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SUPREMES EXPAND RIGHT TO SUE LOCAL COPS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Larry Thompson was charged with resisting arrest when he tried to stop police from entering his apartment in response to a false child abuse complaint. A New York court later dismissed the case on motion of the prosecution “in the interest of justice,” which is code for “no way we can win this dog of a case.”
When Larry later sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the police violated his 4th Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search or seizure), his case was thrown out. Existing New York law held the plaintiff had to show the underlying criminal case had been initiated without probable cause, initiated for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice, and terminated in favor of the defendant. A “favorable termination” was one where the plaintiff had been found to be not guilty.
Larry’s problem was that the criminal case against him was so specious that it didn’t make it to trial. He never enjoyed a “favorable termination” because the prosecution gave up before trial.
You can see the problem in this approach: the sketchier the criminal case, the more likely it is that the matter will never make it to trial. That means the greater the outrage visited on a hapless defendant, the less likely he or she will be found “not guilty” after a trial, because the lower the likelihood that there will even be a trial. The “favorable termination” rule thus punishes the people who have been most aggrieved.
Last week, the Supreme Court greatly expanded a former defendant’s ability to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, holding that “terminated in favor” means only that the “prosecution ended without a conviction” and not “with some affirmative indication of innocence.”
Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote for a six-justice majority:
The question of whether a criminal defendant was wrongly charged does not logically depend on whether the prosecutor or court explained why the prosecution was dismissed. And the individual’s ability to seek redress for a wrongful prosecution cannot reasonably turn on the fortuity of whether the prosecutor or court happened to explain why the charges were dismissed. In addition, requiring the plaintiff to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence would paradoxically foreclose a §1983 claim when the government’s case was weaker and dismissed without explanation before trial, but allow a claim when the government’s evidence was substantial enough to proceed to trial. That would make little sense. Finally, requiring a plaintiff to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication of innocence is not necessary to protect officers from unwarranted civil suits—among other things, officers are still protected by the requirement that the plaintiff show the absence of probable cause and by qualified immunity.
Thompson v. Clark, Case No. 20-659, __ S.Ct. __, 2022 WL 994329, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 1885 (April 4, 2022)
– Thomas L. Root