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Trick-or-Treat… It’s the ATF – Update for October 31, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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ANOTHER MONTH, ANOTHER STASH HOUSE “STING”

ATF-o-lantern171031Richard Zayas, ATF agent and professional “stash house sting” promoter (with more than 100 to his credit) took his show on the road to Cleveland, where he was again successful in finding young, poor black defendants to recruit into his fictitious robbery ring.

The “recruits,” including one poor kid with no prior criminal record, showed up at “work call,” guns in hand, ready to pull off the nonexistent job. The ATF cuffed them all and hauled them away. They were, of course, convicted in due course.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the indictment should have been dismissed based on outrageous government conduct. They argued that the Government’s conduct “created and encouraged the defendants’ commission of the offense by luring the impoverished… defendants with the promise of a large payoff, making repeated requests for meetings over a short period of time, making repeated demands for their commitment to the conspiracy, suggesting and enabling their possession of firearms, by providing transportation via the confidential informant to a pre-robbery meeting, and by providing them with a car to use for purposes of the robbery.”

stash171031Last week, the 6th Circuit upheld the convictions. The Court noted that while some circuits said that under the outrageous government conduct defense, government involvement in a crime may be “so excessive that it violates due process and requires the dismissal of charges against a defendant even if the defendant was not entrapped,” the 6th Circuit had not previously held that the government could be so outrageous as to bar prosecution, and it was not going to do so here.

One of the defendants, who was recruited by an informant acting on Agent Zayas’ direction, claimed “indirect entrapment.” Entrapment is normally carried out by law enforcement; indirect entrapment occurs when “a person is brought into a criminal scheme after being informed indirectly of conduct or statements by a government agent which could amount to inducement.”

Maybe people are indirectly entrapped somewhere else, the 6th Circuit said, but it has “explicitly chosen not to adopt the doctrine of indirect entrapment.” The defendants were out of luck.

Like other “stash house stings” across the country, this opinion drew a sharp concurring opinion. While upholding the conviction, Judge Stranch complained that the stings preyed overwhelmingly on minorities in impoverished neighborhoods. She wrote,

it seems we remain without an established vehicle in the law to define a dividing line between law enforcement practices that are honorable and those that are not. In the interim, these questionable schemes continue to use significant government resources and to adversely impact the poor, minorities, and those attempting to re-integrate into society. And they apparently do so with no increase in public safety and no deterrence of or adverse effect on real stash houses. These costly and concerning sting operations do not accord with the principles of our criminal justice system and I hope they will be discontinued.

United States v. Flowers, Case No. 15-3988 (6th Cir., Oct. 24, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Sentence Reform – Wither Goest Thou? – Update for October 30, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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LISA DOES A ROAD TRIP 2

roadtrip171027We reported last Friday on our trip to Washington for the “Advancing Justice, An Agenda for Human Dignity & Public Safety,” a conference sponsored by the Charles Koch Institute.

Today’s installment is Part 2 of our coverage:

SPEAKERS HINT AT SRCA PROSPECTS

The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2017 (S.1917) is currently before a subcommittee of Senator Charles Grassley’s Judiciary Committee, but we’ve been there before. The 2015 version of the SRCA was approved by the Judiciary Committee, only to die on the Senate floor because leadership refused to bring it to a vote during a presidential election season.

Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the man with his hand on the Judiciary Committee throttle.
Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the man with his hand on the Judiciary Committee throttle.

What is lost in the story of the 2015-16 attempts to pass SRCA is that the bill that came out of the Committee was not the same bill that went in. Instead, a lot of the retroactivity written into the bill as drafted was taken out to please law-and-order conservatives like then-Sen. Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III (now Attorney General) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas).

Sen. Grassley, one of the SRCA sponsors, said at the Advancing Justice conference that the drafters of SRCA17 “kept the package balanced,” taking into account the views of the prior bill’s critics. He said that to those “wanting reasonable compromise, we will be willing partners.”

Sen. Grassley cited a number of pending criminal justice reform bills, including the Smarter Sentencing Act (S.1933), the Mens Rea Reform Act (S.1902) and the CORRECTIONS Act (S.1994), implying that one comprehensive piece of sentencing reform legislation may emerge from the Judiciary Committee that includes pieces of many or all of these bills.

Sen. Grassley’s favorable reference to the Smarter Sentencing Act is a lot different from what he thought two years ago, when he denounced “the arguments for the Smarter Sentencing Act [as] merely a weak attempt to defend the indefensible.” In fact, his complaint that mandatory minimum laws are “too severe” and give prosecutors too much discretion is a major change from 2015, when he complained in a Senate speech about the dangers of the “leniency industrial complex” and “a growing public misconception that mandatory sentences for drug offenders needed to be reduced.”

stars171030So are the stars aligned differently in this Congress? Marc Levin ot the Texas Public Policy Institute told a session on the future of sentencing reform that “part of the strategy is to have as comprehensive a [sentencing reform] package as possible, without making perfect the enemy of the good.” Both left- and right-wing politicians are working on sentencing reform, and Koch Industries general counsel Mark Holden thinks that Attorney General Sessions will not be an impediment to the bill’s passage, despite what Levin called Sessions’ “real difference of opinion” on sentencing reform.

One potential stumbling block may be the Mens Rea Reform Act (S.1902). That Act would add a default rule for juries, requiring them to find criminal intent for federal offenses that don’t explicitly have an intent standard. If enacted, the Act would specify a default state of mind of “willfully,” and would require that unless the statute specified otherwise, AUSAs would have to prove the state of mind for every element of the offense. For example, a felon-in-possession charge under 18 USC 922(g) (which does not specify a state of mind) would require proof that the defendant possessed a gun that had traveled in interstate commerce intending to break the law. Currently, the government only must show the defendant knew he or she possessed a gun, not that the gun had traveled interstate and not that he or she knew the law prohibited possession.

mensrea160124Conservatives and criminal-defense organizations argue the measure is a necessary part of the congressional effort to reform sentencing and incarceration. Some Senate Democrats, however, fear the measure is far too sweeping and could be a back-door attack on federal regulations that police corporate behavior.

Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D – Rhode Island), a member of the Judiciary Committee, told the Atlantic magazine last week that he wouldn’t support a sentencing reform bill containing the change in mens rea proposed by the MRRA. “It would turn me into a warrior against it,” he said. Chuck Schumer (New York), the Democratic leader in the Senate, also was quoted as saying he would oppose such a bill.

Ohio State University law professor and sentencing expert Douglas Berman wrote pessimistically last Friday about the effect the MRRA could have on sentencing reform:

I have said before and will say again that this kind of opposition to a reform designed to safeguard a fundamental part of a fair and effective federal criminal justice system shows just how we got to a world with mass incarceration and mass supervision and mass collateral consequences.  Nobody seems willing or able to understand that making life easier for prosecutors anywhere serves to increase the size and reach and punitiveness of our criminal justice systems everywhere.  In turn, if you want a less extreme and severe criminal justice system anywhere, the best way to advance the cause is by seeking and advocating to limit government prosecutorial powers everywhere.

Sentencing Law & Policy, Is it time for new optimism or persistent pessimism on the latest prospects for statutory federal sentencing reform? (Oct. 28, 2017)

The Atlantic, Could a Controversial Bill Sink Criminal-Justice Reform in Congress? (Oct. 26, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Talking Sentence Reform At “Advancing Justice” – Update for Friday, October 27, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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LISA DOES A ROAD TRIP

roadtrip171027We were in Washington, D.C., yesterday for the “Advancing Justice, An Agenda for Human Dignity & Public Safety,” a conference sponsored by the Charles Koch Institute.

“Advancing Justice” featured a thundering herd of prosecutors, public defenders, economists, doctors and law professors who focused on federal sentencing reform, over-criminalization, the opioid crisis, and effective rehabilitation.

Charles Koch, one of the often-denounced conservative Koch brothers (Koch Industries), is one of the staunchest sentencing reform supporters in the country. Through the Charles Koch Foundation, he has put his money where his mouth is, and bankrolled reforms that have or will have broad support from the right and the left.

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SRCA SPONSORS MAKE THEIR CASE

The Sentence Reform and Corrections Act of 2107 would pass the Senate with 70 votes if it were voted on today, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) told the Advancing Justice conference yesterday.

advj171027The SRCA introduced in 2015 passed Sen. Grassley’s committee 15-5, and both he and Sen. Lee said it would have overwhelmingly passed the Senate had it been brought to a vote. Sen. Grassley said “election year pressures” were responsible for the bill stalling. Mark Holden, Koch Industries general counsel – who spearheaded Koch pressure in favor of the 2015 version of SRCA – was blunter about it: “Presidential politics killed the last Sentence Reform and Corrections Act,” he told one of the sessions focusing on the future of federal sentence reform.

Holden and Sen. Grassley separately noted that there is support within the Trump Administration for a reform bill. Holden noted that while it was well known that White House advisor Jared Kushner – President Trump’s son-in-law – supported sentencing reform because his father had done time for a white-collar offense – others in the Administration support it as well. Energy Secretary Rick Perry, Housing Secretary Ben Carson are strong supporters of the measure. Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin), the Speaker of the House, is “very passionate” about sentence reform, Holden said.

Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III
Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III

Most of the attention has been focused on Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, who reportedly opposes sentencing reform. Holden suggested Sessions “not a real negative.” Sessions’ job, as he acknowledged at his confirmation hearing, is to enforce the laws, not make them. “He has his opinion,” Holden said. Sen. Lee told the conference that Sessions, with whom Lee served in the Senate until early this year, “is willing to work with us on sentencing reform” despite the fact Sessions voted against SRCA15 because he argued it went too far in reducing mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes.

Sen. Grassley said he had supported tougher sentencing in the 1980s and 90s, including mandatory minimum legislation, because it was the right solution to the rising crime rate at the time. But now, he admits “it makes sense to revisit” the laws. He said mandatory minimums are “too severe” and give prosecutors too much discretion in charging. Noting that 25% of DOJ budget is now spent on prisons, Sen. Grassley said the SRCA would “free up federal resources and give prisoners a chance to reform.”

Sen. Lee agreed. “We have finite resources to fight crime. The more spent on prisons, the less is left for enforcement, making communities safer… What we’re doing now on sentencing is not working,” said Sen. Lee, a former federal prosecutor.

He challenged those who oppose reform proposals to share their ideas. “We have to get to the politicians on this.” He said legislators are looking at how to properly identify low-level nonviolent drug offenders. Contrary to AG Sessions’ view, Sen. Lee said the act of drug trafficking “itself is not violent.”

moses171027“The federal sentencing laws were not handed down from Mt. Sinai,” Sen. Lee said. The SRCA is “just a matter of common sense and sound public policy.” The problem, Lee and Holden suggested, was that SRCA supporters will run into the charge that they are “soft on crime.”

“We are going to have address the argument that ‘you are soft on crime’,” Sen. Lee said. “There are not the same market drivers in the federal sphere” as in state criminal justice reform. States cannot “kick the can down the road” like Congress can. At the state level, Sen. Lee said, the argument is to be “smart on crime, soft on taxpayers.” At the federal level, it “still works to be tough on crime. But every state that has done [sentence reform] had reduced crime rates and saved money.”

Axios, an online news site, reported that Lee said to a reporter afterwards that he wants a vote on SRCA before the end of the year, but with health care and tax reform in focus, the criminal justice reform bill has yet to be a priority.

The Crime Report, Federal Sentencing Reform Alive, Senators Insist (Oct. 27, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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All Pro Appellate Judge Stumbles at Trial – Update for October 25, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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I INSTRUCT THE JURY TO DISREGARD THE SMELL

There’s an old saying among trial attorneys that goes something like for the judge to instruct the jury to disregard something very prejudicial it has just seen or heard is “like throwing a skunk into the jury box and then telling the jury to disregard the smell.”

skunk171025The smell in a decision from the 7th Circuit earlier this week was just too intense. What makes the case even more noteworthy is that the trial judge who crossed the line was not just some small-town hack put on the bench as a reward for political loyalty, but rather Circuit Judge Richard Posner, arguably the 7th Circuit’s MVP for the past 25 years.

Judge Posner was taking a turn in the trenches, as circuit judges do from time to time, just to experience some of the rough-and-tumble which they are called upon to referee up on the appellate bench. The plaintiff was Hakeem El-Bey, a self-described Moorish national, who was running the usual tax scam in which he set up an eponymous trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary, and then claimed $300,000 refunds from the IRS. (There are finer points to the scheme, but we’ll leave them out, because they might just encourage illegality).

The IRS resisted his demands, but someone at the Service finally pushed the wrong button, and a check for $300,000 got sent to Hakeem, who quickly spent it. The blunder happened again a few months later, and Hakeem figured he was on Easy Street.

Alas, it was not to be. The IRS Criminal Division caught up with him, and in short order Hakeem was indicted for mail fraud and making false claims to the IRS.

Hakeem represented himself at trial, an idea the foolishness of which we probably do not have to explain. Judge Posner permitted Hakeem his blunder, but appointed a standby attorney, Gabriel A. Fuentes.

sovereigncitizen161125Hakeem followed the tax protester/sovereign citizen script to the letter, filing pretrial motions related to admiralty law, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Posner excluded Hakeem’s sovereign citizen evidence, and warned Hakeem that if he brought it up, the judge might exclude him from the courtroom, too, and let attorney Fuentes carry the defense load/

Some background here: the IRS likes to say it depends on voluntary compliance with the tax laws. And of course it does, just like the state police depend on voluntary compliance with the traffic laws. There’re just not enough cops to stop everyone. But Hakeem and his fellow tax protest travelers like to argue that “voluntary compliance” means taxpayers send in their checks and returns out of the goodness of their hearts. The argument has more holes than a swiss cheese factory, but that inconvenient fact does not deter the Hakeems of the world.

At trial, Hakeem cross-examined an IRS representative on the matter, asking her whether federal tax law compliance was voluntary. She responded:

The tax laws are based on individuals taking their information, voluntarily putting them on the tax returns, and mailing them to the IRS. However, the law states if you don’t do that the IRS can come in and file for you because the law states you file and pay your income tax.

aha171025Hakeem figured this was his “A-ha!” moment. He argued with the witness that “you just contradicted yourself. Because in one case you are saying that the IRS is saying filing taxes is voluntary compliance?” At this point, Judge Posner had had his fill:

THE COURT: Look, paying taxes is not voluntary.
THE DEFENDANT: That’s what it says here. I’m not saying it.
THE COURT: Come on.
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, I’m not saying it.
THE COURT: You don’t pay your tax, you go to jail.
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, I’m just saying what they are saying what they have—
THE COURT: Payment of taxes to the government is not voluntary.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Judge, so you brought in from behind the law.
THE COURT: Just—look, I’m going to kick you out if you keep on with this nonsense. You understand that? You can go watch the case from another room.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I am through.
THE COURT: Don’t you say that tax payment is voluntary.

The jury heard it all.

The government, with one eye on an appeal, was concerned. The next day, before the jury entered the courtroom, the AUSA told the judge “that some of what happened yesterday may have been potentially prejudicial to the defendant … importantly, perhaps, [it] has left a misimpression with the jury in certain respects.” Judge P agreed, and instructed the jury that it should ignore the malodorous exchange of the day before:

After the jury entered the courtroom, the court explained, “You don’t have to worry about the exchanges that Mr. El-Bey and I have had. And I don’t want you to feel any hostility to Mr. El-Bey just because I got annoyed occasionally.” He then proceeded to read parts of the transcript of the previous day’s exchange back to the jury, including his exchange with Hakeem on “voluntary compliance.” The judge concluded

When I said: If you don’t pay taxes you go to jail, what I was simply saying was you must pay taxes, and if you don’t pay taxes it’s criminal and you can be sent to jail. I was not talking about Mr. El-Bey, because he isn’t charged with tax evasion.

Unfortunately, the judge was not quite done. When he was reading the jury instructions, Judge Posner went off-script, ignoring the written instruction on materiality, and ad libbing instead:

One [element] is that … the scheme to defraud involved a materially false or fraudulent pre-tense, representation, or promise. That’s very important, that notion of materiality… Little white lies, those are not material falsehoods. They don’t—I mean, they may embarrass you when it’s discovered, but they’re not—that’s not wrongful conduct. It’s when, with specific reference to our case, if you—if tell—if you tell the Internal Revenue Service a lie which is capable of getting them to do something which they would never do if they knew the truth, namely, give you $300,000 to which you’re not entitled, that is a material falsehood. That’s fraud. And that is an element of the charges.

swift171025On appeal, Hakeem complained that Judge Posner had been biased against him, and thus violated his due process right to a fair trial. In the 7th Circuit, that’s like accusing Taylor Swift of lip-syncing. But the 7th had to reluctantly that Hakeem had a point:

It is clear from the transcript of the trial court proceedings that El-Bey was a difficult litigant. He filed numerous irrelevant motions, disregarded court instructions, and often inappropriately interrupted the district court to express disagreement and dissatisfaction. Nonetheless, we agree with El-Bey that the district court’s remarks during cross-examination of the government’s first witness conveyed bias regarding his dishonesty or guilt. The district court interrupted El-Bey at the beginning of his cross-examination, stating, “Look, paying taxes is not voluntary.” When El-Bey noted that he was only reading what the document stated, the district court remarked “Come on”—a statement laced with skepticism. The district court continued with further remarks in the presence of the jury reflecting upon El-Bey’s dishonesty or guilt, stat-ing, “You don’t pay your tax, you go to jail,” and “I’m going to kick you out if you keep on with this nonsense…” The purpose of the comments cannot eliminate the bias conveyed to the jury by the remarks here. The court’s statements that one who does not pay taxes goes to jail and that El-Bey was acting in a nonsensical manner indicated bias about El-Bey’s guilt or honesty to the jury.

And if that were not enough, the Circuit said, Judge Posner did it again when he ad libbed instructions that “conveyed to the jury that El-Bey was guilty by concluding that El-Bey’s receipt of the checks and money made him guilty of mail fraud and making false claims.”

The appellate court had no doubt about Hakeem’s culpability, noting that “there is more than enough evidence of El-Bey’s guilt. But in the end, that did not matter. “We must… conclude that the unfairness in the trial requires reversal,” the court said. “Any other holding would constitute the adoption of the principle that a defendant the court thinks is obviously guilty is not entitled to a fair trial.”

Hakeem will be retried. Judge Posner will probably not be there.

United States v. El-Bey, Case No. 15-3180 (7th Circuit, October 24, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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6th Circuit Bans Government Nostrums at Sentencing – Update for October 23, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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BELOW-GUIDELINES SUPERVISED RELEASE VIOLATION SENTENCE IS STILL UNREASONABLE

After a federal inmate serves a prison sentence, he or she begins a period known as supervised release. SR is a fancy term for “parole,” except that unlike traditional parole, it doesn’t reduce a sentence. Instead, by law, SR is tacked on to every sentence, even life sentences (which end only with a pine box).

wencelausDPRK171023While on supervised release, an offender is under the thumb of a U.S. Probation Service officer, who has great latitude to either leave the offender largely alone or impose oppression that makes Kim Jong Un look like Good King Wencelaus. While the object of SR is to assist the offender in his or her reintegration into society, one supervising probation officer candidly told us a few years that his district violates a third of all offenders under their supervision.

Upon violation, an offender may be continued on supervision, have supervision extended, or sent back to prison. Because the standard of proof for a supervision violation is much lower than the “reasonable doubt” standard of criminal law and the evidentiary standards are loosey-goosey by comparison to a criminal trial, SR is a Sword of Damocles for ex-offenders trying to get back on their feet.

Of course, there are those offenders – like Ernie Adams, a 71-year old who has been addicted to opiates for 40 years – who just cannot conform. Ernie was on supervised release after serving a drug conspiracy sentence. Unsurprisingly for his addiction history, he failed drug tests three times in as many weeks, and got violated.

What do you expect of an addicted person? It’s a disease. You might as well demand that a person with bronchitis not cough.

fake171023Nevertheless, continued drug use is forbidden by the conditions governing supervised release, and Ernie’s supervised release was revoked. Ernie’s Guidelines range for his SR violation was 21-27 months. At sentencing, the judge talked extensively about Ernie’s substance-abuse problems and rehab failures. The government argued at sentencing that long-term heroin addicts like Ernie needed 18 months for their brain chemistry to “reset” in order for future treatment to be effective. The court nodded in sage agreement to this scientific stat, but cut Ernie a break by sentencing him to 18 months, three months below the bottom of the Guidelines range.

You’d think Ernie would figure he’d dodged the bullet, but you’d be wrong. Ernie appealed, arguing the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Last week, the 6th Circuit agreed.

It turns out that the government’s talk about the 18-month brain “reset” was fake science. The government countered, however, that while what it told the court was as phony as phrenology, that did not matter, because Ernie had no right to the government telling the court the truth. Actually, the government’s argument was a little more nuanced than that, contending that a defendant does not have a due-process right “to be sentenced based on accurate information… beyond the facts of the defendant’s own actions and criminal record.”

The government’s argument was as fake as its “science.” The 6th Circuit said “the due-process right to be sentenced based on accurate information is not limited to information solely about the defendant’s actions and criminal history.” Instead, if the bad science embraced by the sentencing court was an “important factor” in calculating Ernie’s sentence, Ernie’s rights were violated.

pseudo171023The Circuit held that the government’s 18-month brain “reset” was “an unsubstantiated assertion that has the veneer of accuracy due to its supposed status as a product of scientific research.” And it was persuasive: the district court told Ernie it had chosen the sentence length “because you need that long to reset and maybe get another, maybe get another chance at remaining clean and sober.” The Circuit concluded “the district court, therefore, violated Adams’s due-process right when it incorporated this unreliable information in its sentencing decision, and thus this sentence is procedurally unreasonable.”

The 6th Circuit said that while it presumes that a sentence below or within the sentencing range is substantively reasonable, that’s not invariable. Here, Ernie argued that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence because it to impose a sentence of imprisonment and extended the length of the sentence in order to rehabilitate him. The Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that extending a sentence in order to rehabilitate is prohibited, and concluded that the sentence – even though it was below-guidelines – was substantively unreasonable.

United States v. Adams, Case No. 16-2786 (6th Cir., Oct. 11, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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1st Circuit Says Bank Robbery is Still Violent – Update for October 19, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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VIVA LA DIFFERENCE

paperwork171019Since the Supreme Court ruled two years ago in Johnson v. United States that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutional, many forests have been felled to produce the paperwork blizzard that has buried federal courts in sentence challenges.

The ACCA requires that if a convicted felon caught with a gun has three prior convictions for crimes of violence or drug offenses, the sentence that must be imposed is no longer zero to 10 years, but rather 15 years to life. There are three ways a prior offense may be a “crime of violence” under the ACCA. The offense must be either

(1) an enumerated offense (burglary, arson, extortion or use of explosive”); or

(2) an offense that has as an element the threatened use or actual use of physical force against a person; or

(3) an offense that presents a significant risk of physical harm to others.

The first clause is called the “enumerated clause,” because it enumerates certain offenses that count, period. The second is called the “force clause” or “elements clause,” because it relates to crimes that include elements of purposeful force. The third is called the “residual clause,” because it sweeps up what’s left.

violence160110In Johnson, the Supreme Court said the residual clause was so vague that no one could figure out what it meant. For that reason, it was unconstitutional to use the residual clause to make someone liable under the ACCA. The problem was that the same (or very similar) language was used elsewhere in the same statute (18 USC 924) and the criminal code (such as in 18 USC 16(b)). One might think that Johnson invalidated the residual clause in those definitions, too. But one might be wrong…

Whether Johnson invalidates the residual clause in the 18 USC 16(b) “crime of violence” definition was argued a little over two weeks ago in the Supreme Court. That decision will issue before next summer. Meanwhile, battle continues to rage in the lower courts, leading to some rather surprising claims.

butch171019We confess here that we like bank robbery. It’s old fashioned – you know, Jesse James, Bonnie and Clyde, Willie Sutton – and an easy crime to understand. In a federal criminal world of meth labs, insider trading, trading in incorrectly-packeted lobster and throwing back undersized fish, bank robbery is a crime that’s pretty easy to understand. We suspect that someone like Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell never felt a frisson of illicit thrill when a political donor bought his wife an Oscar de la Renta dress, not the way Butch Cassidy was pumped when he knocked over the San Miguel Valley Bank. After all, when was the last time you saw a movie about the Feds trying to take down a CEO for selling tainted peanut butter?

Jeff Hunter was a bank robber, now doing 270 months for the offense. The last 60 months are a consecutive sentence for using a gun during a crime of violence. After Johnson, Jeff filed a post-conviction motion claiming that the extra 60 months was unwarranted, because while he had a gun, a bank robbery is no longer a crime of violence after Johnson.

knifegunB170404This might seem counter-intuitive to you. Of course a bank robbery is a crime of violence, you say. Just as you never should take a knife to a gunfight, you need never take a gun to a nonviolent crime. Who’s ever heard of an armed inside trader?

Last week, the 1st Circuit agreed that while Johnson may sweep broadly, it doesn’t sweep that broadly. No matter what the constitutional status of the residual clause might be, the Circuit said, Jeff’s offense remains a “crime of violence” because of the force clause. The 1st has already held that a bank robbery “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” for purposes of the career offender guidelines (USSG 4B1.2(a)(1)), which use the same “crime of violence” definition as does the ACCA.

But the 924(c) definition varies slightly. All of the others refer to using physical force against another person. The 924(c) subsection definition refers “use of physical force against the person or property of another.”

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Aha! Jeff argued that there is a difference. The 1st agreed, but said that difference does not help him. “The addition of ‘or property’ renders § 924(c)(3)(A)’s scope greater than that of § 4B1.2(a)(1),” the court said. In other words, under the ACCA, if Butch Cassidy had robbed the Union Pacific Overland Flyer by threatening to shoot the engineer, that would have been a crime of violence. If he had robbed it by threatening to shoot the engineer’s dog, it would not have been. shootdog171019However, if he robbed the First National Bank of Winnemucca by threatening to shoot the branch manager’s dog (which was “property”), the offense would been just as much a “crime of violence” as if he had threatened to shoot the manager himself.

Ah, the beauty of the law! Because the statute says bank robbery is effected by “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” the 1st Circuit said, “we hold that federal bank robbery, and a fortiori federal armed bank robbery, are crimes of violence under the force clause of § 924(c)(3).”

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 16-2483 (1st Cir., October 16, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Smarter Sentencing Act: Just Like Before, But With More Sponsors – Update for October 17, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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SMARTER SENTENCING ACT REDUX

deja171017We were a bit befuddled when Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) announced by press release on October 5, 2017, that he and Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) had “reintroduced the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2017.” It was not clear whether this was a complete retread of the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, that died without a vote last December, or whether it was new and improved (or just different).

The confusion was compounded because we were unable to locate a draft of the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2017 anywhere over the next 10 days. We called Sen. Lee’s office last week for a copy of the measure, and received our copy yesterday.

Yes, indeedy, the 2017 version of the bill is identical to old S.502, except for a boatload more sponsors (21 from both sides of the aisle). Highlights of the measure include

• expanding the “safety valve” contained in 18 USC 3553(f) – which permits court to relieve low-level drug offenders with relatively clean records to avoid mandatory minimum sentences under some circumstances – to include people with slightly more criminal history.

Currently, a single misdemeanor in one’s background can disqualify the defendant from “safety valve” consideration. Under the proposed change, a couple of felonies will be too much, but more young defendants facing their first serious criminal charge would be sentenced under a scheme that let the judge weigh individual factors rather than applying an inflexible and harsh minimum sentence.

• making the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1, retroactive.

cracksentence171017In the wake of basketball star Len Bias’ death in 1988, Congress passed the draconian Anti Drug Abuse Act, which equated one gram of crack cocaine to 100 grams of cocaine powder. As a result, drug sentences – which are driven by the amount of drug involved in the crime – soared. The defendants in crack cases were overwhelmingly black.

After years of urging by the Sentencing Commission and studies showing that Congress’ rationale for the ADA – that crack was more addictive and crack offenses more violent – was bunkum, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Unfortunately, to convince recalcitrant senators to support it, the retroactivity portions of the law were stripped out. Thus, a crack defendant sentenced August 3, 2009, was hammered with the 100:1 ratio, while a defendant sentenced August 3, 2010, was treated more in line with what a cocaine powder defendant would face.

The SSA would make the FSA retroactive, permitting defendants sentenced harshly prior to the adoption of the law eligible for resentencing, at their judges’ discretion, to a more reasonable term.

• cutting mandatory minimums in the drug trafficking laws.

Currently, the Byzantine sentencing regime in 21 USC 841(b) provides differing levels of mandatory minimum sentences for various quantities of different drugs, various number of prior drug felonies, and whether death or serious injury resulted from the drug dealing.

hammer160509Under the SSA, a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence would become 5 years, 20 years would become 10 years, five years would become two years. Right now, a defendant with two prior drug felonies (no matter how old) caught with five kilos of cocaine gets a mandatory life term: no ifs, ands or buts. Sure, the public’s thirst for vengeance is slaked by such toughness. But somehow, when the public sees the same defendant, bent and gray, shuffling across the prison yard a quarter century later, the tough sentence seems pretty wasteful.

The SSA would turn the mandatory life sentence into a mandatory minimum of 25 years.

• cutting mandatory minimums in 21 USC 960 for drug mules carrying drugs into the country courier in half.

mule171017Your poor, dumb peasant from El Cocador humping marijuana across the border or clueless young woman flying in to JFK from East Slobovia with heroin in the liner of her suitcase… These are the couriers, the lowest of the low-level defendant being paid maybe two shekels for hauling someone else’s big score. Under 21 USC 960, the drug importation criminal statute, they get hammered with the same mandatory sentences as Mr. Big, the kingpin staying safely offshore.

The SSA would cut the mandatory minimums applicable to couriers by half.

The bill does not explicitly make any change it proposes retroactive other than the extension of the FSA, but a fair reading of Section 5 of the SSA suggests that the Sentencing Commission should do so according to its retroactivity procedures.

Some of the Smarter Sentencing Act provisions echo those of the Sentence Reform and Corrections Act of 2017, introduced two days earlier. We anticipate that the provisions of the two bills will be blended into a single package by the Senate Judiciary Committee.

S.1933, Smarter Sentencing Act of 2017 (introduced Oct. 5, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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5th Circuit Says Defendant Need Not Prove Sentencing Under Residual Clause – Update for October 16, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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TWO WAYS TO WIN

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Lawrence Taylor was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun, and received a 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act sentence because he had three prior state convictions that the judge held to be crimes of violence.

After the Supreme Court’s Johnson v. United States decision, Lawrence filed a post-conviction motion under 28 USC 2255 claiming that one of his prior offenses, a Texas conviction for injury to a child, no longer qualified as one of the three offenses needed to impose an ACCA sentence.

Up until Johnson, the ACCA definition of a crime of violence had three subsections. First, four specific offenses – burglary, arson, extortion and use of explosives – were categorically included. This subset is known as the “enumerated crimes” clause. Second, all crimes that involved use or threat of physical force against another person were included. This subset is known as the “elements” clause. Finally, a “residual clause” held that a any crime posing a substantial risk of physical harm to another was considered a crime of violence as well. Johnson held that the “residual clause” was unconstitutionally vague, because no one could reasonably tell whether an offense would qualify under it or not.

McBryde171016When Lawrence was sentenced back in 2006, the district court did not specify whether the injury-to-a-child predicate offense qualified under the residual clause or the elements clause. At the time, no courts were parsing ACCA convictions that finely. That did not prevent the District Judge – John H. McBryde, who for our money is as poor a federal district judge as can be found in America – from peremptorily deciding 10 years after the fact that the ACCA’s residual clause “did not play any role” in Lawrence’s sentencing. Judge McBryde additionally complained that Lawrence should have asked at sentencing which clause – “elements” or “residual” – the court relied on to make the injury-to-a-child prior into a predicate ACCA offense.

Last week, the 5th Circuit reversed Judge McBryde. It held Lawrence was not to blame for not objecting that the district court did not specify “elements” or “residual,” because at the time, a defendant had “no legal right to such a determination.”

win171916It turned out Lawrence had two ways to win. First, the Circuit said Texas’ injury-to-a-child offense is clearly broader than the ACCA’s elements clause, which is to say that commission of that crime does not necessarily require use or threat of physical force. Because the offense is too broad to rely on the “elements” clause, the district court must have relied the residual clause, no matter what Judge McBryde may say now, and that clause has been declared unconstitutional. So under either element, the injury-to-a-child offense does not qualify him for an ACCA enhancement.

But was it Lawrence’s fault for not objecting to the paucity of the record back in 2006? The appeals court said no. “Theoretically,” the 5th said, “the district court mistakenly could have been thinking of the elements clause when sentencing Taylor. But this court will not hold a defendant responsible for what may or may not have crossed a judge’s mind during sentencing.”

release160523Without the ACCA conviction, Lawrence’s felon-in-possession offense carries a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years. He has already served nine months more than that. Although opposing Lawrence’s position that a defendant making a Johnson claim need not prove which element a sentencing court relied on when it imposed an ACCA sentence, the government nevertheless conceded that “if this Court determines that Taylor’s current motion presents a constitutional claim… we would agree to relief.” Thus, the 5th Circuit vacated Lawrence’s ACCA enhancement and ordered his immediate release.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 16-11384 (5th Cir., Oct. 12, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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No Right to Hearing on Rule 35(b) Motion, 5th Circuit Says – Update for October 11, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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THE PROSECUTOR IS NOT YOUR FRIEND, HARVEY

retro_vintage_kitsch_cop_police_are_your_friends_card-r61c98e4f7d4f40a6b764aedbdb6dfd4c_xvuat_8byvr_324When we were kids, we quickly learned from well-meaning parents that the policeman was our friend. That was quite true, at least up until we hit puberty or so. Then we learned, some of us later than others, that at some point the policeman has ceased being our friend, but rather was just another guy on the public dole who had been trained to believe that all “civilians” – that’s what they call us, like their Boy-Scouts-with-guns organization has anything to do with military service – are suspects and all cases have to be cleared by arrest. Arrest of the guilty party is preferred, but by no means mandatory.

In adulthood, we also came to realize that the prosecutor is as much our friend as is the cop, which is to say ‘not at all’? Cynical, you say? Ask the suddenly-disgraced Harvey Weinstein. Harv is clearly a guy who gives lechery a bad name, someone who used power and money to abuse women. Sure, his hormone-driven nihilism makes Bill Clinton and Donald Trump look like eunichs, and his depravity ought to earn him a one-way ticket to infamy. But that’s not enough. Word today is that the feds are investigating Harvey, a criminal-justice piling on that is as puzzling as it is troubling.

Free Harvey!
You’re not likely to be seeing many of these posters around… but if the Feds can target Harvey for merely being a scumbag, they can target anyone else suddenly not in favor, too.

To be sure, Harvey could be convicted of multiple federal crimes. We know that for a fact, because with well over 4,000 federal criminal statutes and untold additional regulations that have been criminalized as well, anyone – from Mother Teresa to Anthony Weiner – has probably committed multiple federal crimes, often just be getting up in the morning.

Our point to all of this is one that Aaron McMahan would appreciate. Aaron was convicted of drug trafficking in federal court, and then – like other federal inmates who come to the party late – he assisted the government in nailing a former associate. Six months after Aaron’s sentencing, his cooperation resulted in the other guy getting federal time. After that, the Government filed a post-sentence Rule 35(b) motion asking for a reduction in Aaron’s sentence as a reward for his assistance in nailing the other dude.

When defendants help the feds before sentencing, the Government rewards them by filing a motion at sentencing pursuant to 18 USC 3553(e) and Sec. 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. This 5K1.1 motion is like a magic sentencing elixir, letting the sentencing judge ignore any advisory sentencing range, and even statutory mandatory minimums, and sentence the cooperating defendant to as little as probation.

Sometimes, however, the cooperation comes after sentencing, or – as in Aaron’s case – cooperation before sentencing has not yet brought the desired results. Then, the Government may file a motion pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rule 35 motion is made of the same fairy dust as the 5K1.1 motion, letting the sentencing court pretty much do what it wants regardless of other statutes or guidelines.

wink171012When a defendant cooperates, no one from the U.S. Attorney’s Office promises him any reward whatsoever. Wink. Wink. This is because the defendant may be called on to testify, and the defense attorney will invariably ask him or her what has been promised. In the cross-examination pas de deux, the cooperating witness is expected to be able to respond, with rather precise honesty, that no one has promised him a thing. Of course not. Wink. Wink. Everyone knows what is really going on except for the jurors, who no doubt retire to the jury room impressed at the civic-mindedness of the felon on the stand who is willing to stand up for justice because it’s the right thing to do.

Of course, after the cooperating defendant delivers, the government does not have to reward him with a 5K1.1 or Rule 35 motion, and in all but very limited cases, there is not a thing a defendant can do about it. Likewise, the court may decide not to grant a 5K1.1/Rule 35 motion, or may decide to reward the defendant with a lousy orange in his stocking instead of that pony the government recommended. In that case, a defendant’s options are pretty limited.

Practically speaking, however, the system grinds out rewards for cooperating defendants, because if it did not, word would quickly get around the jails and prisons, and cooperation would dry up.

nothing170125Aaron no doubt figured that because he had delivered for the government, the U.S. Attorney was now his friend. Indeed, his “friend” delivered, filing the not-promised but reasonably-expected Rule 35 motion. Unfortunately, it seems the court was not his friend, because two days after the Rule 35 motion hit his desk, Aaron’s district judge denied the motion — before Aaron had received notice or had an opportunity to respond — explaining “even if the court were to accept as accurate all allegations of fact alleged in such motion, the court would not be persuaded that the sentence imposed on McMahan… should be reduced.”

Shocked, Aaron appealed, arguing that the district court should not have denied the Rule 35 motion without first providing him with notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Aaron was shocked again when his former friends at the U.S. Attorney’s Office argued against him in the Court of Appeals, contending that “adopting a notice and hearing requirement in Rule 35(b) motions would “create tension with the authority recognizing that a defendant possesses many more rights during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings than during post-sentencing proceedings.”

noright171012Aaron’s dismay was complete last week, when the 5th Circuit agreed with the government. “A defendant does possess fewer rights during post-sentencing proceedings,” the Circuit held. “Indeed, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(b) provides, ‘a defendant need not be present…[where t]he proceeding involves the correction or reduction of sentence under Rule 35…” Further, a defendant does not have a right to counsel during Rule 35(b) sentence reduction proceedings… Thus, a notice and hearing requirement for Rule 35(b) motions would be in conflict with Rule 43 and this Court’s previous decisions that the attendant rights of presence and counsel do not exist at that post-sentencing stage.”

English statesman Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, once observed that “nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” Writ small, that is something every defendant – even someone as powerful as former Obama and Clinton buddy Harvey Weinstein – should remember about his relationship with the government.

United States v. McMahan, Case No. 16-10255 (5th Cir., October 5, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Draco Would Be Proud of the 2nd Circuit – Update for October 10, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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BITE ME

bite171010Not much shocks us anymore, an unfortunate by-product of the equally unfortunate aging process, but a 2nd Circuit decision the other day made us feel like kids again… amazed, disgusted, shocked kids.

Corey Jones, a 39-year old with an IQ of 69, was in his last 5 months of an 8-year felon-in-possession conviction. While a resident of a halfway house, Corey “allegedly grumbled and was insolent to a staff member,” as two concurring judges described it. The halfway house called the U.S. Marshals to haul Corey back to prison to complete his final few months. Corey “resisted arrest,” which – again according to the dissent – did not consist of kicking or punching, or even stepping towards the marshals in a threatening manner. But when the marshals “were trying to lower his head to the ground,” which is a euphemistic way to describe throwing Corey to the floor, “the hand of the marshal who was apprehending Jones slipped down Jones’ face, and Jones bit him, causing the finger to bleed.”

The injured marshal was a tough guy, or maybe just had more common sense that the United States Attorney. He figured it was no big deal. He suffered no loss because of the injury, and – despite the notoriously generous government policies giving paid time off and God knows what else to employees injured on the job, he did not request any compensation.

Even the Assistant United States Attorney admitted that the bite was “not the most serious wound you’ll ever see.” But such a niggling technicality did not inconvenience the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which asked for and got a single-count indictment against Corey for assaulting a federal officer.

Corey was convicted after a trial. His sentencing Guidelines calculation ended up at a whopping 17½ to 20 years. The judge mercifully sentenced him to 15 years.

That’s right. Nip a marshal’s finger, get 15 years in federal prison. Draco would have been proud.

draco171010You couldn’t make this stuff up.

Corey’s sentencing range was so high because 23 years ago, juvenile Corey was convicted of 1st degree robbery in New York, and 20 years ago, he shot a guy in the leg, which netted him an assault conviction. Those two convictions – both of which occurred half a life ago for slow-witted Corey, made him a “career offender” under the Guidelines. (Without the “career offender” label, Corey was looking at 3-4 years.)

On appeal, Corey argued that New York 1st degree robbery was not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and that his sentence was unreasonable. Last week, the 2nd Circuit affirmed that Corey will remain in prison until he’s at least 50 years old. All for a bitten finger.

Corey argued that under New York law, 1st degree robbery could be committed using minimal force, not enough to meet the “crime of violence” standard of “physical force.” In a previous opinion, the 2nd Circuit had agreed with Corey, and further concluded that after Johnson v. United States invalidated the “residual clause,” 1st degree robbery could not be counted as a predicate for a “career offender” sentence.

The residual clause in USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) provides that a crime of violence includes any offense that ” involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The same language used to appear in the Armed Career Criminal Act, but Johnson held it was so vague in its meaning that application of it violated due process.

But after Corey’s sentenced was vacated, the 2nd Circuit vacated the vacation, withdrawing the opinion until the Supreme Court settled whether Johnson’s holding applied equally to the Sentencing Guidelines. After the high court decided in Beckles v. United States that it did not, the 2nd Circuit took up Corey’s case again.

Robber160229“Robbery” is one of the crimes specifically listed in the “career offender” Guideline as categorically being a crime of violence. But, Corey argued that New York’s robbery statute was broader than the generic definition. He contended the generic definition of robbery requires the use or threat of force in the process of taking the property, while the New York statute would be violated by a robber who uses or threatens force after assuming dominion of the property.

The appellate court rejected the argument. It said the generic definition of robbery, however, is broader than that. Although the common law definition confines robbery to the use or threat of force before, or simultaneous to, the assertion of dominion over property, “a majority of states have departed from the common law definition of robbery, broadening it, either statutorily or by judicial fiat, to also prohibit the peaceful assertion of dominion followed by the use or threat of force.” This broader definition, the court said, “has supplanted the common law meaning as the generic definition of robbery.”

What’s more, the appellate court said, “We have little difficulty concluding that the ‘least of the acts’ of first-degree robbery satisfies the definition of the Guidelines’ residual clause. The least of the acts, both sides agree, is “forcibly stealing property” while “armed with a deadly weapon.” Plainly, a robber who forcibly steals property from a person or from his immediate vicinity, while armed with a deadly weapon, engages in “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

draconian170725Because the sentence fell below the advisory Guideline range, the 2nd held that it was substantively reasonable. The concurring judges agreed that because the court was bound to consider Corey a “career offender” – even though the current version of the Guidelines has dropped the “residual clause” – the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. However, they termed the “result to be close to absurd.” If Corey’s appeal had been a little bit earlier, the reversal would not have been withdrawn. “This means that, as a result of timing quirks (his appeal to us was slightly too late, leading to our decision to pull our earlier opinion), Jones receives a very, very high sentence in contrast with almost every similarly situated defendant.”

United States v. Jones, Case No. 15-1518-cr (2nd Cir., October 5, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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