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A TALE OF TWO COVID DECISIONS

Two circuits handed down decisions on COVID compassionate release last week. Like Charles Dickens’ “best of times, worst of times,” the rulings represented the best in appellate decision-making and the worst.

The Tutorial: Section 3582 of Title 18, United States Code, governs the imposition of sentences, including regulating the limited circumstances under which a sentence can be modified. Once such circumstance is found in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which provides that a court may reduce a sentence when it finds “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to do so, and concludes that such a reduction is consistent with the factors to be considered when a sentence is imposed (found in 18 USC § 3553(a), and generally called “3553(a) factors“).

Since the advent of COVID-19, courts have granted sentence reduction motions (also called “compassionate release” motions, the same way all tissues are called “Kleenex”) in cases where the prisoner has health conditions that increase his or her susceptibility to COVID-19. The approval rate has been something like 19% of all compassionate release motions, but in a criminal justice system in which 97 out of 100 people charged with a federal crime get convicted, the compassionate release odds seem to a lot of inmates to be a sure thing.

One fly in the ointment has been a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) requirement that a compassionate release comply with “applicable” Sentencing Commission policies. The only Sentencing Commission policy has not been updated since before the First Step Act (which is what have inmates the right to file their own compassionate release motions), and the policy contains limitations clearly at odds with the intent of Congress in opening up compassionate release to inmates. As a result, four courts of appeal so far have ruled that district courts need pay no mind to the “applicable policies” language of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), at least until the Sentencing Commission gets around to changing the policy.

Now for the two decisions of the week:

The Best: A district court found Lisa Elias’s hypertension (high blood pressure) alone was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant a sentence reduction. The 6th Circuit last week upheld the denial, underscoring the broad discretion district judges have in deciding compassionate release cases with thoroughness and careful reasoning.

Noting that three other circuits now agreed with its Jones decision that Guideline 1B1.13 does not limit courts in deciding prisoner-brought compassionate release motions, the 6th said “there has emerged a newfound consensus among the courts, and the government provides no compelling reason for us to disturb the consensus of our sister Circuits. Therefore, we hold that 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement for compassionate-release motions brought directly by inmates, and so district courts need not consider it when ruling on those motions. Further… district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others… And, in the absence of an applicable policy statement for inmate-filed compassionate-release motions, district courts have discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling”’ on their own initiative.”

Now the worst: Chadwick Townsend sought compassionate release because, he claimed, his hypertension, high cholesterol and a 10-year old stroke put him at higher risk from COVID-19. His district judge held Chad’s reasons were not extraordinary and compelling, and Tom appealed.

The 5th Circuit turned him down. It held that while Chad’s “chronic illnesses place him at a higher risk of severe symptoms, should he contract COVID… it is uncertain that he is at a significantly higher risk than is the general inmate population. In fact, nearly half of the adult population in the United States suffers from hypertension. And roughly 12% of Americans suffer from high cholesterol. Thus, we cannot say that either of those conditions makes Thompson’s case “extraordinary.” Unfortunately, both are commonplace.”

The Circuit relied on Guideline 1B1.13 without observing that four other circuits have held it does not apply to inmate-filed compassionate release motions. Acting as though it had just emerged from a cave where it spent the last year, the panel noted with some surprise and puzzlement, “To be sure, courts around the country, in some exceptional cases, have granted compassionate release where the defendant has demonstrated an increased risk of serious illness if he or she were to contract COVID. Even where they have denied release, some courts have assumed that the pandemic, combined with underlying conditions, might be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. But that is certainly not a unanimous approach to every high-risk inmate with preexisting conditions seeking compassionate release.”

The Circuit seemed to conflate “extraordinary and compelling” reasons with the separate compassionate release step of considering the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors: “The courts that granted compassionate release on those bases largely have done so for defendants who had already served the lion’s share of their sentences and presented multiple, severe, health concerns. Even where the court denied the motion on grounds other than the lack of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons,’ the defendants’ medical conditions oftentimes were more serious than are Thompson’s. Fear of COVID doesn’t automatically entitle a prisoner to release. Tom can point to no case in which a court, on account of the pandemic, has granted compassionate release to an otherwise healthy defendant with two, well-controlled, chronic medical conditions and who had completed less than half of his sentence.”

Sentencing Law and Policy, Sixth Circuit panel reiterates “district courts have discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ on their own initiative” for 3582(c)(1)(A) motions (January 7, 2021)

United States v. Elias, Case No. 20-3654, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 251 (6th Cir. January 6, 2021)

United States v. Thompson, Case No. 20-40381, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 194 (5th Cir. January 5, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root