Tag Archives: supervised release

SCOTUS Remands Haymond With Muddled Opinion – LISA Update for June 27, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT BADLY SPLIT ON SUPERVISED RELEASE REVOCATION

The Supreme Court today fractured badly on whether a supervised release revocation requires a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The issue was an extreme one: Under 18 USC § 3583(k), a supervised release violation involving certain statutes prohibiting child sex abuse or pornography requires a mandatory five-year additional term. The Tenth Circuit had declared the provision unconstitutional, raising the question whether ANY supervised release violation that included a prison term could be found unless a jury did so beyond a reasonable doubt.

scotussplit190627Yesterday, four justices found that supervised release violations that led to prison terms had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote, “The lesson for this case is clear: Based solely on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict, Mr. Haymond faced a lawful prison term of between zero and 10 years. But just like the facts the judge found at the defendant’s sentencing hearing in Alleyne, the facts the judge found here increased “the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”

However, four Justices are not a majority. Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the particular provision at issue, 18 USC § 3583(k), is unconstitutional. But because the role of the judge in a typical supervised-release proceeding is consistent with traditional parole and because Congress clearly did not intend the supervised release system to differ from parole in this respect, he did not agree with the other four that the Apprendi line of cases applied in the supervised-release context.

Four other justices dissented sharply.

Under precedent, § 3583(k) is declared unconstitutional, but Justice Breyer’s narrower decision controls. Thus, for now, traditional supervised release violations remain free of a reasonable-doubt Apprendi v. New Jersey requirement.

A final opinion day for the Supreme Court’s year is set for today. We expect the decision in Carpenter v. Murphy at that time.

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17–1672 (June 26, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Ask Not For Whom the Supervised Release Term Tolls – Update for June 4, 2019

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SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT PRETRIAL DETENTION LATER CREDITED TO NEW SENTENCE TOLLS SUPERVISED RELEASE

Jason Mont was on five years’ supervised release after doing time for a federal drug offense, scheduled to end on March 6, 2017. With nine months to go, Ohio arrested him for a marijuana trafficking conspiracy and locked him in the beautiful, high-rise Mahoning County jail.

supervisedrelease180713Four months later, Jason pled guilty to the pot charge in state court, and then admitted in federal court that he had violated his supervised-release conditions by virtue of the new state convictions. The federal district court finally got around to issuing a supervised release violations warrant on March 30, 2017, four months later, right after Ohio sentenced him to six years in prison for the pot, with credit for the 10 months he had spent in Mahoning County jail.

When Jason finally had his supervised release revocation hearing in June 2017, he challenged the district court’s jurisdiction on the ground that his supervised release had expired on March 6. he argued that the expiration of his supervised release deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue the warrant on March 30. The court rejected the argument, and ordered him to serve 42 months’ federal imprisonment, to run consecutive to his state sentence.

The Sixth Circuit held that Jason’s supervised-release period was tolled under 18 USC § 3624(e), which provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a . . . crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” Because the roughly 10 months of pretrial custody was held to be “in connection with [Jason’s] conviction,” the appellate court said, his supervised release was tolled in June 2016, and had not yet resumed running as of the time the warrant issued. Thus, there was ample time left on the supervised release term when the warrant issued.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court narrowly agreed. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction is “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” and thus tolls the supervised-release term under 18 USC § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation after learning whether the time will be credited.

The Court said the text of § 3624(e) compels its conclusion. First, dictionary definition of the term “imprison,” both now and at the time Congress created supervised release, encompasses pretrial detention. Second, the phrase “in connection with a conviction” encompasses a period of pretrial detention for which a defendant receives credit against the sentence ultimately imposed. Congress, like most states, instructs courts calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial detention as time served on a subsequent conviction.

supervisedrevoked181106The statute undeniably requires courts to retrospectively calculate whether a period of pretrial detention should toll a period of supervised release, as evidenced by its inclusion of the 30-day minimum jail stay needed to trigger tolling. The statute does not require courts to make a tolling determination as soon as a defendant is arrested on new charges or to continually reassess the tolling calculation throughout the pretrial-detention period. Inasmuch as the statute does not count jail for less than 30 days as tolling supervised release, it clearly anticipates that the tolling decision need be made only once at the end of the period in question.

The statutory context also supports the Court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court said it “would be an exceedingly odd construction of the statute to give a defendant the windfall of satisfying a new sentence of imprisonment and an old sentence of supervised release with the same period of pretrial detention. Supervised release is a form of punishment prescribed along with a term of imprisonment as part of the same sentence. And Congress denies defendants credit for time served if the detention time has already ‘been credited against another sentence’.”

Mont v. United States, Case No. 17-8995 (Supreme Court, June 3, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

If Not For Supervised Release, What’s Forever For? – Update for May 14, 2019

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FOREVER IS A LONG TIME

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeKevin Carson was convicted of having hundreds of kiddie porn images on his computers and having sent some such images to young girls. He got a below Guidelines sentence of 240 months and lifetime supervised release, with conditions prohibiting him from using Internet devices without probation office approval and avoiding from any social media.

Kevin appealed the lifetime supervised release term and the computer and social media restrictions. Because his trial lawyer did not object to the supervised release or the conditions (and for that matter, did not even bother filing a sentencing memorandum, something the appellate court noted with disdain), Kevin had to show that the mistakes were plain error that affected his substantial rights (under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)).

computer190514Last week, the 8th Circuit upheld the lifetime supervised release term and the conditions. Kevin complained the trial court did not consider sentencing factors in giving him lifetime supervised release, but the Circuit said a sentencing court’s explanation “may be relatively brief if the district court rests its decision on the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning and decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case.” Here, a Guidelines policy statement provided that if the offense of conviction is a sex offense, “the statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.” Thus, Kevin’s lifetime supervised release term “was a straightforward application of this policy.”

As for the computer restrictions, the Court ruled that as long as Kevin  could use computers and social media with Probation Office approval – rather than an outright ban – the condition is not too great a restriction on his freedom. Kevin argued that the social media restriction was unconstitutional under Packingham v North Carolina, but the Circuit said Packingham “invalidated only a post-custodial restriction and expressed concern that the statute applied even to persons who have already served their sentence.” Because Kevin will still be serving a sentence on supervised release for as long as he is able to draw breath, the Court held, he will never finish serving his sentence, and thus, Packingham does not make the district court’s restriction on social media during supervised release plain error.

forever190514The decision is noteworthy for Judge Kelly’s incisive dissent, in which he complains that the district court left the 8th Circuit with no explanation for why it varied downward one-third on the sentence but maxed out the supervised release. The need for individual tailoring of supervised release conditions to offenders is substantial, the Judge said, and the advent of IoT devices like thermostats and doorbells, and Amazon.com, could leave Kevin violating supervised release by turning up the heat.

The Judge underscored the problem with sweeping, blunt supervised release conditions like these: Kevin “was thirty-three at the time of his arrest, and his lifetime term of supervised release could very well last decades. We can only imagine the universe of internet-reliant electronic devices that will pervade everyday life by then. The length and conditions of his supervised release may well be justified, but such punishment deserves, at minimum, some reasoned explanation from the sentencing court.”

United States v. Carson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14044 (8th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Running Out the Clock on Supervised Release – Update for May 13, 2019

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FLEEING IN PLACE

emily190513Emily Bernges, my high school Latin teacher, taught us that the Latin verb “fugare” means “to flee,” and is the basis of the English word “fugitive.” Based on that, you might think that to be a fugitive, you have to take flight, or at least do something that seems like running from the law.

Not necessarily, as Phillip Thompson found out. He did some federal time last decade, followed by five years of supervised release. The supervised release was not such a big deal to Phil, because he was deported to his native Jamaica as soon as he was released in 2010. Before he left for the islands, Phil was a told that one condition of his supervised release was that if he came back to the USA, he had to promptly report to his probation officer. Because returning to this country after being deported is a federal crime all by itself, you would think that the last thing Phil would want to do if he sneaked back onto the mainland was report to his PO.

You would be right. Phil returned to the USA in 2012, but got deported again about a month later, well before before his PO found out he had been back. When she did learn of it, she filed a violation petition, but Phil was already back in Jamaica and beyond the reach of the Probation Office. But Phil came back in December 2014, five months before his 5-year supervised release term expired, and this time he stayed. Having the foresight to use an alias and obtain a phony driver’s license, Phil flew under the radar for more than two years, during which time he was busily engaged in organizing large-scale marijuana importation and routing the money through bank accounts back to Jamaica (or so the authorities say).

Phil got arrested in 2017, and after his fingerprints ratted him out, his Probation Officer learned he was back. She amended the pending violation petition, and his supervised release was revoked. Phil challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to even hear his supervised release revocation, because supervised release had expired in June 2015. The district court disagreed, saying under the “fugitive tolling” doctrine, Phil was a fugitive from the time he got back to the USA until he was arrested, and his supervised release stopped running during that time.

Last week, the 4th Circuit agreed. As a general rule, the Court said, a district court’s power to revoke supervised release ends when the supervised release term expires, but the term stops running if the defendant absconds from supervised release and thus becomes a fugitive. Phil argued he was not a fugitive under the fugitive tolling doctrine, because only an active and knowing effort to evade adjudication of a supervised release violation petition is sufficient to trigger the fugitive tolling doctrine. He never knew about the July 2011 petition filed against him because he had been deported two months before.

fugitive190513The 4th disagreed. The fugitive tolling doctrine provides that a supervised release term “is tolled when a defendant absconds from supervision.” That is because Congress intended defendants to serve their full supervised release term, and just as an escaped prisoner’s sentence is not credited for the time the prisoner spends out of custody, a supervised release term should not be credited for the time that a defendant, “by virtue of his own wrongful act,” spends out of supervision. Fugitive tolling, the Court said, “prevents a situation in which we reward an absconder for his misconduct, allowing a fugitive defendant to run out the clock on his release term while refusing to submit to supervision.”

Here, Phil did not just come back to the USA and not report, but he used an alias, got phony ID, and admitted he knew he was supposed to report to the PO if he returned. That was enough to show active measures to hide, and to thus make him an absconder.

United States v. Thompson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14035 (4th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Too Much Frivolity For a Lawyer? – Update for May 9, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

APPLES AND ORANGES

noBS190509A long time ago, Congress decided that prisoners filed too many nonsense lawsuits. There was no cost to the prisoner, who always qualified for in forma pauperis status (which meant, among other things, that the prisoner did not have to pay the federal district court filing fee of $400.00 plus). So in 1996, Congress amended 28 USC § 1915, which requires courts to perform what one lawyer I know crudely but accurately calls the “bullshit review.” If after the judge casts his or her practiced eye on the complaint, the court decides that the complaint is utter crap – known in the legal world as “frivolous” – the prisoner will be denied in forma pauperis status. Of course, the inmate can still go forward by paying the filing fee, but for a guy making a quarter an hour, $400.00 buys a lot of Honeybuns at the commissary.

But that’s all in the civil litigation world. If you find yourself behind the criminal 8-ball, things are different. Apples and oranges.

Matthew Didham wanted to appeal the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. He asked for appointment of counsel, because he could not afford to keep paying his retained attorney, who withdrew after Matt was revoked.

The district court turned him down, because Matt had $750 in his commissary account, and therefore, the court reasoned, he could afford the appeal filing fee. Plus, the district judge found, citing 28 USC § 1915(a)(3), Matt’s appeal was frivolous, because he had “not articulated any argument to suggest that the court revoked his supervised release in error.”

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed, and appointed counsel for Matt. It held that the district court had confused apples for oranges, applying the statute which applies for prisoners’ civil appeals, with the Criminal Justice Act, governing criminal and supervised release appeals. In 28 USC § 1915 cases, the court can deny counsel if the filing is frivolous. But for a supervised release violation, the right to counsel is set out in 18 USC § 3006A “for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” It is not for the district judge to deny where he thinks he was right, and an appeal of his decision must therefore be wrong.

United States v. Durham, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 13264 (7th Cir.  May 2, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

A Toast to Ripeness: Supervised Release Follies – Update for February 19, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FUN AND GAMES WITH SUPERVISED RELEASE

A pair of decisions last week serve as a reminder to federal inmates that if they think prison is frustrating, just wait…

supervisedrelease180713More than one inmate lived in one federal district, but caught his or her case in another. That happened to Randy Pittman. When that happens, the BOP will release the inmate to the federal district in which the crime was committed, not the one in which the inmate lives, unless the inmate convinces the BOP to ask for a transfer of supervision.

With Randy’s prison term set to expire, he asked the district court to grant relocation of his supervised release under 18 USC 3605. There’s nothing unusual about such a request, and Randy justifiably saw no benefit to doing halfway house in Texas when he intended to live with his family in Georgia.

The district court denied his motion as premature because Randy was not yet on supervised release. Randy appealed, but last week the 5th Circuit threw the case out, holding it lacked jurisdiction.

The Circuit held that the district court’s denial of supervised release relocation as being premature was not a final order under 28 USC 1291. Randy argued that the harm he would suffer was real, because forcing him to enter a halfway house in the Texas would undermine his ability “to reintegrate into society.” After all, the halfway house was supposed to let him attain a stable residence, gainful employment, and to prepare for his reentry into society.”

The Circuit did not care. The district court said Randy’s motion was premature. “The best view is that,” the 5th said, is that “the denial of Pittman’s motion is simply not a final, appealable order.”

Of course, it seems that Randy’s harm was immediate, that being a term of halfway house in a place where getting a job, renting an apartment, opening a bank account and getting a current driver’s license made no sense. And it hardly served society either, telling a soon-to-be-released prisoner that he should engage in entirely futile attempts to reintegrate into a society 700 miles from his family. By the time Randy is on supervised release, the damage – an utterly stupid halfway house placement – would be done. The primary question of ripeness is whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. That should have made the issue here, even if it is a collateral order, reviewable.

nobeer180605For David Bell, who was on supervised release, the problem was that the district court has placed special conditions on him that he ““not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or beer, including 3.2% beer, at any time” and that he be at his “place of residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 7 days per week,” unless working.

Dave argued that these had nothing to do with his conviction for marijuana trafficking and money laundering, but the district court said

I’ve had too many defendants that go out and get to drinking, then they get intoxicated and then they go out and violate their supervised release.” As for the curfew, the court said, “And the same reason I put that curfew on there… [T]hey violate their probation, they’re out usually past midnight. They’re out on the prowl, and they get into trouble. They get drinking, then they’re out prowling the streets. Now, there’s no indication you do that. But I’m going to leave it on there because I’m not even going to give you the chance to be tempted by it.

Dave appealed, and last week, the 8th Circuit threw out the conditions. Supervised release conditions must 1 be reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 USC 3553(a), involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 3553(a); and be consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. What’s more, the sentencing court “must make an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances underlying a case and make sufficient findings on the record so as to ensure that the special condition satisfies the statutory requirements.”

The 8th Circuit noted it had previously vacated alcohol bans “where the defendant’s history or crime of conviction” did not support them. Drug convictions alone do not justify such restrictions, and “even repeated marijuana use and light alcohol consumption are not necessarily sufficient to establish dependency.”

supervisedleash181107Here, the Court ruled, the sentencing judge abused his discretion in imposing the condition prohibiting Dave from any alcohol consumption. “Rather than conducting an individualized inquiry into the circumstances of Bell’s alcohol use and drug dependence,” the appellate panel held, “the district court cited its general experience with prior offenders. In fact, the court admitted that there was no indication that Dave drank or prowled the streets.”

As well, the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a curfew. Rather than making individualized findings, the court referenced its general experience with offenders and admitted that there was “no indication” this experience pertained to Dave.

The 8th did not “see a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed the condition after an individualized assessment… It is unclear how the curfew is reasonably related to the protection of the public or Bell’s criminal history and rehabilitative and correctional needs given that the conspiracy involved distributing marijuana through the mail and laundering the proceeds.”

United States v. Pittman, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4490 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019)

United States v. Bell, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4155 (8th Cir. Feb. 12, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Off With Their Heads’: Supervised Release Violations to be Aired at SCOTUS – Update for February 12, 2019

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SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE CASE WITH FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS

Nationally, about a third of all people on supervised release – which is a period of a few years to life after a prisoner is released that is much like parole – get violated. Many of those people are sent back to prison for a term specified in 18 USC 3583(e)(3). The revocation proceeding has a star-chamber quality, employing loosely-goosey evidentiary and procedural safeguards as well as a limp preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of reasonable doubt.

thThe revocation hearing often comes down to the Probation Officer, herself an employee of the very court hearing the revocation, telling the court what her investigation into the alleged violation found, with that being enough for the preponderance finding, confrontation clause rights and hearsay concerns be damned.

“Although such violations often lead to reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not [even] be criminal,” the Supreme Court observed 19 years ago in Johnson v. United States. In fact, where the “acts of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution,” the Court said.

Now, 34 years after supervised release was created as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, SCOTUS is finally asking the hard questions about revocation procedures. In two weeks, the Court will hear oral arguments in United States v. Haymond, a 10th Circuit decision that held the supervised-release emperor has no clothes. The Tenth ruled that it was “unconstitutional and unenforceable” for a district court to revoke supervised release and impose five more years of prison on a defendant based on finding by a simple preponderance of the evidence that he violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child porn.

The Circuit decision invalidated the parts of 18 USC 3583(k) that required a district court to impose prison based on a preponderance finding that a defendant violated the conditions of his release, even where the violation itself might by not be criminal.

imageA Supreme Court decision upholding the appellate decision in Haymond could have implications for over 150,000 people who are now or will someday be on supervised release. Simple math suggests that 50,000 of them will be violated – itself suggesting a systemic failure in the supervised release program – and a substantial percentage of them will face a return to prison. Not stripping defendants of their liberty, restricted though it is on supervised release, without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that they violated supervised release seems a small price to exact from a system that fails so many.

Law360, High Court Takes On Supervised Release Revocations (Feb. 4)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (Supreme Court, oral argument Feb. 26)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Hears Failure-to-Appeal Argument – Update for September 6, 2018

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT SEEMS SKEPTICAL OF ATTORNEY RIGHT NOT TO APPEAL; AGREES TO HEAR PAIR OF SUPERVISED RELEASE ISSUES

While it can be dangerous to predict an outcome from the justice’s comments at oral argument, Supreme Court observers are predicting that it seems more likely than not that the Court will rule that a lawyer who unilaterally decides to disregard his or her client’s instruction to appeal provides ineffective assistance of counsel, even where the client has waived appeal rights.

appeal181107Under Strickland v. Washington, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show the lawyer rendered objectively unreasonable representation, and that there is a reasonable probability that the poor performance caused adversely affected the result of the proceeding. The issues in last week’s Garza v. Idaho case were whether the lawyer rendered deficient performance by refusing to file an appeal, despite his client’s repeated requests and without consulting him, and whether Garza must demonstrate prejudice or whether it is assumed as provided for in the Court’s 2000’s Roe v. Flores-Ortega decision.

Idaho argued there was no prejudice because the state “had already secured the waiver of many, many, many issues, in fact, all of the reasonable issues that could be tried.”

“Well, many but certainly not all,” interjected Chief Justice John Roberts. “They didn’t assure themselves of victory on appeal since there were arguments outside the scope of the agreement, including some that have to be available outside the scope of the agreement,” Roberts explained, alluding to possible claims that the plea and appeal waiver were themselves involuntary.

supervisedrevoked181106In other Supreme Court developments, the Court granted certiorari in Mont v. United States, a 6th Circuit case asking whether a period of supervised release for one offense is tolled under 18 USC 3624(e) during a period of pretrial confinement for a new criminal case, if upon conviction the time is credited toward the defendant’s sentence for the new crime.

A week before, the Court granted certiorari to another supervised release case, United States v. Haymond. Last spring, the 10th Circuit held in that case that 18 USC 3583(k), which requires additional prison time for sex offenders who violate the terms of their supervised release, is unconstitutional, because it takes away the sentencing judge’s discretion and imposes additional punishment on sex offenders based on new conduct for which they had not been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. The government petitioned for high court review.

SCOTUSblog.com, Argument analysis: Court skeptical that a lawyer may unilaterally countermand client’s instruction to file a criminal appeal (Oct. 31, 2018)

Mont v. United States, Case No. 17-8995 (cert. granted Nov. 2, 2018)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (cert. granted Oct. 26, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

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Two Circuits Say Supervised Release Is Not a Guessing Game – Update for October 25, 2018

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5TH CIRCUIT SLAPS LIMITS ON RUNAWAY SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS

Just about everyone serving a federal sentence will find themselves on supervised release sooner or later. Given some of the loosey-goosey SR terms and arbitrary probation officers, it is little wonder that one out of three people on SR end up getting violated.

writingB160425Jonathan Rivas-Estrada had three special SR conditions included in his sentence, that he had to surrender himself for deportation after serving his time, had to give requested financial information to his probation officer, and had to participate in (and pay for) drug testing and treatment. At the end of a long sentencing proceeding, the district judge glossed over those special conditions, which had been in his presentence report and to which Jonathan never objected. While they were not mentioned at sentencing, the special conditions appeared in Jonathan’s written judgment.

Last week, the 5th Circuit said it did not matter what was in his PSR or what he did not object to prior to sentencing. It held that when a defendant had no opportunity to object to special conditions at sentencing (because they were not read by the district judge), any such “unpronounced” special conditions must, upon remand, be stricken from the written judgment.

drinkMeanwhile, in the 7th Circuit, Solomon Smith complained that an SR condition that he refrain from excessive alcohol use was not tailored to his offense (tax fraud) and was vague. The Circuit said he had waived the “tailoring” argument when his trial judge said he had no objections, but it held that the district court’s omission of a definition of what constituted “excessive” rendered the condition unduly vague. The district court originally proposed a BAC of 0.08%, but somehow dropped that from the final judgment. The Circuit said the written judgment should prevent uncertainty over what conditions or version of a condition the district court intend[s] to impose; liberty should not turn on guess-work.”

United States v. Rivas-Estrada, Case No. 17-40033 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2018)

United States v. Smith, Case No. 16-3575 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

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We’ve Got the Shorts (Again) – Update for September 25, 2018

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues. Today, a few short takes from last week’s federal criminal news…

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CASE SHORTS

Hobbs Act Robbery “Violent Crime” in Another Circuit: The 1st Circuit last week held that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 USC 924(c), a statute that sets extra punishment for carrying or using a gun during a crime of violence. The Circuit joins a number of others that have reached the same conclusion.

United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, Case No. 16-1405 (1st Cir. Sept. 17, 2018)

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bathsalt180925DEA Takes a “Bath” in Analogue Case: In a case full of organic chemistry and implications for the regulatory state, the 6th Circuit held that the DEA rules criminalizing the possession of a “positional isomer” of a banned drug require the rule of lenity to be applied. The rule of lenity is a principle of criminal statutory interpretation that requires a court to apply any unclear or ambiguous law in the manner most favorable to the defendant. In this case, the defendant was tried for possessing ethylone, which under the DEA definition was a “positional isomer” of butylone, a scheduled drug. The problem was that under one of several accepted scientific definitions of “positional isomer,” ethylone is not a positional isomer of butylone at all. The Court ruled that where there was more than one definition, and the DEA rules were unclear what definition was to apply, the defendant gets the benefit of the less restrictive definition under the rule of lenity.

United States v. Phifer, Case No. 17-10397 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2018)

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Motion Claiming Juror Lied About Her Background is Structural Error: A couple of guys being tried for a pot-growing operation discovered after the trial that one juror’s son had been convicted of being a marijuana trafficker, a fact the juror concealed on her jury questionnaire. When the defendants raised the juror problem in a motion for new trial, the district court ruled there was no proof of prejudice resulting from of the juror’s false statement, because the overwhelming evidence would have convicted the defendants anyway. The 1st Circuit reversed, ruling that a biased juror would “deprive defendants of ‘basic protections’ without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.” Thus, it is what is known as a “structural error.” Generally, a constitutional error that does not contribute to the verdict is considered harmless, which means the defendant is not entitled to reversal. However, a structural error, one which “affects the framework within which the trial proceeds,” as defined in Arizona v. Fulminante, defies harmless error analysis. When a structural error is raised on direct review, the defendant is entitled to relief without any inquiry into harm. The Circuit granted French a new trial.

United States v. French, Case No. 16-2386 (1st Cir. Sept. 17, 2018)

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polygraph180925Written Judgment Cannot Add Anything to Terms Imposed at Sentencing: Lincoln R. Washington was sentenced on a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. In the judgment form entering his sentence into the record, the district court added a supervised release term that Linc submit to polygraph testing, a requirement the court had not mentioned at the sentencing hearing. The 2nd Circuit ruled last week that imposing such a duty in the written judgment without doing so during the spoken sentence was an impermissible modification of the spoken sentence, notwithstanding the fact that the Presentence Report had made reference to the polygraph requirement.

United States v. Washington, Case No. 17-2841 (2nd Cir. Sept. 18, 2018)

LISAStatHeader2small– Thomas L. Root