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UNFORCED ERROR

Mario Castillo, a 72-year-old grandfather, was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter, a federal crime because it happened in post housing at a military installation. His plea agreement with the government let the parties argue for widely divergent sentences: Mario argued that the Guidelines should result in a 78-month sentence. The government said the range was 235-293 months but agreed to ask for a sentence of 180 months.

At his first sentencing, the district court – which itself was not bound by the plea agreement to any limits – imposed a 235-month term. The 1st Circuit then vacated the sentence because of a procedural error in calculating the Guideline range.

At his resentencing, Mario began by acknowledging that the court had the authority to impose a sentence without regard for his 78-month proposal or the Government’s 180-month proposal. He argued, however, that his age, minimal risk of re-offending, and prior difficulties in prison should convince the district court to sentence him leniently.

The government was not so constrained. Without any prompting by Mario’s anodyne sentencing arguments or questions from the district judge, repeatedly emphasized that the court had the authority to impose a harsher sentence than the 180-month recommendation that it was bound by the plea agreement to request. The government told the court, for example, that

● “We were bound by [the plea agreement], but we did not bind the court in any kind of agreement, and the court is free to sentence anywhere it wants, and the victims are free to argue for anything that they want as well.”

● “Your Honor stated [at the first sentencing] that the court had considered all of the other sentencing factors… and that neither sentence recommendation… was just… which resulted in… the sentence that you imposed at that time.”

● “This court’s sentence, whatever it is, can aptly be supported by the facts and arguments that the United States made in its sentencing memorandum filed in 2018.”

● “Your Honor is still free and legally unimpeded to sentence to whatever he wants between probation and life. That was true [at the first sentencing], it is true today.”

● “The… Court of Appeals did not… say the original 235-month sentence was an unreasonable sentence… or that it was too harsh a sentence….”

● “We are here on a procedural error that has nothing to do with the running room that Your Honor has to sentence.”

The government also repeatedly suggested that public safety required that Mario never leave prison, even though he would be deported right away to the Dominican Republic. The prosecutor said he was “very fearful for the children” in the Dominican Republic” because – regardless of his age – Mario “will sexually offend against children [because] [h]e is attracted to them, and he is going to act on his attraction whenever the opportunities appear.”

The district court heard the prosecutor’s dog whistle loud and clear, and reimposed the 235-month sentence.

Last Tuesday, the 1st Circuit vacated the sentence again, holding that the government breached its plea agreement obligations and violated Mario’s due process rights.

“In our view,” the Circuit said, “the prosecutor’s sentencing presentation constitutes a clear example of paying lip service to the plea agreement while giving a wink and nod to the imposition of a harsher sentence…” The government’s arguments, unprompted by Mario’s sentencing presentation, were an unforced error, “leav[ing] the unmistakable impression that the prosecutor wanted the district court to impose a sentence longer than 180 months…. That was not the government’s promise. This case thus presents an instance of a prosecutor reaffirming a promise to the defendant out of one side of his mouth while simultaneously trying to subvert it out of the other side.”

The government contended that it never actually endorsed a 235-month sentence. “That is true,” the 1st Circuit conceded, “but our caselaw permits a successful breach claim where a prosecutor pays mere ‘lip service’ to a plea-agreement promise… [T]he prosecutor suggested that the district court reimpose the same 235-month sentence without explicitly saying so. Thus, this is a circumstance where the prosecutor… undercut a plea agreement while paying lip service to its covenants.”

The Circuit ordered that Mario get resentenced before a different judge.

United States v. Castillo, Case No. 21-1599, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 1887 (1st Cir. Jan. 28, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root