Tag Archives: bias

You Look Like a Criminal – Update for August 7, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT JUDGE KICKED OFF CASE FOR PROCEDURAL TIRADE

Maybe it’s climate change or Donald Trump. Perhaps the Supermoon. Blame whatever you want, but I haven’t seen two judicial bias decisions in seven years. Now I’m writing about the second one in seven days.

judge160222Leron Liggins was charged with drug distribution in the Eastern District of Michigan. Using Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, he had brought in a similar pending charge from the Eastern District of Kentucky so he could resolve both at once. On the eve of trial, Leron’s lawyer told the court he wanted to plead guilty, but when he appeared for the change of plea hearing, Leron demanded a new lawyer (for the second time).

US District Judge Stephen Murphy was not amused. He said, “Most defendants don’t get my attention or stand out, but Mr. Liggins does.” After reviewing the tortured procedural history of the case, the Judge said:

I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant. I’m tired of getting the runaround. This has been going on since February 6, 2018. We’ve got a case out of Kentucky that came here under Rule 20. Rule 20 says the reason for the transfer was the defendant has agreed to plead guilty. I feel as if the Court has been misled. I’ve been told in an official pleading and informally the defendant was going to plead guilty. We canceled jurors. We got a trial date. Now we got this.

Leron tried to talk, but the Judge shut him down, saying, “If you speak anymore, I’ll have you hauled out of here.” Then, turning to Leron’s lawyer, the Judge exploded:

This guy has got my attention. What do you want me to do? This guy looks like a criminal to me. This is what criminals do. This isn’t what innocent people, who want a fair trial do. He’s indicted in Kentucky. He’s indicted here. He’s alleged to be dealing heroin, which addicts, hurts and kills people, and he’s playing games with the Court.

The pandemic and Leron’s demands for other counsel ended up delaying things for a couple more years. Right before the trial was to begin, Leron’s new lawyer moved to have the Judge recuse himself for bias under 28 USC § 455(a).

murphy230807The next day, Judge Murphy denied the motion while saying he appreciated the “opportunity to clear up a few things that ha[d] been bothering [him] for a few months.” The Judge incorrectly recounted that Leron had “engaged in a personal colloquy” with the court that had caused the district judge to become “upset.” He had not, unless “STFU” passes for a friendly exchange of views. Nevertheless, for his conduct, the district judge delivered a faux apology:

And I want to say right now directly to Mr. Liggins I’m sorry, I apologize for getting upset. I did that because, A, I thought we were going to have a guilty plea; B, I thought that the colloquy was getting out of hand; and C, I lost my head… Now, having said that, I would say two things. Number one, [Leron’s lawyer] in that transcript agreed with my underlying concerns, and number two, just because I got mad does not mean I’m biased against Mr.—Mr. Liggins… I was mad, I was hostile, I was disapproving, and I regret it. I made a mistake by yelling like that, but I wasn’t upset or concluding that Mr. Liggins was—was guilty of an offense or hostile or partial toward him. I concluded he was acting in a manner which was frankly obstructionist and making me mad.

Leron, the Judge is sorry that you behaved so badly that you made him mad. Can you tell how sorry the Judge is?  

Neither can I.

The Judge then asserted, “I’m not, trust me. I give Mr. Liggins the same rights and opportunities here to demonstrate his innocence or lack of guilt as any other litigant.”

guiltyproveninnocent230807(Parenthetical:  You have to love the Judge’s standard of proof.  All this time we thought the government had to prove a defendant’s guilt. Turns out, at least practicing MurphyLaw, that a defendant has to prove his innocence.)

Leron was unable to prove his lack of guilt. He was convicted. After that, he appealed. Last week, the 6th Circuit threw Judge Murphy off the case.

A judge’s misconduct at trial may be “characterized as bias or prejudice” if “it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” But this takes more than just judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases. “Expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display,” the 6th held, “do not establish such bias or partiality… Only if the remarks reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible” does a judge cross the line.

But Judge Murphy found that line, and he crossed it. The appellate court said:

Difficult as the recusal standard may be to reach, we find that the district judge’s unacceptable remarks at the January 30, 2020 hearing satisfy it. Among the many disparaging remarks about Liggins that the district judge made, the most troubling is that Liggins ‘looks like a criminal to me.’ We are highly concerned by this remark, especially when directed toward Liggins, an African American man… These remarks served no purpose for courtroom administration, but rather constituted gratuitous commentary by the district judge about his opinion of Liggins and his feelings about Liggins’ case.

blamevictim230807In classic victim-blaming, the government conceded that Judge Murphy should not have lost his temper, but argues that his frustration was “understandable” based on Leron’s conduct during pretrial proceedings. The 6th shut that argument down flat: “To the contrary, we do not find the district judge’s conduct understandable in the least. The complexity or long duration of a criminal case gives no license to a district court to prejudge the defendant’s guilt or otherwise dispose of the case in any manner except through fair proceedings:

Finally, the Circuit ruled, the Judge’s apology – which, even if it should have counted for anything, was two years too late – didn’t matter. “In considering the denial of a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 USC § 455, we do not look to whether the district court made a sufficiently curative apology to the defendant in ruling on the motion; rather, we consider whether recusal was warranted at the time that the defendant made the motion.” Judge Murphy’s “looks like a criminal” comments “demonstrated a deep-seated . . . antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

That was enough to warrant recusal.

United States v. Liggins, Case No. 22-1236, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20040 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Qui Custodiet? – Update for August 1, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAESAR’S WIFE

The Romans recognized the problem: “Qui custodiet ipsos custodes?” Roughly translated, “Who will guard the guards?”

Just as Julius Caesar expected his wife Pompeia to be above suspicion of disloyalty and infidelity, we expect our judges to be above suspicion of bias. But, as the Supreme Court has observed, “Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself.” Rare is the federal defendant who hasn’t felt like his or her judge is biased.

At least weekly, someone asks me how they can get his or her case assigned to a different judge because “my judge is biased against me.” The plain truth is that winning reassignment of a case to a different judge because of bias “is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted,” as the 2nd Circuit put it last week.

irony230801Everyone knows how hard correctional officers work and how important it is to ensure they have a carefree retirement. For BOP employees, the federal government guarantees a generous and secure sunset for its employees. But state and local COs have to depend on retirement promises made by governments that, unlike Uncle Sam, can’t print money to cover any shortfalls.

The New York City Correctional Officers Benevolent Association collected money from its members to invest in a pension plan. COBA’s executives got bribed into investing $20 million in Platinum Partners, a shaky pension plan that went bankrupt primarily because the pension managers pillaged it for their own benefit.

One of the bit players, defendant Jona Rechnitz, cooperated with the government. In fact, the government said, Jona was “one of the single most important and prolific white collar cooperating witnesses in the recent history of the Southern District of New York.” The government told the court that while Jona knew about the bribes, he “did not appear to know that Platinum was a fraud, or even that it was a bad investment.”

But District Court Alvin Hellerstein ordered changes in Jona’s Presentence Investigation Report, including that he had “had to know” both that Platinum was a “high-risk fund” and that the Fund was “willing to pay a bribe to obtain funds to satisfy a liquidity shortage, thus making it reasonably foreseeable that an investment of pension funds risked the loss of those funds.”

money160118At sentencing, Judge H bumped Jona’s restitution from a proposed $1.2 million to $10 million and sentenced him to 5 months. Before judgment was entered, COBA intervened, asking that restitution be increased to $14.25 million.

While the appeal and COBA’s motion were pending, Jona learned from witnesses who had spoken to Andrew Kaplan – another defendant in the ongoing Platinum prosecutions – that Andy considered Judge Hellerstein to be “like a father” to him, and the judge had even advised Andy as to whether he should accept the government’s plea offer regarding his Platinum-related criminal conduct. The Judge and Andy had also talked about the significant monetary losses associated with the charges against Kaplan, and Kaplan’s feelings towards other Platinum executives.

While COBA’s motion for additional restitution was still pending, Jona asked the Judge to recuse himself to “avoid the appearance of any impropriety and in an abundance of caution.” Jona’s primary concern was that the size of his restitution turned largely on the credibility of his claim that he had believed “in the soundness of Platinum Partners as an investment vehicle,” and that the Judge might have obtained extrajudicial information regarding the case from Andy Kaplan, which Jona would not have had the opportunity to challenge.

cmon161027The Judge turned him down, holding that his relationship with Andy Kaplan and the case pending against Andy were unrelated to the restitution issue involving Jona, in part because “there is no suggestion that [Jona] had any relationship with [Andy].” The Judge denied that he had any extra-record information regarding Jona or Platinum.

While Jona’s appeal was pending, the government told Jona’s lawyer that Judge Hellerstein had phoned the Assistant U.S. Attorney working on the case to ask how much Jona had paid in restitution and to complain that Jona was “sly, cannot be trusted, and use[d] religion as a cloak.” The Judge asked the AUSA “not to speak to [Jona’s] counsel about this…”

Jona argued to the 2nd Circuit that Judge Hellerstein should have recused himself under 28 USC § 455. Last week, the 2nd Circuit agreed.

Under § 455(a), a judge should disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” while § 455(b) requires a judge to recuse or herself in any case where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or where the judge or spouse or someone within the 3rd degree of relationship to either has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding or may be a witness.

The Circuit concluded that Judge Hellerstein had crossed the line.

First and foremost, the district judge had a close, near-paternal personal relationship with Kaplan… a person who was directly involved in Jona’s bribery case… The government correctly points out that Kaplan was not one of the most central figures in Jona’s bribe scheme. But Jona’s testimony implicated Kaplan in concealing the Platinum investment from other COBA employees – a circumstance that placed Kaplan squarely in the middle of yet another incidence of wrongdoing at a firm where, through his guilty plea, he had already admitted to participating in a different criminal conspiracy…

The district judge did not merely have a close personal relationship with Kaplan; he advised Kaplan on his criminal case arising out of the Platinum collapse… The district judge’s advisory role is further problematic in light of the restitution question because Kaplan’s and Jona’s interests are plausibly adverse on that issue. COBA, of course, can recover its losses only once, even though two groups – those involved in the bribery scheme and those involved in the fraud – arguably caused them… Because Kaplan is a defendant in the Platinum case, it is possible that he will be ordered to pay restitution… [T]he more COBA recovers from the bribery defendants, the less it will need to recover from the Platinum defendants.

The Circuit concluded that “the judge’s close relationship with Kaplan, his advisory role in Kaplan’s criminal case, and the proximity of the cases (including with respect to restitution) would cause a reasonable person to question the district judge’s impartiality and was sufficient to necessitate recusal under 455(a).”

bias230801But the Circuit wasn’t done: “The district judge’s phone call with the prosecutor here was doubly ill-advised because it was both ex parte and off-the-record,” the panel held, “magnifying the concerns inherent to both types of communications. After all, but for the commendable transparency of the United States Attorney’s Office, Jona would not have learned of this phone call… [T]here is no obvious justification for conducting this particular inquiry ex parte and off-the-record. A public docket entry requiring an update from the parties would have been equally effective to monitor Jona’s restitution payments… And to the extent that the district judge felt the need to emphasize his views on Jona’s allegedly negative qualities, such statements should be reserved for open, on-the-record forums, if shared at all.”

Jona’s case was assigned to a different judge for resentencing.

United States v. Rechnitz, Case No 20-1011-cr, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19054 (2d Cir. July 26, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root