Tag Archives: 11th circuit

Sotomayor Unhappy With 11th Circuit’s Need for Speed – Update for June 16, 2020

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR WOODSHEDS 11th CIRCUIT ON § 2244 OPINIONS

Alone among the federal circuit courts of appeal, the 11th has a practice of publishing its decisions on inmates’ 28 USC § 2244 motions seeking the right to bring a second-or-successive § 2255 motion.

oneanddone200616A little background: Every convicted defendant has the right to file one motion to set aside the conviction or sentence under 28 USC § 2255, the federal statute that controls how a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging convictions is brought in the federal system. The filing is subject to strict time limits, and once an inmate files a § 2255 motion and has that motion decided on the merits, he or she cannot bring another unless some tough-to-get permission is first granted by a federal court of appeals.  Like March Madness, this freedom tourney is “one and done.”

To get that permission, a defendant files a motion under 28 USC § 2244 for permission to file a second-or-successive § 2255. Permission is only granted in limited, well-defined circumstances. The § 2244 proceeding is a quickie: the appellate court is to decide the motion in 30 days, leaving the court little time to consider a complex inmate application. The government rarely is permitted to file an opposition to the request. Any denial of an inmate’s § 2244 motion cannot be appealed, reconsidered or taken to the Supreme Court. What is more, the appeals court has to decide it within 30 days of filing, 

Some circuits make it even tougher. In the 11th Circuit, an applicant must confine his or her entire legal argument to a single-page form. To make matters worse, the 11th Circuit publishes its decisions on § 2244 motions.

speeddating200616“Publishes its decisions?” you ask. “How can that be a bad thing? Doesn’t it help future filers by explaining the Court’s position on the issues that may be raised?”

That is true, but the problem is that the courts publish everything, as long as “publish” has a small “p.” When a court Publishes a case with a capital “P,” that means that the case becomes precedent. All district courts in the circuit must follow the precedent, and the court of appeals itself cannot reverse or abandon the precedent unless the court does so in an en banc proceeding. What’s more, the holdings don’t just bind § 2244 filers. They will bind future litigants on direct appeal as well.

(By the way, I use the capital “P”/small “p” for illustration only.  It is not a term of art in law).

Thus, published decisions that are binding on future litigants (including those on direct appeal) are being decided on the sketchiest of records, in a judicial version of “speed dating.”

Last week, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a rare concurring statement in a decision denying certiorari to an appellant who had been bound by an 11th Circuit § 2244 denial. Michael St. Hubert argued on appeal that his Hobbs Act robberies were not “crimes of violence” that could support convictions under 18 USC § 924(c) for using a gun during their commission. The issue is quite a live one after last summer’s United States v. Davis. But Mike and several other defendants were shut out by the Circuit because it had already settled the question they raised in its § 2244 proved.

25words200616Justice Sotomayor suggested that the appellate court’s § 2244 practice “raises a question whether the Eleventh Circuit’s process is consistent with due process.” She wrote, “In sum, the Eleventh Circuit represents the ‘worst of three worlds.’ It “publishes the most orders, adheres to a tight timeline that the other circuits have disclaimed,” and “does not ever hear from the government before making its decision.” In this context, important statutory and constitutional questions are decided (for all future litigants) on the basis of fewer than 100 words of argument.”

The Justice urged the 11th Circuit to adopt procedures that “better accord with basic fairness—and would ensure that those like [this defendant] would not spend several more years in prison because of artificially imposed limitations like 100 words of argument.”

United States v. St. Hubert, 2020 US LEXIS 3146 (Supreme Ct. June 8, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

11th Circuit Travels Farther From Earth – Update for May 8, 2019

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

11TH CIRCUIT BAR FIGHT

Last week, the 11th Circuit denied en banc review of a case in which a pre-Booker Guidelines career offender sought collateral review of his sentence, based on the void-for-vagueness doctrine of Johnson v. United States. No surprise there. But a number of judges on that court, including the former acting chairman of the Sentencing Commission, Judge William Pryor, wrote 27 weird pages explaining the soundness of their denial.

earth190508Essentially, the majority said that the Guidelines were always advisory, even when they were mandatory, because the mandatory guidelines were never lawful. Therefore, a judge could have given the defendant the same high sentence even if he was not wrongly considered to be a career offender, despite the obvious fact that any judge who had done that would have been summarily reversed. If the sentence conceivably could not have changed, the majority wrote, then the ruling (in this case, Beckles) is obviously procedural, and the defendant cannot rely on it to change his sentence, because it is not retroactive.

Judge Rosenbaum and two other judges threw 36 pages back at the majority:

According to the Pryor Statement, the Booker Court did not make the Guidelines advisory because they were always advisory, since the Sixth Amendment never allowed them to be mandatory. That is certainly interesting on a metaphysical level.

But it ignores reality. Back here on Earth, the laws of physics still apply. And the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a law does not alter the space-time continuum. Indeed, there can be no dispute that from when the Guidelines were adopted in 1984 to when the Supreme Court handed down Booker in 2005, courts mandatorily applied them, as 3553(b) required, to scores of criminal defendants — including many who still sit in prison because of them.

The inmate, Stoney Lester, was lucky enough to get released on a 2241 motion by the 4th Circuit – in which circuit he was imprisoned at the time – making the 11th Circuit denial academic. But the otherworldly logic of the majority, especially from a circuit fast becoming notorious for accepting any tissue-thin reason to deny a defendant constitutional or statutory justice (see here and here, for instance), is mind-numbing.

Lester v. United States, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 12859 (11th Cir. Apr. 29, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Another Circuit Sets Impossible Bar for Dimaya 924(c) Claims – Update for October 8, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small

CIRCUITS BUSY SHUTTING DOWN 924(C) DIMAYA CLAIMS

violence160110In the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya, a lot of people doing time for using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence have hoped to attack their 18 USC 924(c) convictions by arguing the underlying crime was not violent. Two courts of appeals – the most recent one last week – are making that pretty hard. A third circuit may be on the way there.

Section 924(c) makes it punishable by a minimum five-year consecutive sentence, to use, carry, or possess a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.” The “residual clause” of 924(c) defines “crime of violence” to mean a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Johnson v. United States and, later, in Dimaya, the Supreme Court invalidated similar residual clauses, because what might or might not constitute a “substantial risk” was so vague that a reasonable person was unable to determine beforehand what the legal effect of conduct would be. For example, while murder certainly carried a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the victim, how about drunk driving (which, if it were the defendant’s fourth or tenth offense – depending on the state – might be a felony)?

Due to Johnson and Dimaya, all manner of offenses that may sound like they’re violent have been held not to be “crimes of violence.”

Irma Ovalles, convicted of being part of a carjacking crew that used baseball bats and assault rifles, filed a 2255 motion challenging her 924(c) conviction on the grounds that carjacking in its ordinarily sense is not a crime of violence. Last week, the 11th Circuit handed down a ruling that all but dooms her effort.

violent170315To determine whether a prior offense is a “crime of violence,” which is what Johnson and Dimaya address, a court is to use a “categorical approach,” which requires a reviewing court not to look at what the defendant actually did to, for example, assault a police officer in, say, Tennessee. Instead, the court is to ‘imagine’ an “idealized ordinary case of the crime,” and figure out whether it could be done without using violent physical force. Sure punching a cop would use violent physical force. But what if the defendant spit on the police officer instead? If Tennessee state law would permit prosecuting such an act, would that – disgusting though it might be – be held not to be “violent physical force?” If so, the predicate crime is not a “crime of violence.”

So assume the defendant were packing a gun hidden in her waistband while assaulting the officer? Or pulled the gun and pistol-whipped him? Would the fact that she reasonably been prosecuted for spitting on him instead mean that the crime was not violent, and thus render the 924(c) residual clause impermissibly vague?

categorical181008The 11th Circuit cleanly cut the “categorical approach” Gordian knot. “On the flip side,” the Court said, “Johnson and Dimaya also make clear… that if 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is instead interpreted to incorporate what we’ll call a conduct-based approach to the crime-of-violence determination, then the provision is not unconstitutionally vague.” Unlike the categorical approach, the conduct-based approach does not focus on legal definitions and “hypothetical ordinary case,” but instead looks at how the defendant actually committed the underlying crime. The 11th held that where the crime of violence being weighed is not a prior offense, but instead a contemporaneous one (and you cannot commit a 924(c) offense without simultaneously committing a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense), then the conduct-based approach had to be used under the rule of “constitutional doubt.” The rule of “constitutional doubt” holds that any reasonable construction available must be used in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. “Accordingly,” the Circuit ruled, “we hold that 924(c)(3)(B) prescribes a conduct-based approach, pursuant to which the crime-of-violence determination should be made by reference to the actual facts and circumstances underlying a defendant’s offense.”

Under the conduct-based approach, Irma is clearly going to be in deep trouble when her case gets back to the district court. As one 11th Circuit judge asked in his concurring opinion, “How did we ever reach the point where this Court, sitting en banc, must debate whether a carjacking in which an assailant struck a 13-year-old girl in the mouth with a baseball bat and a cohort fired an AK-47 at her family is a crime of violence? It’s nuts.”

violence181008

The 4th Circuit just last month heard en banc arguments in United States v. Simms, which may go the same way as Barrett and Ovalles.

Ovalles v. United States, Case No. 17-10172 (11th Cir., Oct. 4, 2018)

United States v. Barrett, Case No. 14-2641 (2nd Cir., Sept. 10, 2018)

United States v. Simms, Case No. 15-4640 (4th Cir., decision pending)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small

Please Reverse Us, 11th Circuit Panel Tells Colleagues – Update for May 31, 2018

Leave a comment

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues. 

LISAStatHeader2small
11TH CIRCUIT PANEL BARS 2255 BRADY CLAIM, THEN ASKS EN BANC COURT TO REVERSE DECISION

rightwrong180531It’s pretty rare to see an appeals court beg for en banc review to reverse Circuit precedent, but a 3-judge panel of the 11th Circuit did that last week.

Gino Scott was convicted by a jury over a decade ago of drug trafficking. As do most defendants who lose jury trials, he filed a direct appeal and then a 2255 motion. He lost those. But a few years later, the government admitted to his trial court that it had Brady information about how its informant, whose testimony had help nail Gino, lied about his background on the stand.

Gino filed a second 2255 motion based on the newly-revealed information. But under 28 USC 2244, newly-discovered evidence will not allow a second-and-successive 2255 to go forward unless the new evidence would establish that no reasonable jury would have found the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.

The Supreme Court has held that not every second 2255 is a “second-and-successive” 2255 motion. Instead, “to determine whether an application is ‘second or successive,’ a court must look to the substance of the claim the application raises and decide whether the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in the prior application.” But the 11th Circuit previously held in Tompkins v. Secretary, DOC that this Supreme Court holding did not apply to second 2255s raising Brady claims.

spengler180531In last week’s decision, the 11th Circuit panel argued that Tompkins is wrong, and that a newly-discovered Brady claim is not a second-and-successive 2255. But, for the uninitiated, a three-judge panel has no power to reverse a prior published circuit decision. Rather, unless a Supreme Court decision does so, only the Court sitting en banc has the right to abandon Circuit precedent.

For that reason, after Gino’s panel explained in great detail why Tompkins was wrong, it was nevertheless obligated to apply Tompkins to deny Gino’s claim anyway. Gino’s court ended with a plea to the other judges in the Circuit: “Supreme Court precedent, the nature of the right at stake here, and habeas corpus require a petitioner who has reasonably probably been convicted because the government failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence, to have a full and fair opportunity to obtain relief. For this reason, we urge our colleagues to rehear this case en banc and reevaluate the framework we established in Tompkins.”

Scott v. United States, Case No. 15-11377 (11th Cir. May 23, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root

LISAStatHeader2small