U.S. Attorney. Could Blanche Dubois have been a federal defendant?

More often than we care to recall, defendants have spilled their guts, only to be denied any sentencing benefit by government lawyers who expected more. In one case we know of, a defendant was instrumental in convicting a murderer, but he helped a U.S. Attorney in one jurisdiction, and that U.S. Attorney could not convince the U.S. Attorney whose office was prosecuting the defendant a thousand miles away – and who displayed a real animus toward the defendant – to make the motion.

Unsurprisingly, we get asked regularly how to force the government to file a § 5K1.1 or a Rule 35(b) motion. Our answer is almost always the same: You can’t. The only factor limiting AUSAs in reaping the benefit of cooperation and then arbitrarily denying a sentence reduction motion is the fear that word will get around, and then no defendants will cooperate. Fat chance of that: when a defendant is facing a mandatory minimum sentence of 20+ years, there’s no straw too small to grasp.

That’s not to say that some defendants can’t be their own worst enemies. Defendants like Tyran Patton. Tyran was a major cocaine and heroin dealer in the Chicago area. In April 2010, law enforcement arrested one of Tyran’s people with 8 kilograms of cocaine and 3 kilograms of heroin, amounts that carried a substantial mandatory minimum sentence. Later, in an unrelated case, ATF agents arrested Tyran in a firearms investigation. Government agents explained the facts of life to Tyran, chiefly how they had him dead to rights on the gun, and how another train – this one a heavy-duty drug conspiracy indictment – was coming down the tracks at him. Tyran wisely agreed to confess to all and to cooperate with the ATF.

snitch160802He did all right for awhile. Over a year, he made controlled purchases of guns for his ATF case agent, and ultimately helped get about 60 weapons off the street. But Tyran had his own agenda, and the ATF agent supervising him was a greenhorn. Tyran was allowed to pick his own targets, and so he did, delivering only street-level dealers while protecting higher-level gun traffickers, family members and friends.

What a tangled web Tyran spun! When the ATF told him in 2012 that he was need to testify before a grand jury, and that his grace period was running out – meaning he would be indicted on the drug charge soon – Tyran disappeared for about six months. He surfaced only after the government had finished several trials, and word was out on the street that he was a snitch. The government suspected he came forward because he needed government protection.

Tyran tried to make a plea deal with the government, but prosecutors were pretty steamed at him and refused to do so. So he pled guilty without benefit of a deal, and was sentenced to 20 years and change.

Tyran complained that he should have gotten the benefit of a sentence reduction motion from the Feds. Last week, the 7th Circuit turned him down.

The Court started by observing that district courts have limited authority to review a prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial‐assistance motion, and may grant a remedy only if the refusal is based on an unconstitutional motive, or if it is “not rationally related to any legitimate Government end.” The burden is on the defendant to make a “substantial threshold showing” that the government improperly withheld a substantial‐assistance motion before he can receive a remedy.

stool160530Tyran argued that the government withheld his sentence reduction for reasons “not rationally related to any legitimate Government end.” The Circuit, however, found two very good reasons not to reward Tyran. First, he gamed the tyro ATF supervising agent by manipulating who he targeted to avoid ensnaring family members, friends and some of the higher-level gun movers the ATF really wanted to catch. Second, Tyran “disappeared for over six months, right after being told he was going to be indicted and needed to testify at a grand jury hearing. While Tyran claims he had to have an operation during that time and that his wife turned off his cell‐phone, even his own attorney acknowledged that Patton could have acted more promptly in getting in touch with the government following his surgery. Both rationales support the government’s decision not to move for a reduced sentence.”

Tyran argued he should have been granted a hearing in which he could develop his claim that the government’s withholding of the sentence reduction motion was illegitimate. The Court said he had it backwards: “A defendant has no right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing unless he makes a substantial threshold showing of an improper motive. Tyran failed to make such a showing. In fact, he did not even argue to the district court that the government’s rationale for refusing to move for a substantial-assistance reduction was unrelated to a legitimate government end. Instead, Tyran merely argued that he deserved the reduction because he provided the government with substantial assistance which led to the prosecution of seven individuals and taking 60 guns off the street.”

United States v. Patton, Case No. 13-1319 (Feb. 9, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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That’s Right… Just Blame the Victim – Update for February 13, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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YOU CAN’T RAPE THE WILLING

Thirty years ago, when life was courser and the P.C. police weren’t roaming around being outraged about everything, an old wag of an attorney described to us his approach to an upcoming rape trial (where he represented the defendant).

“You can’t rape the willing,” he said, a line he later used in the trial to introduce the jury to his argument that the victim had been a willing participant in the offense.

blame170213Sadly for the defendant, the trial was in a small, rural Midwest county, and both the perp and the victim were male. Back in the day, the stalwart folks in rural America did not think much of gay assignations, and they were too willing to believe that the victim would have never consented to such odious conduct. In fact, the victim was quite drunk and undoubtedly nearly as willing as the defendant, at least until he sobered up hours later, but no matter. The defendant was convicted, and probably would have been whether it was consensual or not.

A lot has changed since then, those unenlightened days when people hated gays and loved their bankers. Now it’s turned on its head.

mortgage170213Minas Litos and his friends were busy a decade ago doing what fraudsters all were doing, writing bogus mortgage applications for people who lived under bridges, collecting the proceeds, and riding into the sunset. Minos had a portfolio of real estate to “sell.” He would give his applicants down payment money, and then lie about their assets, income and cash on hand to Bank of America. In each of the transactions, Minos and his associates walked away with the purchase price of the property they had sold minus the down payment amount, since the “down payment” they received was their own cash (which they’d surreptitiously transferred to the impecunious buyer).

Minos and the others were duly convicted of fraud, and as part of their sentence, the district court awarded Bank of America $893,000 in restitution. Last Friday, the 7th Circuit reversed the restitution in a breathtaking decision that blasted BOA as a willing handmaiden in Minos’ fraud (and for that matter, in the Great Recession of 2008).

BOA170213Federal law requires “mandatory restitution to victims of certain crimes,” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996), including fraud. But, the Court said, this applies only where “an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense”… and “that doesn’t seem to describe the loss suffered by Bank of America as a result of its improvident loans, especially when we consider its complicity in the loss — its reckless decision to make the loans without verifying the solvency of the would-be borrowers, despite the palpable risk involved…”

In the Circuit’s opinion, more time was spent on the victim than on the defendant:

The order of restitution is questionable because Bank of America, though not a coconspirator of the defendants, does not have clean hands. It ignored clear signs that the loans that it was financing at the behest of the defendants were phony. Despite its bright-eyed beginning as an upstart neighborhood bank for Italian-American workers, Bank of America has a long history of blunders and shady practices; it narrowly survived the Great Depression of the 1930s, nosedived in the 1980s, and lost tens of billions of dollars in the crash of 2008—including $16.65 billion in a settlement with the U.S. Justice Department over charges of mortgage fraud… And at the sentencing hearing the judge said: “I think they [the defendants and Bank of America] are equally culpable. Isn’t that a fair way to look at this? … Bank of America knew [what] was going on. They’re playing this dance and papering it. Everybody knows it is a sham because no one is assuming any risk. So what’s wrong with saying they’re of equal culpability?” Indeed; and we are puzzled that after saying this the judge awarded Bank of America restitution—and in the exact amount that the government had sought.

The Court complained that the mortgage applications Minos gave to BOA were “a joke on their face.” People claimed to own real estate that they didn’t own, claimed $10,000 a month income and millions in the bank, and came back to the trough multiple times – including one woman with a claimed monthly income of $3,400 who got 6 mortgages in a 10-day period.

dontcare170123But, the 7th complained, BOA did no investigating whatsoever. Indeed, the Court said, “To say the bank was merely negligent would be wrong. Recklessness is closer to the mark.” The panel said BOA didn’t care, because it knew it was going to promptly unload the loans on Fannie Mae (which wore a “kick me” sign on its corporate posterior). As the Court put it, “the bank’s failure to demand evidence of the financial sufficiency of the mortgagees constituted deliberate indifference to a palpable risk that the bank’s executives must have been aware of. The bank had every incentive to close its eyes to how phony these loan applications were, because it expected to turn around and sell the mortgages to a hapless Fannie Mae.”

So, because the victim was willing, Minos and his co-conspirators should get off scot-free? Not really. The Court said

Restitution for a reckless bank? A dubious remedy indeed—which is not to say that the defendants should be allowed to retain the $893,015. That is stolen money. We don’t understand why the district judge, given his skepticism concerning the entitlement of Bank of America to an award for its facilitating a massive fraud, did not levy on the defendants a fine of $893,015.

The case is being remanded to the district court, where the judge will undoubtedly resentence Minos and his co-defendants to zero restitution, but a fine of $893,000.

United States v. Minos, Case No. 16-1384 (7th Cir., Feb. 10, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Everything You Know About Mass Incarceration is Wrong – Update for February 10, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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HINT: IT AIN’T DRUGS AND IT AIN’T LONG SENTENCES

We are not much for writing book reviews. The last one we did was sometime in the mid-1970s in college journalism class. Occasionally, a book is published that just might change the arc of the debate, however, and John Pfaff’s new tome, Locked In, just might be such a book.

incarceration170210This is not beach reading. With a formidable array of statistics, dense text and a plethora of charts, Pfaff shows that some of the most cherished notions of the right and left are wrong. The War on Drugs caused mass incarceration? Wrong. Longer sentences have crowded our prisons? Wrong again.

Pfaff argues convincingly that a significant cause of prison population growth is rising admissions, and he points an accusing finger at the increasing rate at which prosecutors filed felony charges during years when both crime rates and arrests fell.

Most of the criminal justice debate has focused on rigid sentencing rules: mandatory minimum sentences, “truth in sentencing” laws that require offenders to serve at least 85% of their original sentence, and habitual criminal laws that can send away repeat offenders for decades, if not a lifetime. While criminal sentences in the U.S. are much longer than the international average, and while the records suggest the raw sentence is longer, Pfaff shows that the time actually served has grown very little.

The real problem, Pfaff says, is not “time served” but rather the sheer rate of admissions into prisons, which have skyrocketed since the 1980s. Sentencing reform legislation that does away with mandatory minimum sentences for low-level crimes may be worth doing, but it’s not going to affect mass incarceration.

Pfaff, a professor of both law and economics, says just 16% of the 1.3 million people in state prisons (where the vast majority of inmates are held) are there on drug offenses, while more than half are convicted of violent crimes. If everyone in state and federal prison serving a drug sentence was released, Pfaff writes, the US would still have 1.25 million people behind bars, an incarceration rate four times higher than in 1970.

Sentencing151228What’s more, Pfaff points out, drug offenses don’t contribute to racial disparities in imprisonment. The percentage of whites sentenced for drug crimes (15%) is actually slightly higher than that for blacks (14.9%) and Hispanics (14.6%). Reducing sentences for nonviolent drug criminals would only have a small impact on mass incarceration.

By contrast, violent offenses explain the majority of mass imprisonment, driving racial disparities because the rate for whites (46.6%) is significantly lower than that for blacks (57.8%) and Hispanics (58.7%).

Pfaff favors “cutting long sentences for people convicted of violence, even for those with extensive criminal histories, since almost everyone starts aging out of crime by their 30s.” He also urges less reliance on prison and more on community-based anti-violence programs. Pfaff argues that the real concern is not sentence length, but serving any time in prison at all. Whether an inmate serve 12 or 16 months, he says, the impact is the same. Upon release, convicted felons have a hard time getting decent jobs or good housing. And with the odds heavily stacked against them, they’re more likely to reoffend.

“If we are serious about ending mass incarceration,” he argues, “we will have to figure out how to lock up fewer people who have committed violent acts and to incarcerate those we do imprison for less time.”

gun160718An interesting corollary argument – one we’ve long shared where firearms laws are concerned – was advanced by columnist Diane Dimond last week. She cited a 2014 National Research Council study that found “those committing crimes usually have no idea what kind of sentence their actions might net them and that ‘certainty of apprehension’ is far more important to them” than sentence length. The study reports that “arrests ensue for only a small fraction of all reported crimes.” By illustration, the number of reported robberies outnumber robbery arrests by about 4-to-1, and the offense-to-arrest ratio for burglaries is about 5-to-1. These ratios have “remained stable since 1980.”

Dimond argues that “those bent on bad deeds know the odds of getting caught, which gives them a decisive advantage, so they take their chances.”

The Marshall Project, Everything you think you know about mass incarceration is wrong (Feb. 9, 2017)

Washington Post, What we get wrong about mass imprisonment in America (Feb. 8, 2017)

Commonwealth magazine, Is criminal justice reform misfiring? (Feb. 6, 2017)

Boston Globe, Why we should free violent criminals (Feb. 5, 2017)

Diane Dimond, Thinking Outside the Box on Sentencing Guidelines (Feb. 4, 2017)

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Who You Calling a Liar? – Update for February 9, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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WITNESS CAN’T BE ASKED IF OTHER WITNESSES LIED
The ream crime is probably how airlines handle baggage to begin with...
The ream crime is probably how airlines handle baggage to begin with…

The Government says Nelson Pereira had a sweet gig. As a baggage handler for an airlines, Nelson was able to get certain suitcases without owners flown to Newark from Puerto Rico. The Feds said the duffels were full of cocaine, and Nelson and his buddies would intercept them in the baggage area, insuring they never slid onto the baggage carousel, where the wrong kind of DEA dog might sniff them.

The indictment said the scheme went on for a decade. When heads started to roll, two defendants caught up in the scheme fingered Nelson.

liar170209Trial came down to the government informants’ word against Nelson’s. The prosecutor was hard on Nelson, pointing out repeatedly during cross-examination that Torres and Olmo – the two government witnesses – told a story very different from Frank’s version. Some might suggest that the questioning came close to badgering, but the thrust of it was the prosecutor trying to get Nelson to call the other witnesses liars:

Q. Because you didn’t know Gerardo Torres, the fact that he met you, Frank Pratts [sic] . . . that never happened either; right?
A. No. It did not happen.
Q. So that’s not correct then. That was another thing that Mr. Torres made up; right?
Defense Attorney: Your Honor, questions as to what Mr. Gerardo Torres made up or didn’t make up, it’s like bringing something out.
Court: Overruled.
Q. That’s something else that Gerardo Torres made up and put against you.
A. Yes. It’s a good story, but it didn’t happen.

And at another point, the district court encouraged the questioning:

Q. [B]ut you’ve never seen Carlos Camacho before until you got to court; right?
A. Correct. I never met Carlos Camacho.
Q. So that’s something he made up; right?
A. You’re answering your own question.
Q. No. I’m asking you what the question is.
Court: Let’s not get into an argument here. The question is [if that’s] something that[] Mr. Torres made up.
Defense Attorney: But he is not the person to say that Mr. Torres made it up or not. He is not Mr. Torres.
Court: Overruled. . . . If it’s not true, then it’s something Mr. Torres made up.
A. Correct. It’s a lie.

Witnesses testify falsely all the time. But that does not mean they’re liars. Lack of perception, lack of recall… it happens. As Dr. Judith Loftus, a nationally recognized expert on eyewitness testimony, put it:

Why, after all, would they lie? Ah, there’s the word – lie. That’s the word that gets us off track. You see, eyewitnesses who point their finger at innocent defendants are not liars, for they genuinely believe in the truth of their testimony. The face that they see before them is the face of the attacker. The face of innocence has become the face of guilt. That’s the frightening part – the truly horrifying idea that our memories can be changed, inextricably altered, and that what we think we know, what we believe with all our hearts, is not necessarily the truth.

You see Bigfoot? If so, you're probably a liar.
        You see Bigfoot? If so, you’re probably a liar.

But everyone understands “lie.” Getting a defendant to lash out at witnesses whom the jury presumes have no axe to grind makes the defendant look guilty. Name-calling make him less sympathetic. Nelson’s prosecutor kept returning to the theme, because the court overrode the defense objections to it, and Nelson was willing, after a fashion, to play ball.

Fortunately, the First Circuit was not. Last week, the Court reversed Nelson’s conviction.

The court held that “counsel should not ask one witness to comment on the veracity of the testimony of another witness… Underlying this rule is the concept that credibility judgments are for the jury, not witnesses, to make… These types of questions are also improper because Rule 608(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence “does not permit a witness to testify that another witness was truthful or not on a specific occasion.”

Practically speaking, “was-he-lying” questions “ignore other possible explanations for inconsistent testimony . . . which put the testifying defendant in a ‘no-win’ situation of . . . either accusing another witness of lying or undermining his or her own version of events.” The questions are “argumentative, and often their primary purpose is to make the defendant appear accusatory. The danger is that the prosecutor first forces the defendant to label government witnesses as liars who are making up stories, and then, after laying this groundwork, seeks to convince the jury that it is the accusatory defendant—and not the prosecution witnesses—who is unworthy of belief.”

The error in Nelson’s case was not harmless. The Circuit noted the dearth of physical evidence, and noted that because the government witnesses’ testimony was not corroborated – and because they had an arguable motive to lie – the eight occasions on which the government pushed Nelson to call them liars deprived him of a fair trial.

United States v. Pereira, Case No. 15-1669 (1st Circuit, Feb. 3, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Judge Does Not Follow Instructions, Gets Replaced – Update for February 8, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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WE’RE AT A “LOSS” TO EXPLAIN IT

Tom Evans was a Colorado real estate developer who raised a pot full of investor money to renovate an apartment complex. The deal was completely legitimate, but rather risky.

The apartment project turned into a disaster.
The apartment project turned into a disaster.

When the deal started to go bad, Tom dumped $4.5 million of his own money into the project. Unfortunately, he also started commingling his money with the investors’ funds, and lying to the investors and bankers about how the deal was going.

When his fraud was discovered in 2007, a receiver took over the project. The receiver managed to convince investors to invest good money after bad to save the project.  Alas, the rescue did not work, and the whole deal collapsed.

Tom was convicted of fraud, and sentenced to 168 months, chiefly because the district court held him responsible for a $12.3 million loss. The 10th Circuit reversed the sentence and sent the case back, telling the district court to determine “the reasonably foreseeable amount of loss to the value of the securities caused by Mr. Evans’ fraud.” The district court was “disregard any loss that occurred before the fraud began and account for the forces that acted on the securities after the fraud ended.”

In order to exclude harm preceding the fraud, the district court had to determine “the value of the securities at the time the fraud began.” But on remand, the government threw up its hands and said it could not do that. So the district court decided the investors had lost over $4 million in equity, and resentenced Tom to 121 months.

Last Friday, it was the 10th Circuit’s turn to throw up its hands. The Circuit said it had clearly told the district court what had to be done – called “the law of the case” – and the district court was not entitled to go off on a frolic by ginning up a new theory on “loss of equity.”

Money on the burn pile - but how much of it did Tom's fraud set alight?
Money on the burn pile – but how much of it did Tom’s fraud set alight?

The problem was simply this. Before Tom committed any fraud at all, the apartment project was circling the drain. After the fraud ended, the receiver enticed investors to toss even more money on the burn pile. The issue, then, was how much of the total loss was because of the fraud instead of because of external factors. The Court complained that the government’s inability to figure out the value of the investors’ stake in the deal on the day before the fraud began didn’t excuse complying with the Court of Appeals had ordered.

The district judge had said that she would have given Tom 121 months even if her Guideline calculation was too high. She pounded Tom at sentencing, saying “You lied to your victims, you stole their funds, and you failed to manage the investment properties in the manner you promised.” She complained that she could not find Tom responsible for “the full $12 million he stole from investors”

instructions170208The 10th Circuit was not impressed with the district court’s alternate sentence. The sentencing judge’s “finding was clearly erroneous,” the Circuit said, “for there is no evidence that Mr. Evans stole money from investors. To the contrary, Mr. Evans contributed approximately $4.5 million of his own money to keep the business afloat. Mr. Evans’s misrepresentations could conceivably represent a form of “stealing” if the misrepresentations had caused investors to lose money. But… the government has been unable to prove loss to investors caused by the fraud.”

The appellate panel sent the case back for resentencing, and ordered it be heard by another judge. While the 10th noted – as appeals courts always do in cases like this – that it was sure the judge was not personally biased, it nevertheless noted several reasons for assigning a different judge:

First, the district judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Evans deserved a sentence enhancement, saying that it was unfortunate that the loss computation was not higher…. The judge added that she believed Americans “do not take white collar crime seriously enough… Even after we rejected the original loss calculation, the district judge reiterated her belief that Mr. Evans had “stole[n]” approximately $12 million and expressed regret concerning the inability to order restitution in that amount… Thus, we could reasonably expect our disposition to cause difficulty on remand.

judge160606Because the government had its chance prove loss but failed to do so, the Court ordered that a new sentence would not include any enhancement for loss or number of victims.

Tom probably knew good news was coming. After this case was argued last November, the Court of Appeals ordered his release on bail on December 12th. He’s served three years, considerably more than what his corrected Guidelines suggest. Interestingly, Judge Neil Gorsuch was on the panel that considered the briefs and heard the argument. He recused himself before the judgment, because of his nomination to the Supreme Court only four days before the opinion issued.

United States v. Evans, Case No. 15-1461 (10th Circuit, Feb. 3, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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