Tag Archives: sentencing

Saying It Doesn’t Make It So – Update for January 12, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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DADDY SAYS…

Because170112Serial college football coach Terry Bowden – who spent sojourns between his many coaching gigs as a TV sports analyst – delighted in quoting his father, legendary Florida State coach Bobby Bowden. “Daddy says…” Terry would start out, and then deliver a gem of football wisdom like Moses delivering the stone tablets.

We almost regret that Bobby’s been busy the past year coaching the University of Akron Zips to a lackluster 5-7 season, because we would like hearing him tell us “Daddy says… boys without fathers wear earrings to be like their mommas…” Yeah, really. Bobby said that.

Our point is that just because “Daddy says” it, it doesn’t mean it’s so. That’s the same point the 5th Circuit made in a decision handed down earlier this week.

fraud170112Euneisha Hearns was a mortgage loan officer involved in a rather plain vanilla conspiracy. She held customers lie to get mortgages, which was something of a sport in the halcyon days before the market collapsed in 2008. In Euneisha’s case, buyer interested in purchasing property on Brownstone Court in Dallas lacked the cash for a down payment. Hearns whipped up a loan application for him that puffed the value of the place and his ability to pay, netting enough for the buyer to close the deal and use some of the loan proceeds for the down payment (sort of like a snake eating itself).

Unsurprisingly, the buyer defaulted, the false statements came to light, and Euneisha was indicted. An old lawyer we used to work with liked to say, “no thief only steals once,” and this maxim apparently held here. There wasn’t just one bad loan at Euneisha’s. There were at least ten the government knew of.

Euneisha figured she was on the hook for about $180,000 (the amount of the Brownstone loan, an amount that will probably buy a storage shed in San Francisco). But the Sentencing Guidelines let a court set the loss based on the offense itself and related conduct. The presentence report prepared after trial said the conspiracy was responsible for total loss of $866,000, which included the Brownstone loan and “loss amounts related to nine other properties.”

“What other properties?” asked Euneisha. The PSR retorted that  “the Government has identified 10 properties [including the Brownstone Property] that involved fraud in the mortgage loan process. Government records reflect that with respect to these properties… Hearns [and her co-conspirators] were all involved in the scheme to defraud.”

Ah, the “Daddy says…” gambit. The PSR otherwise provided no information or evidence to support the loss amounts or Euneisha’s involvement in the other nine deals. The government presented evidence with respect to three of these properties at trial, but the remaining six properties were not mentioned either at trial or at sentencing. Nothing in the record showed when the six remaining transactions occurred, whether criminal activity was associated with the transactions, or whether Euneisha had even heard of them. Who bother? The government says, the PSR repeats. Game, set, match.

history170112Euneisha did not offer evidence to show that she was not involved with the other properties. It would have been hard to do so, to prove a negative. It’s especially tough in loss calculation, because loss amounts “need not be determined with precision” and “all that is necessary is that the finding be plausible in light of the record as a whole.” What’s more, PSRs – which, like history, are written by the winners – are generally considered “reliable evidence for sentencing purposes.” The district court concluded that “the information contained in the presentence report has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” It held Euneisha responsible for all $866,000.

Bcorso170112ut as another sportscasters, the equally legendary Lee Corso, likes to say, “Not so fast, my friend!” This week, the 5th Circuit vacated the sentence. Sure, the Court said, “a district court may adopt the findings of the PSR without additional inquiry if those facts have an evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the information is materially unreliable.” What’s more, a defendant has the burden of showing that the information in the PSR is materially unreliable.

However, the problem here is that the PSR contained no information to support the loss amounts and no evidence Euneisha had anything to do with the other transactions. The government only mentioned three of the nine properties at trial. As for the others, “the facts contained in the PSR regarding these six properties lack an evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability,” the Circuit said. “Although a PSR may be considered as evidence by the court when making sentencing determinations, bare assertions made therein are not evidence standing alone.”

negative170112The appellate panel made clear that Euneisha was not at fault for failing to disprove the PSR’s loss claim. “If the factual recitation in the PSR lacks sufficient indicia of reliability,” the Court held, “then it is error for the district court to consider it at sentencing — regardless of whether the defendant objects or offers rebuttal evidence.”

The case will go back for resentencing.

United States v. Hearns, Case No. 16-40222 (5th Cir., Jan. 9, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Bootstrapping Your Way to Enhanced Sentences – Update for January 11, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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CHECK OUT THESE GUNS

About one out of ten federal offenders is charged with a firearms offense, and just about all of them are charged as felons-in-possession.

guns170111The shorthand is misleading, because literally, 18 USC 922 nowhere uses the word “felony.” But it does talk about a lot of other things. You can commit the offense colloquially called felon-in-possession if you own a firearm or ammunition that has traveled in interstate commerce after (1) being convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison; (2) being under indictment for such a crime; (3) being convicted of any misdemeanor involving domestic violence; (4) being a fugitive from justice; (5) being a drug abuser; (6) being under a civil protection order; (7) being an illegal alien; (8) being dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or (9) having renounced your citizenship.

The statute’s a hot mess, and its byzantine requirements would almost be laughable if the penalty – up to 10 years in prison – were not so serious. We just talked to a Navy veteran the other day who wanted to expunge a domestic violence misdemeanor he had gotten while on leave 22 years ago. He was shocked when we told him that he was committing a 10-year federal felony by owning the shotgun he hunted deer with every year.

Today’s case isn’t about the flaws in the statute, however, but rather the flaws in the system. Dasean Taylor was very much a felon-in-possession. In fact, he must have caught the authorities’ attention as a bona fide bad guy, because law enforcement sent an informant to buy guns from Dasean on three separate occasions.

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                            Not a business license…

Catching Desean the first time he sold a gun would have been plenty to hang him as a felon-in-possession. But the Sentencing Guidelines include an arsenal of enhancements that can jack up the sentencing range of a felon-in-possession, and the government pretty clearly wanted Dasean’s hide.

Dasean’s case centered around a 4-level enhancement for trafficking in firearms. The enhancement would apply to Desean if he sold two or more guns, and knew or had reason to know possession of the guns by the buyer was illegal or the buyer was going to use the guns illegally.

To be sure they could hammer Dasean, the authorities had their undercover buyer tell Dasean he was going to file the serial numbers off one of the guns. One of other guns sold was a sawed-off shotgun, illegal to own unless it was registered under 26 USC 5841. The district court held that the sale of those two guns satisfied the trafficking enhancement.

An unfortunate effect of the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines was to institutionalize the practice of sentence manipulation. The drug guidelines increased according to the weight of the drugs sold, so law enforcement would not just make one buy, but rather a number of buys, until a weight threshold was reached. If the offense carried an enhancement for possession of a firearm, the undercover would beg the defendant to find a gun, any gun, that the undercover could buy. The worst examples are the “stash house” robberies, where the ATF agents running the sting would tell tales of a fictitious safe house stacked with kilos and kilos of cocaine. Why tell the perps they could knock over a place and get 4 kilos of coke when it was just as easy to promise 25 kilos?

§ 924 tacks a few years onto a sentence for carrying a gun during a violent or drug crime.
                                           Some guns you just know aren’t for plinking at cans…

In today’s case, Desean complained on appeal that there wasn’t enough evidence to apply the 4-level enhancement to his sentence (giving him 71 months instead of 46 months). Monday, the 1st Circuit affirmed the enhancement and sentence.

The district court found that “the cooperating witness [said] that he [was] going to take the serial number off” and that therefore “Mr. Taylor as a supplier would know [that the transfer] involved some unlawful possession or the use or disposal of the firearm unlawfully.” Dasean said the audio didn’t prove he heard the buyer say that, but the Circuit concluded otherwise., holding that because Taylor must have heard the statement,

then the District Court committed no clear or obvious error — or, for that matter, any error at all — in concluding that Taylor knew or should have known that the removal of a serial number is indicative of “anticipation that the gun will be used in criminal activity,” and thus that Taylor knew or should have known that CW-1 intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.

Now that’s a totem pole of inferences! The Court inferred from the audio that Dasean heard the buyer saw he’d remove the number, it inferred that Dasean knew that removing serial numbers indicates the buyer plans to be up to no good with the gun, and therefore it inferred that Dasean knew or should have known that the buyer intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.

Maybe so, but we think that begs the question. The cooperating witness did not intend to use the firearm unlawfully, or, for that matter, to remove the serial number. Instead, he was buying the firearm (and making the claim) at the behest of law enforcement, without any intention of carrying out his promise. It’s pretty obvious the buyer claimed he wanted to remove the serial number solely to trap Dasean with a higher guideline range. But can a defendant be said to know a b uyer will do something the buyer has no intention of doing when he claims to plan to do so?

It’s just unseemly to lie to someone, and then punish them because you assert they must have believed their lie.

boot170111Of course, there was a sawed-off shotgun, too. Under the National Firearms Act, one may not possess a sawed-off shotgun without registering it with the ATF. But the district court conceded that proper registration of the shotgun was possible, just unlikely. The Court of Appeals agreed, noting among other things that Dasean knew the buyer was up to no good because he “was on notice that CW-1 had expressed during the September transaction an intention to remove the serial number from a firearm.”

We don’t excuse selling guns to people who intend to misuse them, but the entire exercise in pumping up Dasean’s sentence struck us a serious case of bootstrapping.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 15-1775 (1st Circuit, Jan. 9, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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7th Circuit Sanctifies Judicial “Hunches” as Sentencing Tool – Update for January 10, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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HUH?

pecks170110Ryan Gibbs was just one of those perennial bad boys, with a record as long as your arm and a demonstrated lack of interest in conforming his conduct to the strictures of the law. In front of a district court for possession with Ryan faced a Guidelines-suggested 151-188 month sentencing range. The government asked for 216 months. The most Ryan could have gotten was a 240-month term.

The district judge, rambling “none too clearly” (as the Court of Appeals lamented), decided that Ryan was incorrigible:

When I look at the 3553(a) factors apart from the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” your “history and characteristics” of you as a defendant does [sic] not indicate that there should be any leniency at all; that they [anteced‐ent unclear] “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” which your history and characteristics indicate that you have no respect for the law; “provide just punishment.” Nothing — No previous sentence that this Court has imposed or other Courts have deterred you from your criminal conduct.

With this gibberish constituting the sum and substance of the district court’s application of the sentencing factors of 18 USC 3553(a), the judge slapped Ryan with 216 months.

Last week, the 7th Circuit affirmed the sentence. No surprise there – the government wins over 92% of the time in criminal appeals to begin with.

But the Court of Appeals upheld the decision primarily because it sensed it could trust the judge’s (and, to a lesser extent, the prosecutor’s) gut.

hunch170111The Circuit admitted that no one in the case “attempted a sophisticated analysis of the likely consequences… of adding roughly two years to the sentence he would have been given had the judge stopped at the top of the guideline range… both the prosecution and the judge based the 216-month sentence (proposed by the government, imposed by the judge) on a hunch. As the prosecutors as well as the judge are highly experienced, their hunches are likely often to be reliable.”

The Court said that, after all, the government can suggest any sentence within the statutory range and the judge can impose any sentence within the statutory range. Plus, the panel argued, the “briefs and argument of defense counsel in this case bordered on the perfunctory.”

So the judge and the AUSA are “highly experienced” and their hunches are “reliable.” Defense counsel, on the other hand, is a legal klutz filing cookie-cutter motions and soulless briefs. It sounds as though imposition of a sentence after proper consideration of the Guidelines and sentencing factors in Sec. 3553(a) is a privilege reserved only for defendants who have good lawyers or face lousy prosecutors and a neophyte judge.

Judge Richard Posner, the author of the decision and an appellate jurist for whom we have great respect, said that “some consideration, however, should be given to the possibility of basing a prison sentence – at least a very long one (and an 18-year sentence is very long) – on something other than a hunch.” We agree wholeheartedly. But he then proceeded on a flight of impractical fancy by suggested that maybe the sentencing judge should have called the Sentencing Commission, which then would given the AUSA, court and defense counsel guidance on why it set the Guidelines where it did, and might even propose the right out-of-guidelines sentence in this particular case. The parties might find the Sentencing Commission “a valuable resource,” Judge Posner opined.

momscold170110What a capital idea! For that matter, the district courts might just want to call Congress for guidance on why the statutory penalties are as they are, or ring up the President for his view as to whether it should peremptorily commute the sentence, or even ask the defendant’s mother what punishment she found to be the most effective when Ryan was a mere lad. To be sure, the Sentencing Commission could not be so busy that it wouldn’t be willing to give a few minutes of time to arbitrate an individual sentence in Ryan’s case (or in any of the other 80,000 criminal sentences that occur in federal courts annually).

phonefriend170110In the days before the Guidelines, judges sentenced anywhere within the statutory range virtually without oversight or discretion. The Guidelines were to change all of that. In Gibbs, the 7th Circuit has handed down a decision that enshrines a judge’s “hunch” as a standard that trumps all others. What’s nearly as bad, the Court has suggested that maybe district courts should start using the U.S. Sentencing Commission as a “phone-a-friend” in troublesome sentencing cases, a development undoubtedly as unwelcome to the Commission is it would be for people like us who believe that judging is for judges.

United States v. Gibbs, Case No. 16-1747 (7th Cir., Jan. 6, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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10th Circuit Reverses Sentence as Too Lenient – Update for January 6, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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A TOAST OF JOHNNY WALKER TO THE JUDGE

Doesn’t every guilty defendant long for a district judge like the one who sentenced Johnny Walker?

The defendant was well named...
                                      The defendant was well named…

Mr. Walker, who ironically enough was an alcoholic and drug user, had robbed a couple of banks. In fact, he had apparently robbed an even dozen in his past, and this offense was hardly his first rodeo. He pled guilty and faced a Guidelines advisory sentencing range of 151-188 months.

Nevertheless, his public defender – a guy whose chutzpah and persuasive skills should make him a thousand dollar-an-hour defense attorney – convinced the district court to hold off sentencing so Johnny could go to an in-patient rehab clinic for 12 weeks. Then, after Johnny successfully graduated from that program, the public defender talked the district court into sentencing his client to time served (which amounted to 33 days that Johnny had spent in jail before being bonded out). The judge was impressed that Johnny had overcome his addition, joined a church, gotten a job and lived with a supportive family.

soft170106Two days ago, the 10th Circuit reversed. Noting that the sentence was less than 1% of the bottom of the Guidelines range, the appellate panel held that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Court conceded that the district judge had tried to craft a fair sentence individualized to the defendant, but held that in so doing, ignored the seven sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

Of the seven sentencing factors, three factors weigh against a time-served sentence, one points both ways, and three are inapplicable. We recognize that these factors do not necessarily bear equal weight, and the district court bore the delicate task of balancing these factors.

* * *

In balancing these factors, the district court focused almost exclusively on Mr. Walker’s newfound sobriety. We do not question the materiality of this factor. But by declining to impose any prison time, the district court effectively failed to give any weight to the congressional values of punishment, general deterrence, incapacitation, respect for the law, and avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities…

The Court of Appeals was especially troubled by Johnny’s inability to cite a single bank robbery case nationwide where such a light sentence was imposed.

Of course every perp thinks he'll get away with it...
Of course every perp thinks he’ll get away with it…

It didn’t help matters that the district judge publicly expressed his disdain for the sentencing standard of general deterrence, where the court is to consider whether the sentence imposed will deter others from contemplating a similar crime. The district court reasonably thought this standard was nonsense, because hardly anyone sets out to commit a crime thinking he or she will be caught. If you figure you’re going to get away with it, you hardly contemplate the possible punishment if you do. And this, of course, presupposes that the criminal element reads the newspapers, consults the Guidelines, and generally knows what happens in the halls of justice.

The Court of Appeals was unswayed by the district court’s commonsense rejection of the deterrence value of a sentence. The 10th complained that the judge “gave inadequate attention to this purpose. The court reasonably concluded that no further prison time would be necessary to deter Mr. Walker, but did not ‘give much stock’ in the importance of general deterrence. Federal law required the court to put its skepticism aside.”

jump170106As our sainted mother would have asked, “if federal law told you to go jump off a bridge, would you do it?” Mom and the district court employed a little too much common sense to satisfy the 10th Circuit.

The 10th Circuit has thus held that all seven sentencing factors count, but only as much as the court wants them to count. Johnny could have gone 6-1 in favor of probation and a medal, and the Court of Appeals would have still said that the seventh factor tipped him into prison anyway.  

Johnny will now head back to court, where he’ll undoubtedly get the real prison time that the Court of Appeals wants him to have.

United States v. Walker, Case No. 15-4171 (10th Cir., Jan. 4, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root
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A Couple of Year-End Decisions of Interest – Update for January 3, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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GOV’T APPEALS WIRETAP SUPPRESSION FOR AGENT’S LIE

Late last week, the Government appealed a remarkable Dec. 22 EDNY decision to suppress wiretap evidence because a federal agent perjured himself on the application.

liarliar171013In the case, a drug trafficking prosecution, the Government wanted to use recorded phone conversations, as well as GPS data taken from the ankle bracelet of a conspirator who was on state parole. Senior District Judge Jack Weinstein ruled, however, that a Homeland Security agent falsely swore in a 2015 affidavit supporting the there had been no previous wiretaps on the targets, when in fact there had been four in the last 12 years. 

“This was not a ‘misunderstanding.’ It was perjury,” the Judge wrote in United States v. Lambus. “Knowingly false statements cannot be tolerated, especially if those statements are made at proceedings where the courts have little choice but to take the government at its word.”

The government argued the agent made an inadvertent mistake, but admitted his representations were “absolutely wrong.” The appeal was filed last week in the 2nd Circuit, and will postpone a planned Jan. 9, 2017, trial.

The Judge also limited the use of GPS data pulled from Lambus’ ankle bracelet. Lambus’ parole officer began to suspect he was dealing drugs, and otherwise violating his parole, he made Lambus wear a bracelet. The PO kept the bracelet on for 2 years, and shared the date with the Feds.

gps170103“A state cannot use a parolee as a sort of fly paper, trailing him around the community for years, trolling for criminals,” the court held. “If the state wishes to search someone for the primary purpose of furthering a deliberate effort to gather evidence as part of a wide-ranging criminal prosecution, the “warrant and probable-cause requirement is not…‘impracticable’;” the search cannot be justified as a “special need,” even if the searchee is a parolee.

Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Lambus, Case No. 15-CR-382 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016)

– Thomas L. Root

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NO SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT FOR LIST OF PRIOR ARRESTS

Maximo Mateo-Medina tried to do it right. He was thrown out of the U.S. after a conviction, but came back to care for his dying wife. After she passed away, he stayed to care for her special-needs grandson, whose parents were dopers. When he threw the kid’s father out for drug abuse, the dopehead dad turned him in for illegal reentry.

snitch161004The government agreed he should only get 6 months, but the district court gave him a year, because the Presentence Report listed 6 prior arrests that did not result in convictions. The PSR had no facts about the arrests, but that didn’t keep the court from hammering Maximo, holding he had “engaged in conduct which to the Court’s view belied and made ring hollow a little bit his desire to merely come to America to seek a better life.” The sentencing judge complained it was the reason Maximo “did not have any actual adult convictions is because of the breakdowns in the court—in the state court system—and not because of innocence.”

Last Friday, the 3rd Circuit said the district court violated Maximo’s due process rights by speculating about his criminal past with no evidence supporting its conclusions. The Court of Appeals cited recent studies that showed whites and blacks who commit the same minor offenses get treated very differently: “In early adulthood,” the Court said, “race disparities in drug arrests grew substantially; as early as age 22, African-Americans had 83% greater odds of a drug arrest than whites and at age 27 this disparity was 235%.” With respect to Hispanics, the study found that socioeconomic factors such as residing in an inner-city neighborhood accounted for much of the disparity in drug arrest rates.”

prohibition-arrests-blacks-thumbnailIn other words, it’s as likely that Maximo got arrested a lot because he was a Hispanic in a poor neighborhood, and not prosecuted because the charges were too bogus for a prosecutor to mess with. Without some facts showing he was guilty but lucky enough to beat the raps, the Circuit said, a sentencing court cannot consider arrests without convictions in increasing a defendant’s sentence.

United States v. Mateo-Medina, Case No. 15-2862 (3rd Cir., Dec. 30, 2016)

– Thomas L. Root

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