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Butterfly Wings Don’t Beat For Innocence – Update for July 7, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE BEIJING BUTTERFLY

butterfly220707When mathematician Edward Lorenz first posited the notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing today could affect the path of a tornado in Kansas three weeks hence, his fanciful illustration became the interface with chaos theory that the average Joe and Jane could understand. Essentially, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.

When a federal defendant is presented with a plea agreement and told by her lawyer that it’s the best deal she can hope for, the fine print is rarely explained. That includes Section 10(b)(1)(A)(iii) on page 12 which says something like “Defendant waives the right to challenge the conviction or sentence under 18 USC § 3742 or on any collateral attack under 28 USC § 2255 or other section, except in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

pleawaiver220707And why not sign it? The defendant is under plenty of stress as she contemplates agreeing to spending a decade in prison, and a lot of that gibberish in the back of the plea agreement means a lot less to her than her attorney’s blandishments that the judge certainly won’t give her more than 48 months.

In chaos theory parlance, the appeal/collateral attack waiver is a pretty small input. Only later does the output become huge.

The Supreme Court left for vacation in time for the 4th of July. Like a fireworks display, the finale was stellar and stunning: abortion, guns, prayer, and the biggest case of all, a decision that may spell doom for the administrative state. But just like many fireworks finales, after the final glowing detonation fades, one straggler rocket goes airborne, with no light but a surprise reverberating boom.

Last Thursday, the Court released its final list of certiorari grants and denials for the term, announcing the one or two cases it will add to next term’s docket while denying a long list of petitions. One of the denials was a guy named Zenon Grzegorczyk (pronounced just the way it sounds). Zenon, a good father, wanted to murder six people whom he blamed for his divorce and for the loss of custody of his child. He hired and paid hitmen to pull it off.

hitman220707Problem was that Zenon, not being an avid news consumer, was unaware that all hitmen available for hire are undercover law enforcement officers, moonlighting for some pocket money. Thus it was in this case. Zenon was promptly charged with murder for hire (18 USC § 1958) and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

Zenon signed a plea agreement in which, among other things, he waived any right to challenge his murder-for-hire and firearms convictions. He was sentenced to about 18 years.

A couple of years later, after the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya that crimes of violence had to be accompanied by use or threat of force, Zenon filed a § 2255 motion challenging the firearms conviction. Because of his plea agreement, the District Court denied the motion, and the 7th Circuit affirmed. Zenon filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Davis that a conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not itself a violent offense that could support an 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The government flipped its position, asking the Supreme Court to vacate the 7th Circuit’s judgment because Davis made Zenon actually innocent of the 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The mechanism is called a “GVR,” because the Supremes grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the lower court’s decision, and remand the case for further consideration, all in one order.

judgeB160229The Supreme Court refused, denying the petition last week. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in a concurrence to the denial that “[b]ecause the 7th Circuit correctly concluded that the defendant’s unconditional guilty plea precluded any argument based on the new caselaw, this Court has no appropriate legal basis to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.”

What is notable was the spirited dissent written by Justice Sotomayor. She argued that Zenon’s case

falls comfortably within this Court’s longstanding GVR practice… The Solicitor General’s considered concession that 18 USC § 1958(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A) is an intervening development that has triggered the Government’s agreement to forgo assertion of the procedural bar that proved decisive below. Consequently, there is surely a reasonable probability of a different result on remand: With the Government waiving the procedural bar, Grzegorczyk’s § 924(c) conviction and 5-year sentence should be vacated, and his § 1958(a) sentence reduced by at least 2 years and 7 months. Moreover, given the stakes for Grzegorczyk, as well as the Government’s express consent, this is a case where the marginal cost to judicial efficiency and finality from a remand should yield to solicitude for Grzegorczyk’s rights. “Further proceedings” are therefore “just under the circumstances,” 28 USC § 2106, and the Court should issue a GVR order.

“By denying certiorari rather than issuing a GVR order,” Justice Sotomayor fumed, “the Court allocates the full cost of the Government’s error to Grzegorczyk, who faces over 7½ extra years of incarceration as a result.”

innocent210504What this means, of course, is that actual innocence of a count of conviction will always yield to an oppressive appeal waiver signed in haste by a defendant who is understandably focused on the larger issues in her plea agreement rather than flitting butterfly of a provision, whose wingbeats seem inconsequential at the time but may later spawn a tornado of injustice.

In his concurrence, Kavanaugh suggested that if the government really felt that Zenon was entitled to relief from the five -year 924(c) sentence, “the Attorney General may recommend a pardon or commutation to the President, and the President may pardon the defendant or commute the sentence.”

Like that’s gonna happen…

Grzegorczyk v. United States, Case No. 21-5967, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3273 (June 30, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Waive It ‘Goodbye’? – Update for November 5, 2021

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ONE AIN’T DONE

oneanddone200616A lot of possible objections or defenses can be waived if they aren’t raised at the right time. If a defendant doesn’t raise an objection to the indictment or venue or speedy trial before the jury is seated, the objections are lost. Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lists a whole bevy of such issues.

Many other rights are often waived if the defendant enters into a plea agreement with the government. Such rights, which have to be specifically and expressly waived in the plea agreement, usually include the right to appeal, the right to file other types of post-conviction challenges, and even – often enough – the right to file requests for documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

A plea waiver is common and enforceable. But the government has to raise the defense of plea waiver in order to get any traction. Let’s say a defendant signs a plea deal with the government that includes a promise not to appeal or bring a collateral attack on a conviction or sentence. Later, she files a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 claiming, for example, her lawyer screwed up at sentencing. If the government doesn’t raise the plea waiver as a defense at the time it files its objection to the § 2255 motion, it can’t come back later and assert the defense.

It’s “one and done.”But how long is “done?” Derrick Borden found that out last week. Despite having signed a plea waiver that prevented any post-conviction challenges to his conviction, Derrick filed motion to vacate his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis invalidated the basis for that count. The government, agreeing that the § 924(c) conviction should be vacated, did not raise the plea waiver as an objection.

After the § 924(c) was vacated, Derrick was resentenced. Not liking how that turned out, he appealed the new sentence as being too much. The government raised the plea waiver as a defense to the new § 2255, arguing Derrick had no right to appeal.

Derrick argued that the government – having waived its right to invoke the waiver against his first § 2255 motion – was not allowed to selectively enforce the plea deal, and that the letter it wrote the district court waiving the waiver the first time around should be read to have abandon its right to enforce the waiver for all time.

Waivers160215Last week, the 2nd Circuit turned him down, apparently a bit miffed that Derrick tried to sandbag the government for having done the right thing. “To start, the Circuit said, “consenting to permit Borden to move to vacate his § 924(c) conviction was in Borden’s interest, in the interest of judicial economy, and in the interests of justice… we see no reason to discourage the Government from consenting to the correction of a constitutional error by offering limited relief from an appeal waiver (or waiver of other post-conviction relief) that benefits the defendant.”

The 2nd said the government’s letter let Derrick “obtain precisely the relief he sought. And although courts construe plea agreements strictly against the government, that standard does not necessarily extend to a letter that is not a separate plea agreement upon which the defendant relied in waiving any rights.

United States v. Borden, Case No. 19-4316-cr, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32030 (2d Cir., Oct. 26, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Lousy Lawyering and Other Stories – Update for April 27, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“DID I SAY FIVE YEARS? I MEANT FIVE DECADES…”

Four decisions of note last week:

stupidlawyr191202Oops, My Bad: Dave Mayhew was charged with white-collar fraud. The government offered him a plea deal that promised a maximum sentence of five years.

“C’mon, man,” his lawyer said. “That’s no deal. If we go to trial, five years is the worst we can do.” Dave, who paid big bucks for this professional advice, followed his attorney’s guidance and went to trial.

You can guess what happened. Dave lost, and he was sentenced to 27 years.

After appeals were over, Dave filed a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective for giving him such bad advice. The district court denied the petition, pointing out that Dave was told at his re-arraignment that he could get up to 55 years on all of the charges and the court – no one else – would decide the sentence. So Dave knew what he was getting into, the judge claimed, and that cured any prejudice he would have suffered from his lawyer’s idiocy.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed. The re-arraignment came only after Dave had rejected the plea deal. The Circuit admitted that in the usual lousy-advice-on-sentence-exposure case, the law is clear that if the defendant pleads guilty after a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing, the court’s warning that only it would determine the sentence and that the maximum the defendant faces, “taken together, may well have been enough to cure… counsel’s misadvice. But there is a fundamental problem,” the 4th held, “with applying that principle here, and it has to do with timing: The court’s admonitions in this case came only after Dave already had rejected the government’s plea offer, and there is no indication — in the record or from the government on appeal — that the offer remained open at that point.”

Bait and Switch: Rebecca Stampe made a deal on her drug case, agreeing to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea locking her sentence at 168 months. An 11(c)(1)(C) plea sets a particular sentence or sentence range, with the court’s role limited to honoring the sentence deal or rejecting the guilty plea.

Deal170216Becky’s deal came with a government promise that if she testified against her co-defendant, she might get a substantial-cooperation sentence reduction under USSG § 5K1.1. But after she made the plea deal, the government dismissed the case against her co-defendant because of some unspecified misconduct by the informant (which presumedly made the informant’s testimony worthless).

Becky demanded information about the misconduct under Brady v Maryland, arguing that it was material to her guilt as well. She also moved to withdraw from her plea agreement (but not her guilty plea), figuring she’d do better with an open plea that let the court sentence her than she would with a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea.

Last week, the 6th Circuit shot her down. The Circuit ruled that the evidence could not possibly be material to Becky’s defense, because she had already pled guilty, so there was no defense left to make. As for the plea agreement, the Circuit said, “While we do not doubt that Stampe sincerely believed that she might avoid some prison time because of her putative cooperation in her co-defendant’s case, the plea agreement contemplated but did not require that possibility. So contrary to her assertion on appeal, it was not the ‘principal purpose’ of the agreement. The main purpose was the exchange of her plea for the government dropping the other charge against her and agreeing to a 168-month sentence.”

mathisEnd Run: John Ham filed a 28 USC § 2241 habeas petition claiming that Mathis v United States – a Supreme court decision that dictated how a sentencing court should apply the “categorical approach” in deciding whether a prior crime was a “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act – required that he be resentenced to a lot less time.

John figured that the 4th Circuit’s United States v. Wheeler decision authorized the district court to address his § 2241 petition on the merits. The district court disagreed, and Jim appealed.

Wheeler adopted a four-part test for using § 2241 petitions to attack a defective sentence where a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.” One of those tests is that a petitioner must show a retroactive change in substantive law that happened after the direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.

John claimed that Mathis satisfies that requirement, changing “well-settled substantive law” about how a sentencing court should apply the categorical approach. Last week, the 4th Circuit disagreed.

“Mathis itself made clear that it was not changing, but rather clarifying, the law,” the 4th held. “The categorical approach has always required a look at the elements of an offense, not the facts underlying it… Indeed, Mathis merely repeated the ‘simple point’ that served as ‘a mantra’ in its ACCA decisions: ‘a sentencing judge may look only to the elements of the offense, not to the facts of the defendant’s conduct’.”

abandoned210427jpgSee You Around, Chump: Finally, in the 8th Circuit, Charles Ahumada filed a § 2255 motion arguing his attorney abandoned him by failing to file a petition for rehearing on his direct appeal. Not so, the Circuit said. In order to make a 6th Amendment ineffective assistance, a defendant first has to have a constitutional right to counsel. There is no constitutional right to counsel on a discretionary appeal, and a petition for rehearing is exactly that.

Chuck admitted as much, but argued that the Circuit’s Criminal Justice Act plan requiring counsel to file non-frivolous appeals gave him a due process right to effective counsel. “Even assuming there was a breach of the statute, the CJA,” the 8th said, “it does not give rise to a claim for ineffective representation of counsel.”

United States v. Mayhew, Case No 19-6560, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11248 (4th Cir., April 19, 2021)

United States v. Stampe, Case No 19-6293, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11459 (6th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ham v. Breckon, Case No 20-6972, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11493 (4th Cir., April 20, 2021)

Ahumada v. United States, Case No 19-3632, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 11861 (8th Cir., April 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Don’t Listen to the Judge – Update for September 17, 2020

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SHUT UP, YOUR HONOR

You’d think that when a federal judge tells you that a plea offer stinks, you could take that to the bank.

shutup200917That didn’t happen for Seneca Harrison. After he was charged with an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) felon-in-possession, the government offered him a 70-87 month plea deal. At Seneca’s change of plea hearing, the judge – upon hearing the deal – threw the Assistant United States Attorney out of the courtroom, and then told Seneca the federal (as opposed to the state) system “sucks” and is “really harsh.” The judge advised Seneca he’d get a better deal going to trial.

So Seneca did what the judge suggested… and he got hammered. Because going to trial took away his Guidelines acceptance-of-responsibility points, his sentencing range increased. He was sentenced to 92 months.

Last week, the 10th Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case to a different judge for resentencing. Everyone agreed that the judge’s comments on the plea violated F.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). And Seneca was prejudiced by it, because there was a reasonable probability he would have taken the government deal if the court had kept its mouth shut. To be sure, the district court’s comments were “inappropriate. Commenting on the sentencing practices of another judge and making disparaging remarks about the federal system harms the public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Harrison, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28621 (10th Cir Sept. 10, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Lord, Save Us From Parents… – Update for June 30, 2020

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FATHER KNOWS BEST

Seldom is a defendant is such a mess that the advice of his family or friends cannot make things worse. That’s what happened to David Day.

David faced a messy white-collar case, one that could easily yield a Guidelines sentence of more than 90 months. His public defengoodlawyer160314der was top-drawer (as full-time public defenders usually are): she could assess a loser of a case, and she did, negotiating a government offer for a 51-month sentence.

But parents always want the best for their kids. Although David was in his mid-30s, his Dad figured prominently in planning his defense. And Dad, who had seen all of the relevant TV shows,  figured a court-appointed lawyer couldn’t possibly be any good. He convinced David to reject the offer, and then to dump his PD in favor of hiring two lawyers Dad knew, both whom could smell a fee and thus told David he could easily beat the case.

Things went downhill fast.

After the new lawyers collected their fee, paid over several months (by Dad), they entered their appearance in the case. The government generously re-offered the 51 month deal, but the new lawyers – without ever opening the case files, which they had not yet bothered to pick up from the public defender – told David to reject 51 months and go to trial.

toast200630A few weeks later, the new lawyers finally picked up the files and read the discovery. For the first time, they could see that David was toast. They convinced him to plead, but by then there was no deal. He entered an open plea, which is a plea to the whole indictment without any deal whatsoever. When all the dust settled, David got 92 months.

David filed a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion, arguing the hired lawyers were incompetent for telling him to reject the plea offer without having first read the file. That seems like a pretty basic blunder. But David’s trial judge didn’t think so. She denied the § 2255 motion without a hearing, holding that even if the lawyer had done that, David could not show he was prejudiced by their mistake, because the government’s offered plea agreement would not have bound the court to a particular sentence, so there was no guarantee the judge would have sentenced David to 51 months.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed. The proper inquiry, the Circuit said, is not whether the sentencing court is bound by a plea agreement, but whether it is reasonably probable that the court would have accepted its terms and that the resulting sentence would have been less than the one that was actually imposed.

The 7th complained that the “judge’s prejudice analysis also overlooks the practical realities of plea negotiations. Few court observers would contend that the government’s views as reflected in its plea stipulations and Guidelines recommendations have no influence on a judge’s real-world sentencing decisions… Judges usually follow the nonbinding recommendation in Rule 11 type B agreements in part because they know that not accepting prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations will hamper plea negotiations in future cases. Why would prosecutors offer nonbinding plea agreements — and defendants accept them—if they count for nothing in the sentencing decision?

dumblawyer180108The government weirdly warned the Circuit that ruling in David’s favor would produce “absurd results” by encouraging defendants to engage incompetent attorneys. Of course they would: it makes perfect sense to hire a dummy and get slammed with a lot of time, so that you can roll the dice on your less-than-10% chance that you can win your § 2255 a few years down the road.

Ask David. He’s already served all but 12 months of his 92-month sentence. No doubt he’s happier to have his rights vindicated after he’s done the time he would not have had if he had stuck with his public defender.

The Court, with regal understatement, wrote the government argument “strikes us as an entirely unrealistic concern.”

Day v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19640 (7th Cir. June 24, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

A Short Rocket – Update for March 12, 2020

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WE’VE GOT THE SHORTS…

rocket-312767Arson: In a decision approving filing a second-or-successive 2255 motion, the 6th Circuit last week held that because United States v. Davis is retroactive, a defendant who was convicted of 18 USC 844(i) arson and an 18 USC 924(c) use of a destructive device (a Molotov cocktail) could challenge the 924(c) conviction.

The 6th said the defendant’s “924(c) conviction was premised upon his use of a destructive device in furtherance of the 844(i) offense… The question is whether 844(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another… Arson under 844(i) does not appear to qualify as a crime of violence under 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against “any building… used in interstate or foreign commerce,” including one owned by the arsonist… That means defendant’s 924 conviction must have been based on 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated…”

In re Franklin, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6672 (6th Cir. Mar, 3, 2020)

manyguns190423Waiver: The defendant pled guilty to violating 18 USC 924(c) for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence — theft from a firearms dealer under 18 USC 922(u). He filed a 2255 motion claiming after United States v. Davis, a 922(u) violation no longer counts as a crime of violence. But his plea agreement included the waiver of his right to contest the conviction and sentence “on any ground, including any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates directly to this waiver or its negotiation, including any appeal… or any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to, a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255…”

Last week, the 7th Circuit ruled this collateral-attack waiver was valid and barred a Davis challenge to the conviction and sentences.

Oliver v United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6760 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2020)

Fair Sentencing Act: The Defendants were sentenced for crack offenses under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A) prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. After the First Step Act passed, they applied for sentence reductions. The government; argued they were not eligible because the amounts of crack they were found to have been involved with at sentencing were so great that their sentence exposure did not change.

crackpowder160606The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York last week held that the defendants were eligible. It held that “the weight of authority supports Defendants’ interpretation. “[T]he majority of district court cases in this Circuit” have found “that a defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act based upon his offense of conviction, as opposed to his actual conduct… Decisions from other circuits also favor Defendants’ interpretation. See United States v. White, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119164 (S.D. Tex., July 17, 2019) (collecting over 40 cases across the nation that agree with defendants’ interpretation of ‘covered offense’).”

The EDNY court said it “joins the chorus of district courts to hold that eligibility under… the First Step Act is based on the crime of conviction and not a defendant’s actual conduct. Both defendants were convicted of violating 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A), the statutory penalties for which were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. They are both therefore eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”

United States v. Pressley, 2020 US Dist. LEXIS 34973 (EDNY Feb 28, 2020)

ACCA Recklessness: The Supreme Court last week granted certiorari to a case asking whether an offense that involves physical force that is used recklessly – that is, conduct undertaken with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk – is a crime of violence for Armed Career Criminal Act purposes.

A prior case asking the same issue was recently dismissed after the defendant/petitioner died.

Borden v. United States, Case No. 19-5410 (certiorari granted Mar. 2, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Mike is No Snitch… And He Wants You to Know It – Update for February 25, 2020

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THANKS FOR NOTHING, YOUR HONOR

In my weekly newsletter for federal inmates, I employ use pseudonyms – such as “John Doe” where the guy’s real name is Styrene Lewd – for defendants in cases I report. I do it for all inmates, whether they’re convicted of beating a platoon of SEALs to within an inch of their lives in a bar fight or instead found guilty of some unspeakable child sex crime. I do this in order to avoid any problems for the inmate if he has chosen not to reveal his offense to others in the cellblock.

nosnitch200225Nothing can ruin a carefully curated cover story like an email newsletter blasting your name and actual offense to over 7,000 inmates on a Sunday night.

I change the names back to reality in the these blogs, however, because accuracy demands it. So if you read about Styrene Lewd, you can be confident that Styrene Lewd is the real deal. After all, what are you going to do about it? Park outside the prison with a soundtruck?

I used today’s defendant’s actual name in the newsletter, however, because that is undoubtedly what he wants. His name is Mike Bacon, and he is no snitch. But when he pled guilty to bank robbery, however, and signed his plea agreement, the district court told him that he also had to sign a plea agreement supplement that described the robbery offense and contained other details, including the fact that he had refused to cooperate with the government.

snitch160802Mike objected. This trip to the big house was not Mike’s first rodeo, and he knew that when an inmate hit the yard, others imprisoned there would find a way to access his court files. Seeing a notation that a document – especially a supplement to the plea agreement – was filed under seal, anyone reading the file would conclude that Mike had cooperated with the government. That is, that he was a rat.

For the uninitiated, being known in the joint as a “rat” or a “snitch” or even perhaps, to use the gentle British phrase, “helping the police with their inquiries,” is not a good thing.

The district court, however, helpfully explained to Mike, “We… file the supplement under seal in every case… to protect the rare person who does cooperate.” The thinking goes that if everyone had a sealed supplement, then no one could identify the “rare” person (in the court’s words, “rare” here meaning about 60% of all drug defendants, for example) who signs a cooperation agreement.

Mike’s lawyer told the district judge that “when you have a sealed pleading in your record, that becomes known to the people in the prison, and it causes him a security problem… I’m not sure all the inmates in the prison know that a sealed pleading is filed in every case, and… .it doesn’t mean he’s cooperating. That’s why he doesn’t want that sealed pleading in this case, and he would like to have that withdrawn because it’s put him in danger.”

The court sealed it anyway, and Mike appealed. Last week, the 10th Circuit agreed with Mike.

There is a strong presumption judicial in favor of public access to court records, the Circuit held, and that presumption cannot be overcome except “where countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests.” The party seeking to keep records sealed bears the burden of justifying the secrecy.

sealed200225In Mike’s case, instead of requiring the government to advance a significant government interest to justify keeping the plea supplement sealed, the district court simply relied on a local rule mandating sealed supplements in every case. “This ruling does not satisfy the common law standard,” the 10th said. A sealing decision must be supported with findings based on “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case and weigh the relative interests of the parties.”

Local rule or not, the district court will have to find a compelling reason to seal the supplement. Because Mike is no snitch, that’s not likely to happen.

United States v. Bacon, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5377 (10th Cir. Feb. 21, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

It’s Called ‘Marketing’ – Update for February 6, 2020

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HAVE MERCY ON AN ORPHAN

Everyone has heard the one about the guy who killed his parents, and then asked the court for mercy because he was an orphan. That’s kind of what happened to Pasquale “Patsy” Rubbo.

bassomatic200206If you are of a certain age (that is, if you have  Medicare card), you recall Dan Akroyd’s Bassomatic. Substitute pot scrubbing for fish cleaning, and you’d havePatsy’s invention, the “Scrubbieglove.”

Patsy pled guilty to fleecing investors out of $6 million to market the Scrubbieglove, a cleaning sensation that did not do so well on the dishes, but cleaned out investors’ wallets slick as a whistle. The glove never made it to market, but the $6 million Patsy and his co-conspirators raised through fraud let them have one whale of a party for a few years.

Patsy signed a plea deal that contained a government promise to recommend a 20% reduction in his sentence in exchange for his cooperation. As well, Patsy promised not to appeal his sentence. But while he was released on bond prior to sentencing, he communicated with a known witness in the case, placing phone calls, exchanging email, and initiating wire transfers, all in an attempt to license the Scrubbieglove through the witness’s company.

promises 200206Patsy’s actions violated the conditions of his bond, which prohibited him from contacting victims or witnesses. Patsy told the government of neither the witness contacts nor his efforts to license the Scrubbieglove rights.

When the government found out, it only recommended a 15% downward departure in Patsy’s sentence instead of the 20% departure anticipated in the plea agreement.

In response to the government’s refusal, Patsy appealed. As for the plea agreement, he claimed the government breach of its 20% pledge relieved him of his appeal waiver.

Last week, the 10th Circuit pitched Patsy’s appeal. The Circuit said the agreement obligated Patsy to cooperate with the government on any matter under investigation. Because he tried to license the Scrubbieglove – “the product at the center of the government’s case” – and withheld the information from the government, Patsy had breached his promise.

toastknife200206The government agreed to move for a reduction as long as Patsy’s cooperation was full and truthful. The agreement stated the government expected to recommend a 20% departure “based on the facts known to the government as of the date of the Plea Agreement.” Thus, the 10th ruled, “the express language shows the government did not unequivocally promise to recommend a departure of a certain percentage… The government unsurprisingly determined that Defendant’s conduct warranted a reduced departure recommendation. Given that Defendant withheld information relating to the government’s investigation, it did not breach the Plea Agreement by recommending a 15% departure at sentencing.”

The government did not breach the agreement. Thus, Patsy was not relieved of the obligation not to appeal.

United States v. Rubbo, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2503 (10th Cir Jan 27, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Futile Arguments of the Week – Update for October 31, 2019

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CAPTAIN OBVIOUS

obvious191031Two cases decided last week serve as reminders that some arguments are so obviously futile as to constitute a waste of everyone’s time.

Anthony Shockey violated supervised release by using methamphetamine. Use of a controlled substance is a Grade C violation, but new criminal conduct is a Grade B or A violation. His probation officer charged him with possession of meth, a violation of state law. Tony argued to the judge that he had not possessed the meth, just used it.

Guess how that turned out.

burger191031The district court found a Grade B violation, and imposed a prison term. On appeal, Tony Shockey contended that his use of meth did not require a finding that he also possessed it. The 7th Circuit would entertain none of that. “The district court reasonably could infer possession from use,” the Circuit said. “Inferring possession of a drug from the consumption of that drug is just as sensible as inferring, from the statement ‘I ate a hamburger for lunch,’ that the person possessed the hamburger before wolfing it down.”

Meanwhile, in the Western District of New York, George Moses had a proffer deal with the government. The government says that he lied through his teeth, so much so that it obtained a superseding indictment accusing him of making false statements to federal agents.

George moved to dismiss the new counts, arguing that the proffer agreement was ambiguous about whether the government could prosecute him for any lies he told, and the ambiguity should be resolved in his favor. Last week, the district court refused to throw out the counts.

The Court noted that in the proffer agreement, George had “agreed to provide complete and truthful information regarding any and all criminal matters of which the witness may have knowledge.” Under the agreement, the government could demand George take a polygraph. And paragraph 5 provided that while the information he provided could not be used against him, “any statements… provided by the witness may be used against the witness in a prosecution for perjury, making false statements or obstruction of justice.”

liar151213The district court said that plainly, the parties’ intention gleaned from the the proffer agreement was that George would tell the truth during the proffer session. “The agreement repeatedly makes it clear that Defendant must be truthful at the proffer session,” the district judge wrote. “That was the bargain struck by the parties. To interpret the agreement in the manner urged by Defendant would constitute a tortured reading of the proffer agreement that would ultimately permit Defendant to lie with impunity at the proffer session in direct contravention of the purpose of the agreement.”
Yeah, that was pretty obvious.

United States v. Shockey, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31474 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2019)

United States v. Moses, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181823 (WDNY Oct. 21, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

6th Circuit Fleshes Out Ineffective Assistance on Plea Deals – Update for October 15, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6th CIRCUIT ISSUES FASCINATING INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE DECISION ABOUT BAD ADVICE ON PLEA DEALS

Ttakethemoney191015ell me if this sounds familiar: a defendant is charged with a crime. His or her court-appointed attorney discourages making any plea deal with the government, because counsel can win it for sure at trial. At trial, defense counsel completely misunderstands the law, and mangles the defense. Defendant is convicted, and gets hammered.

That’s what played out at the 6th Circuit last week. The Court granted habeas corpus to a Michigan inmate who was convicted of aiding and abetting a robbery-turned-murder. Billy Joe Byrd and his girlfriend Bobbie Sue decided to commit a robbery. Billy Joe got cold feet before the crime, but he gave Bobbie Sue his gun. Bobbie Sue shot a man while robbing his castle. Rather than heading down south with Bobbie Sue, Billy Joe turned himself in.

In Michigan, aiding and abetting a murder carries the same sentence as the murder itself, mandatory life. Billy Joe wanted to make a plea deal, but his court-appointed attorney convinced him that because he had walked away from the crime before it happened, he could not be convicted. He told Billy Joe it didn’t matter even if he gave Bobbie Sue the gun knowing she was going to rob the Gasso, because he did not intend that she do so.

lawyermistake170227Alas, the defense attorney was as wrong as he could be. Michigan requires a defendant claiming abandonment as an affirmative defense to establish “by a preponderance of the evidence voluntary and complete abandonment of a criminal purpose.” In fact a prior Michigan Court of Appeals case, People v. Akins, held that, despite the defendant’s defense that he changed his mind about a robbery, his abandonment defense failed because, among other things, he “gave his gun to [the principal], knowing that it would be used to commit the robbery.”

Bobbie Sue had a better lawyer. She pled to second-degree murder and got 30 years. In fact, she testified against Billie Joe. That’s not in the song.

The 6th Circuit was incredulous that defense counsel met with Billy Joe for a grand total of 60 minutes between indictment and trial. Billy Joe said that during their meetings, the lawyer did not review the sentencing guidelines or explain aiding and abetting or other legal concepts underlying the case. The lawyer “baldly denied these allegations but also testified that he did not remember his conversations” with Billy Joe “precisely” or “particularly.”

In that court, prosecutors wait for defense counsel to request an offer before beginning negotiations. Then, the prosecutor will develop a proposal and consult with the interested parties. The judges in that court rarely reject plea agreements. Billy Joe “was denied the opportunity to accept a lesser charge and more lenient sentence because his trial counsel,” the 6th said, “never initiated plea negotiations with the prosecutor’s office.”

The District Court refused Billy Joe any post-conviction relief, holding that he could not prove he would have taken a plea offer. Besides, the government argued, the 6th Amendment only covers effective assistance when the government makes an offer. Here, Billy Joe never initiated plea negotiations.

billyjoe191015

The 6th Circuit said that did not matter, holding that “in the context of the right to effective assistance of counsel… the absence of a right to be offered a plea or to have it accepted… is beside the point’.” The Circuit said Billy Joe’s lawyer displayed “a shocking lack of comprehension regarding the pertinent law” in the case… A criminal defendant has a right to expect at least that his attorney will review the charges with him by explaining the elements necessary for the government to secure a conviction, discuss the evidence as it bears on those elements, and explain the sentencing exposure the defendant will face as a consequence of exercising each of the options available.”

The Government argued Billy Joe was not prejudiced, because he claimed he was innocent, and so would have gone to trial anyway. The 6th disagreed. Here, the defendant’s “interest in proceeding to trial was rooted in misinformation gleaned from his counsel’s faulty advice, making it an unreliable metric of reasonably probable outcomes.” Defense counsel’s advice to Billy Joe “was erroneous and omitted critical details” about the case. Thus, Billy Joe “lacked the requisite information to weigh the options in front of him, and whatever desire he exhibited before trial is not dispositive of what he would have done if he were properly educated about the charges against him.”

Byrd v. Skipper, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30163 (6th Cir. Oct. 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root