Tag Archives: appeal

Failure to Anticipate Is Not Ineffective Assistance – Update for September 12, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Should Have Seen That Coming

Tyree Neal pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 USC §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846. At his sentencing, the district court found that Ty’s prior Illinois cocaine conviction supported a recidivism enhancement under § 841(b)(1)(C) that raised his maximum sentence from 20 years to 30 years. The district court hammered him with 30 years.

Two years after Tyree lost his appeal, the 7th Circuit held in United States v. Ruth that under the “categorical approach,” because Illinois’s definition of cocaine is broader than the federal definition, an Illinois conviction for cocaine delivery could not support a recidivism enhancement under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C). This meant that if Ty were sentenced today, his maximum sentence would be 20 years.

Ty filed a 28 USC § 2255 habeas corpus motion arguing that his appellate, sentencing, and plea attorneys were all constitutionally deficient because they failed to anticipate the argument that ultimately won in Ruth. Ty claimed they should have seen it coming and raised it in his case.

The district court denied his § 2255 motion. Last week, the 7th Circuit agreed.

The Circuit said the proper inquiry is “an objective assessment of counsel’s performance considering the options available to the defense.” Considering his appellate attorney, the 7th agreed that “looking back, it is fair to say the Ruth argument was stronger than those appellate counsel made (if that is not already apparent from the outcome of Ruth compared to Neal’s direct appeal). But we cannot conclude the Ruth argument was “clearly stronger” at the time of Neal’s appeal.

“A significant obstacle to comparison is that the arguments aimed at different goals. As an appellate lawyer must, counsel curtailed the number of issues by focusing on Neal’s conviction. If her arguments prevailed, Neal would have had a second opportunity for trial and acquittal. A successful Ruth challenge would have left Neal with a 20-year sentence. Those different ends do not affect the likelihood of success for their different means, but they would influence an attorney’s professional judgment about the “strongest” issues for appeal. Although we can imagine situations where an argument against a defendant’s sentence is strong enough that it must be raised even if in the alternative, appellate attorneys are not always required to pick issues with a higher likelihood of success but a lower reward.”

“Holding that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance would thus encourage a kitchen-sink approach to advocacy,” the Circuit said, “the implicit logic being that she should have made the Ruth argument in addition to the issues she raised, not instead. Would an attorney still think we would find the Ruth argument persuasive if she knew it shared a limited page-count with Neal’s plea arguments? “As for sentencing counsel, the 7th said, he did what Ty asked him to, attackng the enhancements for use of violence, obstruction of justice, and reckless endangerment. After Neal provided “the names of a number of witnesses that he wanted counsel to interview,” counsel retained an investigator to interview those witnesses, subsequently spoke with several, and subpoenaed them to appear at Ty’s sentencing. Counsel also negotiated a plea deal that, if the court had followed it, would have given Ty the same 20-year sentence that a Ruth issue would have given him.

The Circuit said,

After Ruth, we can comment that sentencing counsel’s attempts to lower Neal’s offense level and convince the district court to exercise its discretion leniently were not the best possible approach to reducing Neal’s exposure. But it is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel’s overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy.

Neal v. United States, Case No. 23-1722, 2025 USApp LEXIS 23018 (7th Cir. Sept 5, 2025)

United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020)

~ Thomas L. Root

‘He Should Have Called,’ Lawyer Tells 5th Circuit – Update for January 30, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘YOU HAD ONE JOB’, 5TH CIRCUIT TELLS LAWYER

A trial lawyer representing a client post-sentencing can fairly be said to only have one remaining task: To consult with the client about the advantages and disadvantages of appeal and to determine whether the client wants to file appeal papers with the court.

onejob240130Lucas Tighe, represented by Attorney Sharon Diaz, pleaded guilty in 2019 to conspiracy and firearms charges. The court sentenced him to a top-of-the-Guidelines 150 months in prison, a sentence made up of the statutory maximum of 120 months on two counts (run concurrently) and 30 months consecutive for the conspiracy charge. Luke was also charged in state court for organized criminal activity related to the same gun issues as in his federal conviction.

Two months after his federal sentence, Luke got 15 years on his state charges. He wrote to the federal court asking it to run his federal sentences concurrent with the state sentence, claiming that he was misled by counsel and that he never saw his presentence report. The district court construed the letter as a 28 USC § 2255 motion, but when Luke did not respond, the court dismissed it. About 5 months later, Luke sent another letter to the court asking about his appeal. He told the court that he was in state custody, his attorney had told him she was not able to help him anymore, and he never received a copy of the judgment or sentencing paperwork. The district court appointed counsel, who filed a 28 USC § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to perfect an appeal.

Luke said that he had directed Diaz prior to sentencing to ask the judge about running his federal sentence concurrently to any forthcoming state sentence but counsel “blew me off.” Luke complained that Diaz told him that after he was sentenced,  she would visit him at the jail later that day, but she never showed.

The district court denied the § 2255 motion, but last week, the 5th Circuit reversed. “Diaz admitted that she had not advised Luke about the advantages or disadvantages of taking an appeal,” the Circuit said. She “excused her failure to directly ask Tighe before sentencing whether he wanted to appeal by saying, ‘Well, at that point, he hadn’t been sentenced yet, so — I did not ask him at that point if he wanted to appeal’.”

shouldcall240130But after sentencing, she failed to ask Luke whether he wanted to appeal, relying instead on whether he successfully reached out to her from prison. Diaz said that if Luke had contacted her and “expressed his desire to appeal, then she would have advised him of the potential advantages or disadvantages of appealing.”

Not good enough, the 5th ruled: “Counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. In making this determination, courts must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known.”

Here, the Circuit found a rational defendant in Luke’s situation would have wanted to appeal, and Luke reasonably demonstrated that he was interested in appealing. Luke and Diaz were admittedly both shocked by the court’s stacked 150-month sentence. “Regardless of whether Diaz did or did not tell Tighe that he would not get a stacked sentence, she still expressed shock over it,” the 5th said. “It is reasonable to expect that Tighe would have that same reaction.”

shocked191024Also, Attorney Diaz acknowledged that Luke wanted to ask the district court to run his federal sentence concurrent with his state sentence,” but she failed to do that. “Those are all indications that Tighe would be interested in appealing. Further, Diaz excused her failure to directly ask Tighe whether he wanted to appeal because he had not yet been sentenced. Under that same reasoning, Diaz could not have properly consulted with Tighe about an appeal prior to sentencing when she gave him his notice of right to appeal because she would not yet have known the ‘advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal’ that she is required to counsel her client on.”

In other words, you can’t fairly tell your client that a sentence should be appealed until you know what the sentence is.

“In the absence of any self-evident reason why Tighe would not have filed a direct appeal,” the 5th said, “and without any regard to the potential merits of such an appeal, we conclude that he has established prejudice…”

United States v. Tighe, Case No. 22-50332, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 1758 (5th Cir. January 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Could SCOTUS Decision in Haymond “Bring Down Supervised Release?” – Update for March 4, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

AN UNSURPRISING WIN AND A PROMISING ORAL ARGUMENT

The Supreme Court last week ruled that even if a defendant’s plea agreement includes an appeal waiver, defense counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a notice of appeal  if the defendant asks for one.

The decision – Garza v. Idaho – is not such a big deal. Every circuit that has considered the question, except for the 3rd and 7th, already follows the rule.

appeal181107Since the 2000 Roe v. Flores-Ortega decision, if a defendant asks defense counsel to file a notice of appeal, and the lawyer does not, it is considered ineffective assistance of counsel (which violates the 6th Amendment) regardless of whether the appeal had any chance of winning. Some courts, however, have wondered whether the Roe rule should apply where a defendant’s plea agreement waiving appeal rights. A few places, including Idaho, have held that in that case, failure to file a notice of appeal would be ineffective assistance of counsel only if the defendant could show a reasonable probability that he or she would have won on appeal.

easyappeal190304Last week, the Supreme Court disagreed. It noted that even a defendant waiving appeal retains the right to appeal limited issues (such as claiming defense counsel was ineffective for ever getting the defendant to sign the plea agreement to begin with). The Supremes said that filing the one-page notice of appeal is very easy (the notice does not even have to list the issues being appealed), and most defendants have a pretty ill-formed idea of what the issues should be before the transcripts are prepared. For those reasons, SCOTUS said, the Roe rule should apply for plea waivers: if your lawyer fails to file a notice of appeal after you ask him or her to, it is ineffective assistance of counsel, even where you waived your appeal rights.

Perhaps more significant, the Supremes heard oral argument last week that could bring down supervised release. The case question the constitutionality of 18 USC 3583(k), which requires convicted sex offenders to return to prison for at least five years if a judge finds they have committed certain crimes. The defendant in the case, Andre Haymond, served time for child porn, and was returned to prison after he violated supervised release. He argued that the law violates his right to have his sentence determined by a jury, rather than a judge, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Eight justices seemed likely to agree with him, even if it was not yet clear how they will remedy the constitutional violation. Several questioned the government’s view that a jury was not required to find the facts leading to a supervised release violation and more prison time. Much of the oral argument focused less on whether the law was unconstitutional and more on how to fix it.

supervisedleash181107Haymond is consequential to all of supervised release. As it is, while on supervised release, a defendant is subject to violation for a variety of technical, non-criminal conduct, and may be returned to prison if the court finds by a mere preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the violation. Haymond could upend this, extending the constitutional guarantees of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington (that people can lose liberty only upon admissions of guilt or findings of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt) to supervised release violations as well. In fact, Justice Samuel Alito – the only Justice in the government’s corner – complained during argument that a ruling for Haymond could “bring down the entire supervised release system.”

Statistics say one out of three people released on supervised release will be violated, making this case huge.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that “there may now be eight Justices prepared to extend Apprendi/Blakely rights to supervised release revocation. Now we what to see just how big the ultimate opinion will be (and how loudly Justice Alito will complain about more procedural rights for criminal defendants).”

Garza v. Idaho, Case No. 17-1026 (Feb. 26, 2019)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (argued Feb. 26)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Haymond seemingly to become major Apprendi progeny altering federal supervised release revocations (Feb. 26)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Hears Failure-to-Appeal Argument – Update for September 6, 2018

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT SEEMS SKEPTICAL OF ATTORNEY RIGHT NOT TO APPEAL; AGREES TO HEAR PAIR OF SUPERVISED RELEASE ISSUES

While it can be dangerous to predict an outcome from the justice’s comments at oral argument, Supreme Court observers are predicting that it seems more likely than not that the Court will rule that a lawyer who unilaterally decides to disregard his or her client’s instruction to appeal provides ineffective assistance of counsel, even where the client has waived appeal rights.

appeal181107Under Strickland v. Washington, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show the lawyer rendered objectively unreasonable representation, and that there is a reasonable probability that the poor performance caused adversely affected the result of the proceeding. The issues in last week’s Garza v. Idaho case were whether the lawyer rendered deficient performance by refusing to file an appeal, despite his client’s repeated requests and without consulting him, and whether Garza must demonstrate prejudice or whether it is assumed as provided for in the Court’s 2000’s Roe v. Flores-Ortega decision.

Idaho argued there was no prejudice because the state “had already secured the waiver of many, many, many issues, in fact, all of the reasonable issues that could be tried.”

“Well, many but certainly not all,” interjected Chief Justice John Roberts. “They didn’t assure themselves of victory on appeal since there were arguments outside the scope of the agreement, including some that have to be available outside the scope of the agreement,” Roberts explained, alluding to possible claims that the plea and appeal waiver were themselves involuntary.

supervisedrevoked181106In other Supreme Court developments, the Court granted certiorari in Mont v. United States, a 6th Circuit case asking whether a period of supervised release for one offense is tolled under 18 USC 3624(e) during a period of pretrial confinement for a new criminal case, if upon conviction the time is credited toward the defendant’s sentence for the new crime.

A week before, the Court granted certiorari to another supervised release case, United States v. Haymond. Last spring, the 10th Circuit held in that case that 18 USC 3583(k), which requires additional prison time for sex offenders who violate the terms of their supervised release, is unconstitutional, because it takes away the sentencing judge’s discretion and imposes additional punishment on sex offenders based on new conduct for which they had not been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. The government petitioned for high court review.

SCOTUSblog.com, Argument analysis: Court skeptical that a lawyer may unilaterally countermand client’s instruction to file a criminal appeal (Oct. 31, 2018)

Mont v. United States, Case No. 17-8995 (cert. granted Nov. 2, 2018)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (cert. granted Oct. 26, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

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