Tag Archives: habeas corpus

Supreme Court Lets Wheeler Stand, Whiffs on Chance to Resolve Circuit Split – Update for March 25, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO WADE INTO 2241 DEBATE

Last Monday’s Supreme Court orders list carried good news for  people waiting on a certiorari decision on the 4th Circuit’s United States v. Wheeler case.  But for those who would like to see the 2255(e) debate put to bed, the day brought nothing but bad news.

deniedcertB170925Everyone convicted of a federal crime has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a procedure intended to protect defendants from denial of their constitutional rights. Traditional habeas corpus is governed by a statute, 28 USC § 2241. However, Congress has directed federal defendants seeking to challenge their convictions or sentences to a special habeas corpus statute, 28 USC § 2255, which spells out what kind of showing must be made in order to obtain relief, and when and how that showing is permitted. To prevent abuse of the 2255 procedure, the law prevents any defendant from filing more than one such motion except under the most restricted of circumstances.

But not all circumstances can be foreseen. For that reason, Congress included 28 USC § 2255(e), which provides that a federal defendant may use the classic route, 28 USC § 2241, when it  “appears that the remedy by [2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” This subsection has become known as the “savings clause.” 

gunknot181009A number of years ago, Gerald Wheeler was convicted of federal drug trafficking and gun charges. His drug and gun possession sentences were increased dramatically because he had a prior North Carolina drug felony.


Except, due to a unique sentencing law on North Carolina’s books at the time, Gerry’s state drug conviction really was not a felony, because the maximum sentence he could have gotten was undera year. The 4th Circuit had gotten that wrong in hundreds of cases, but finally set it right in 2011 with United States v. Simmons, which held that hundreds of state convictions like Gerry’s really weren’t felonies after all. But Simmons came too late for Gerry, whose 2255 motion had already been heard and denied.  Believing that the “safety clause” was intended for this kind of situation, Gerry filed a traditional § 2241 habeas corpus petition. Up to this point, the “savings clause” had been held to apply only where a change in statutory interpretation (like Simmons) resulted in the petitioner being actually innocent of a criminal offense. Gerry was not claiming that. Instead, he said he was actually innocent of the sentence, not of the underlying conviction. The district court said that kind of actual innocence didn’t count, and denied Gerry’s motion.

In a big victory for defendants, the 4th Circuit reversed, holding for the first time that the § 2255(e) savings clause could be invoked if at the time a defendant was sentenced, precedent made the sentence legal, but after the prisoner’s appeal and § 2255 motion, the settled substantive law changed and was held to be retroactive.

The government did not much like the 4th Circuit’s decision, and thus petitioned the Supreme Court to review Wheeler. Typically, SCOTUS takes government requests for certiorari very seriously, but last Monday the Court refused the government’s request.

safetyvalve190325Wheeler is at last final, which is great news for people who happen to be locked up in prisons located in the 4th Circuit. If you are in other circuits, your prospects may be dimmer. If you’re housed in the 10th or 11th Circuit – neither of which believes that the § 2255(e) “savings clause” has any meaning whatsoever – you are just plain out of luck.

The not-so-great news: Three other requests for review of the “safety clause” were also denied last week, Lewis v. English, Delancy v. Pastrana, and Dusenbery v. Holt. Lewis (10th Cir.) and Delancy (11th Cir.) argued that those Circuits are wrong, and a prisoner should be allowed to file a § 2241 petition to raise arguments that were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent at the time of his or her original § 2255 motion, but that are meritorious in light of a subsequent decision overturning that precedent. Dusenbery (3rd Cir.) argued that a § 2241 petition filed under the 2255(e) savings clause should be able to raise actual innocence of sentence (like Wheeler successfully did) as well as innocence of conviction.

All of the petitions were relisted (reconsidered by the Justices) multiple times before being denied. The website SCOTUSBlog noted of the Wheeler denial that “it’s somewhat unexpected for the court to reject a government petition on an obviously recurring issue. But the government in Wheeler and the petitioner in Lewis each claimed that their case was the only good vehicle, and apparently they succeeded in persuading the court that all the vehicles were bad.”

The Supreme Court looks for a case with facts and arguments that make it well suited for a decision that will sweep broadly. It apparently decided that none of the four met that standard. The issue will continue to arise, and I think the Court will eventually take it up. But for now, people needing the relief that only a § 2241 petition can provide will be victims of geography.

United States v. Wheeler, Case No. 18-420 (cert. denied Mar 18)

Lewis v. English, Case No. 18-292 (cert. denied Mar 18)

Delancy v. Pastrana, Case No. 18-5772 (cert. denied Mar 18)

Dusenbery v. Holt, Case No. 18-5781 (cert. denied Mar 18)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Relist Watch (Mar. 20)

– Thomas L. Root

News of the (Good) Weird – Update for February 11, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SOME RUMORS ARE STRANGE ENOUGH TO BE TRUE
Did you hear about Mark getting released by his judge?
Did you hear about Mark getting released by his judge?

I hear from a lot of people, and unfortunately, most of what I hear is rumor. So I was skeptical last Friday when a guy at FCI Big Springs reported a friend of his had just gotten released on his recalculated 54 days of good time.

You should remember that in the First Step Act, Congress clarified its intent from 30 years ago that federal inmates receive 54 days of good-conduct time per year. Previously, the provision was so poorly written that the Bureau of Prisons read it to mean that after 365 days, a prisoner would get an award of 54 days. What Congress meant was that 311 days of good conduct, an inmate would be awarded 54 days (which would make a year).

What’s the difference?  Seven days a year, which the First Step Act made retroactive to the beginning of the current  sentence.  I talked to one inmate at the end of his 23-year sentence who is in line to get an additional five months off. Instead of being home for Thanksgiving, he’ll be there for July 4th.

Or he would have been. But in correcting its prior screw-up, Congress committed a new one: the effective date for the seven days additional good time was placed in the wrong section of First Step (Section 102(b)(1)(A), along with the earned-time credits). Congress intended that the earned-time credits become effective only after giving the Attorney General time to adopt a risk assessment algorithm. But it neither intended nor saw a need to delay application of the additional seven days, which the BOP can apply to inmates’ sentences with the push of a button.

Screwup190212Despite its intent, Congress goofed, so that instead of taking effect when the First Step Act was signed, the additional good time will not be effective until July 19, 2019. This has made a mess of halfway house and release dates for a lot of people whose date would have moved by weeks or months. Just last week, Mother Jones reported that “4,000 prisoners who hoped to be out for the holidays remain stuck behind bars waiting for answers.”

So when I heard on Friday that federal prisoner Mark J. Walker had been given his extra good time and immediately released by a Federal District of Oregon judge, I doubted it.

It happened.

There is a lot of story to this case, such as what drove Mark’s public defender to file the motion, that I just do not know. But file the PD did, delivering to the Court a 14-page petition for writ of habeas corpus on Jan. 25 that argued the only rational interpretation of the First Step Act was that the Sec. 102(b)(2) 210-day delay applied only to the new extra time credit and not to the seven days additional good time. Plus, the PD argued, delaying the effectiveness of the extra seven days violated due process by being arbitrary and capricious, and Mark’s immediate release was necessary to avoid irreparable harm.

The argument is creatively, innovatively weird. The government’s response, on the other hand, was just plain weird. The AUSA chose to ignore Mark’s substantive arguments, instead opposing the petition solely on the ground that the Oregon court lacked jurisdiction, and that Mark should have filed in the Northern District of Texas, where he was confined.

release161117Last Thursday, an Oregon federal district court ruled that “given the Government’s failure to address the merits… and the equities of the situation” it would grant “the relief requested… without a final determination of the merits of the legal issues raised by Defendant.” Senior US District Judge Ralph R. Beistline ordered the BOP to recalculate Mark’s sentence and to release him “without delay if the recalculation confirms that the Defendant’s term of imprisonment has expired.” Mark was released the same day.

By its terms, the decision is not intended to rule on the merits, and as a district court order, it lacks precedential value, but it is a creative and audacious filing that let Mark go free two months before he otherwise would have.

Order, United States v. Walker, Case No. 3:10-cr-00298 (D.Oregon, Feb. 7, 2019)

Mother Jones, Trump’s One Real Bipartisan Win Is Already Turning Into a Mess (Feb. 5)

– Thomas L. Root

3rd Circuit Lowers Procedural Hurdles for Actual Innocence Claims – Update for July 31, 2018

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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3RD CIRCUIT HOLDS “ACTUAL INNOCENCE” EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE NEWLY DISCOVERED

The Supreme Court ruled in Schlup v. Delo that an actual innocence claim was an exception to habeas corpus “procedural default.” More recently, McQuiggin v. Perkins held that actual innocence excuses filing a habeas petition late. But courts of appeal have wrestled with whether the evidence of actual innocence has to be newly discovered, or just be evidence the jury never saw before.

Some of the people who say this really are...
Some of the people who say this really are...

The 3rd Circuit weighed in on the issue last week, joining the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 9th in holding that the evidence the petitioner relied on could be simply evidence the jury never saw before, even if it was evidence that the defendant knew about, but his lawyer never presented.

The 3rd said, “in a case where the underlying constitutional violation claimed is ineffective assistance of counsel premised on a failure to present evidence, a requirement that the new evidence be unknown to the defense at the time of trial would operate as a roadblock to the actual innocence gateway. To overcome this roadblock, we now hold that when a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to discover or present to the fact-finder the very exculpatory evidence that demonstrates his actual innocence, such evidence constitutes new evidence for purposes of the Schlup actual innocence gateway.”

Reeves v. Fayette SCI, Case No. 17-1043 (3rd Cir., July 23, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

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