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Unringing the Bell – Update for November 29, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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IGNORING A BIG WHITE BEAR

whitebear171129Everyone’s favorite author Leo Tolstoy recounted that as a boy, he was inducted into a childhood secret pact called the “Ant Brothers.One of the initiation rites was to stand in the corner and not think about a big white bear.

So how do you not think about the bear? In a decision handed down several weeks ago, the 4th Circuit provide no helpful pointers on how to do it, but nonetheless mandates that it must be done.

Next to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Brady v. Maryland claim is probably the most common one raised in post-conviction motions. To make a successful Brady claim, a prisoner has to show that the evidence at issue favorable to him either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches a government witness; that the evidence was suppressed by the government, either willfully or inadvertently; and the prisoner suffered prejudice because the evidence was material.

Evidence is material if a petitioner can show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense.

guilty170417Tony Juniper asked a federal court to grant him a writ of habeas corpus because Virginia prosecutors withheld evidence that undercut the State’s timeline used to convict him of murder, as well as evidence that would have discredited one of the State’s key witnesses. The district court agreed that the evidence had been withheld, that it indeed gave Tony defenses he never had without the evidence and it undercut the trustworthiness of a star State witness. The problem, the district court said, was that other evidence that it thought proved Tony’s guilt was not affected by the Brady material.

In a surprising (and we think welcome) decision, the 4th Circuit reversed, holding that first, the district court failed to “apply the proper legal standard in determining whether Petitioner alleged or established sufficient facts regarding materiality to warrant an evidentiary hearing.” In assessing a Brady claim, a court must construe facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, and “draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.”

slept171129Second, the district court failed to properly account for the impeachment value of the withheld evidence. In determining whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the trial would have been different, a court must consider “the aggregate effect that the withheld evidence would have had if it had been disclosed,” by adding to the weight of the evidence on the defense side… all of the undisclosed exculpatory evidence” and subtracting from “the weight of the evidence on the prosecution’s side… the force and effect of all the undisclosed impeachment evidence.” This meant the court had to assume that what the witness who would have been discredited said would have been ignored by a skeptical jury.

Finally, the district court cannot make credibility determinations based on a written record alone. In Tony’s case, the judge refused to credit Brady evidence that someone who looked like the murder victim had been seen much later than when Tony could have possibly killed her. The district court reasoned that crediting these statements would require accepting them “over the word of people who claim to have seen the petitioner either at or leaving the crime scene” before 12:44 p.m.

The 4th Circuit complained that “in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief… based on undisclosed exculpatory evidence, credibility should be assessed on the basis of an in-court hearing where the judge can see and hear the witnesses.” The district court decided who the jury would have believed without hearing the witnesses on the stand.

This case is a fascinating and detailed instruction manual as to how a district court must analyze a Brady claim. Without thinking about the bear.

Juniper v. Zook, Case No. 13-7 (4th Cir. Nov. 16, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Turkeys 3, Prisoners 0 – Update for November 28, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS ON PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS

presidential_pardon_thanksgiving_tile_coasterThe good news from the Trump White House is that the President has issued 1.5 times more pardons in his first 10 months in office as did either President Obama or President George W. Bush. The bad news is that the pardons only number three, all of the recipients were turkeys of one type of plumage or another, and none of the  pardons suggests the President will be very interested in further clemency.

arpaio171128The first act came in late August, when Trump pardoned primo turkey Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio – already well known for his harsh treatment of inmates – after he was convicted of contempt of court for ignoring federal court orders against harassing Hispanics. Prisoners applying for executive clemency are advised by the Justice Department that a show of contrition really helps, but that’s not necessarily a condition if you’re the good Sheriff.

A week ago today, President Trump pardoned two more turkeys, both more the Meleagris gallopavo kind, in the annual pre-Thanksgiving pardoning ritual that has been around for 30, 50 or 140 years, depending on the historian you believe.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman noted that Obama, Bush and Clinton “all started their presidencies with two full years in which they failed to use their historic clemency powers in any way. But Prez Trump is unlike his predecessors in so many ways, and his use of the pardon power is yet another example.” After the pardons of Phoenix-area Sheriff Joe Arpaio and the turkeys named Wishbone and Drumstick last week, Prof. Berman wonders about the next acts of clemency: “who knows?”

pardon171128But Trump himself has in the past as well as last Tuesday implied a lack of enthusiasm for the kinds of clemency Obama pursued. After announcing that Wishbone and Drumstick will join the two turkeys Obama pardoned last year, “Tater” and “Tot,” Trump joked that he is not allowed to reverse Obama’s turkey pardons.

“As many of you know,” Trump said, “I have been very active in overturning a number of executive actions by my predecessor. However I have been informed by the White House Counsel’s office that Tater and Tot’s pardons cannot under any circumstances be revoked. Tater and Tot, you can rest easy.”

Maybe the birds can shake their tailfeathers for joy, but the people most interested in clemency can fairly read into Trump’s statement a decided lack of interest in the Obama-era clemency.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Hasn’t Prez Trump has already pardoned a turkey before this week’s traditional ceremony? (Nov. 20, 2017)

Business Insider, Trump pardons ‘Drumstick’ the turkey and jokes about overturning Obama’s turkey pardons (Nov. 21, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Taking the “Justice” Out of DOJ – One Position at a Time – Update for November 27, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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DOJ’S NOT JUST INCONSISTENT, IT’S GUTLESS AS WELL
Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III
     Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III in a seriously retouched photo.

Anyone who wonders where Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III will take the Dept. of Justice has to look no further than a brief filed last month in McCarthan v. Collins.

Late last July, we wrote about McCarthan, which deals with when and under what terms an inmate may use a 28 USC 2241 motion. Recall that every inmate gets to file one motion under  28 USC 2255, but only one: filing a second 2255 motion requires prior approval of a court of appeals, which is granted only in unusual circumstances.

One such circumstance is a new Supreme Court ruling changing a constitutional rule and made retroactive. The 2015 Johnson decision, that declared part of the Armed Career Criminal Act unconstitutional, is the most recent example of such a case.

But sometimes changes in the law are not based on the constitution, like a 1995 Supreme Court decision holding that the lower courts had been misinterpreting 18 USC 924(c) – which punishes using a gun in a crime of violence or drug offense – and locking up people to whom the statute did not apply. The decision was purely one of statutory interpretation, with no constitutional dimension at all. Because of that,  people who had already filed a 2255 motion were prohibited from filing another one, because the nonconstitutional change in the law did not qualify them for a second 2255.

For that kind of problem, 2255 has a “saving clause” at 28 USC 2255(e), which provides that a prisoner may use the other form of federal habeas corpus – a petition under 28 USC 2241 – if it “appears that the remedy by [2255] motion is inadequate or in-effective to test the legality of his detention.”

Some of the people who say this really are...
Some of the people who say this really are…

For the past 20 years, prisoners have been allowed to use 2241 to challenge convictions that suddenly became non-convictions because statutes had been reinterpreted in such a way that the inmates were no longer guilty of a crime. And what could make more sense? If a guy has been locked up for a decade, and he already used up and lost his 2255 motion nine years before, does that make it fair to keep him in prison another 10 years for something that’s no longer a crime?

Many years ago, Dan McCarthan walked away from a halfway house, a mistake that caught him an escape charge. At the time Dan was convicted of a felon-in-possession gun charge, all escapes were deemed to be violent, and that got him 15 years under the ACCA. But then, in 2009, the Supreme Court held escape was not a violent crime. Because the decision was based on interpreting the statute and not the constitution, it did not entitle Dan to file a second 2255, so he filed a 2241.

The district court threw out Dan’s 2241, but a three-judge panel on the 11th Circuit held he was entitled to seek review using that petition. Then, the Circuit decided to rehear Dan’s case en banc, and told the parties to brief the question of whether the 2241 was even usable in this kind of case.

Meme171127The Circuit – by a 7-4 vote last March, with six different opinions totaling more than 150 pages – held that an initial Section 2255 motion is an adequate and effective remedy to “test” a sentence, even when circuit precedent forecloses the movant’s claim at the time of the motion. After all, the Circuit said, a movant could have asked the court of appeals to overrule its precedent, sought Supreme Court review, or both. The en banc decision asserted the saving clause in Section 2255(e) is concerned only with ensuring that a person in custody has a “theoretical opportunity” to pursue a claim, even if, at the time of the initial 2255 motion, the claim was virtually certain to fail in the face of adverse precedent. In other words, you have to raise arguments even when the court has already said the arguments are futile.

Prior to the 11th Circuits’s decision in Dan’s case, only the 10th Circuit took such a draconian view of the saving clause. But now, the circuit split is 9-2, and thousands of federal inmates are shut out of relief.

Dan filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court last summer, asking the Court to resolve the circuit split by ruling that the 2255 savings clause was intended to throw a lifeline to someone who never had a reasonable chance because circuit precedent foreclosed his argument. He argued that “the conflict on the question presented cries out for the Court’s intervention. The arguments on both sides of the conflict are well developed, with the benefit of numerous opinions across nearly every regional circuit over the last two decades. There is little room for the law to develop further… This case satisfies all of the criteria for the Court’s review, and the petition for a writ of certiorari should therefore be granted.”

This is where the plot thickens. For the last 16 years, the Justice Department had taken the same view held by Dan and 9 out of 12 circuits. DOJ even said so in at least 11 separate Supreme Court filings. But that was then. This is now, and now, the AG wants to have it both ways.

DOJ told the Supreme Court that it no longer believed that federal prisoners serving longer prison terms than the law allowed were entitled to challenge their sentences in court, because they could have raised the issue themselves years before (when their chance of prevailing was theoretical at best and located somewhere between slim and none). 

curtain171127That change of position alone is duplicitous, but the next part is downright gutless. Given the fact of a substantial circuit split, you might be forgiven for thinking that DOJ would suggest the Supreme Court should take this case to settle the issue. But instead, Sessions’ department doesn’t want the Supremes to touch it, even though the DOJ brief acknowledges that the legal question is significant and that its new position could condemn inmates to serve out unlawful sentences.

Last week, The New York Times observed that “it is one thing for a new administration to switch sides in a legal dispute. That is merely unusual. It is another to urge the Supreme Court to deny review in a case that would test whether the government’s new position is correct.”

Dan’s petition is scheduled to be considered at the Supreme Court’s conference on Friday, December 1.  It could be decided then or get relisted for one or more subsequent conferences.

New York Times, Serving Extra Years in Prison, and the Courthouse Doors Are Closed (Nov. 20, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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(Winnie the) Pooh on You, Warden! – Update for November 22, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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GREAT MOMENTS IN THE ANNALS OF INMATE LITIGATION

From the We Couldn’t Make This Stuff Up Department:

bear171122Remember the Pastafarians? Now comes Chris Grief, who says keeping stuffed animals in his cell is necessary for his religious practices. He sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, claiming that he “engages in meditation as part of his quest to achieve spiritual enlightenment…” and he believes that “everything has a spiritual essence to it.” He told the district court he “has a strong spiritual connection with the spiritual essence of stuffed animals…” and that in order “to meditate on enlightenment he must do so with the presence of at least two stuffed animals.”

Yeah, he really said that.

sacrilege171122You will find it as incredible as we did that the institution did not bother respond to his heartfelt request to “receive and possess two stuffed animals.” Just as unbelievably, the district court heartlessly threw out Chris’s RFRA complaint, holding that his “belief that stuffed animals are necessary for his religious practice falls within the category of beliefs that are ‘so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection’.”

Fortunately for Chris, the 2nd Circuit put a start to such hobnailed intolerance. Last week, it reinstated Chris’s lawsuit.

weird171122It was not enough, the appellate court ruled, for the district judge to find Chris’s attachment to his teddy bear “bizarre.” Of course it is, but that’s not the point of the RFRA. Rather, the Circuit said, “whether a professed belief is entitled to free exercise protection under our precedents requires a determination by the ‘factfinder’ regarding ‘whether the beliefs professed are, in the claimant’s own scheme of things, religious’.”

The district court will therefore have to determine whether Chris’s veneration of stuffed toys is sincere, no matter how weird it may seem.

Grief v. Quay, Warden, Case No. 16-1651 (2nd Cir., Nov. 13, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Shut My Mouth! – Update for November 21, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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THE NIGHT THE LIGHTS WENT OUT IN TEXAS

A federal prison in Texas, like a lot of joints around the country, suffers from frequent power outages. Derrick Brunson (who has since been released) filed an administrative remedy request with prison administrators, expressing his concern over security due to the lights going out all the time and asking that something be done about.

work171121Derrick’s counselor quickly responded to his filing. She complained that he was “just putting more work on her desk.” In response to Derrick’s filing, she wrote him up for threatening her, filing a disciplinary report  known in federal prison parlance as a “shot.”  Derrick was promptly thrown into the SHU – the “Special Housing Unit” – for three weeks while awaiting a hearing in front of a Disciplinary Hearing Officer.

In due course, he was found guilty of the “shot” and was given 7 days in disciplinary segregation and a loss of some good time credits he had previously earned.

shutmouth171121After his 28 days in the SHU, Derrick appealed the finding of guilt, and his appeal fell on the desk of cooler heads. The DHO’s finding was reversed, and the “shot” was expunged. After that, Derrick – who justifiably felt that he had been punished for exercising his 1st Amendment rights in a completely reasonable way – brought a Bivens action against prison staff for a retaliation conspiracy against him for speaking out.

The district court dismissed Derrick’s complaint, holding that his conspiracy claim was “conclusory” and his seven days in seg was too insignificant an injury, “de minimis” as the courts like to say.

shu171121Last week, the 5th Circuit reversed.  The appellate court held the district judge should not have ignored the 21 days Derrick spent in the hole waiting for a hearing. “Taking the 21 days in the SHU and the seven days of disciplinary segregation together,” the Court said, “the alleged retaliatory act lasted at least 28 days, which is certainly… not de minimis.

The 5th found it significant that the shot was later expunged, because that suggested the counselor “lacked any basis for initiating the charge.”  And Derrick’s conspiracy claim was not “conclusory,” the Court said. He alleged that while he was in the SHU, the Captain told him, “You didn’t think I know the lights are an issue? You are not going to make threats.”  A lieutenant then said, “Thanks for telling us how to do our jobs, you want to tell us how to do our jobs things go downhill for you.” 

tapemouth161230When Derrick pointed out that the incident report did not state a violation, the Captain responded, “Well, when I talk to the DHO we’ll see if he can articulate” one. The DHO subsequently changed the charged offense from “threatening” to “refusal to obey an order.” 

The Circuit held that “these facts suffice to state “an agreement to commit an illegal act which resulted in the plaintiff’s injury.”

Brunson v. Nichols, Case No. 14-31350 (5th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Reeling in Some ‘Desperate Targets’ – Update for November 20, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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7TH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS ANOTHER STASH HOUSE STING, BUT WITH SCATHING CONDEMNATION OF GOVERNMENT

You know the story by now. After prison, Tracy Conley was getting his life together. He had a job, a car, and a girlfriend. He was regaining his footing one step at a time.

stash171120At least he was, until a series of unfortunate events. Tracy got to work one day to find the machine he operated was down. His employer sent him home. He started to drive back to his girlfriend’s house, but in a second stroke of bad luck, was running out of gas. He stopped at a gas station, and saw two friends, from whom he tried to borrow a few bucks for some fuel.

The friends convinced him to come to a meeting instead, where a guy named Myreon pitched them all on robbing a drug stash house stuffed with cocaine. Of course, there was no stash house and no 50 kilos of powder. Instead, the whole scheme was orchestrated by the ATF.

Tracy and the others were thus ensnared in what the 7th Circuit called “a now familiar government set up in which a government actor, pretending to be a criminal, presents the defendant with an opportunity to be part of a robbery of an illegal drug stash house. The stash house is fictional, of course, and so the government decides which and what quantity of drugs it will have (in this case, fifty kilograms of cocaine) and how high or low the barriers to the crime will be (in this case it was allegedly protected only by two armed and one unarmed guards). Tracy took the bait and ended up with a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment on drug distribution and weapons charges.”

The Circuit upheld Tracy’s conviction and sentence (which was way below his Guidelines range), but had to pinch its collective nose shut to do so. Reviewing the district court’s unhappiness with the case and widespread judicial criticism of stash house “stings,” the 7th said:

The district court’s discomfort with this case echoes a substantial body of criticism of similar stash house cases both from this circuit and others. Beginning many years ago, we criticized these cases as “tawdry,” noting in particular how these operations are “directed at unsophisticated, and perhaps desperate defendants” like Tracy who easily take the all-too-tempting bait put out for them by the government.

stash171031In this case, Tracy may have been starting down a straighter path, after a life filled with many poor choices. He was gainfully employed, had obtained his GED, enrolled in some college courses, and had skills in electronics and marketing. But he was also an ‘unsophisticated and desperate’ target, so down on his luck that he did not have even enough money to get home from work on the day he was approached by his co-conspirators… Like the district court, we ‘question the wisdom and purpose of expending the level of law enforcement resources and judicial time and effort in this prosecution’. But the resources have been expended and the district court conducted an exceptionally thorough post-trial review and ‘after much consideration, time, reflection and review of the parties’ arguments and the trial record’ properly denied the motion for acquittal or new trial on all charges.

United States v. Conley, Case No.15-3442 (7th Cir. 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Dog Bites Man – Federal Sentencing Said to Be Racially Tinged – Update for November 16, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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WE’RE SHOCKED! SENTENCING COMMISSION STUDY FINDINGS FEDERAL SENTENCING IS UNFAIR

blackprisoner171116While this hardly comes as much of a comfort to you if you’re already serving one, a United States Sentencing Commission report issued last week found that, statistically speaking, your sentence is longer if you’re black than if you’re white, or if you’re a male instead of a female.

The report compares sentences handed down to similarly situated people between October 2011 and September 2016. Its key findings are

• black males continue to catch sentences that are 19% longer than those imposed on white males. The average black male sentence of about 92 months in 2007 has fallen to about 75 months, mostly because of changes in crack cocaine sentencing ranges, while white male sentences have risen slightly from 58 to 64 months. But when the data are adjusted for the effect of the Fair Sentencing Act, the gap between black and white sentences is unchanged since 2007.

• sentence departures and variances given for reasons other than assistance to the government are the principal culprits. During the period, black males were 21% less likely than whites to get a downward departure or variance, and when they did get one, their sentences were still 17% longer on the average. When the courts sentenced within the sentencing range, black male sentences were still 8% longer than those of whites.

• violence did account for any of the demographic differences in sentencing. Violent black male sentences were on average 20% longer than violent white male sentences.

• females received shorter sentences than males during the period, unchanged from every year since 2003. White and Hispanic women received 26% shorter sentences than males, and black women got 21% shorter sentences. These rates suggest while there is a racial sentencing disparity for women, its smaller than for men.

• non-citizens got longer sentences than similarly situated citizens, but education didn’t make a difference.

guy171116The 2003 PROTECT Act (which defendants generally disliked) drove the racial disparity down to 6%, but after United States v. Booker – which made the Guidelines advisory – the difference between black and white male sentences increased by 10%. The pronounced disparity between white and non-white offenders may be partially attributable to the lack of a strict, rational sentencing scheme. When judges use their discretion, implicit racial and gender biases may show.

US Sentencing Commission, Demographic Differences in Sentencing: An Update to the 2012 Booker Report (Nov. 13, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Yeah, It’s That Bad – Update for November 10, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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EVERY BAD THING YOU’VE HEARD ABOUT BOP HALFWAY HOUSE POLICIES IS TRUE
Not the kind of "halfway house" we're talking about.
Not the kind of “halfway house” we’re talking about.

Federal law requires that the Bureau of Prisons provide each inmate with re-entry services – a transition from prison to freedom – during that last portion of their sentences. That includes placement in a halfway house or on home confinement. It used to be that BOP capped halfway house at six months. Then Congress passed the Second Chance Act, which authorized up to double that.

With its new authority, the BOP promptly began giving inmates up to six months in halfway house. Not a jot more. And although there Second Chance Act is almost a decade old, the BOP still persists in giving an inmate not more than 10% of his or her sentence in a halfway house, up to six months. Do three years? You get 3.6 months in a halfway house. Do 60 months? You get six months? Do 30 years? You get six months.

Well, that was then and this is now. A lot of inmates have been emailing us for the last two months, reporting that the BOP is seriously cutting halfway house time, ironically just as Congress is seriously debating the need for more programs to combat recidivism among federal inmates.

then171110Well, it’s all true. The Trump Administration has been quietly cutting support for halfway houses in recent months, eliminating programs and severing contracts with as many as 16 facilities. Reuters reports that a BOP spokesman confirmed the cuts in response to an email inquiry from Reuters, but maintained they only affect areas with small populations or underutilized centers. “The Bureau remains firmly committed to these practices, but has had to make some modifications to our programs due to our fiscal environment,” Reuters quotes the spokesman as saying.

U.S. District Judge Edmund Sargus, who sits in the Southern District of Ohio, confirmed one contract cut was with Alvis in Dayton, a decision he called “a real stumper.” If Dayton, with a metro population of a half million people, is one of the “small population” areas BOP is talking about, then perhaps the BOP’s statement is, um, questionable.

The BOP spokesman said that the cuts have not reduced referral rates or placements, and only impact “about 1% of the total number of beds under contract.”  That estimate might be equally suspect, if the widespread inmate complaints are any indication.

A small liberal website, Splinter, reported last week it alone had gotten 40 emails from federal prisoners whose halfway house had been cut. Some had their halfway house time cut completely. Others reported reductions in the time they’d already been granted.

Eight senators ­– four Republicans and four Democrats – wrote to BOP Director Mark Inch two weeks ago, expressing concern “that the BOP is reducing its use of Residential Reentry Centers without explanation or advance notice to those most affected. As a consequence, inmates are spending more time in prison, being released directly from prison into the community without the necessary supervision, or spending insufficient time in transitional facilities. These changes, particularly in the absence of a justification, threaten to make our communities less safe while increasing BOP operating costs over time.”

Reuters, Trump administration reduces support for prisoner halfway houses (Oct. 13, 2017)

Letter to Mark Inch from Sen. Charles Grassley and others (Oct. 26, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Pay No Attention to the Witness’s Lie – Update for November 6, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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WHOSE PANTS ARE ON FIRE?

corso170112You’d think that when a key prosecution witness lies on the stand during a murder trial, and the prosecutor knows it and the judge knows it and everyone except the jury knows it, the judge or the prosecutor would jump up and say, “Not so fast!”

After all, the obligation of someone – and that someone is supposed to be the prosecutor – to tell the jury the witness is lying is pretty well established after Napue v. Illinois and Giglio v. United States.

lies171106It’s pretty important that the prosecutor tell the jury his or her witness is lying. The defense attorney can do that, and often does, but somehow the punch of branding the other side’s witness a liar is not quite as effective as telling the jury your own witness is a liar. And even if the lie is about something tangential to the meat of the testimony, it’s important that the jury know about it. You lie about a little thing, you may lie about big things, too.

Consider the fate of poor Lariec Sherman, shot to death 18 years ago in a Peoria, Illinois, housing project. Although there was no physical evidence, the State of Illinois quickly rustled up four people who said Paysun Long was the shooter.

At Paysun’s first trial, two witnesses changed their stories, but the prosecutors playing the recordings of their statements made before they had recanted. One of the remaining two witnesses, Brooklyn Irby, first fingered Paysun but then then changed her story. She ultimately testified that before the trial, she told prosecutors her story about Paysun being the shooter was a lie.

Paysun was convicted, but it was overturned on appeal.

When Paysun was retried, prosecutors used the recorded testimony of two witnesses and live testimony from the other two. The defense again told jurors about how two witnesses had recanted. When Irby testified, she told the jury that Paysun was the shooter, but her account of the crime differed from what the other eyewitness said. The most damaging witness said Paysun shot the victim from behind.

pantsonfire160805It was Irby’s cross-examination that was interesting. She denied she had ever told the police and prosecutors that her initial identification was a lie. Although the prosecutor did nothing to correct her testimony, Paysun’s attorney didn’t sit on his hands. He called the prosecution’s own investigator as a witness, who admitted to jurors that Irby had indeed recanted her incriminating testimony during the first trial.

Even during closing arguments, the prosecutor never acknowledged that Irby had lied. Instead, he told the jury about a letter Irby had written that was even not in evidence. The judge interrupted, telling the jury to disregard the State’s attempt to put unadmitted hearsay in front of the jury, but all the instruction did was to get the jury’s attention. So much so, in fact, that during deliberations, the jury  asked to see the letter that was not part of the record.

Unsurprisingly, Paysun lost the second trial, too.

Paysun filed a post-conviction motion in state court, arguing the prosecutor violated Napue v. Illinois, which holds that the a prosecutor’s failure to correct a government witness’s false testimony is a due process violation. For good measure, Paysun complained that the State violated Giglio v. United States as well, which held that prosecutors have a duty to disclose to deals they make to get witnesses to testify.

Illinois courts ruled Paysun’s prosecutor had violated Napue and Giglio, but that it was “harmless error” because of other evidence in the case (that being the shaky testimony of the only eyewitness who had not recanted) that proved Paysun’s guilt. After appeal failed, Paysun filed a 28 USC 2254 motion in federal court, seeking review of the Illinois courts’ denial of habeas.

The district court agreed that the Napue and Giglio violations were presumed to prejudice Paysun, without any harmless error analysis allowed. Last year, the 7th Circuit agreed, but then the State won the right to an en banc rehearing.

Late last month, an en banc panel of the Circuit decided 5-3 that Napue and Giglio did not necessarily mean a defendant had a due process claim if the false testimony wasn’t elicited by prosecutors, if the truth was already known to the defense during trial, if the prosecutor did not ask jurors to rely on the false testimony, or if the jury learned the truth anyway.

cmon161027Here, the panel said, although the prosecutor remained silent about Irby’s perjury, Paysun’s lawyers exposed it. Plus, the prosecutor didn’t specifically rely on Irby’s false testimony, but instead just talked around it, arguing that her identification of Paysun as the gunman was true regardless of whatever the jury might think about the rest of what she said. In fact, the majority hypothesized, maybe the prosecutor’s refusal to correct Irby’s testimony actually helped Paysun because it allowed his attorneys to be the ones to portray Irby as a perjurer.

“C’mon, man,” the three dissenting judges seemed to say. The dissent was puzzled, dismayed maybe, that the majority would let a prosecutor get away with a lie. They said, “the majority’s suggestions that Napue leaves the state courts room to avoid following it on the facts of this case are without support. Napue expressly rejected several of the suggestions, and its logic clearly rejects the last.”

Paysun’s attorneys have not revealed whether they plan to seek Supreme Court review. However, one commentator said, “it seems an obvious avenue of appeal, giving the justices an opportunity to reaffirm the principle they announced in 1959 and in 1972, that the government has a constitutional and ethical obligation to ensure that it speaks out against perjury when it unfolds in the middle of a trial in front of the jury.”

Long v. Pfister, Case No. 13-3327 (7th Cir., Oct. 20, 2017) (en banc)

The Marshall Project, Getting Away with Perjury (Oct. 30, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Newspeak Redux: Another Violent Crime is not a Crime of Violence – Update for November 2, 2017

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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10TH CIRCUIT SAYS HOBBS ACT ROBBERY NOT A GUIDELINES “CRIME OF VIOLENCE”

angels170726The debate over whether criminal offenses that any viewer of Law and Order would have no problem labeling as violent are in fact “crimes of violence” continues to rage. In the Newspeakean world that remains after United States v. Curtis Johnson and United States v. Mathis, determining whether a violent crime is a “crime of violence” has come to occupy the same station as counting the number of angels on the head of a pin.

Whether a crime is a “crime of violence” has great relevance, because it can qualify the unlucky defendant for a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence (Armed Career Criminal Act), a mandatory consecutive sentence of at least five years (use of a firearm during crime of violence under 18 USC 924(c)), a much higher Guidelines sentencing range as a “career offender,” and a host of other statutory and Guidelines burdens. That’s not to mention the impact on legal residents subject to deportation for crimes of violence, an issue that is part of the Sessions and Dimaya case awaiting decision in the Supreme Court.

The latest entrant into the debate comes from the 10th Circuit, where Darnell O’Connor faced a Guidelines enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because he had a prior conviction for a Hobbs Act robbery. Darnell’s advisory sentencing range for his felon-in-possession-of-a-gun conviction (18 USC 922(g)(11)) was increased by about six months because of the prior.

There are three ways a prior offense may be a crime of violence under the Guidelines. It may be either (1) an enumerated offense listed in the Guidelines (burglary, arson, extortion or use of explosive”); (2) an offense that has as an element the threatened use or actual use of physical force against a person; or (3) an offense that presents a significant risk of physical harm to others.

Robber160229The first clause is called the “enumerated clause,” because it enumerates certain offenses that count, period. The second is called the “force clause” or “elements clause,” because it relates to crimes that include elements of purposeful force. The third is called the “residual clause,” because it sweeps up what’s left. The “residual clause” was declared unconstitutionally vague two years ago in United States v. Johnson, at least as it applies to the ACCA, but the Supreme Court subsequently decided it could be applied in the Guidelines definition of “crime of violence.”

The definition of a “crime of violence” is the same whether its figuring out whether someone is an armed career offender under the ACCA or whether figuring out whether it’s a crime a violence under 18 USC 16(b), or whether figuring out whether the Guidelines make one a “career offender” under the Guidelines.

violence160110On appeal, Darnell argued that a Hobbs Act robbery was not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines definition – which is fundamentally the same as the statutory definition – because it encompassed conduct that was broader than “robbery.” If some conduct that would be a crime under the statute would not be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines, then any conviction under that statute will not qualify as a “crime of violence” for a sentence enhancement under the Guidelines, regardless of whether the conduct that led to the prior conviction was in fact violent.

Under the force clause, the court looks at whether the statute underlying the prior conviction “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” If the statute criminalizes only conduct that fits within the force clause, then a sentencing enhancement is valid. But if the Hobbs Act robbery statute covers conduct that falls outside the force clause—such as threatening property rather than “the person of another”—then Hobbs Act robbery would not categorically be a crime of violence under that clause.

The Hobbs Act defines robbery is the unlawful taking of someone’s personal property against his will by use or threat of force “to his person or property.” The Government argued that the Court had to focus on the “minimum conduct” criminalized by the underlying statute without applying “legal imagination” to consider hypothetical situations that technically violate the law but have no “realistic probability” of falling within its application. It argued it Darnell could point to no case where the government would prosecute” threats to property as a Hobbs Act robbery.

The Court held that was immaterial, because Darnell “does not have to make that showing.

Hobbs Act robbery reaches conduct directed at “property” because the statute specifically says so. We cannot ignore the statutory text and construct a narrower statute than the plain language supports.” Because Hobbs Act robbery can be committed against property, where generic robbery cannot, it is broader than enumerated robbery, and cannot qualify as violent crime under the “enumerated clause.”

Likewise, the enumerated offense of extortion cannot include the Hobbs Act within its sweep, because the Guidelines now define extortion as being focused only on physical injury to a person. Hobbs Act extortion includes threats to property, and thus is too broad under that term as well.

Finally, the Court said, Hobbs Act robbery cannot qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines “force clause,” because Hobbs Act robbery can include force against property, while the “force clause” requires physical force against a person.

Darnell’s two prior Hobbs Act convictions thus were not crimes of violence, despite the fact that they were undoubtedly violent crimes.

United States v. O’Connor, Case No. 16-3300 (10th Cir., Oct. 30, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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