Tag Archives: 18 usc 3632

Exclusions From FSA Credits Are Easy To Come By – Update for November 14, 2025

November 14, 2025 lisa-legalinfo Leave a comment

We share news and provide commentary on federal criminal justice issues, mainly focusing on trial and post-conviction topics, legislative efforts, and sentencing debates.

FSA CREDITS FOR AGGREGATE SENTENCES TAKE IT ON THE CHIN

Greg Bonnie is serving a 120-month drug-trafficking sentence and a consecutive 24-month revocation sentence tied to a 2005 conviction that included an 18 USC § 924(c) gun count.

A § 924(c) conviction is one of about 63 different convictions listed in 18 USC § 3632(d) that will disqualify someone from receiving First Step Act credits. Those credits are awarded as an incentive to inmates to complete programs that are proven to make them less likely to commit new crimes once they are released from prison.

A couple of asides here. First, when the First Step Act programs were developed, experts estimated that they would substantially reduce recidivism. The actual results through June 2024, however, showed that the reduction was far greater than what even the most optimistic projections had anticipated. People whose programming placed them in the “low” recidivism category were estimated to have a repeat-offender incidence of under 25%. Real-world results showed that the repeat-offender incidence for almost 13,000 “low-risk” inmates over four years was 11.4%.

Second aside: The First Step Act directed the Attorney General to issue an annual report on the effectiveness of the Act’s several programs for five years, ending with June 2025, including review of the FSA credits and recidivism. Unfortunately, the current Administration’s Attorney General has been too preoccupied with pardoning people on the President’s preferred list, prosecuting sandwich throwers, purging the disloyal, and pursuing the President’s enemies to honor its obligation. We are thus six months overdue for the final 2025 report, and thus we’re having to make do with what old data we have.

Back to FSA credits: The list of convictions excluded from FSA credit makes sense only in a very political way. If your co-defendant possessed a gun while selling the marijuana you two raised, your § 924(c) disqualifies you. If you rob a bank and beat up a teller, you’re qualified. If you download child porn, you are disqualified. If you hire a hit man (who turns out to be an undercover cop) to kill your spouse, you’re OK.

The exemption of the § 924(c) offense from FSA credit was an 11^th-hour deal Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made with Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) in order to corral their support for the First Step Act. As you may recall, § 924(c) requires that a court impose a mandatory consecutive sentence of at least five years on anyone convicted of possessing, using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence or drug offense. Stick a Glock in your waistband while selling a guy a 20-lb bale of marijuana you and your cousin grew back in the woods? The Guidelines will score you at a base 14 for that sale, barely worth 15 months in federal prison. But the gun in your waistband will add another five years to the sentence.

And now for Greg: In 2005, Greg was sentenced to 120 months for his bad judgment to engage in a drug trafficking offense and a consecutive 60 months for having the even worse judgment to possess a gun while doing it. In 2017, he completed the sentence in began an 8-year term of supervised release.

When it came to dealing drugs, Greg was learning-challenged (or his time in BOP custody was so much fun he wanted to repeat it). Whatever the reason, Greg resumed the drug trade while on supervised release. In 2021, he was again convicted of drug trafficking and received another 120-month sentence. Because the new crime also violated his supervised release, Greg received a consecutive 24-month sentence, for a total of 144 months.

The Bureau of Prisons is authorized by law to aggregate sentences, meaning that multiple sentences are blended into a single aggregate term for administrative purposes. That worked against Greg here: the BOP decided that because one-third of the Greg’s prior sentence was for a § 924(c) violation, and because one-sixth of his current sentence (24 months of a total 144 months) was for a supervised release violation stemming from the prior sentence, Greg was serving a sentence for a violation of § 924(c) and was ineligible for FSA credits.

The math is interesting. About one-eighteenth of his current sentence can be attributed to the § 924(c) violation. Presumedly, if the court had sentenced him to one day additional incarceration for the supervised release violation – making the § 924(c) share of the current sentence less than 1/9000th of the total sentence – Greg would still be considered ineligible for FSA credits.

Notwithstanding the intellectual force of my reductio ad absurdum argument, not to mention the serious question of whether serving a prison term for violating a term of supervised release can fairly be considered to be serving a prison term for any of the counts of conviction that led to the original prison term), the BOP denied him FSA-credit eligibility for the entire 144-month sentence. Under 18 USC § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment are to be treated “as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment” for administrative purposes. Thus, the BOP took the view that Greg’s 24-month supervised release revocation term disqualified him from earning FSA credits for his entire 144-month sentence.

This was no mean matter: Greg’s maximum FSA credits would have been about 50 months, entitling him to a year off of his sentence and the right to spend the remaining 38 months’ worth of credit or so on home confinement or in a halfway house.

Greg filed a 28 USC § 2241 petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the BOP could deny him FSA credits only for the 24-month supervised release revocation. The district court denied his petition, and last week, the 4^th Circuit denied his appeal.

The issue was whether a federal prisoner serving multiple terms of imprisonment, some of which qualify for FSA credits and at least one tied to a conviction that is deemed disqualifying by 18 USC § 3632(d)(4)(D), may earn FSA credits during the non-disqualifying portion of the sentence.

In a 2-1 decision, the 4^th held that because 18 USC § 3584(c) requires aggregation for administrative purposes, and because administering FSA credits is an administrative function, any prisoner serving an aggregate term that includes any disqualifying conviction is ineligible for FSA time credits for the entire aggregate term. The aggregate term is evaluated as a whole, and because the aggregate includes a disqualifying § 924(c)-based revocation sentence, Greg is ineligible for credits for the entire aggregate term.

The dissenting judge argued that the text “is serving a sentence for” naturally means ineligibility only while the disqualifying sentence is actually being served; once that period ends, eligibility resumes for the remaining eligible term.

The Circuit’s decision aligns with other circuits and mechanically emphasizes the statute’s categorical prisoner-level disqualification in a blunt-force kind of way.

Bonnie v. Dunbar, Case No 24-6665, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 28978 (4th Cir. Nov 5, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

A Win for FSA Statutory Clarity – Update for November 21, 2024

November 21, 2024 lisa-legalinfo Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COURT HANDS BOP LOSS ON FSA CREDIT COMMENCEMENT

In a detailed and lengthy decision, a Middle District of Alabama district court ruled on November 4th that otherwise eligible prisoners must start earning First Step Act time credits from the moment they are sentenced rather than when the BOP says they can.

As first blush, the issue seems pretty clear. Section 3632(d)(4)(A) of Title 18 says that a “prisoner, except for an ineligible prisoner under subparagraph (D), who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits…” Section 3635(4) defines a “prisoner” as “a person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal offense, or a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.”

You don’t have to be a lawyer to figure out that an eligible prisoner, therefore, is anyone who has been sentenced to prison for a federal crime (we’ll leave the other category, “a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons,” for another day), provided he or she has not been convicted for one of the 63 exempt crime categories — such as sex offense or using a gun in a crime in violation of 18 USC § 924(c), to name only two of the myriad of exclusions — and is not an alien with a final order of deportation. The exclusions leave about half of the people in BOP facilities eligible for FSA credits.

The BOP denied Sohrab Sharma 122 days of FSA credit, finding that he was not an “eligible prisoner” from the commencement of his sentence until he was finally delivered to FPC Montgomery and again when he was locked up and transferred for an unspecified violation of prison rules. Under 28 CFR § 523.42(a), a BOP-adopted rule, “[a]n eligible inmate begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate’s term of imprisonment commences (the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility where the sentence will be served).”

The Court held that “the statute unambiguously addresses the question of when an inmate is eligible for FSA credits,” to which 28 CFR § 523.42 “adds a layer of eligibility not found in the statute [that] conflicts with its express language.”

The District Court ruled that an eligible inmate is entitled to FSA credits from the date the sentence commences under 18 USC § 3585(a) which “specifies ‘the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transport to’ his initial BOP-designated facility as the date his or her ‘sentence to a term of imprisonment commences’ for purposes of determining whether he can begin to earn FSA time credits.”

The Court said, “The BOP must apply time credits to eligible prisoners who have earned them and cannot categorically make prisoners ineligible for such credits in a manner that contravenes the statutory scheme set forth in 18 USC § 3632.”

Sohrab’s case was sent back to the BOP to determine whether he was an “eligible prisoner” for the purpose of those 122 days, instead of being categorically excluded because he was riding a bus or sitting in segregation.

While the decision is welcome, it is a district court opinion that has no binding precedential value in its own circuit, let alone anywhere else. The government being the government, count on the opinion having utterly no impact on how the BOP applies 28 CFR § 523.42 in any case other than Sohrab’s.

Sharma v. Peters, Case No. 2:24-CV-158 (M.D. Ala., November 4, 2024), 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 199823

– Thomas L. Root

Bad Cases Make Hard Law – LISA Newsletter for September 12, 2024

September 12, 2024 lisa-legalinfo Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHEN ‘SHALL’ CAN MEAN ‘MAY’

Last week, I referenced Booker v. Bayless, a strange case from the Northern District of West Virginia that found the Federal Bureau of Prison’s duty to place people with sufficient First Step Act credits in halfway house or home confinement was not subject to judicial review.

Civil War combat vet and Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once wrote that “hard cases make bad law.” A fair obverse of that aphorism applies to Bayless: Bad cases make hard law.

In Bayless, the prisoner filed a messy habeas petition arguing that the BOP should be ordered to give him the 12 months halfway house he was entitled to under the Second Chance Act. As I noted last week, prisoners are not ‘entitled’ to even one day of halfway house under the SCA. The Magistrate Judge said as much in his Report and Recommendation.

The petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation with the District Court, asking the Judge (as the Court described it) “to take ‘judicial notice’ of… Woodley v. Warden… [P]etitioner cites [18 USC] §§ 3624(g) and 3632(d)(4)… [and] goes on to quote directly from Woodley.” Rather than declining to consider arguments on those sections that hadn’t been raised in front of the Magistrate Judge, the District Court addressed them, relying on Murray Energy Corp v. Environmental Protection Agency, a 4th Circuit decision that ruled an EPA decision was not subject to court review because the statute in question did not impose on the EPA a duty “amenable” to 42 USC § 7604(a)(2) review.

The District Court ruled,

Section 3632 — when read as a whole — imposes on the BOP a broad, open-ended statutory mandate to do many things for inmates. The BOP is thus left with considerable discretion in managing its § 3632 duty. The BOP gets to, among other items, assess an inmate’s risk of recidivism and needs, develop individualized reentry plans for inmates, determine the appropriate classification and placement of inmates within the prison system, manage and facilitate inmates’ participation in programs designed to address their specific needs, provide incentives for inmates who engage in positive behavior or successfully complete programs, [and] make recommendations regarding sentence adjustments based on inmates’ participation in programs and overall conduct… By statute, it has already been found that “a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court”… Thus, this Court finds that § 3632 does not impose on the BOP a specific and discrete duty amenable to review by this Court. By rejecting the analysis in Woodley, this Court is keeping in line with what other courts have been doing regarding placement.

The other cases cited by the Court as supporting its holding all predate the application of FSA credits and provide dubious support.

The Bayless decision is patently wrong. First, the issue is much narrower than reading § 3632 “as a whole.” Rather, it is whether – once an inmate meets all of the eligibility requirements – the BOP has a mandatory duty to place the prisoner in halfway house or home confinement. That does not ask the Court to review any discretionary eligibility requirement listed in § 3632, but rather only asks whether – once a prisoner is found to be eligible – what a single sentence in § 3632(d)(4)(C) means. That sentence is “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall transfer eligible prisoners, as determined under § 3624(g), into prerelease custody or supervised release.” (Emphasis mine).

Pretty simple question… Does “shall” mean “shall” or does it just mean “may?” But the Bayless court says the answer is not for the courts to say.

Second, the EPA decision interprets a statute – 42 USC § 7604(a)(2) – that is particular only to the EPA. That statute authorizes a private citizen to sue the EPA “where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator…” There is no adjunct to this in the First Step Act. Instead, the operative statute for a prisoner would be 28 USC § 2241, the writ of habeas corpus, a very different animal indeed.

Under the Bayless reasoning, the FSA credit statute becomes toothless, leaving the BOP free to do anything it wants to do with the credits a prisoner has earned.

The Bayless decision is error-ridden, but it is largely the result of a petitioner who didn’t know what he was doing and made a mess of his ill-advised 28 USC § 2241 petition. Unfortunately, he has now appealed the denial to the 4th Circuit. Unless he gets competent legal help pretty fast, he is likely to turn a bad district court decision into a disastrous Circuit precedent.

Bad case. Hard law.

Booker v. Bayless, Case No. 5:24-CV-43, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149061 (N.D. W.Va., August 20, 2024)

Booker v. Bayless, Case No. 24-6844 (4th Cir, docketed August 28, 2024)

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, Jr, J., dissenting)

Murray Energy Corp v. Environmental Protection Agency, 861 F3d 529 (4th Cir. 2017)