Tag Archives: violence

The Wacky World of Federal ‘Violence’ – Update for November 4, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOW VIOLENT IS KIDNAPPING?

In a world where people wearing blowup costumes holding signs are violent anarchists while others smashing the doors of the Capitol are peaceful tourists, it was perhaps inevitable that a federal court would hold that kidnapping a family of four, zip-tying the parents and holding a gun to a 3-year-old girl’s head in order to find out where the family money was hidden, is not a categorical crime of violence.

This is the latest in a decade-plus saga of Killiu Ford. Killiu is perhaps pronounced “kill you,” an unfortunately apt name for the defendant. As noted, Killiu and his co-defendants abducted a family at gunpoint, robbing them of $30,000.

The district court sentenced Killiu to 600 months in prison, 216 months for two counts of kidnapping the parents, 300 months consecutive for two counts of kidnapping the kids, and 84 months on an 18 USC § 924(c) firearm conviction, consecutive to the other sentences. Later, the government conceded that the § 924(c) conviction had to be vacated because kidnapping was not a violent crime under the statute. The 10th Circuit remanded Killiu ‘s case for resentencing.

On remand, the district court reduced Killiu’s 600-month sentence by 84 months, down to 516 months in prison. But the judge said Killiu deserved a bigger reduction due to his significant rehabilitation during the 12 years he had already spent in prison. But the prosecutor argued that the court was obligated under 18 USC § 3559(f)(2) to impose a mandatory minimum 25-year sentence for each of the two kidnapping convictions involving the children.

Killiu argued that the district court was not obligated to impose mandatory-minimum 25-year sentences and requested instead a downward variance to 240 months.

The district court ruled that § 3559(f)(2) required a mandatory minimum 25-year (300-month) sentence for each of the kidnapping convictions involving the children. In light of that, the court imposed a 300-month sentence for each of Killiu ‘s remaining five convictions, all to run concurrently.

Under § 3559(f)(2), someone convicted of a crime of violence that is kidnapping as defined by the federal kidnapping statute, 18 USC § 1201, shall “be imprisoned for life or any term of years not less than 25.” But § 1201 does not define “crime of violence.” The 10th Circuit concluded that when § 1201 was passed, 18 USC § 16(a) – which defines “crime of violence” – was already on the books. The fact that Congress did not separately define “crime of violence” in § 3559(f) suggests that it was satisfied with the § 16(a) definition.

Using that definition, the 10th Circuit said, “courts have consistently found that a person can commit kidnapping without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. For example, a person can commit kidnapping by inveigling—that is, luring, or enticing, or leading the person astray by false representations or promises, or other deceitful means… [B]ecause kidnapping can be committed by “inveigling,” a kidnapping offense does not categorically have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.

Killiu’s case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Ford, Case No. 23-1400, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28174 (10th Cir. October 28, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Simms Raises the Ante on 924(c) Crimes of Violence – Update for January 28, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT SIMMS DECISION TEES UP 924(c) DEBATE FOR SUPREME COURT

The vigorous debate since the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Dimaya last year at first seemed to surround whether the residual clause of 18 USC 924(c) – which defines “crime of violence” to include any offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another” – was unconstitutionally vague. That is what the Supreme Court said about the same language in the Armed Career Criminal Act (in Johnson v. United States) and in Dimaya last spring referring to 18 USC 16(b).

violence181008But in the last few months, the argument has morphed into some more basic: when judging whether the offense underlying an 18 USC 924(c) charge is violent, should a court use the categorical approach (which asks whether the offense in its ordinary form is violent, not what the defendant did in the particular case under review)? Or should the court instead look only at how the defendant in the case under review committed the offense?

Three circuits have embraced the conduct-based approach, the 1st in United States v. Douglas, the 2nd in United States v. Barrett, and the 11th in Ovalles v. United States. Three others have backed the categorical approach, the 5th in United States v. Davis, the 10th in United States v. Salas, and the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Eshetu. Two weeks ago, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition to review the 5th Circuit’s Davis decision.

The Circuit split deepened last Thursday with the 4th Circuit’s long-awaited decision in United States v. Simms. In a contentious 100-page decision, the en banc Circuit decided 8-7 that whether an underlying offense supporting a 924(c) conviction is a crime of violence, a trial court must use the categorical approach the Supreme Court adopted and used in Leocal v. Ashcroft. What’s more, using the categorical approach, the 4th said, it is clear that a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery (18 USC 1951) is not a crime of violence.

By extension, this means that in the 4th Circuit, no conspiracy to commit a violent crime is itself a violent crime (although it is in the 2nd Circuit).

violence160110The 4th Circuit focused on the phrase “by its nature” in 924(c)(3)(B), saying that the language directs courts to consider only the basic or inherent features of “an offense that is a felony,” and that the phrase “directs courts to figure out what an offense normally… entails, not what happened to occur on one occasion. Had Congress intended a conduct-specific analysis instead, it presumably would have said so; other statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way… We cannot adopt a reading of 924(c)(3)(B) that renders part of the statute superfluous over one that gives effect to its ‘every clause and word’.”

As important as Simms may be to the 924(c) debate, it is clear that it is not the last word. The Supreme Court is going to resolve the sharp circuit split in Davis as early as June, although it is could well hold off oral argument and a decision to the term beginning in October 2019.

United States v. Simms, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2341 (4th Cir. Jan. 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root