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Bivens, Uh-huh. What Is It Good For? Absolutely Nuthin’ – Update for August 23, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BIVENS – KILLING IT SOFTLY

I was just graduating from high school when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Webster Bivens, who sued federal agents after they broke into his apartment without a warrant and arrested him on a drug charge (that was promptly dismissed by a magistrate judge).

policeraid170824In the 50-year-plus interlude since I turned 18, Webb Biven’s handwritten lawsuit seeking monetary damages against the agents who kicked down his door became famous in legal circles as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Webb has quite accidentally lent his name to all lawsuits seeking money for federal officials’ and agents’ misconduct, widely known as “Bivens actions.”

I now carry a Medicare card. The high school from which I graduated no longer exists. And when reading this week’s 3rd Circuit’s decision in Kalu v. Spaulding, I keep recalling Edwin Starr’s 1969 piece War, albeit with different lyrics:

Bivens, uh-huh, what is it good for?
Absolutely nuthin’.
Say it again, y’all.

Or maybe Roberta Flack: Bivens – Killing It Softly.

Congress has authorized federal money-damages lawsuits against state and local officials and employees for the violation of one’s constitutional rights in 42 USC § 1983. When Webb argued in 1971 that there must exist a similar right to sue federal officials and employees for damages when they run roughshod over a person’s constitutional rights, the Supreme Court obliged him, finding in the Constitution an implied right to do to federal officials what § 1983 lets one do to state and local officials.

In the decade following the Bivens decision — which authorized suits seeking damages for 4th Amendment violations — the Supreme Court approved a Bivens damage remedy for a congressional staffer’s gender discrimination claim under the 5th Amendment (Davis v. Passman) and for a federal prisoner’s inadequate-care claim under the 8th Amendment (Carlson v. Green).

However, 1980 was the high-water mark for Bivens. Since then, citing the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power, SCOTUS has consistently narrowed the grounds that can support a Bivens actions.

“At bottom,” the Supremes said two years ago in Egbert v. Boule, a decision that drove a stake through the heart of Bivens, “creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor.” Thus, litigants are denied the right to bring a Bivens action in “a new context.”

bivens240823If it ain’t a 4th Amendment “kick-down-the-door” suit, a member of Congress with wandering hands, or an 8th Amendment inadequate care claim, Bivens is good for absolutely nuthin’.

This week, the 3rd Circuit demonstrated in a lengthy opinion just how dead Bivens is, making the casual reader wonder why the Supreme Court — which is not adverse to the death penalty — didn’t simply consign Bivens to the dustbin of history the way it did Roe v. Wade (another relic of my youth).

John Kalu, who was a federal inmate at the time, brought an 8th Amendment claim against a Bureau of Prisons correctional officer for sexually assaulting him on three occasions. John has since been released and thus has no remedy for the alleged offense except money damages. However, the Circuit held, “[h]eeding the Supreme Court’s recent and repeated warning that we must exercise ‘caution”’ before implying a damages remedy under the Constitution, we decline to extend the Bivens remedy to Kalu’s claims.”

The 3rd admitted that John’s Bivens claim for sexual assault was pretty close to the Carlson situation, where the Court allowed a Bivens action for the BOP’s failure to protect a prisoner from a sexual assault by another prisoner. But while admitting that “the distinctions between Kalu’s sexual assault claim and the one recognized in Carlson are perhaps small, at least in practical terms… given the Supreme Court’s expressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied here.”

The Circuit ruled that

the availability of an alternative remedial scheme through the BOP’s administrative remedy program, Congress’s repeated omission of a cause of action against individual officials in both the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and separation of powers principles are special factors counseling against extending Bivens liability to Kalu’s officer-on-prisoner sexual assault claim. As Egbert cautions, whether to supplement an existing remedial scheme with a damages action is a legislative determination that we are not allowed to ‘second-guess…’ We therefore hold Kalu’s 8th Amendment sexual assault claim… is ineligible for remedies under Bivens.

In Egbert, the Supreme Court indicated that if it had to decide Bivens today, it “would decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.” One wonders why the Supreme Court didn’t simply overturn Bivens, stare decisis be damned, and spare the judicial system and plaintiffs the steady drip inevitably leading to limiting Bivens to a meaningless singularity.

forcedsex161202One of the unanimous three-judge panel in Kalu was Judge Luis Restrepo, who also serves on the US Sentencing Commission. Although Judge Restrepo felt that Egbert required that he join the majority opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion delivering a blistering criticism of “the alarming reports of pervasive staff-on-inmate sexual abuse within the Bureau of Prisons and corresponding flaws in the administrative remedy process.”

Judge Restrepo noted that while the “Federal Prison Oversight Act, which President Joe Biden recently signed into law… provides much-needed safeguards, the provision of a civil legal remedy for survivors of staff-on-inmate abuse is notably absent from the text of the statute. This absence, Egbert cautions us, may lend ‘reason to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy’ in cases such as the one before us’.”

Uh-huh.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971)

Egbert v. Boule, 596 US 482 (2022)

Davis v. Passman, 442 US 228 (1979)

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)

Kalu v. Spaulding, Case No. 23-1103, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21092 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Criminal History Guidelines Going Retro By Narrowest of Margins – Update for August 25, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION CLIFFHANGER SENDS CRIMINAL HISTORY CHANGES RETROACTIVE

reeves230706Sentencing Commission meetings – and admittedly, we don’t have many in our sample, because the USSC was moribund for the five years ending last August – are usually yawners. Chairman Carlton Reeves likes to talk and loves polite consensus. No one on the Commission is a bomb-thrower, and every the most vigorous policy disputes are cloaked in courtesy. Everyone – even the ex officio Dept of Justice member Jonathan J. Wroblewski – gets a turn at the mic.

That’s partly why yesterday’s meeting was so surprising.

The Commission approved the first retroactive application of a Guideline change in nine years, deciding that Amendment 821 – which lowers criminal history scores in some cases – should apply to people already sentenced. It also adopted policy priorities for the 2024 amendment cycle that include maybe amending how the guidelines treat acquitted conduct and assessing whether Bureau of Prisons practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.

Zero is Hero:  Right now, someone with zero or one criminal history point (a minor misdemeanor) is scored a Criminal History Category I. This rating provides the lowest sentencing range for any given Guidelines offense level. The Commission has adopted a new ”zero-point” Guidelines amendment, which added Section 4C1.1 to the Guidelines. The new section will grant people with zero criminal history points who meet a long list of other conditions (such as no guns or violence, no sex offenses) a 2-level reduction in their Guidelines offense level. The practical effect will be that the person’s advisory sentencing range will drop two levels (such as from Level 30 (97-121 months) to Level 28 (78-97 months).

Status Seekers: At the other end of criminal history, the Guidelines have always assigned an extra two points if the current offense was committed while someone was under supervision. Supervision could be probation or parole from a prior offense or supervised release from a prior federal offense. The two points (called “status points”) could be a snare for the unwary. A defendant involved in a conspiracy of several years duration might pick up a DUI offense during the period the conspiracy is going on. Even if the local judge lets him or her off with unsupervised probation, that local conviction would add 2 criminal history points and quite likely land the defendant in a higher criminal history category.

nostatus230825Last April, the Sentencing Commission abolished all status points for people who had fewer than seven accumulated criminal history points driving their criminal history category. For those with seven or more points, only one status point would be added rather than two. In making this change, the USSC determined that status points had little to no relevance in the accurate determination of a criminal history profile.

As it must do whenever it lowers the Guidelines, the Commission last May opened a proceeding to determine whether those changes should benefit people who have already been sentenced as well as those who have yet to be sentenced. This retroactivity proceeding ended with yesterday’s meeting.

Chairman Reeves opened the meeting with a full-throated endorsement of making the criminal history amendments retroactive. Commissioners Luis Restrepo (Judge on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals) and Laura Mate (Federal Public Defender) followed him, voicing their support for full retroactivity.

I yawned. It hardly mattered at this point that the Commission’s audio feed was garbled, because retroactivity was up 3-0, and it seemed that victory was a foregone conclusion. A done deal.

But then, Commissioner Claire Murray (a former Assistant Attorney General) delivered an ordered and rational argument against retroactivity, followed by complementary arguments against going retro by Commissioners Candice Wong (US Attorney’s Office for DC) and Claria Horn Boom (US District Judge from both districts of Kentucky). Suddenly, the vote was 3-3, and retroactivity was tottering.

It thus fell to Commissioner John Gleeson (Wall Street lawyer and former federal judge) to decide whether 18,000 or so federal prisoners would be eligible to have their sentences adjusted to what USSC doctrine now believed was appropriate. Judge Gleeson did not disappoint.

gleesonB160314Speaking in quiet, measured tones, Judge Gleeson observed that the opponents of retroactivity complained that the changes made by Amendment 821 “do not remedy a systemic wrong and thus could not rectify a fundamental unfairness in the guidelines manual,” and thus the need for finality and the administrative burden placed on courts by retroactivity meant that the changes should not be made retro. “In my view,” Judge Gleeson said, “it is hard to overstate how wrong that argument is.”

Judge Gleeson highlighted the disproportionate impact the two criminal history guidelines had had on minorities. He said that 43% of the prisoners affected by the retroactive change in status points are black and 20% are Hispanic. About 69% of those benefitting from the zero-point change are Hispanic. Judge Gleeson said that while

“there’s no such thing as fully remedying and racial disparity that’s been built into our criminal justice system for so long… making these amendments retroactive will have a tangible effect for people of color… Overreliance on criminal history can drive pernicious racial disparities in sentencing… we [have] visited fundamental unfairness on thousands of people through guidelines that judges follow… [that] we know from the data are wrong… At the receiving end of these sentences there are three-dimensional human beings.”

Final vote for retroactivity was 4-3.

retro160110The retroactivity order prohibits district courts from granting any change in sentences prior to February 1, 2024. The Commission voted that delay to ensure that people who might be released will have the opportunity to participate in reentry programs and transitional services that will increase the likelihood of successful reentry to society.

The Commission estimated in its July 2023 Impact Analysis that retroactive application would carry a meaningful impact for many currently incarcerated individuals:

• 11,495 prisoners will have a lower sentencing range due to the status-point change, with a possible sentence reduction of 11.7%, on average.

• 7,272 prisoners will be eligible for a lower sentencing range based upon the “Zero-Point” change, with an average possible sentence reduction of 17.6%.

Eligible prisoners will have to file a motion with their sentencing courts under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) seeking the reduction. The district court is entitled to grant no more than a reduction to the bottom of the revised sentencing range (with special rules for people who have had departures for assisting the government), and no issues may be considered other than the revised criminal history score. Whether to grant as much a reduction as possible, only part of the possible reduction, or none at all is entirely up to the judge.

US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting (August 24, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Sentencing Commission votes to make its new criminal history amendments retroactive and adopts new policy priorities (August 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root