Tag Archives: 18 usc 16

The Wacky World of Federal ‘Violence’ – Update for November 4, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOW VIOLENT IS KIDNAPPING?

In a world where people wearing blowup costumes holding signs are violent anarchists while others smashing the doors of the Capitol are peaceful tourists, it was perhaps inevitable that a federal court would hold that kidnapping a family of four, zip-tying the parents and holding a gun to a 3-year-old girl’s head in order to find out where the family money was hidden, is not a categorical crime of violence.

This is the latest in a decade-plus saga of Killiu Ford. Killiu is perhaps pronounced “kill you,” an unfortunately apt name for the defendant. As noted, Killiu and his co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, robbing them of $30,000.

The district court sentenced Killiu to 600 months in prison, 216 months for two counts of kidnapping the parents, 300 months consecutive for two counts of kidnapping the kids, and 84 months on an 18 USC § 924(c) firearm conviction, consecutive to the other sentences. Later, the government conceded that the § 924(c) conviction had to be vacated because kidnapping was not a violent crime under the statute. The 10th Circuit remanded Killiu ‘s case for resentencing.

On remand, the district court reduced Killiu’s 600-month sentence by 84 months, down to 516 months in prison. But the judge said Killiu deserved a bigger reduction due to his significant rehabilitation during the 12 years he had already spent in prison. But the prosecutor argued that the court was obligated under 18 USC § 3559(f)(2) to impose a mandatory minimum 25-year sentence for each of the two kidnapping convictions involving the children.

Killiu argued that the district court was not obligated to impose mandatory-minimum 25-year sentences and requested instead a downward variance to 240 months.

The district court ruled that § 3559(f)(2) required a mandatory minimum 25-year (300-month) sentence for each of the kidnapping convictions involving the children. In light of that, the court imposed a 300-month sentence for each of Killiu ‘s remaining five convictions, all to run concurrently.

Under § 3559(f)(2), someone convicted of a crime of violence that is kidnapping as defined by the federal kidnapping statute, 18 USC § 1201, shall “be imprisoned for life or any term of years not less than 25.” But § 1201 does not define “crime of violence.” The 10th Circuit concluded that when § 1201 was passed, 18 USC § 16(a) – which defines “crime of violence” – was already on the books. The fact that Congress did not separately define “crime of violence” in § 3559(f) suggests that it was satisfied with the § 16(a) definition.

Using that definition, the 10th Circuit said, “courts have consistently found that a person can commit kidnapping without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. For example, a person can commit kidnapping by inveigling—that is, luring, or enticing, or leading the person astray by false representations or promises, or other deceitful means… [B]ecause kidnapping can be committed by “inveigling,” a kidnapping offense does not categorically have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.

Killiu’s case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Ford, Case No. 23-1400, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28174 (10th Cir. October 28, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Racketeering Conspiracy Held Not to be Crime of Violence – Update for December 30, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

3RD CIRCUIT FINDS A RACKETEERING CONSPIRACY IS NO CRIME OF VIOLENCE

Nelson Quinteros was being deported to his native El Salvador on the grounds that a prior criminal conviction under 18 USC § 1959(a)(6) was a crime of violence, and thus an “aggravated felony” under the immigration laws. (An aggravated felony conviction will get a non-citizen deported).

violent160620Sec. 1959(a)(6), a subsection of an offense entitled “Violent Crimes In Aid of Racketeering,” provides that whoever, for payment or to join or advance in a racketeering enterprise, “murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished… for attempting or conspiring to commit a crime involving maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury…”

Sound violent? Well, yes, rather. But in the weird legal world that “crimes of violence” have inhabited since Curtis Johnson v. United States, back in 2010, sought to define what violence is, what appears to be a violent crime cannot be counted on to necessarily be a “crime of violence” under the statute.

The Board of Immigration Appeals originally held that Nelson’s § 1959(a)(6) conviction was a crime of violence under 18 USC § 16(b), a statute that defined what constituted a crime of violence under the criminal code. However, after the BIA decision on Nelson’s case, the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya threw out § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague. That meant that the § 1959(a)(6) offense was no longer a crime of violence unless it could qualify under § 18 USC § 16(a). Last week, the 3rd Circuit ruled that Nelson’s prior conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under that subsection, either.

violence151213Section 16(a) defines crime of violence as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, substantially the same definition used in 18 USC § 924(c) and in the Armed Career Criminal Act. “Looking at the least culpable conduct,” the Court wrote (as it must), “an individual could be convicted of conspiracy under 18 USC § 1959(a)(6) without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” What’s more, because a § 1959(a)(6) conviction does not require that a defendant commit any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute could conceivably punish for “evil intent alone.”

In other words, Nelson and his cronies could sit around with a few brewskis talking about how they would later commit bodily mayhem on some old lady crossing the street. That would violate § 1959(a)(6), even if later, on the way to do so, they passed a storefront church and were saved, thus abandoning their lives of sin. The conspiracy offense would still have been committed, but nowhere would they have threatened or committed an act of violence.

religion191230

Nelson’s case was about deportation, but its holding suggests that many of the statutes in Chapter 95 of the criminal code, which includes the Hobbs Act and murder-for-hire, may be vulnerable to a Mathis v. United States-type analysis in the wake of Johnson, Dimaya, and United States v. Davis.

The world of “crimes of violence” keeps getting stranger.

Quinteros v. Attorney General, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 37237 (3rd Cir. Dec.17, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root