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A Day to Beat Up Lawyers – Update for February 23, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LAWYERS BEHAVING BADLY

Today, we feature a pair of cases in which lawyers are the stars, and not in a good way:

banana210223I Feel Conflicted: When Eric Scurry arrived for day 1 of his drug trial, his lawyer – Chris Davis – was missing. It seemed Chris had a hearing in another courtroom, and that one was more important to him than Eric’s was. This is not a development calculated to give a client a warm, fuzzy feeling about his attorney, the notion that his or her freedom was playing second banana to a client who had paid more for the lawyer’s services.

But not to fear, Eric! Chris’s wife, Mary, was also a lawyer, and Chris – who cared about Eric’s case very much – dispatched her to cover the trial. No matter (as it turned out later) that Mary had not read the file and knew nothing about Eric’s case. She was a warm body with a law degree, just what a guy facing decades in prison needed.

Had Mary read the file, she would have been aware that Eric and his co-defendants previously had attacked the wiretap that led to their arrest for a technical deficiency, albeit a glaring one. The district court denied their motion to suppress the evidence, but the issue their joint motion raised was a substantial one.

Everyone on the defense side of the table knew that… except for Mary. She convinced Eric to take a plea deal for a minimum 10 years, reserving only the right to appeal one inconsequential pretrial holding. The co-defendants also pled, but their attorneys reserved the right to appeal the wiretap suppression.

jailfree140410That turned out to be a good deal for Eric’s co-defendants. They appealed and won. The Court of Appeals held the government’s wiretap application to be deficient, and all of the evidence against them was suppressed. The co-defendants walked free. But Eric did not, because his plea deal did not reserve the right to raise that issue.

Eric seemed to recognize that Mary had screwed up, because on appeal, he had the Davises thrown off his case. He told the court he planned to accuse them later of incompetence. That made sense. But what happened next did not.

Inexplicably, when Eric filed a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 seeking to set aside his guilty plea, Mary offered to represent him on the motion, and he agreed. She then amended the § 2255 motion, claiming Eric had been coerced into pleading guilty by the evidence that had later been thrown out in his co-defendants’ cases, thus giving him the same level of professional representation on his § 2255 that she had given him at trial: lousy.

The problem was simple: to set aside his guilty plea and plea deal, Eric was required to show not just that his perception of the admissibility of the evidence was wrong, but that his lawyer had given him incompetent representation. Which of course Mary had. But because Mary failed to argue her own incompetence during the § 2255, the court denied Eric relief.

conflict200318Last week, the D.C. Circuit threw Mary (and, for good measure, Chris) off the case again. The problem is, the Circuit said, “as long as counsel’s advice to take the plea rather than gamble on an evidentiary suppression issue was “reasonably competent,” the plea is “not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession.” That being the case, Eric could not win his § 2255 unless he showed Mary has given him incompetent advice. And that, as I noted, meant Mary would have to argue that she was incompetent.

The Circuit ruled that “by affirmatively intervening in Scurry’s collateral proceedings despite the conflict and not pressing the ineffective assistance claim, Davis seemingly made a choice advancing her own interest at the expense of her client’s.”

Eric will get another shot at relief, this time – we trust – with a competent lawyer.

usmale210223I’m A U.S. Male: Elvis warned that you shouldn’t “tamper with the property of the U.S. Mail (or maybe ‘male’)”. Last week, Sixth Circuit said you can’t use the U.S. mail to tamper with statutory deadlines, either.

Blake Cretacci hired a lawyer to file a 42 USC § 1983 action for damages against some local jail guards who allegedly used excessive force against him and . Blake hired a local lawyer by the unlikely name of Andy Justice, who prepared the complaint. Andy planned to file the federal court complaint electronically, as attorney members of the bar of the court are allowed to do. But on the night before the statute of limitations expired on Blake’s claim, Andy discovered that Coffee County, Tennessee, where the conduct occurred, was not in the Middle District of Tennessee, where Andy was admitted, but instead in the Eastern District of Tennessee, where Andy was not admitted.

The next day, Andy tried to get admitted to the Eastern District so he could electronically file the complaint, but that could not be accomplished in only a day. Andy drove to a federal courthouse in Winchester, Tennessee, to try to file the complaint in person, but there was no staffed clerk’s office there. By then, Andy could not get to the Chattanooga federal courthouse in time, but he had an idea.

The “prison mailbox rule,” enshrined in Houston v. Lack, holds that if an inmate files a document with a federal court by mailing it from the prison, the filing is deemed to be delivered to the courthouse the moment the inmate turns it over to a prison official. Andy, being a bright lawyer, knew this, so he ran the complaint over to Blake at the jail.

Andy told Blake that he should deliver it to a correctional officer immediately, explaining that because he was an inmate, he could take advantage of the prison mailbox rule. Blake did so.

dogmail210223Last week, the 6th Circuit threw out Blake’s complaint as untimely. The Circuit ruled that “the prison mailbox rule was created to prevent pro se prisoners from being penalized by any delays in filing caused by the prison mail system. But if a prisoner does not need to use the prison mail system, and instead relies on counsel to file a pleading on his or her behalf, the prison is no longer responsible for any delays and the rationale of the prison mailbox rule does not apply… Accordingly, we hold that, in the context of the filing of civil complaints, the prison mailbox rule applies only to prisoners who are not represented by counsel and are proceeding pro se.”

Nice try, Andy, but you can’t use the U.S. mail to tamper with court deadlines. Elvis could have told you that.

United States v. Scurry, Case No 18-3067, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 4785 (D.C. Cir.  Feb 19, 2021)

Cretacci v. Call, Case No 20-5669, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 4493 (6th Cir. Feb 17, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Just Sign Right Below the Illusory Promise – Update for January 4, 2018

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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PLEA AGREEMENT OFFERS NOTHING, STILL OK

Jose Rivera-Cruz agreed to plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a gun. He signed a plea agreement in which the government (1) did not agree to reduce or dismiss any of charges, (2) reserved the right to argue for a statutory-maximum sentence, and (3) did not stipulate to a criminal history category of offense level. The plea agreement did permit Jose to argue for a 96-month sentence (a right he had with or without a plea agreement), and let the government argue for a statutory-maximum 120-month sentence (the most sentence Jose could get by law). However, the government did agree to recommend that Jose receive a 3-level acceptance of responsibility.

pleadeal180104After getting hammered with the full 120 months by the district judge, Jose argued on appeal that he should be allowed to get out of the plea agreement due to lack of consideration. Under basic contract law, both parties must give and receive consideration. If there is no consideration, the contract is not enforceable. Jose argued that just as Oz never did give nothing to the Tin Man that he didn’t already have, Jose got absolutely nothing under the plea agreement that he could not have gotten by pleading to the indictment without a plea agreement.

considerationLast week, the 1st Circuit disagreed. The appellate court held the plea agreement provided Jose with “at least three separate benefits, each of which independently constituted sufficient consideration.” First, the government agreed to move for the third acceptance-of-responsibility point under USSG 3E1.1(a), something it did not have to do because Jose refused to plead guilty until the eve of trial. The Circuit said the fact the 3-level reduction did not help him at sentencing made no difference: “the government’s voluntary agreement to submit the same three-point reduction, rather than a two-point reduction, certainly gave Rivera-Cruz a better ‘chance at less’ in front of the district court.”

tinman180104Second, the government agreed not to seek a 4-point obliterated-serial-number enhancement under USSC 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). The Presentence Report included the enhancement anyway, and Jose complained the government did not fight it, but the Court said the AUSA had no “affirmative obligation… to object to the enhancement at sentencing. In any case, the government’s voluntary agreement not to include the… enhancement in the plea agreement improved Rivera-Cruz’s chances of obtaining a more lenient sentence, and accordingly constituted sufficient consideration for his plea.”

Finally, the government agreed not to seek a 15-year mandatory minimum Armed Career Criminal Act sentence. Jose argued on appeal that the promise was meaningless, because he never would have qualified for an ACCA sentence. The 1st Circuit said that did not matter: “the government was under no obligation to drop its pursuit of an ACCA sentence. Its decision to do so in the plea agreement… provided Rivera-Cruz with a ‘chance at less’ during sentencing,” whether that chance was meaningful or not.

United States v. Rivera-Cruz, Case No. 16-2398 (1st Cir., Dec. 22, 2017)

– Thomas L. Root

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Once You Say It, You Own It – Update for June 15, 2017

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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MEAN WHAT YOU SAY

changeofplea170616Anyone spectator who has ever endured a change-of-plea hearing in Federal court has some sense of what the prophet Isaiah meant when he wrote of inhabiting eternity. The hearing drones on and on, with discussions about the defendant’s mental state, understanding of his or her rights, the nature of the rights being given up by the guilty plea, the elements of the charges, maximum and minimum sentences, fines and restitution, effect of the Guidelines, and on and on.

The whole back-and-forth between the defendant and the judge – known as the plea colloquy – is scripted by F.R.Crim.P. 11, which covers in detail what has to happen during the guilty plea. Such hearings go on over 70,000 times a year in federal court, and virtually every one of them is mind-numbing.

Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises other than those in the plea agreement. One question that is almost always asked is whether the defendant is fully satisfied with his or her legal counsel, the representation, and advice received. Another is whether anyone had  threatened or attempted in any way to force the defendant to plead guilty.

ecoli170616At first blush, the questions seem silly. If the defendant is being forced to plead guilty, he or she is hardly going to screw the pooch by telling the judge that. Even worse is the question about satisfaction with counsel. The defendant has not even had his or her guilty plea accepted, let alone get sentenced. It’s as though Yelp required you to post your restaurant review before your appetizer arrives. Sure, the maître d’ was polite, and the tablecloths clean and starched. But you may well feel much different at 3 o’clock tomorrow morning, when you discover that e.coli. had been living in the house salad.

meanit170616As meaningless as the answers may be, they nevertheless because granite-hard truth if the defendant ever suffers buyer’s remorse. Consider Kevin Reed. Halfway through his federal fraud trial, he decided to plead guilty. During the plea colloquy, the district judge asked Kevin if he was “fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice” he had been given. Kevin replied, “Yes.  He’s  excellent.”  He  also  confirmed  that  no  one  had  threatened him or attempted “in any way” to force him to plead, and that he was pleading guilty of his “own free will” because he was actually guilty.

A few months later, as sentencing loomed, Kevin hired a new set of lawyers. They moved to withdraw the plea, arguing that Kevin’s trial attorney’s ineffective representation at trial left Kevin with no choice but to bail out, and thus coerced him to plead guilty. The district court denied the motion.

Last Tuesday, the 7th Circuit upheld the district court. The Circuit acknowledged that a defendant could withdraw a guilty plea, but such a motion is “particularly unlikely to have merit if it seeks to dispute the defendant’s sworn assurances to the court.”

That was exactly what Kevin was trying to do. He argued that his trial attorney ignored tens of thousands of documents and didn’t interview dozens of potential witnesses, but he did not identify any of the witnesses or documents or show how they would have bolstered his case. More importantly, the appellate panel tartly noted, Kevin kind of forgot to mention any of this in his plea colloquy, or to complain that he was answering “yes” to the court only because his attorney told him to.

trifles170616At the plea colloquy, Kevin said his lawyer was excellent and that his plea was voluntary. “Those sworn statements were not ‘trifles’,” the 7th said, that Kevin could simply “elect to disregard.” To be sure, a plea entered because counsel is unprepared for trial would be an involuntary plea, but the district court found Kevin’s claim of lawyer ineffectiveness “vague,” and the appellate court agreed.

The problem is that at the change-of-plea colloquy, a defendant – especially one unfamiliar with the criminal process – has no way to know whether his lawyer has provided good representation or not. Nevertheless, a defendant will be held to the words he or she speaks. Whether the defendant knows the correct answer or not, that answer is going to bind him or her. Say it like you mean it, because once you give the answer, you own it.

United States v. Reed, Case No. 16-3428 (7th Cir., June 13, 2017)

– Thomas L. RootLISAStatHeader2small